

**Political
Monopolies
in
American
Cities**

**The Rise and
Fall of Bosses and
Reformers**

Jessica Trounstine

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The University of Chicago Press

Chicago and London

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The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

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Printed in the United States of America

17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 1 2 3 4 5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Trounstine, Jessica.

Political monopolies in American cities : the rise and fall of bosses and
reformers / Jessica Trounstine.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-81281-6 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-81282-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-81281-2 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-81282-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Incumbency (Public officers)—United States. 2. Local elections—
United States. 3. Municipal government—United States. 4. Power (Social
sciences)—United States. 5. Political culture—United States. 6. Patronage,
Political—United States. 7. Political corruption—United States. I. Title.

JS395 .T76 2008

320.8'50973—dc22

2008007421

ⓈThe paper used in this publication meets the
minimum requirements of the American National
Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials,
ANSI Z39.48-1992.

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
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Foundations of Political Monopolies

AS CHICAGO TRANSFORMED from a small merchant town in the early 1800s to a partisan, modern city after the Civil War, city officials gained power and city budgets expanded. These new resources offered politicians the opportunity to use public funds to increase their chances of reelection. Following the Chicago Fire of 1871, machine politics, the practice of exchanging benefits like city contracts or patronage jobs for votes, became common among aldermen, providing a head start in the next campaign to those who had already captured office (Simpson 2001). Once politicians gained control over city workers through patronage, they encouraged the bureaucracy to work for political purposes. When the patronage workforce was not sufficient to guarantee electoral victory, politicians of both parties were content to stuff ballot boxes, rig voting machines, and threaten and bribe voters throughout the twentieth century. These strategies biased outcomes in favor of those who were already in power.

In San Jose, politicians used a different set of strategies to enhance their probability of reelection. Starting in the late 1890s, a group of orchardists and fruit packers led a fight to implement California's first fully reformed city charter. Aided by their recent purchase of the city's newspapers, suffrage restrictions at the state level, and poll taxes in the county, by 1916 San Jose reformers achieved at-large elections for city council and replaced the elected mayor with an appointed executive. The new charter decreased the pay for council offices and made local elections nonpartisan. This created a political system in which incumbents had strong advantages going into elections because opportunities for opposition to arise were limited.

In any competition the relative skill, strategy, and luck of the contestants determine who will win and who shall lose. But the rules of the game define the competition itself. Rules dictate which skills and strategies will be most valuable, who may participate and who may not, and what constitutes victory versus defeat. Furthermore, changing the rules of the game can change who is likely to win. When the National Bas-

ketball Association added a three-point line, the new rule advantaged players who could successfully sink shots from more than twenty-two feet away, as opposed to the taller, larger players, who nearly always prevailed in fights closer to the basket. In anticipation of the rule change Detroit coach Dick Vitale explained that now “[a team] might have to draft a long shot specialist” (quoted in Dupree 1979, F5). Clearly, at least this observer believed that the new rule had the potential to change how the contributions and skills of various players would be evaluated in building a winning team.

Rules have the potential to advantage not only certain types of players and teams but also to advantage those who have already won. Professional sports leagues are so attuned to this possibility that they require that the most successful teams pick last in the next season’s draft. Imagine instead that the winners of the World Series, the Super Bowl, the Stanley Cup, and the NBA playoffs were automatically granted first draft choice and that all other teams selected in order of their win/loss records. Such a rule would be very likely to increase the incumbency advantage for the winners, compounding the benefit of victory over time. So, although rules do not have any normative value per se, they do have consequences for the outcome of competitions. Thus, we should expect shrewd players and team owners to seek rules that benefit them, and once the rules are in place, to make decisions and select strategies that take advantage of the structure that the rules provide.¹

Politicians, also engaged in competition, have incentives to do the same thing. They will tend to support rules and rule changes that enhance their chances for victory. All political systems are governed by sets of rules; and, just as in the sporting world, these rules determine which skills are most valued, which strategies are most useful, and who is most likely to win. However, the extent to which rules enhance or limit competition varies. Some systems are governed by rules that promote competition while others systematically advantage those who already control political power. In this work, biased systems refer to those political arrangements in which the rules limit information for constituents, make it costly for challengers or voters to enter or exit the political system, or disproportionately allocate seats, in effect advantaging incumbents over challengers regardless of government performance. Political systems do not fall neatly into two categories—biased or unbiased. They fall along a spectrum. Because of the infinite possible combinations of rules, it is impossible to rank systems precisely along a scale of bias. Furthermore, no single strategy is either necessary or sufficient for a coalition to

dominate government for a long period of time. But it *is* possible to say that some rules increase bias compared to systems that lack such rules. Politicians in Chicago and San Jose were among the many that were advantaged by rules that increased the probability of victory for incumbent candidates.

In cities across the United States, politicians have enacted and relied on rules that increase their probability of reelection at all stages of the voting process—preference formation, casting votes, and translating votes into seats. Coalitions have used the strategies listed in table 1.1, which include information bias, vote bias, and seat bias, to advantage incumbent politicians. Two bundles of strategies have been common in American history: some coalitions achieved control primarily through the use of government resources for political ends (machines) while others monopolized government by relying on rules that limited the opportunity for dissenters and minority populations to participate in elections (reformers). The following sections provide a more in-depth analysis of each type of bias used by governing coalitions in nine cities: Chicago, New York, New Haven, Kansas City, Philadelphia, San Jose, Austin, San Antonio, and Dallas. The selection of these cities from the larger data collection was driven by the availability of electoral data as discussed in the introduction and in the appendix. The first five cities listed above are classified as machines and the last four are classified as reform. The following discussion is organized by biasing category (information bias, vote bias, and seat bias) and by coalition type (machine or reform). This chapter is meant to provide readers with a general understanding of how rules can enhance incumbents' reelection chances. It does not include a description of the context in which the strategies were selected, how the choices were made, who enacted the changes, and who opposed them. Additionally, evidence that a lack of biasing strategies limited incumbency advantage is only sparsely provided. These important details are covered in chapters 3 and 4.

Controlling Information

In order to shape the political preferences of residents, an organization must control information about government performance and available alternatives. Machines sought to control information using a number of different mechanisms. Perhaps the primary strategy of bias was to place organization loyalists in official positions that held investigative authority, such as local-level prosecutors, grand juries, or state attorney generals (Key 1935). When investigations did occur, machines used control over

city agencies to destroy evidence, provide extended leaves to potential witnesses, and otherwise prevent people from cooperating with prosecutors (Key 1935). The machine's relationship to the criminal underworld was sometimes utilized to kill informants (Key 1935). In cases where machines failed to limit investigations, their ability to maintain control of government could be severely impeded. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, Tammany was beset by state investigations into its strategies of fraud and the corrupt practices of its leaders (O'Connor 1871, 1). Such episodes were frequently followed by losing the mayoralty to reform forces (Finegold 1995).

Another mechanism of information control was influence over the news media. Machines attempted to achieve favorable news coverage by bribing editors or reporters, contributing heavily in advertising funds, or by offering publishers or editors public jobs (Key 1935). Key reports that bringing libel suits against papers was another tactic used to control the presentation of harmful information. In a few cases machines resorted to murdering investigative reporters (Key 1935). However, Gosnell (1933, 22) argues that machines often held power "in spite" of newspaper opposition. For some machines at least, this strategy of bias was not necessary to dominate elections.

Reformers had different and less obviously corrupt methods for controlling information and shaping the preferences of voters in favor of their incumbent organizations. At the turn of the century, many reform organizations secured the enactment of nonpartisan local elections, arguing that parties should be irrelevant to urban administration. Because reformers argued that they had identified the most appropriate approach to good government, political institutions that made governance conflictual, like parties, served to stymie progress. One reform leader in San Francisco argued that the purpose of the nonpartisan movement was "to unite decent voters in an effort to take the city government out of politics" (*Los Angeles Times* 1888, 1). By "politics" reformers meant "patronage and selfish intrigue of those who lived on the public payroll and were therefore considered hindrances to community development" (H. Stone, Price, and K. Stone 1940, 268). In converting elections to nonpartisan contests, reformers sought to minimize divisions in the electorate and among elites. In a similar vein, writing about authoritarian regimes, Przeworski (1986) explains, "If one set of policies is seen as superior for the welfare of the society and this set of policies is assumed to be known, then it seems irrational to introduce uncertainty as to whether this set of policies will be chosen" (59).

Nonpartisan elections also allowed reformers to build alliances across party lines more easily. In many cases reformers could not win without this bipartisan support. The lack of party cues to assist voters in the formation of preferences resulted in systems biased in favor of candidates with independent wealth or fame and incumbents (Adrian 1952, 1959; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001), advantaging reform coalition members. Additionally, the less structured environment for competition in a nonpartisan system served to decrease interest and knowledge among constituents, making it difficult for challengers to activate opposition to the incumbent regime (Schaffner and Streb 2002; Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956). Without parties to train new leaders and teach voters political skills, nonpartisan elections also increased the probability that membership in the incumbent organization was the only path to access the system.

The most powerful reform weapon in shaping the preference of voters was control over the local media. Whereas machines were forced to persuade newspapers to refrain from investigative reporting or from printing attacks on their organizations, in reform cities newspaper editors and owners were the actual leaders of the reform movements. In San Jose, San Antonio, Dallas, and Austin, reform-owned newspapers refused to report stories that challenged the dominance of the local elites (Bridges 1997; P. Trounstein interview 2003). The local papers in all four reform cities endorsed reform charters, and news stories about city hall tended toward unabashed editorializing. According to a review of city manager government in Dallas, the publisher of the *Dallas News* "threw the full weight of his paper behind" the movement (H. Stone, Price, and K. Stone 1940, 267). Every day leading up to the charter election, the *Dallas News* published a front-page article explaining some aspect of the proposed change and urged its adoption. On the eve of charter reform in San Jose, the *Mercury-Herald* printed a front-page article that argued the election would reveal "whether the people of San Jose want boss rule or popular rule; whether the jobs of city hall shall go to henchmen who do nothing for their pay but politics for their master, or to clean capable men who are good citizens and are accustomed only to a fair wage for fair service" (quoted in Ellsworth and Garbely 1976, 14).

Newspaper owners and publishers supported reform coalitions at least in part because reformers promised to use public funds to help the cities grow, and growth translated into a larger market for news consumption. As an explanation for his pro-development stance, San Jose

publisher Joseph Ridder was rumored to have remarked, "Trees don't buy newspapers" (Stanford Environmental Law Society 1970). Newspaper owners, with fixed assets, would also gain from an elimination of corrupt government and smaller tax bills. In some cities, newspaper owners and editors were the founders of the reform movement, like George Dealey in Dallas, who was the "initiator of the most up-to-date reforms in city government" (H. Stone, Price, and K. Stone 1940, 267). Many of these leaders also subscribed to the reform belief that there was only one good and right way to govern a city. Given that reformers had identified this right way, opposition to the reform agenda was viewed as unproductive for the community, and therefore not suitable for printing. Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) explain that the Communist Party relied on a similar claim to justify suppression of dissent, arguing that "there is no legitimate basis for disagreement" (12).

Everywhere, local news organizations shared the vision of the common good that reformers proposed to enact. However, it took time to build this commonality of sentiment—especially when one or more papers were owned by an opposition party or faction. Strategic purchases of opposition newspapers aided reformers' pursuit of dominance. In Austin the leaders of the opposition owned the evening paper and reported anticharter speeches in great detail (H. Stone, Price, and K. Stone 1937). This changed after reform leaders purchased the paper in 1924. In 1896, the San Jose Good Government League was organized to win control of the city for the forces of reform but failed in part because the city's newspapers published articles critically analyzing the reform plan. Such problems were avoided when reform leaders J. O. and E. A. Hayes purchased two of the city's three newspapers and ended printed opposition to the reform charter and candidates. As publishers of the newly consolidated *San Jose Mercury Herald*, the Hayes brothers pushed the reform agenda in news articles and editorials. The editor of the *Herald* resigned after discovering that the new owners intended to impose an editorial policy with "political implications" (Arbuckle 1985, 42). The reform slate victory in 1902 was attributed to the news media support. The Hayes family completed their news monopoly in 1942 when they purchased the town's third and last independent newspaper, *The News*. Two years later the reform coalition finally achieved a monopoly. When the San Jose reform coalition lost power in the 1970s, it was only after the newspaper had again changed leadership and made public the diverse views and preferences of the San Jose community. By coordinating the support of papers, reformers were "shielded from criticism by

enthusiastic and boosterish local mass media" (Bridges 1997, 140) and successfully biased the system in their favor.

Biasing Votes Using Government Resources

The second stage of the voting process requires voters to translate their preferences into votes on election day. Coalitions can take steps to ensure that incumbent office holders are advantaged when ballots are cast by limiting the ability for residents or challengers to enter or exit electoral contests. In order to bias outcomes toward their organizations, governing coalitions in many political systems focus on trading divisible benefits (like public jobs) for support, thereby using government resources to engender loyalty to the incumbent regime and pay political workers (Sorauf 1960). In one sense, jobs awarded through political connections represent a strategy of electoral mobilization that might be considered similar to providing supporters with targeted tax breaks. In both strategies benefits are awarded to a particular segment of the community rather than the public as a whole, and both strategies at least loosely connect political support to the receipt of the benefit.

Patronage and tax breaks are particularistic as opposed to programmatic policies, which benefit abstractly defined categories of citizens regardless of the individual's vote (Stokes 2007). Relying on particularistic benefits can enhance an incumbent's probability of victory relative to challengers because challengers can only promise such a trade in the future whereas the incumbent can use public money to back his promise.² But because challengers can and do propose different distributions of these particularistic benefits, the system is only weakly biased.

Patronage becomes a strong strategy for bias when the coalition uses the benefit coercively: threatening recipients with losing their jobs if they do not perform political functions, requiring that job holders pay a portion of their salary into party coffers, and/or using political appointees to further bias the political system through practices like vote fraud and intimidation. When workers are assured of economic security if and only if they support the incumbent coalition, they are extremely unlikely to engage in political opposition (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1956). The loyalty generated by such uncertainty over maintaining one's job is likely to be even more dramatic when the employee has few options for work in the private sector. In this way, coercive patronage serves as a barrier to entry for challengers and a barrier to exit for voters.

Party-based coalitions in Chicago, Kansas City, New York, New Haven, and Philadelphia employed patronage coercively. In Kansas City

nearly all machine leaders and workers held public jobs, some contributing up to 50 percent of their salaries to the party's campaign funds (Larsen and Hulston 1997). In Chicago Mayor Cermak pressured employees to contribute 1 to 2 percent of their salaries (Gottfried 1962). In 1917, when Socialist candidates ran a strong campaign, New York's machine, Tammany Hall, sent police officers to break up the rallies, intimidate supporters and close the public meeting halls. A similar set of events took place during the 2002 election for mayor in Newark, New Jersey, where municipal code enforcement shut down restaurants where the challenger had scheduled meetings and fundraisers (Curry 2003).

In Chicago Boss Richard Daley made certain that his patronage appointees would remain loyal to him by threatening their jobs and controlling which government decisions they made (Royko 1971). To ensure that municipal employees would be beholden to him and not the city council, Daley transferred the authority for budget preparation from the council finance committee to the comptroller and budget director's offices, both controlled by his administration.³ He also removed the council's authority to issue city contracts and driveway permits, make personnel appointments, and conduct city planning. Each time Daley turned the activity over to a bureaucratic department over which he had control. By using government resources to organize and maintain the coalition, machine organizations successfully biased electoral outcomes in favor of incumbent coalitions.

However, patronage was not sufficient to guarantee long-term dominance for urban coalitions because various factions and opposition parties used the same strategies. Providing jobs, contracts, and other divisible benefits to political supporters may enhance the organizational capacity of the coalition, but it does not equate to unquestionable victory unless the coalition controls all of the available resources. Development of a monopoly using patronage as a biasing mechanism requires that a coalition control *access* to patronage, often through relationships with higher levels of government. Chicago's Mayor Cermak, the first in a long line of Democratic machine builders, artfully positioned a Democrat as governor and secured state jobs to ease the city and his organization through the Great Depression. In the next mayoral election, Democrats won 83 percent of the vote. In Pittsburgh Mayor Lawrence secured over 21,000 county WPA jobs, and in 1937, the Democrats won a landslide victory (Royko 1971). Jersey City's Boss Hague managed to gain control of the entire state WPA allotment, 75,000 positions, by offering President Roosevelt congressmen who would support New Deal programs (Royko

1971). Pennsylvania's Republican leader Matthew Quay used state funds to exert uncontested influence over local politics in Philadelphia at the turn of the twentieth century. He provided and withheld patronage and state appropriations to ensure loyalty in the city (McCaffery 1992).

In Chicago, when Daley rose to power, he built strong alliances in the Democratic Party at county, state, and federal levels. As a result of these ties, the machine faction of the Democratic Party could credibly argue to voters that electing any other organization would translate to a loss of benefits including patronage jobs. As a result election outcomes became biased in favor of the machine. Where organizations had difficulty securing and/or controlling patronage, they did not survive without alternative electoral strategies. For instance, in New York, anti-Tammany governors doled out patronage to various wings of the Democratic Party until the late 1890s. Tammany finally consolidated power only when a new governor supportive of the organization channeled patronage to Tammany leaders after the turn of the century. In Boston divided loyalties at higher levels of government prevented the formation of any city-wide machine (Erie 1988).

Control over the bureaucracy through patronage workers also allowed coalitions in Chicago, Kansas City, New York, New Haven, and Philadelphia to control delivery of municipal benefits and application of city laws. New York's machine made sure that the city's attorney used the power of the office to go after political challengers or their supporters for violations of mundane city ordinances. Near election time "a general raid . . . [was] made on the whole body of store keepers and others in the district, care, of course, being taken not to trouble any who are known to be of the right stripe." Storekeepers were then offered the option of settling their violation in exchange for their vote at the next election. Any fines paid by violators were funneled into the machine's reelection fund (*New York Times* [1857] 1877, 8). Legal and illegal businesses knew that they needed the machine on their side to pass inspections, secure utility extensions, ignore closing laws, sell liquor during the prohibition, run lotteries, and so on (see Erie 1988; Gosnell 1933, 1935; Biles 1995). A 1917 editorial in the *New York Times* explained Tammany's system:

Bootblacks, pushcart men, fruit vendors, soda water stand and corner grocery keepers, sailmakers, dry goods merchants, and so forth, 'all had to contribute to the vast amounts that flowed into station houses, and which, after leaving something in the nature of a deposit there, flowed on

higher.' . . . The police was a collecting agency for Tammany Hall every day of the year. (*New York Times* 1917, E2)

Such a system ensured that businesses would organize electoral support for the machine.

To illustrate the power of the political organization over illicit business ventures, Harold Gosnell (1935) recorded a conversation between a precinct worker and district leader in 1933, two years after the Chicago machine won its first election and thirteen years into prohibition. The district leader asks the precinct worker, "What kind of business are you in?" The precinct worker responds, "It's legit' . . . I've got the cops with me. All I do is sell moonshine." To which the district leader responds, "Sell moonshine, why _____ haven't you ever heard of the law?" The precinct worker answers, "You'r' so ____ smart that you oughtta be a lawyer. I don't rob nobody. I don't make the stuff. All I do is sell it. I got cops coming into my saloon all the time. 'Course I suppose you could get to me. That's why I come in here" (118). Two important conclusions can be drawn from this conversation. First, violating prohibition required the support of political leadership. Second, at least one way to achieve such support was to work for the party in power. Incumbent politicians, reliant on their patronage workforce, could use selective application of the law to enhance their probability of reelection.

However, excessive corruption served to undermine a machine's power if it became too offensive to voters or attracted the attention of higher levels of government. Successful machines were careful to use corruption to ensure loyalty, not to aggregate enormous wealth.⁴ In the period prior to machine consolidation in both Chicago and New York, corruption was rampant; individual aldermen and bureaucrats negotiated bribes with interested businesses and with each other to ensure the passage and implementation of beneficial legislation (Simpson 2001; Shefter 1976). Such aldermanic rent seeking made it difficult to sustain cooperation, and in both cities the political system remained open to anyone who could marshal a large enough personal following. In other words, too much corruption could make it easier for challengers to emerge and threaten incumbents. But properly controlled, patronage workforces could act as a strong deterrent to opposition, biasing outcomes in favor of incumbents using public funds.

Machines also profited from their skill in employing electoral fraud and repression. Stories abound of politicians throwing uncounted ballots into the river, registering and voting on behalf of the dead or departed,

and paying for individual votes at the turn of the century.⁵ Kansas City's Boss Pendergast garnered 50,000 phantom voters in the late 1940s (Reitman and Davidson 1972). Between 1930 and 1934 the number of voters in the second ward rose from 8,128 to 15,940 without a significant population increase (Larsen and Hulston 1997).⁶ In Richard J. Daley's first election for mayor, the *Chicago Tribune* published photographs of Democratic ward boss, Sidney "Short Pencil" Lewis, erasing votes cast for Daley's Democratic opponent in the primary. Daley's Republican opponent, Robert Merriam, sought to have Daley disqualified because of the fraud. However, the Democratic machine controlled the board of elections, and the commissioner chastised Merriam rather than Lewis or Daley. Merriam estimated that 100,000 ghost voters cast primary ballots. The chief election commissioner charged, "Merriam is following Hitler's tactics which consisted of this—it you tell a lie often enough, people will begin to believe you" (quoted in Gowran 1955, 1). Finegold (1995) reports that an alleged Tammany tactic was to hide a piece of lead under one's fingernail while counting ballots in order to void ballots cast for the opposition.

Yet corruption in elections actually signified the weakness of the machines. Parties rely on fraud when they believe that they cannot win an election fairly and/or lack the institutional power to change the rules to favor their candidates (Kousser 1974). Machines used fraud until they became entrenched because patronage without the coercive elements was an ineffective strategy for ensuring the loyalty of voters, especially after the implementation of the Australian ballot. In the Short Pencil Lewis election, Daley was running against a popular reformist incumbent in the primary, and in the general election he faced the son of a beloved professor and alderman, Charles Merriam. Although Daley had the support of the unions, the committed patronage appointees, and important endorsements from state Democrats, he faced a difficult election. It was not easy to commit vote fraud successfully, and elections would have to have been close for fake ballots to have made a difference in large cities (Argersinger 1985).⁷ Additionally, fraudulent voting practices were short lived and labor intense—only one election could be rigged at a time. During years when machine control was strongest, fraud was much less common.

In addition to fixing the votes of people who arrived at the polls, machines preferred for their opponents to stay at home on election day, also enhancing the vote bias of the system. Cox and Kousser (1981) argue that party workers turned from mobilizing supporters with illegal

tactics to discouraging opponents with threats when the enactment of the Australian ballot made verifying votes too difficult. Some machines avoided the problem by refusing to oil the voting-machine lever for the opposition candidate. The squeak of an unoiled lever immediately identified opposition supporters to the polling officials (Erie 1988). The Jersey City machine consistently roughed up voters discovered to have cast opposition ballots. While nascent machines engaged in intimidation or chicanery to keep opponents out of the voting booth, in later years, machines supported the passage of laws that legally limited the size of the electorate when it served their needs (Erie 1988).⁸ By constructing their ideal electorate through fraud and intimidation, machines biased the system in favor of their incumbent organizations.

Bosses also frequently frustrated their competitors' attempts to organize. Royko (1971) reported that in Chicago Daley constructed an enormous intelligence-gathering wing within the police department so that he had information on anyone who might be working against him. Machines used threats and arrests, denial of meeting or parade permits, and selective enforcement of laws to limit insurgencies against their organizations. They relied on state laws that protected existing parties at the expense of new coalitions. For example, in Chicago, an independent needed 60,000 to 70,000 signatures to get his name on the ballot, compared with the regular party requirements of only 2,000 to 4,000. Next, the independent needed the machine-controlled Chicago Elections Board to approve the entire list of signatures (Royko 1971). In 1931 five minor candidates filed to run for mayor against the machine's founder, Anton Cermak. As president of the county board, Cermak controlled the board of election commissioners, which declared the petitions of all five candidates illegal (Gottfried 1962). These rules worked as barriers to entry for challengers, thus favoring the machine's candidates.

Reformers Shape the Electorate with Institutions

Whereas machines used informal and extralegal tactics like patronage ties, bribery, and threats to shape election outcomes in their favor, politicians in San Jose, Austin, Dallas, and San Antonio relied on legal mechanisms of bias that determined who had the right to cast ballots. Reformers proposed, lobbied for, and supported passage of suffrage restrictions at the state and local levels, including literacy tests, abolition of alien suffrage, registration requirements, poll taxes, obscure polling places, and measures that decreased the visibility or comprehensibility of politics, such as nonconcurrent elections.⁹ Reform changes to city elec-

toral and governing institutions had the effect of limiting opportunities for opponents to voice dissent and ensured that those who cast ballots shared reformers' demographics and policy goals.

In Austin only 37 percent of adults over the age of twenty-one had the right to vote in 1933 because of suffrage restrictions including the poll tax and literacy test (Bridges 1997). Phoenix required annual registration renewal four months prior to a primary election, imposed literacy tests, and even as city boundaries expanded, maintained a single site for registration—the county clerk's office downtown. Phoenix also enacted a city charter in 1912 that limited voting to taxpayers.¹⁰ San Antonio required property ownership for bond elections until 1969 and in tax elections until 1975 (Brischetto, Cotrell, and Stevens 1983). California first required voter registration in 1866 with the passage of the California Registry Act sponsored by the Republican wing of the Unionist Party. The act required naturalized citizens to bring their court-sealed documents to the county clerk in order to register and required registration three months prior to elections. Mobile and migrant workers were the focus of increased residency requirements for voters in the 1870s (Keysar 2000). In 1911 the Progressive legislature established biannual registration.¹¹ In 1894 California's Republican-controlled state house enacted a literacy requirement that barred from voting anyone who could not write his name and read the Constitution in English.¹² The *Los Angeles Times* applauded the amendment saying “here is one of the greatest reforms of our age . . . for the illiterate herd of voters will no longer haunt the polls on election day . . . and therefore the honest voter will have a chance to carry the election.” The article implored, “if you are a true-hearted, patriotic American citizen; if you seek the welfare of your home and native land . . . vote ‘Yes’ on this question” (Curran 1892, 9). Santa Clara County, where San Jose is located, also had a four-dollar poll tax in the late 1890s (Pitti 2003). A local populist newsletter criticized the tax for its disfranchising effects on “free white men eligible for naturalization,” meaning European immigrants and low-income whites. The article made clear it was *not* concerned about “Chinamen or negroes” (quoted in Pitti 2003, 84). Such barriers to registration and voting significantly decreased the size of the electorate and especially impacted participation among poor and working-class residents and communities of color.

By 1900 San Jose and the Santa Clara Valley had already established their position as the agricultural heartland of California. Canneries and orchards employed large numbers of Chinese, then Japanese, and finally

Mexican immigrants throughout the twentieth century. Chinese workers in particular were targeted for restriction from social and political life at the state level. Led by laborers and grangers from San Francisco, California's constitution was amended in 1879 to include a series of anti-Chinese provisions. Chinese were prohibited from voting, owning land, and working in certain occupations, and municipalities were authorized to exclude Chinese from city bounds or to designate specific areas of the city where Chinese residents could live (Keyssar 2000; Yu 1991).

Though the anti-Chinese movement was centered in San Francisco, it also found support in San Jose. San Jose's Chinatown was burned to the ground in 1887 and forced to relocate outside of the city. Community members largely believed the fire was a result of arson tacitly approved by the city council and mayor because the ethnic enclave stood in the way of downtown development. The fire department successfully saved every non-Chinese owned business in the path of the fire, but not a single Chinese-occupied structure (Yu 1991). In a 1902 pamphlet entitled "Sodom of the Coast," leaders of the reform movement targeted gambling operations and graft centered in the Chinese community in an effort to overhaul the city government (Yu 1991). Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the reform-owned *San Jose Mercury Herald* printed articles in support of excluding Asian immigrants and preventing aliens from owning land, and warning of the "yellow peril" (McEnery interview 2003). Such anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiment suggests that San Jose's leaders would have supported the state-level changes that narrowed the electorate.

In addition to state suffrage restrictions, San Jose reformers were likely aided by the fact that the laboring class worked seasonally and tended to leave the city after harvest. Elections were held when agricultural workers were not living in the city—late winter and early spring.¹³ According to one source in 1939, the permanent agricultural workforce in San Jose was 3,000 people. During harvest season this ballooned to 40,000 workers (San Jose Commission 1985). Holding elections when the migrant workforce was not in residence excluded this segment of the community from direct political participation. Pickers and canners earned wages at the bottom of the city's pay scale (Pitti 2003, 82, 222), and given that the working class constituted the most vocal opposition to reform charters, it seems likely that reformers would have been aided by limiting their participation.

Reform incumbents also benefited from institutionalized mechanisms that increased barriers to competition through charter revision and city

ordinances. This legally biased the system in favor of certain types of people who were the most likely supporters of the reform agenda. Reformers decreased the pay for city council and other city boards and commissions and increased candidate qualifications through charter revisions. These changes meant that office holders all worked other jobs that had flexible hours or had some independent source of wealth. For example, in Austin council members were required to post \$10,000 bonds before taking office in the early 1900s (Bridges 1997, 65). The result was that city councils were increasingly populated by upper-class professionals and small-business owners, the same groups leading the reform movement. As stated in one leader's description of San Jose politics, the city council members would "walk over to city hall, sit down and decide what needed to be done and then go back to their real jobs" (McEney interview 2003). Between 1944 and 1980, a large proportion of San Jose's leadership community attended Bellarmine College Preparatory, a private Jesuit high school, graduated from Santa Clara University, the local Jesuit college, and lived in one of two wealthy, white neighborhoods.¹⁴ They were part of a "good old boys network" of civic-minded men who "really cared about the city," but who were not representative of the entire community (Hammer interview 2003).

Nonpartisan elections in reform cities also essentially required that candidates have independent sources of wealth for campaign funds. One leader in the Phoenix reform coalition bemoaned "the fact that we're criticized . . . that a little group of people get in a closed room . . . and select a handful of people and put them up. But [we] don't know any better way" (quoted in Bridges 1997, 122). The changes reformers made to government erected barriers to entering the political fray, encouraged certain types of people to become active participants in governance, and actively discouraged others, biasing outcomes in favor of reform candidates.

Machines and Reformers Insulate their Seat Shares

In the final stage of the voting process, the translation of votes to seats, incumbent political coalitions often have immense power in biasing the system because they can insulate coalition members from challenges. In these cities as elsewhere, gerrymandering was used to bolster the chances of incumbent coalitions. During the 1920s, New York's Boss Murphy drew district lines to dilute the votes of Italian neighborhoods (Erie 1988). In Jersey City, Boss Hague also employed gerrymandering, packing the city's Irish into the "Horseshoe District" in order to prevent their votes from influencing elections in other areas (Erie 1988). During

the 1960s and 1970s, Daley's machine relied on creative district line drawing to ensure that neighborhoods with black and Latino majorities were dominated by white, machine-loyal representatives (Erie 1988).

Reformers in San Jose, Austin, Dallas, and San Antonio increased incumbents' probability of retaining control through seat bias. They implemented at-large elections, transformed elected seats to appointed ones, and used strategic annexations. By abolishing districts and choosing at-large elections, reform charters ensured that minority preferences, even those of substantial size, remained unrepresented in the city legislature (Gelb 1970; Jones 1976). At-large elections also had the effect of shifting representation toward voters rather than residents. In a ward or district system, regardless of the number of voters in a given area of the city, the area is assured of representation on the council. In an at-large election this is no longer the case. Thus, in reform cities where turnout had already been decreased through suffrage restrictions and registration requirements, it became even less likely that areas would be represented if they had high proportions of people unlikely to vote. Given the nature of the suffrage restrictions, these areas of the city tended to be low income, working class, and communities of color.

In many reform cities, the abolition of districts or wards generated some of the most vocal opposition and contentious argument against the reform charters. Opponents of Austin's 1908 reform charter argued that "under the aldermanic system the citizens are assured direct representation in the affairs of the municipality, and direct control over ward improvements. Ward representation is in line with the democratic doctrine of local self-government."¹⁵ In 1924 Austin's reform charter passed by a tiny margin of twenty votes out of 4,906 ballots cast. Five of the city's seven wards defeated the charter, but the two wealthy areas of town passed it by a three-to-one margin. Because the election was citywide, the supporters won.

San Jose reformers abolished the ward system in 1915 to reduce the "parochial influence" of districts (P. Trounstine and Christensen 1982, 83). The coalition displaced by San Jose's reformers had been able to control city government because it maintained strong support in the city's central wards, the first and fourth, while reformers came to dominate the second and third. One historian described the character of the different wards this way:

The first and fourth wards are the oldest developments and for many years better businesses have been leaving them to move eastward into newer por-

tions of the city. The vote in these declining wards, now containing depreciated residences, cheap hotels and second rate establishments of one sort and another, has generally tended to be machine controlled, pro-labor, morally liberal and antagonistic to municipal reforms. The second ward is of mixed character, while the third has been the traditional stronghold of the better elements, with strict moral views and continued efforts to secure a government which they believe honest and impartial. The state normal is located in this ward and college, business and professional people predominate in its population. (Thorpe 1938, 6)

In revising the charter, San Jose reformers lost in the first and fourth wards but won large numbers of votes in the second and third wards, as well as in newly annexed territory, thereby cinching the citywide victory. According to the political editor of the *San Jose Mercury News*, a movement to return to districts in the late 1970s charged that the at-large system "served the interests of the folks who had established it, not the average person in town . . . [the people who had established at-large elections] didn't want the small, parochial interests of more narrowly based groups to have any influence in politics" (P. Trounstine interview 2003). At-large elections required more campaign funds, more extensive organization and bigger mobilization operations in order to win, and so tended to bias outcomes in favor of reform incumbents.

It is important to note that all of the reform cities studied here implemented at-large elections after suffrage restrictions had been enacted at the state level. This may be both cause and effect. If a political coalition faces opposition of substantial size, creating at-large elections might jeopardize maintaining control. If the opposition won barely more than 50 percent of the vote, they might win 100 percent of the seats. In Austin there is evidence that reform opponent Emma Long was elected because voters pooled all five of their council votes for her in elections. This was known at the time as "single-shotting." In order to combat this tactic, reformers changed the system to a designated-place system where each voter could only cast one vote per at-large seat.¹⁶ It seems likely that reformers would have been wary of enacting at-large elections unless suffrage restrictions had created an electorate amenable to their goals. Further, because charter changes required a majority vote of the city, it also seems unlikely that charter changes abolishing districts would have passed in the absence of suffrage restrictions.

Reformers also benefited from the use of strategic annexation that maintained an electorate that supported their administrations. As they

grew, cities like San Jose, San Antonio, Dallas, and Austin selectively expanded their city boundaries and chose not to annex other outlying communities. San Jose's annexations were driven in part by strategies of economic development and city leaders were aggressive in securing state laws facilitating the process (Cavanagh 1953). Its first planned annexation was a one-hundred-foot-wide strip of land leading to the city of Alviso, where San Jose hoped to build a port in 1912. Though the port was never built, San Jose did construct a technologically advanced sewage-treatment plant on the site, which then became the tool by which other communities could be convinced to be annexed to the city (Bogini interview 2003). Given that annexation decisions were made in order to "grow and be able to pay the bill,"¹⁷ poorer communities and undevelopable land were not priorities. San Jose reform leaders sought to "capture the cross roads which the administration told us were going to be the shopping centers of the future—where the sales tax would be" (Starbird 1972, 4). Not surprisingly, while San Jose had access to its treatment plant in Alviso, it did not annex the actual city, a poor agricultural community, until the late 1960s. When the annexation did occur it was in response to Alviso's attempt to annex the sewage-treatment plant to its own borders.

Phoenix and Albuquerque annexed and developed communities far from the city center, leapfrogging over poor African American and Latino communities close to downtown. Phoenix annexed its black community in the late 1950s for the 1960 census, while Albuquerque excluded poor Latino communities in the Valley and to the Southwest into the 1960s and 1970s (Bridges 1997). San Jose annexed vast tracts of suburban land, incorporating 1,419 outlying areas by 1969. Yet, as of 2005 there were pockets of county land surrounded on all sides by the city of San Jose. Remaining outside of the official city bounds, these areas have been excluded from participating in local government. In other cities annexation decisions had a more direct and obvious political effect. San Antonio's annexation practices were challenged by the Justice Department under the Voting Rights Act in 1976 because they diluted a growing Mexican American population in the city.¹⁸ Annexations had the effect of creating and maintaining a community and electorate that tended to support reform goals. Had excluded communities become part of the reform cities it is very likely that reform governments would have lost elections. Thus, annexations biased the system in favor of incumbent reformers by determining whose votes translated into seats and whose views would not be counted.

Finally, reformers biased government toward the incumbent regime by transforming many elected positions into appointed offices. Reform charters eliminated popularly elected mayors or turned them into ceremonial heads while investing all executive power in city managers appointed by the council. The purpose of this change was to create a more efficient government. An editorial in the *Dallas News* urged voters to support the new charter by asking, "Why not run Dallas itself on business schedule by business methods under business men? The city manager plan is after all only a business management plan." The article goes on to explain, "[T]he city manager is the executive of a corporation under a board of directors. Dallas is the corporation. It is as simple as that. Vote for it" (quoted in H. Stone, Price, and K. Stone 1940, 286).

The elimination of elected leaders generated extensive controversy. In Phoenix in 1948 city employees and labor organizations opposed the reform charter and the strength of the city manager position because they did not feel that collective bargaining and civil service would be protected. Similarly, in San Jose the reform charter granted the city manager the authority to appoint all of the city's officials without approval from the council and the power to prepare the annual budget. At the same time, the council served on a part-time basis, for very low pay, and was elected at-large in nonpartisan elections. The charter instructed councilors to interact with municipal employees "solely through the city manager" (San Jose City Charter, Section 411). For further clarity, the charter explains: "[N]either the Council nor its members . . . shall give orders to any subordinate officer or employee, either publicly or privately" (San Jose City Charter, section 411). As a result, the manager had an enormous information and resource advantage over the elected legislators. Even if dissenting voices were elected in small numbers to the city council, the control of the city remained tightly bound to the reformist city manager and his administration. In Austin the first council elected following the city manager charter revision was unpopular with the voters because it was not responsive to their needs. One observer noted:

The council that worked with Manager Johnson was not a representative body at all. . . . It was a super-managerial board. It refused to provide the type of political leadership necessary to keep the administration responsive to public opinion, and to maintain satisfactory public relations. Its members did not acknowledge that their constituents had any claim on their time, and they referred those who inquired about city business to the city manager. . . . The council did eliminate 'politics' in the sordid sense of the


word by ending patronage. . . . it also eliminated politics in the democratic sense of the word. (H. Stone, Price, and K. Stone 1937, 24)

Reformers eliminated the possibility for opposition in their structures of government. Eakins (1976, 3) explains the consequences of this drive to increase the competence of the political system: efficiency “both in theory and in practice meant heeding some citizens and not others . . . [and] the cost of greater efficiency was less democracy.” Eliminating politics resulted in an elimination of the pressure and ability to incorporate disaffected and disgruntled constituents. Such strategies of bias effectively insulated incumbent coalitions from shifts in public sentiment and lay the foundation for monopoly control of government.

Conclusions

All political systems are governed by rules. Inevitably, rules advantage some groups and individuals over others. When rules consistently advantage incumbents by limiting information, erecting barriers to entry or exit, or distorting the translation of votes to seats, the system is biased in favor of the ruling group. Throughout the twentieth century, San Jose was governed by a set of rules that limited the opportunity for dissenters to participate in the political arena and minimized the power of minority voices. Regardless of the characteristics of their potential opponents, San Jose’s reform incumbents benefited from these rules that shaped who the electorate would be and how their votes would be counted. Likewise in Chicago large numbers of patronage employees loyal to the boss significantly enhanced the power of those politicians who had already won one round of elections. But, however helpful suffrage restrictions and the political use of patronage were to reform and machine leaders, the presence of these institutions did not ensure monopoly control. By the mid-twentieth century, virtually every city in the United States was governed by one or more of the types of rules described in this chapter. What distinguished a biased system from a monopolized system was the presence of organization.

5



Effects of Political Monopolies

RICHARD J. DALEY may be the most famous mayor in twentieth-century America. He had immense power and many adoring fans. Ebulient aldermen were known to burst out in spontaneous praise of their leader during council meetings. He was nicknamed “Hizzoner.” When Daley passed away, thousands of people stood in line for hours in twenty-below weather to offer him tribute. One man explained, “[A]ll these people are repaying him for remembering them like he did” (quoted in Keegan 1976, 1). This was the same Richard J. Daley who in 1968 handed down an order that would haunt him for the rest of his life. As Chicago hosted the Democratic National Convention and the nation watched riots rip the city apart, Daley instructed his officers to “shoot to kill arsonists and ‘shoot to maim or cripple’ looters” (Schreiber 1968, 1).

Daley viewed the liberal antiwar movement in the same way that he viewed the civil rights movement and the War on Poverty—as an affront to his power and the stability of Chicago (Cohen and Taylor 2000). As he made clear in his famous order, he was prepared to defend his city at any cost from the success of such revolutionary elements. In large part Daley was able to maintain stability. Chicago never went bankrupt, never lost its business district or its middle class. While other rustbelt cities like Detroit hemorrhaged people and taxes, Chicago was the “city that work[ed]” (*New York Times* 1976, 28). But for some Chicagoans, particularly poor and black Chicagoans, the city did not work quite so well. Daley governed over a period of rapid development and intense segregation. African Americans lived in overcrowded ghettos, were restricted from high-level political positions, were arrested and incarcerated at disproportionate rates, discriminated against in city hiring, and provided with lower quality city services.

San Jose’s reform leaders, epitomized by the powerful city manager Dutch Hamann, can also be characterized as having led the city to greatness while leaving some neighborhoods behind. In the post-WWII era, San Jose was changing rapidly. Defense contracts and the mild climate

encouraged a massive influx of migrants to the Santa Clara valley. Between 1940 and 1950, San Jose's population grew by nearly 25,000 people. When Hamann was appointed in 1950, he took office determined to build upon this growth, to make the San Jose metropolitan area "one of the . . . most important areas of the West Coast" (San Jose Master Plan 1958, quoted in Matthews 2003, 95). In 1969 Hamann wrote, "There is no question in my mind that San Jose will be the dominant city of Northern California before the next twenty years have passed. The growth that lies before the city will dwarf all that has gone before" (quoted in Stanford Environmental Law Society 1970, 21).

Hamann's work was not in vain. In many ways the foundation for Silicon Valley was laid by his coalition and its bold decisions throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Matthews 2003). Yet, although growth and development were the goals of San Jose reformers, some areas of the city, particularly those that were predominately Mexican American, lacked paved roads, street lights, sewerage systems, and representation on the city council. San Jose's Latinos endured police brutality and discriminatory treatment in the justice system, the school system, and in city hiring (Pitti 2003).

In both San Jose and Chicago, the system of monopoly created by well-organized coalitions and biased systems led to a political arena that made challenging those in power difficult if not impossible. In a healthy democratic system, success in office suggests that the coalition has responded to the needs and wants of the voters. But if political institutions have been biased toward those in power, reelection of the incumbent organization does not mean that residents have exerted control over their elected officials. Chapter 2 provided evidence that dominant coalitions in machine and reform cities tilted electoral outcomes in their favor by shaping preferences, limiting voting options, and influencing the translation of ballots into seats held by the government. Chapter 4 substantiated that bias and organization had identifiable electoral effects as well. But what, if any, consequences did monopoly have for the people living in these cities?

This chapter offers both quantitative and narrative support for the argument that during monopoly periods, the governing coalition had the opportunity and incentive to respond to narrow segments of the population. As was the case in the previous chapter, for the most part this chapter refers to periods when bias and coordination were present at high levels, and compares these to periods in which either or both factors were not present. The choice to use this dichotomous categorization

is driven not by a belief that cities only come in two states, but by a lack of nuanced data that would allow for an investigation into the effects of varying degrees of monopolization. Nonetheless, the relative distinction between monopolized and nonmonopolized cities remains a central theoretical contribution of this work. The 30 percent of American cities that met these admittedly high standards for monopolization did have political patterns that looked significantly different from other cities.

First, I present evidence that, once in power, machine and reform regimes ceased intensive mobilization of new voters and selectively courted core supporters to turn out. At the same time, the dominant coalition reduced benefits to some portions of the population and elections became uncompetitive. As a result, during the monopoly period, turnout of eligible voters declined.

Next, I investigate the effects of monopolies more broadly by examining patterns in the distribution of government benefits. I find that compared to cities in which there is no single dominant coalition advantaged by bias, monopolies focus benefits towards governing coalition elites and core coalition members, away from the broader community. In machine cities, party leadership positions, patronage jobs, government contracts, services, and urban policies were focused toward select white ethnic groups. In reform cities, middle-class whites and business constituencies filled elective and appointed offices and were provided expansive growth policies, low taxes, amenities and services in middle-class neighborhoods, and businesslike operation of government. Additionally, for both machine and reform regimes, powerful governing coalition elites were offered a disproportionate share of benefits.¹ I find that during the monopoly period, dominant coalitions spent less overall, reduced differences between expenditure and revenue, met the demands of key coalition members, and increased spending on developmental categories at the expense of the broader public.² Successful efforts to win reelection do, in the end, mean that fewer voters play a role in the governing process as security in office liberates coalitions from citizen demands.

Declining Participation Is a Consequence of Monopoly

In order to analyze the effect of monopoly for residents, I begin by looking at patterns of voter turnout during the bias period. In this section I use election data from the same nine cities analyzed in chapter 4. Five of the cities represent machine monopolies: Chicago, New York, New Haven, Kansas City, and Philadelphia. Four represent reform monopolies: San Jose, San Antonio, Austin, and Dallas. A complete expla-

nation of the selection criteria for this sample is provided in chapters 1 and 4. In short, these cities were selected on the basis of available data. The dependent variable, *turnout*, is a measure of the total number of ballots cast in a given election divided by the number of eligible voters. The number of eligible voters includes all persons of voting age (males only prior to 1920). Noncitizens are included for both theoretical and practical reasons. Increasing the citizenship rate was an important strategy for mobilizing voters in machine cities, and a number of cities offered alien suffrage during the time period. Additionally, city-level data on numbers of citizens is not available for the entire time period.

The *bias period* for each city serves as the main independent variable in the analysis. This variable is coded one in years when high levels of bias and coordination were present and coded zero when either condition was not met. The list of years in the bias period for each city is included in table A4. A complete description of the coding choices for this variable is offered in chapter 4, along with more detailed descriptions of additional independent variables that control for alternative explanations for changes in turnout. To account for the possibility that turnout is purely responsive to the competitiveness of elections, I include the *margin of victory*—the percentage of the vote gained by the loser with the highest total subtracted from the percentage of the vote gained by the winner with the lowest total in each election. Also included are: the number of *candidates* running for each seat, the number of *incumbents* running, and the natural log of the total *population* of each city. I add a trend variable representing the *year* that the election was held and dummy variables representing the type of seat for which the election was held, *manager*, *commissioner*, or *mayor*, with *council* as the excluded category. Finally, a dummy variable is included indicating whether the city is classified as *machine* or *reform*.³

In a simple comparison, table 5.1 shows that for most of the cities in this study, the turnout of eligible voters in citywide, general elections was lower during the bias period.⁴ Furthermore, this decline in turnout is statistically significant. To more rigorously test the hypothesis that turnout declined during bias periods, I regress the log odds of turnout of eligible voters ($\ln(\text{turnout}/1-\text{turnout})$) on the dummy variable for bias period and include the controls listed above.⁵ The log-odds transformation of the dependent variable is used to achieve a normal distribution of the dependent variable and to bound predictions between zero and one. The analysis presented in table 5.2 shows that during bias period, the log odds of turnout of eligible voters in citywide elections

Table 5.1: Turnout during bias periods

	No bias (%)	Bias (%)
Chicago	50	49
New York	45	34
New Haven	44	57
Kansas City	34	47
Philadelphia	53	45
San Jose	32	21
San Antonio	17	14
Austin	22	18
Dallas	11	8
Albuquerque*	36	16

* Figures are from Bridges (1997).

Table 5.2: Effect of bias on turnout of eligible voters

	Log-odds turnout of eligible voters			
	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error
Bias period	-0.38**	0.07	-0.23**	0.06
Incumbents running			0.00	0.03
Margin of victory			-1.36**	0.14
Candidates per seat			0.06**	0.02
Log population (millions)	-0.11**	0.03	-0.10**	0.03
Year	0.01**	0.00	0.01**	0.00
Machine/reform	1.48**	0.14	1.38**	0.13
Commissioner	-0.05	0.10	0.06	0.10
Mayor	0.31**	0.12	0.25**	0.12
Manager	0.55**	0.12	0.67**	0.13
Constant	-2.56**	0.20	-2.43**	0.18
<i>F</i>	113.68**		99.18**	
<i>R</i> ²	0.51		0.62	
<i>N</i>	686		686	

Note: Standard errors are clustered by city-election.
 OLS regression: **p* < .10 ***p* < .05

declines by about 0.38, which equates to about 6 percentage points on average.⁶

Since the analysis in chapter 4 suggested that competition also declined during the bias period, it is possible that the relationship between dominance and turnout is spurious. The second regression in table 5.2 shows that even controlling for incumbents running, the margin of victory, and the number of candidates per seat, turnout declines by about 4 percentage points during the bias period.⁷ As dominant coalitions won by larger margins and increased their incumbency advantage, fewer voters were involved. In essence, these regimes could win reelection with only a small share of the eligible electorate voting them back into office.

There are competing explanations for these declines in turnout. Residents might not vote because, as I contend, they are discouraged from participating, or alternatively because they are satisfied with the governing coalition. If the second explanation were true, one would expect those most satisfied with the governing coalition to drop out more rapidly than those dissatisfied. A precinct analysis in San Jose and a ward level analysis in Chicago suggest that the proportion of people turning out to vote declined more drastically in areas populated by *non-core* coalition members.

To conduct this analysis I singled out areas in each city that were part of the core coalition and areas that were peripheral to the organization in power. The neighborhoods were selected using a combination of secondary source materials and census data. I used GIS mapping tools to define the boundaries of the neighborhoods and then assigned precincts to the correct area using polling-place addresses. In San Jose, the core areas, Willow Glen and Hester Hanchett, represent extremely stable, white, middle-upper-class neighborhoods with very high proportions of homeowners. The peripheral neighborhoods, East San Jose, North College Park, and the Gardner area, correspond to residents least favored by the regime. They have remained poor and working-class neighborhoods with high numbers of nonwhite renters since the 1930s. For the analysis of Chicago, I used the heavily African American second, third, fourth, sixth, and twentieth wards to signify residents least favored by the regime, and combined statistics from the working-class, Irish and Eastern European eleventh, thirteenth, and nineteenth wards for the core areas.⁸ Table 5.3 shows the pattern of turnout over time in the two types of neighborhoods.

The data suggest that turnout of registered voters deteriorated at a higher rate in areas representing non-core coalition members. While turnout rates declined in the core areas, overall the rate remained fairly

Table 5.3: Turnout varies with regime membership

San Jose			Chicago				
Year	Peripheral turnout (%)	Core turnout (%)	Mean margin of victory (%)	Year	Peripheral turnout (%)	Core turnout (%)	Mean margin of victory (%)
1938	47	46	1	1931	82	95	17
1946	32	36	13	1959	49	76	43
1958	20	26	59	1963	61	78	11
1962	27	36	12	1977	28	60	32
Total decline	-20	-10		Total decline	-54	-35	

stable. In both cities, these areas averaged higher turnout rates than the city as a whole. One might argue that these patterns represent the greater sensitivity of low socioeconomic status voters to changes in competition. The column noting the mean margin of victory in each election signifies that the relationship is not so straightforward. In neither city is the turnout rate particularly responsive to competitiveness. It is also suggestive that in the earliest election for both cities the peripheral neighborhood turnout rates were about equal to the rates in core neighborhoods. Once the regime collapsed, these areas again turned out at higher rates.

To rule out competing hypotheses, one would ideally test the relationship between dominance and turnout while controlling for socioeconomic status. Unfortunately, accurate data are not available at sub-city levels. I attempt to circumvent this problem using two additional analyses. First, I add controls to the turnout regressions presented above, indicating the proportion of the city that *rents* homes and the percentage of residents that are *nonwhite*. These measures serve as proxies for the residents that would be most likely to drop out of the electorate due to socioeconomic factors. Table 5.4 provides the outcome of this analysis. Adding the controls strengthens the power of the bias-period variable. Independent of the size of the poor and nonwhite populations, the bias period reduces turnout.⁹

The second way I propose to eliminate socioeconomic effects on turnout is to analyze turnout in Chicago's fifty wards for three elections during the bias period, controlling for the demographic makeup of those wards. The analysis pools general elections for mayor from 1959, 1963, and 1971. The dependent variable is the log odds of the turnout of eligible voters. The independent variables in this regression are the percent-

Table 5.4: The effect of bias on turnout of eligible voters, controlling for city demographics

	Log-odds turnout of eligible voters	
	Coefficient	Std. error
Bias period	-0.30**	0.07
Incumbents running	-0.00	0.03
Margin of victory	-1.25**	0.14
Candidates per seat	0.04**	0.02
Log population (millions)	-0.14**	0.03
Year	0.02**	0.00
Machine/reform	1.42**	0.16
Commissioner	0.30**	0.12
Mayor	0.49**	0.13
Manager	0.31**	0.13
% nonwhite	-2.73**	0.33
% renters	-0.44	0.43
Constant	-2.70**	0.36
F	78.18**	
R ²	0.66	
N	601	

Note: Standard errors are clustered by city-election.
 OLS regression: * $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$

age of residents in each ward who are of Irish, Polish, African American, or German descent.¹⁰ I use 1960 census data for 1959, interpolated values for 1963, and 1970 values for 1971. To uncover the relationship between regime membership and turnout, I also add a dummy variable for submachine boss William Dawson's controlled wards. Dawson was the machine's most prominent organizer of black votes.¹¹ If the theory is correct, African American areas should have a negative relationship with turnout except for Dawson's wards, which should have a positive relationship.

The results in table 5.5 suggest that regime membership was an important component in determining average rates of turnout. Although not statistically significant, as predicted, areas with high proportions of African American residents had lower turnout, except where Dawson organized voters for the machine. The highest African American concentration areas that were not organized by Dawson had 48 per-

cent turnout.¹² However, in Dawson's wards, with a mean of 82 percent black residents, turnout averaged 54 percent. In comparison, Irish and Polish populations have a positive effect on turnout. Moving from the minimum concentration of Irish residents to the maximum increases the predicted turnout from 46 percent to 72 percent. For Polish descendants, the figure goes from 47 percent to 51 percent. In heavily German areas, turnout averaged only 51 percent. This makes sense given that Germans were peripheral to the Daley machine (Erie 1988). Germans had the highest socioeconomic status of these groups, so this relatively moderate level of turnout counters a purely socioeconomic explanation. Due to problems of ecological inference, these results should only be taken as suggestive, but they do contribute to the body of evidence illustrating that dominant regimes selectively mobilize supporters and ignore or perhaps discourage others from participating in elections.

With no viable opposition, a satisfied electorate, and the goal of long-term dominance in sight, coalitions in machine and reform cities changed their focus. They became less interested in mobilizing the maximum number of voters and more interested in maintaining a coalition closer to minimum winning size. Qualitative evidence also indicates that during the bias period, machine and reform regimes selectively mobilized core coalition members and ceased efforts to register and turn out others.

Table 5.5: Chicago turnout by ward

	Log-odds turnout of eligible voters	
	Coefficient	Std. error
% Irish	8.66 **	2.56
% Polish	2.11*	1.09
% German	-0.42	2.32
Dawson	0.12	0.18
% black	-0.13	0.33
1959	-0.17 **	0.07
1963	0.21 **	0.05
Constant	-0.26	0.19
<i>F</i>	25.39**	
<i>R</i> ²	0.297	
<i>N</i>	148	

Note: Standard errors are clustered by ward.
Regression: * $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$

Machines were famed for their unwavering efforts to naturalize, register, and mobilize newly arriving immigrants. But this behavior only accurately describes the early stage of machine building. When machines faced a tough fight for office they sought to maximize their share of votes from the eligible population, and they did so primarily by bringing new voters into an established political system with strong party allegiances. Once they achieved dominance, machines no longer fought laws that restricted certain populations from voting, and they began to ignore newly arriving immigrants, focusing instead on turning out their reliable patronage-based coalition (Erie 1988; Pinderhughes 1987; Grimshaw 1992). The 1900 census in New York reveals that 56 percent of white immigrants were naturalized, compared to only 43 percent in 1920, the middle of the city's bias period. Between 1890 and 1920 the Jewish and Italian proportion of the New York voting-age population expanded rapidly from 10 percent to 30 percent. During the same period, the share of Jewish and Italian voters rose more modestly from 2 percent to 13 percent (Erie 1988).

While machines simply stopped intensive efforts to bring people to the polls, reformers implemented institutional changes that minimized the number of voters. Measures like nonpartisan and nonconcurrent elections, strict registration requirements, poll taxes, literacy tests, and minimal press coverage depressed turnout citywide (Kelley, Ayres, and Bowen 1967; Lee 1960; Alford and Lee 1968; Dixon 1966). Throughout the twentieth century in reform cities, the common trend was declining turnout, but reform coalitions often mobilized their core constituencies to win elections. To ensure passage of municipal bonds and support of the reformers' platform, San Jose's city manager formed high-powered bond committees, held rallies, and invited celebrities to speak on behalf of his proposals and candidates. In 1961 he brought Miss America to San Jose to endorse a bond (Stanford Environmental Law Society 1970). The result of mobilizing only certain segments of the community was that in both machine and reform cities, dominant coalitions appeared to govern with near-complete consensus. They faced little to no competition from elites, and voters offered sometimes close to unanimous support of their leaders.

Monopoly Results in More Narrowly Distributed Benefits

Given that monopolies encounter reduced electoral participation from certain groups, are they then able to reduce services and exclude these groups from the benefits of government? To test this proposition, I ana-

lyze city financial patterns, comparing periods of monopoly dominance to both pre- and post-monopoly periods and to cities that never hosted a monopoly. This analysis includes the 244 cities ever to have been listed on the Census's 100-largest-cities list (see appendix tables A1–A3).

If my theory is correct, when monopolies are in power, spending should be targeted toward governing coalition elites as well as the regimes' core constituencies at the expense of benefits that serve the broader electoral community. Support for this claim is provided through an analysis of the proportion of machine and reform city budgets spent during the monopoly period as compared to other periods on three categories of expenditure, representing: (1) elite demands, (2) core constituency demands, and (3) broader community demands.

This analysis relies on annual city financial data gathered from the United States Census County and City Data Book from 1940–86.¹³ For the most part, the fiscal measures are provided every five years in the second and seventh year of a decade, and the demographic measures are provided every decade in the Census of Population and Housing. I interpolated values for intervening years for the independent variables. The dependent variables, all based on real measures, are the proportion of direct general expenditure spent on various fiscal categories that serve as proxies for the winners and losers of municipal benefits.

Admittedly, there are no precise measures of expenditures for different types of voters that work across both time and place. I rely on the available census data and arguments made in the secondary literature to select the categories of spending. *Reformers' core* constituents were white, middle-class voters, and, thus, city spending on sanitation services—a major concern of homeowners—is used to represent their demands (Bridges 1997). The base of machine regimes was working-class, white ethnic voters. The machine's most valuable benefit was a payroll job. Consequently, the percentage of city budgets allocated to police and fire expenditures is used to capture the *machines' core* preferences. Since the vast majority of police and fire expenditures go toward payroll, it is reasonable to assume that increases and decreases in this measure indicate expansion and contraction of the city workforce.

One cannot use payroll expenditures directly because the proportions vary depending on the total number of functions a city must handle. Given that every city in the data set handles police and fire functions, this measure operates as the best proxy for the preferences of the machine's core. Further, this measure allows one to distinguish between the different uses of payroll for a machine monopoly. As explained in chap-

ter 2, patronage positions were used to organize the machine and bias the system in favor of the incumbent coalition. But payroll jobs were also provided as benefits for machine supporters.¹⁴ However, police and fire positions are frequently protected by civil service. Though machines had many ways of getting around civil-service requirements, the presence of police and fire unions ensures that in many cities hiring and firing cannot be done on a solely political basis. In this analysis I seek to measure the machines' propensity to increase benefits to their core supporters, not the presence of bias. Using the proportion of the budget spent on police and fire allows me to do this.

Both types of regimes relied heavily on the business class to maintain stability and support progress in their cities. For machine and reform regimes alike, the governing coalition included interests that could finance development and campaigns for office and block proposals that they perceived as threatening; these represent the governing coalition elites. I use expenditure on roads and highways, representative of pro-development spending, to capture spending for *governing coalition elites* (Peterson 1981). Finally, to measure changes in spending on *broader community* goods, I analyze expenditures in the categories of health and public welfare.¹⁵

In an ideal world, I would have used the characteristics that define monopoly (organization and bias) as my primary independent variables in determining a *monopoly period* for each of the 244 cities in the data set. Due to the severe paucity of municipal election data and the difficulty of measuring machine forms of bias across a large number of cases, there is virtually no way to do this. Instead, I rely on the rich historical research conducted by other urban scholars to determine sets of years that might be considered monopoly periods in each city and then analyze municipal benefit distribution in relation to these periods. A complete description of the process employed is provided in chapters 1 and 4. Clear start and end dates for the monopoly period were determined for twenty-five cases (listed in table A3 in the appendix). Of these twenty-five cases, seventeen are machine monopolies and eight are reform monopolies.

A simple analysis of expenditure patterns displayed in figure 5.1 provides evidence that compared to the periods before and after dominance, machine and reform regimes spent a larger share of their budgets on governing coalition elites and core constituents during monopoly periods.

Reformers increased expenditure on sanitation by approximately 6 percentage points in order to serve their middle-class voters during the monopoly period. Machine regimes reduced sanitation spending during their monopoly periods but increased police and fire expenditures by




Fig. 5.1: Effect of monopoly period on spending patterns

an average of 3 percentage points, suggesting the importance of payroll jobs for their supporters. In both types of cities, highway expenditures, supported by businesses and developers, increased during monopoly periods by an average of 2 percentage points, while spending on health and welfare declined by an average of 4 percentage points.

In order to test these findings more rigorously I regress the percentage spent in each category on a dummy variable for the monopoly period and include a variety of controls to isolate monopoly as a causal factor.¹⁶ Other scholars have argued that fiscal capacity, functional responsibilities, bureaucratic decisions, and residents' needs are better predictors of government spending than political factors (see Meier, Stewart, and England 1991 for a review of the literature). A measure of *general revenue* standardized to 1982 dollars is used to test the alternative hypothesis that capacity, not dominance, determines spending patterns.

Because cities are subordinate to states and the federal government, a large portion of their revenue comes from intergovernmental transfers. When subventions are tied to specific purposes, expenditure patterns may reflect priorities of higher levels of government rather than political demand. Additionally, extra income from the state or federal government may free up city funds for spending on redistributive functions. The percent of *intergovernmental revenue* is included to control for these possibilities. Along these same lines, a dummy variable noting whether or not the city had *home rule* indicates the flexibility of local officials in changing patterns of expenditure.

To account for the possibility that demographics may drive patterns in city spending, I add a control for the percentage of the population that is *nonwhite* according to the census.¹⁷ Additionally, the size of the needy population may affect expenditure patterns. I include the proportion of the population that is home *renters* to account for this. Another aspect of a city's need might be its size, both geographic area and total population. For instance, as a city expands and incorporates outlying areas, expenditures on new infrastructure might dominate. The regressions include measures of the city's *land area* in square miles, *total population*, and five-year *percent change* in total population to control for this possibility. The measures of land area and total population are logged to account for a leveling-off effect at high values. Finally, I include a *year* variable to capture linear trends in spending,¹⁸ dummy variables for region including *South*, *West*, and *Midwest* (with *Northeast* as the excluded category), and dummy variables noting whether the city was ever monopolized by a *machine* or *reform* organization.¹⁹ These last two variables allow me to determine whether or not machine and reform cities had different spending patterns from nonmonopoly cities over the entire time period, even when monopolies were not in power.

I present four models below, regressing the proportion of the budget spent on sanitation, police and fire, highways, and health and welfare on the variables described above. The analyses exclude cases in which it is known that a monopoly dominated at some point during the twentieth century, but where I have no knowledge of the precise start and end dates for this monopoly (see table A2 in the appendix). In the regressions on core expenditures (sanitation and police and fire), the monopoly period is specific to the type of regime in question. For instance, in the model for sanitation expenditures, the monopoly period is only coded one during reform monopoly periods; it is coded zero for all other cases during all other years. This allows me to test the possibility that the focused expenditures were particular to the regime's core constituents and not an effect of monopoly in general.

For both machine and reform cities, the results in table 5.6 suggest strong, clear patterns of expenditure. Regimes concentrate resources on governing coalition elites and core constituents at the expense of the broader public.

Both machine and reform monopolies spent significantly more on their core members during monopoly periods. Reformers increased expenditures by more than 6 percentage points and machines by about 3.5 percentage points for the most important constituents. The figures

Table 5.6: Effect of monopoly on targeted benefits

	% DGE spent on reform core		% DGE spent on machine core		% DGE spent on coalition elites		% DGE spent on broader public	
	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error
Monopoly period	0.061 **	0.019	0.033 **	0.013	0.022 **	0.008	-0.029 **	0.013
Fiscal capacity								
General revenue (millions)	-0.001	0.001	-0.004 **	0.001	0.003 **	0.001	0.008 **	0.002
Fiscal flexibility								
% revenue intergovernmental	-0.031	0.036	-0.148 **	0.052	-0.062	0.041	0.116 **	0.034
Home rule	-0.010 **	0.004	-0.013 **	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.016 **	0.006
Population needs								
% nonwhite	-0.007	0.021	-0.003	0.016	-0.012	0.019	-0.070 **	0.026
% renters	-0.179 **	0.023	-0.155 **	0.015	-0.176 **	0.024	0.206 **	0.073
Log land area	-0.011 **	0.005	-0.025 **	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.020 **	0.009
Log population (millions)	0.007	0.005	0.022 **	0.005	-0.012 **	0.004	0.005	0.006
5-year relative population change	0.070 **	0.027	-0.116 **	0.039	0.085 **	0.027	-0.085 *	0.051
General controls								
Year	0.001 *	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001 **	0.000
South	0.046 **	0.012	0.037 **	0.007	0.023 **	0.004	-0.027	0.030
West	0.018 **	0.008	0.102 **	0.005	0.031 **	0.007	-0.076 **	0.024
Midwest	0.041 **	0.008	0.038 **	0.004	0.054 **	0.008	-0.038 **	0.014
Machine	0.011 *	0.006	-0.016 **	0.005	-0.011	0.007	-0.041 **	0.014

(continued)

Table 5.6: Effect of monopoly on targeted benefits (continued)

	% DGE spent on reform core		% DGE spent on machine core		% DGE spent on coalition elites		% DGE spent on broader public	
	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error	Coefficient	Std. error
Reform	-0.020	0.013	-0.021 **	0.006	-0.036 **	0.011	0.029 *	0.017
Constant	0.187 **	0.062	0.565 **	0.072	0.210 **	0.063	-0.057	0.084
Wald χ^2	2469.80 **		26806.15 **		7180.14 **		1835.85 **	
R ²	0.183		0.278		0.330		0.160	
p	0.315		0.477		0.348		0.608 *	
N	1158		836		1158		907	

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors reported.
 +Model corrected for autocorrelation, Prais Winsten method.
 OLS regressions: * $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$

may seem small, but represent large sums of real money. The differences between the monopoly and nonmonopoly periods equate to an increase of about \$9.4 million on sanitation spending in the average reform city and about \$13.7 million on police and fire spending in the average machine city.²⁰ Both types of regimes also increased spending by about 2 percentage points on the developmental category of roads and highways, a priority for developers and business interests. At the same time, coalitions spent 4 percent less on health and welfare. Splitting the sample by monopoly type confirmed that the effect of monopoly period was statistically indistinguishable for machine versus reform regimes with regard to increased spending on roads and decreased spending on health and welfare. Additionally, monopolies reduced per capita expenditure by about \$9.20, even when controlling for revenue, a decline of about 19 percent. This reinforces McDonald's (1985) argument that contrary to the expectations of turn-of-the-century critics of machine politics, these organizations did not expand government to provide for the needs of the urban masses.²¹ As machine and reform regimes became secure in office, they turned their attention away from the demands of a broad electoral coalition to serve the preferences of governing coalition elites and key coalition members.

There are a number of interesting results from these analyses for students of city politics. For instance, these data support Peterson's (1981) argument that cities are significantly more likely to spend money on redistributive programs when they have bigger budgets overall and receive significant amounts of aid from higher levels of government. Additionally, having a large population in need of government services (renters in these models) appears to tie the hands of city budget makers significantly, encouraging a reduction in spending on sanitation, police and fire, and roads in favor of health and welfare. As other scholars have found, region remains an important factor in determining spending patterns. Yet even with these controls, the monopoly period remains a significant predictor in expenditure patterns. In their quest for reelection and in service to their organizations, dominant coalitions shifted municipal expenditures toward their key constituencies.

Dominance Increased Benefits for Core Coalition Members

Qualitative evidence also suggests that when regimes successfully dominate the system, they focus benefits on their core constituency and members of the governing coalition. In machine and reform cities alike, dominant coalitions rewarded key members of their coalitions with increased benefits and policy choices. Monopolies were successful

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Qualitative evidence also suggests that when regimes successfully dominate the system, they focus benefits on their core constituency and members of the governing coalition. In machine and reform cities alike, dominant coalitions rewarded key members of their coalitions with divisible benefits and policy choices. Monopolies were successful

because they were attentive to their base. This is not a small point. All of the coalitions that governed over a monopoly period were reelected to office time and again. Even if the rules of the game advantaged these incumbents, they would not have survived had they not been responsive to some portion of their communities. As William Munro (1933) remarked, "[I]t is the boss who serves as the mediator between poverty and power . . . he is the protector of his people" (19).²²

In Chicago, the Irish held the mayor's seat from 1933 until 1983, with one brief three-year hiatus. Into the 1970s, the Irish held between one-quarter and one-third of the seats on Chicago's city council, while they made up only about 2 percent of the total city population (Erie 1988).²³ New York's Tim Sullivan, Irish boss of the East Side, governed over a district that was 85 percent Jewish and Italian, but only 5 percent Irish in 1910. New Haven's white immigrant ethnic groups, Italians, Irish, and Jews, accounted for 57 percent of the city's registered voters in 1959, but accounted for 82 percent of elected municipal officials. Of these groups, the Irish were most heavily overrepresented, at 29 percent of the officials but only 11 percent of the electorate (Wolfinger 1974). Because dominant organizations in these cities controlled the nomination process as a mechanism for consolidating their monopoly, it can be seen as no accident that core coalition members were disproportionately slated for office.

White ethnic constituencies also won disproportionate shares of patronage jobs, party positions, and appointments in machine cities. Table 5.7 shows the percentage of government employees identified as Irish in three machine cities. As machines consolidated power, they employed a greater percentage of the total Irish workforce in municipal government. In 1900, Irish shares of government jobs were roughly proportional to their population proportions. By 1930, when machines

Table 5.7: Irish government employment in machine cities

	% employed in local government		% of workforce employed in local government		% of population (1st and 2nd generation)	
	1900	1930	1900	1930	1900	1930
New York	36.6	51.7	5.8	23.6	31.1	8.8
Jersey City	42.4	58.3	5.1	20.8	37.7	3.3
Albany	30.0	41.0	4.6	14.8	32.6	10.1
Average change, 1900-1930	+14%		+14.6%		-26.4%	

Source: Erie (1988); United States Census of Population and Housing, 1910, 1920, 1930

dominated these three cities, Irish patronage far outstripped population shares.

Some scholars have argued that patronage or “bloated public employment” is actually a form of income redistribution (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 2000, 220). However, while groups like the Irish benefited from machines’ allocations of patronage, during the bias period, machines actually employed a smaller proportion of the total population in government jobs. Analysis suggests that the proportion of residents employed in city jobs declined from 4.3 percent to 3.4 percent on average during machine monopoly periods.²⁴ Given this, it is unlikely that the machines were simply attempting to redistribute income to all low-income and working-class persons.

Aside from patronage jobs and municipal positions, core coalition members in machine cities benefited from their preferred relationship with dominant regimes in other ways as well. Union members were rewarded with large public works projects and support for labor organizing. Other coalition members, like business groups, frequently requested and were granted lax enforcement of laws governing their conduct or operations, an underassessment of taxes, and liberal business policies (Pinderhughes 1987). Pendergast’s general refusal to enforce oversight of nightclubs and prohibition contributed to the birth of some of the world’s greatest jazz (Ward and Burns 2000). New Haven’s Mayor Lee’s first foray into redevelopment was a massive overhaul of the city’s parks and recreations programs—projects all to be heavily used by the lower-class residents of the city. He fixed up decrepit athletic fields, built playgrounds, an athletic center, a new clubhouse on the municipal golf course, and a new lawn-bowling clubhouse. In Pittsburgh, the Lawrence organization rewarded African Americans with a fair employment practices ordinance and top-level appointments in the administration.

Machines also supported policies important to their voters. In New York, the Tammany commission that investigated the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire proposed fifty new laws to protect wages and working conditions for women and children, a boon to their factory-working constituents (Erie 1988). In Albany, where core coalition members were middle class, the machine provided efficient city services, low taxes, and underassessment for homeowners. Such policies came to be adopted by other machine cities as well, especially as their core constituents became home owners. Daley’s city “that worked” met the demands of this constituency. He focused on street repairs and beautification, garbage collection and snow removal, low property taxes and preservation of property values.

An important qualification stated in chapter 3 is that machines were careful not to exclude groups of residents from their coalitions outright. This is evident in their allocation of benefits to non-core members. Throughout the monopoly period, machines were skilled at providing symbolic benefits that cost few resources. New York's Boss Sullivan, while keeping Jews and Italians out of elected office and coveted patronage positions, provided food baskets, coal, and sometimes rent money to the new immigrants. He sponsored legislation to make Columbus Day a holiday, took to wearing a yarmulke, and nominated Jews and Italians for minor party posts. Similarly, Kansas City's Boss Pendergast opened political clubs that provided a social outlet for residents who could not afford or were excluded from the city's country clubs. In New Haven the mayor visited at least two schools a week, talking with teachers and reading to the children. In every machine city, bosses provided picnics and ballgames, attended weddings, wakes, and funerals, opened citizen complaint offices, and provided small favors to community members, all as inexpensive efforts to maintain the voters' good will without having to share the most valuable benefit—patronage. These strategies to win reelection were popular and responsive to portions of the community. As mentioned in chapter 1, none of these leaders could afford to rest on bias alone. They worked for reelection as all politicians do, by cultivating a reliable constituency.

Though reform coalitions did not rely on patronage for building their regimes, key elected and appointed municipal positions *were* focused toward core members. Well into the 1980s the overwhelming majority of those who served on San Jose's boards and commissions were part of an old elite network. Political jobs were dominated by a circle of white, middle-class men connected through the city's Catholic boys' high school and Catholic college. Two of San Jose's oldest, whitest, and wealthiest neighborhoods were home to nearly every city council member throughout the entire reform period of 1945–77 (Christensen 1997).

Reformers attended to their core from the beginning of their regimes, focusing on middle-class, white constituents. They offered low, stable tax rates, efficient homeowner services, and clean government. An analysis of library building during San Jose's reform period exemplifies the beneficiaries of reform dominance. Between 1944 and 1962, the most powerful years of the reform administration, four libraries were built. All were nestled within the two neighborhoods that produced all of the city's reform politicians (San Jose Public Library 2003). Similarly, in Austin, all five branch libraries were built in neighborhoods providing

wide margins to reformers during the bias period. In San Antonio during the monopoly period, libraries in African American neighborhoods and low-income housing projects were closed. The first new branch to be built since 1930 opened in a newly annexed, affluent Anglo community. Phoenix's reform government conducted a study to determine sites for new libraries that would be most advantageous to their electoral fortunes (Bridges 1997).

Aside from gaining new libraries, middle-class migrants to the West also benefited from reform governments' responsiveness to residential developers. By granting unhindered access to surrounding open space, reform governments provided a plethora of moderately priced, suburban, single-family homes with large plots and beautiful natural surroundings.²⁵ Reform governments also increased attention on homeowner services. In return, for many years these homeowners loyally supported reform coalitions at the ballot box. However, there were costs to this style of development that would ultimately chip away at reformers' power. Residents faced traffic congestion, environmental degradation, and high costs of living. The loss of agricultural land and the elimination of the orchard industry were encouraged by Hamann and other reform leaders, who offered to rezone agricultural parcels to increase the value of the land for sale (Matthews 2003, 101). This provided a larger sale price to the growers and made more land available for development. That growth had externalities does not minimize the fact the coalitions were providing a substantial benefit to homeowners by lowering the cost of homes and increasing attention to homeowner services.

Dominance Increased Benefits for Governing Coalition Elites

The biggest winners from reform governments were the elite developers, who were so powerful that city planning was often driven wholly by their preferences. In all of these cities, the historical period with the most pronounced development and rapid growth was the monopoly period. This was no accident—the leaders of these regimes were visionaries with long-term plans for their cities, making developers key members of the coalitions. One San Jose developer explained that during the reformers' reign, he was the "closest thing to a power broker that the city had ever had" (Charles Davidson interview 2003).²⁶ Annexation decisions were based on requests submitted by developers—not on cost to existing residents or the city's ability to provide services to the new areas. Sewer lines were planned by sticking pins in a map when developers requested a connection, and built when enough pins seemed to justify a new line

(P. Trounstein and Christensen 1982). Reform coalitions also subsidized development with public funds. Developers saved about \$700 per lot in San Jose compared to neighboring Milpitas due to public funds offered for construction costs, less stringent construction requirements, and low rates on service extensions to the developments in San Jose (Stanford Environmental Law Society 1970). In Austin, when developers paid for street building and utility connections, they were repaid five times the expenditure for ten years, or until the developer's costs were totally recouped with interest. Developers, city administrators, and businesses profited tremendously from these policies. In Phoenix, a 1961 article reported that the new millionaires of the city were primarily housing developers (Martin 1961).

In machine cities, too, governing coalition elites and city officials benefited personally from dominance. Machines in Chicago, New York, New Haven, Pittsburgh, and Albany fashioned powerful governing coalitions of developers, bankers, and unions. They used redevelopment, slum clearance, and corporate development to maintain support from these elites. In Philadelphia, the Republican machine assisted utilities like the United Gas Company and the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company in establishing economic monopolies (McCaffery 1992). Three brothers connected to the Philadelphia machine, George, Edwin, and William Vare, collected nearly \$30 million in city contracts (Committee of Seventy). Many members of the governing coalition—particularly the political organizers, precinct leaders, and ward bosses—received public jobs. Forthal (1946) found that 70 percent of precinct captains in Chicago held public jobs during the mid-1920s. Other members of the coalition benefited from public contracts or partnerships and inside information. In Kansas City, Pendergast's concrete company poured "every cubic inch of material needed for the massive public works programs he relentlessly sponsored for his city" (Ward and Burns 2000, 196). Tammany's Boss Plunkitt was famous for his views on "honest graft." In his words, "If my worst enemy was given the job of writin' my epitaph when I'm gone, he couldn't do more than write 'George W. Plunkitt. He Seen His Opportunities, and He Took 'Em.'" (Riordan 1994, 6).

Machines brokered deals through which businesses provided benefits to politicians, like jobs for constituents, winter coal, or cash, in exchange for favorable policy decisions regarding business operations. In Kansas City, for example, Pendergast received a large cash payoff in exchange for orchestrating the appointment of a superintendent of insurance, who agreed to allow an increase in insurance rates. One journalist

wrote of the sheriff's position in Chicago, "Knowledgeable people had a rule of thumb at that time that if a sheriff couldn't step out of office four years later with a clear \$1,000,000 in his pocket, he just wasn't trying" (quoted in Cohen and Taylor 2000, 74). So, for many machine elites, dominating the political system and minimizing challenges to the machine's power translated into personal wealth and status.

Peripheral Groups Suffered during Monopoly Periods

While governing coalition elites and core coalition members won benefits from dominant coalitions, other members of the community suffered when public expenditures declined during periods of dominance. The lack of competition generated by the consolidation of the monopoly eliminated the power of peripheral groups to bargain for increased benefits and representation. In machine and reform cities alike, dominant coalitions faced competing demands from poor minority residents seeking integration, better school funding, a halt to police brutality and discrimination, appointment to high-level political positions, and public investment in jobs, housing, and welfare. Simultaneously, middle-class whites and business constituents preferred low-tax, service-oriented policies, and sought continued segregation in housing and education.

During the monopoly period in Chicago (and elsewhere), these conflicts were decided in favor of whites, the machine's core constituency. Using public funds, Chicago's Housing Authority became a veritable model for ghetto building, enforcing segregation, poverty, and racism. In 1957, Chicago's *Daily Defender*, the nation's leading black newspaper, editorialized, "[I]t seems strange that segregation bars are being lowered in the deep South, while in Chicago we are raising them higher!" (11). Daley, like many mayors, expressed strong support for public-housing programs, advocating assistance to people in need. In 1958, Daley traveled to Washington to convince the federal government to allow Chicago to build "low, walk-up structures that would provide apartments for large families, contain small apartments on the first floor for elderly persons, and represent a type of construction that might eventually be sold to private owners" (Buck 1958, 23).

Over time, because of the paucity of funding, the concentration of people, and the enforcement of segregation, housing developments became terrifying places to live, trapping people in prisons filled with violence and drugs. But there was no incentive for the machine to provide solutions because it did not face electoral threats, and so it remained insulated from the reality of the ghetto. Furthermore, some scholars have

argued that the machine benefited from maintaining the public-housing system because of the large numbers of patronage jobs it offered (Cohen and Taylor 2000). Continued racial violence at the edges of the ghetto and a close election in 1963 convinced Daley to pull away from efforts to promote integration in service to his white base.

Another example of machines choosing policies that placed the demands of their core supporters over peripheral groups was in the realm of school funding. In many machine cities, a large proportion of the core constituency sent their children to parochial schools (Erie 1988). This frequently made school funding a low priority. During the monopoly period, machines in this data set reduced school expenditures by nearly 6 percentage points.²⁷ In Chicago the segregation of schools became a major target of black outrage. Led by the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations, the African American community launched an effort in the early 1960s to remove the public school superintendent, Benjamin Willis, for failing to take steps to integrate the city's schools. This culminated in two large-scale boycotts by black students, a number of rallies, marches on city hall, and scathing editorials in the *Daily Defender*. The first citywide desegregation plan was issued almost twenty years later in 1980.

Machines controlled the distribution of benefits carefully. In some cities machines established Byzantine bureaucracies to ensure that only core members would receive municipal benefits. In New Haven, acquiring delivery of some services like tree pruning or waste disposal required attaining a series of permits from offices open at irregular, infrequent times. Such a system makes it possible for the bureaucracy to have a large amount of discretion in providing services, and places the onus for pursuing government benefits on the residents.

There is also substantial support for the argument that machines were highly concerned with who was awarded public jobs (see Wolfinger 1974; Stave et al. 1988). The reliance on patronage jobs as a source of municipal benefits may have had an effect on the administration of city services. There is a large literature on public bureaucracies that shows that staffing bureaus with a high proportion of political appointees makes agencies more responsive to elected officials, but at the cost of less expertise (D. Lewis 2008). There is some evidence that the pattern is similar at the local level (see Stein 1991, for example). Munro (1933) argues, "Misgovernment, in all its iniquities [*sic*], falls most heavily on the poor and on the underprivileged." He explains further, "It is they who have to put up with the dangers and the inconvenience of slipshod

building laws, lax health regulations, inefficient inspection of food and milk, uncleaned streets, overcrowded school buildings, and unsupervised playgrounds" (20). Thus, the dominant coalitions' reliance on patronage may have been the source of additional negative outcomes for residents who were peripheral to the monopoly.

In many cities urban renewal represented the provision of benefits to core coalition members and governing coalition elites at the expense of peripheral groups. For every new building that was erected, a slum was cleared, displacing more than a million residents over the course of the federal program (Anderson 1964). These decisions were not made independent of the racial and ethnic makeup of neighborhoods (Hirsch 1983). Although money for urban renewal came from the federal government, the implementation of the programs and the designation of sites of low-income housing projects were handled by local governments. In Chicago, the city council gave neighborhoods the right to "veto the construction of public housing within their borders" (Schill and Wachter 1995, 1295). The result was an extreme concentration of high-rise public housing projects in heavily black neighborhoods. In New Haven alone, Wolfinger (1974) estimates 7,000 households and 25,000 residents were moved to make way for urban renewal. While millions of dollars were spent pursuing redevelopment, the poorest residents in machine cities became poorer. New Haven spent over \$200 million in public funds on renewal programs, but by the 1970s had become the fourth-poorest city in the country. By 1989, the infant-mortality rate rivaled third-world countries in some neighborhoods, and the citywide average was the second highest in the nation.

This is not to say that leaders like New Haven's Mayor Dick Lee sought to exacerbate poverty in their cities. On the contrary, Dick Lee was wholeheartedly committed to saving New Haven from its long downward spiral (Rae 2003). However, in many places, the way in which urban-renewal programs were carried out created advantages for some and disadvantages for others because politics and policy remained closed to segments of the population. For example, in New Haven, Mayor Lee's administration organized Citizen Action Committees (CACs) to advise the redevelopment process, provide opportunities for citizen input, and generate support for governmental decisions, but Dahl (1961) argues that "except for a few trivial instances the CAC never directly initiated, opposed, vetoed or altered any proposal brought before them by the mayor and his Development Administrator" (131). Throughout the 1950s, the urban-renewal program governed by New Haven's Demo-

cratic machine relied on maps that had been developed decades earlier to determine which areas of the city to raze and replace. The maps that they used ranked neighborhoods from best to worst. Rae (2003) has argued that the hierarchy was “based as much on bigotry as land or buildings” (281). By designating predominately African American neighborhoods as slums and/or risky investments and then demolishing the community, the government instituted a self-fulfilling prophecy for these areas.

In Chicago, black anger against the machine built throughout Daley’s years in office, as the monopoly continually slighted the African American community. Issues of police brutality were actively avoided by the Democratic organization. According to the *Daily Defender*, “[T]he Chicago police force is composed largely of men who do not even bother to hide their racial bias, so strong is their hatred of the Negro. And, it is not unlikely that this anti-Negro feeling is a reflection of the people at the top” (1957, 11). In 1960, of 200 lieutenants on the police force, not one was black (*Daily Defender* 1960, A10).

When an important Black Panther leader, Fed Hampton, was shot by Chicago policemen assigned to protect Daley’s candidate for state attorney, a prominent African American congressman, Ralph Metcalfe, felt he could no longer support the Daley machine. Metcalfe openly broke with Daley, and when he next faced reelection, Daley slated a high-profile white cabinet member to run against Metcalfe in the primary. Although Metcalfe won, Daley’s decision was both meant and taken as a direct assault on Chicago and Illinois’s African American communities. To inflame the issue further, after Metcalfe’s death in office, a white machine loyalist was selected as his replacement. Similarly, when Daley’s death required that the city council appoint an acting mayor, they passed over the African American president pro tem of the city council (Preston 1982). Throughout the monopoly period in Chicago and elsewhere, blacks demanded and were denied appointments to municipal positions. “Mr. Mayor we would like to point out,” the *Daily Defender* said, “that in comparison with other cities . . . Chicago is sadly lacking in the utilization of its finest and most well-qualifies [*sic*] Negro citizens in responsible positions in your administration” (1956, 9). By 1970, blacks made up 40 percent of Chicago’s population, but only 20 percent of the municipal workforce. As of 1974, Latinos made up only 1.7 percent of the full-time city payroll (Belenchia 1982) but about 10 percent of the population.

Prior to the consolidation of the monopoly, and even during the early years of the machine’s rise to power, Chicago’s Democratic politicians reached out to the black community. For example, Mayor Ed Kelly built

a sizable black following by empowering submachine boss William Dawson, granting him control over the policy racket, appointing blacks to municipal posts, slating black candidates, and targeting blacks for government aid. He defended integrated public housing and schools and banned the movie *Birth of a Nation*.

Similarly, in New York, before the monopoly consolidated, Tammany's bosses expanded vote totals by promising benefits to Jews and Italians. During the 1910s and 1920s, the rising Hague organization in Jersey City actively courted and won the allegiance of new immigrants by converting the city hospital into a medical center and providing free health care to the city's poor. Between 1900 and 1920, competitive party pressures in Albany led politicians to mobilize newer ethnic immigrants from southern and eastern Europe by providing them with jobs and economic relief. Thus, it was only after consolidation of the monopoly that machines narrowed their focus.

Reform Periphery

Constituents on the periphery of reform monopolies also suffered while regimes were in power. Because reformers had spent much energy and many resources on separating politics from government, dissent was eliminated in the very structure of the cities' institutions. By unifying the executive and legislative branches of government and making council seats at-large, all of those in power were beholden to the same constituency. Such a structure made it appear as though the cities were homogeneous and unified, but many cities with reform governments had large populations of residents who did not always share reform views. Intense debates erupted over the placement of public works, the location of new roads and freeways, the provision of parks, libraries, and schools, and the role of labor unions in municipal government.

While reform coalitions maintained agendas that promoted growth and development, benefiting business and middle-class whites, they ignored the social needs of many residents and neglected the city's burgeoning physical problems (Abbott 1987). One of the clearest examples of this pattern is seen in Southwestern annexation policies. As cities like San Jose annexed new communities at the behest of developers, poorer communities closer to the center were not provided with basic municipal services. The Latino neighborhood known as the Mayfair District in San Jose flooded in 1952, creating a significant public health threat (Matthews 2003). The same creek overflowed its banks again in 1955, 1958, and 1962. The year that the monopoly collapsed, 1979, the water

district finally filed an application to protect the nearly 4,000 homes and businesses in the area from further damage.²⁸ In the early 1970s, residents of Alviso, a heavily Latino area, blocked a bridge, demanding that crossers pay a toll to pay for needed repairs that the city of San Jose refused to provide (Allen-Taylor 1998).

Austin's 1969 Model Cities program first focused on paving and drainage in center-city neighborhoods. Yet, the predominately African American west side of Austin did not have paved streets in some areas until 1979 (Orum 1987). Meanwhile, city government provided sewerage, streets, and utilities for all of the new developments. In Albuquerque, developers were required to set aside 4 percent of new developments for park land. By 1960, the middle class and affluent neighborhoods boasted fifty small parks and green areas, whereas the poor Valley communities had no public parks unconnected to schools. Some poor and working-class sections of Phoenix lacked municipal water and sewers because they were never annexed. As a result, they only had running water between midnight and 5 a.m. The busy annexation mill in San Antonio doubled the city's size between 1940 and 1950, but leapfrogged over older, poorer, and more heavily Latino neighborhoods. During these years, reformers promised Latino leaders that they would build drainage projects in return for support in bond elections. The bonds passed and the money was allocated, but the projects were never built (Johnson, Booth, and Harris 1983). As late as the 1980s, Mexican American communities in San Antonio and Albuquerque were beset by flooding due to inadequate drainage systems.

Reform coalitions were strategic in their choices to annex and develop. The policies were meant to benefit governing coalition elites and core members in the coalition. Rapid growth precluded development of a public transit system, which would have been highly valuable to low-income residents. New homes and jobs that the reform coalitions brought to their cities did not go to minority residents (Geilhufe 1979). In many places, the newly annexed or developed subdivisions were not open to persons of color. According to a study conducted in post-WWII San Jose, "[A]ll of the subdivisions opened within the last five or six years have written restrictions barring property from occupancy or use by all non-Caucasians except those who are working as domestics in the area" (quoted in Pitti 2003, 88). In the 1960s, when San Jose was the fastest-growing city in the nation, Mexican Americans concentrated on the East Side affectionately called one barrio *Sal Si Puedes* ("Get out if you can"). It was here that Cesar Chavez began his career organizing

the Chicano movement (Pitti 2003, 91). In 2005, Buena Vista, a poorly developed, seedy area, surrounded on all sides by San Jose, was still not annexed by the city. In San Antonio, the Good Government League directed development money to the suburbs, away from older areas that were increasingly strained by the arrival of new low-income immigrants (Johnson, Booth, and Harris 1983).

Many reform governments chose not to build low-income housing, even when federal funds were offered and demand was great. By 1977 the Santa Clara County housing task force declared that about 40 percent of households were in need of housing assistance. A report by the California Builders Association found that increasing developer profits (not increased labor or land costs) contributed most to the skyrocketing home prices between 1967 and 1977. The lack of affordable housing in San Jose meant that low-income residents were often forced to move outside city bounds, first to Alviso and later to Gilroy or Morgan Hill.

Those Latinos who stayed in San Jose lobbied for low-cost housing, improved services, an end to discriminatory housing practices, and better, integrated schools on the East Side. A report of schools endangered by inadequate protection against earthquakes showed that all seventeen schools in serious risk were located in Mexican American communities on the East Side. Latino communities deteriorated relative to white neighborhoods throughout the monopoly period, and segregation worsened (Alesch and Levine 1973). The city responded to these demands primarily with symbolic gestures, creating a Human Relations Board and a program to track the race and ethnicity of city employees. According to Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984), San Jose's Model Cities program had a very small budget and was largely used to "insulate city hall from minority demands, to minimize opposition . . . and to divert minority discontent away from city hall toward the leaders of the programs" (217-18). In 1971, San Jose police stopped a black IBM research chemist for a traffic violation and shot him when he attempted to run away. Outraged residents protested in front of city hall and filled council meetings, demanding action (Christensen 1997). But the governing coalition had no incentive to be responsive to minority demands. The institutions that it had created and the culture of nonparticipation that it cultivated kept reformers safely in office.

Inequities in school funding were another legacy of the monopoly period in many reform cities. Until 1953, California law mandated that school district boundaries be coterminous with city boundaries. If a city annexed territory, the school district in the existing territory would be

dismantled. As a result, school administrators frequently opposed annexations. At the request of San Jose's assembly representative, the legislature changed the law to disconnect school and city boundaries. The legacy of this change has been extreme fragmentation of San Jose's school systems, and vast inequalities in the school tax bases among the city's different neighborhoods (see Matthews 2003 for a detailed account).

There is evidence that diverse views existed in reform cities throughout the monopoly period. In Austin, during the early 1960s, African Americans joined with sympathetic whites to protest the policies of segregation in the city. They met with city council members, developed ordinances, and offered legal advice to city leaders about how integration could be achieved. At multiple council meetings, the group presented its case. At one meeting in late March 1963, the head of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People "launched into a wordy tirade against prejudice and discrimination," reading passages from John Howard Griffin's *Black Like Me* (Orum 1987, 259-60). One by one, leaders of the movement came forward to speak, maintaining a filibuster for two full weeks. It is not a tenable position that the city government was unaware of the demands and dissatisfaction of Austin's minority community.

After a disastrous flood in East San Jose in 1952, a newly consolidated Mexican American political group, the Community Service Organization (CSO), began a massive voter-registration drive among Latino residents. In that year alone, 4,000 new voters were registered (Pitti 2003, 167). The response of the white elite makes it clear that they noticed the mobilization. On election day, city leaders dispatched an increased number of poll watchers to Mexican neighborhoods. At one site, four voters were turned away for failing the literacy test. Immediately, CSO sent representatives to the polling place and proved that the challenged voters could in fact read and write English (Pitti 2003).

Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, San Jose residents began to question untrammled growth, argue for increased debate on planning and growth policy, and ask that the city require any new development to "constitute a 'net benefit' to the entire community rather than promoting growth for its own sake" (a San Jose citizens committee report, "Goals for San Jose," quoted in Stanford Environmental Law Society 1970, 31). During this period, San Jose lost out on the race to secure defense spending because the city had failed to develop adequate infrastructure to support the military's needs (Schoennauer interview 2003). In a 1973 Rand Corporation Study, researchers interviewed residents to

determine what kind of living environment they preferred. Interviewees were provided with fifty options that they proceeded to rank from most to least desirable. The choices ranged from things like "a place where people of different races and different ethnic groups can live together—where their children can learn to understand each other" to "a trailer park that is well protected, with small plots, lots of community recreation, little shops within its boundaries" (Christen 1973, 6). Other choices highlighted the importance of the environment, high incomes, or public transportation. The authors of the study found so much variation in the responses that they were unable to draw definite conclusions about the community's preferences. They did find that Anglo and Mexican American residents shared many of the same preferences, but one key difference stood out. Anglos were more concerned about environmental protection while Mexican Americans found a good bus system of utmost importance.²⁹ The authors also determined that the differences between the preferences of Anglo residents and Mexican American residents were much less stark than the dissimilarities between the city planners and the residents as a whole. Despite the diverse views among community members and elites, dominant coalitions governing in biased electoral arenas responded to a narrowly defined constituency.

As in the case of machines, during periods prior to the consolidation of reform monopolies, politicians sought support from a broader public. During the 1930s, Austin's city council made improvements to the city hospital, opened a new public swimming pool, and launched an intensive drive against syphilis. The city hired a "paid Negro director in charge of recreation for his own people," established a "Negro advisory committee" (H. Stone, Price, and K. Stone 1937, 7), and built a black library and black parks. In the late 1930s, Austin built three public-housing projects with federal dollars, one for blacks, one for Mexican Americans, and one for whites (Orum 1987). In 1949, an additional project for African Americans was built on the East Side.

Of course, Austin was still an extremely segregated city—a deliberate creation by white leaders. However, these leaders *did* assert that a segregated community could be equal. Austin city planners sought to enforce segregation by enhancing city services in only one of the African American neighborhoods, encouraging blacks to vacate other parts of the city. According to the zoning report:

It is our recommendation that the nearest approach to the solution of the race segregation problem will be the recommendation of this district as a

Negro district; and that all the facilities and conveniences be provided the Negroes in this district, as an incentive to draw the Negro population to this area. This will eliminate the necessity of duplication of white and black schools, white and black parks, and other duplicate facilities for this area. . . . We further recommend that the Negro schools in this area be provided with ample and adequate playground space and facilities similar to the white schools of the city. (quoted in Orum 1987, 175)

Similarly, a zoning report in Dallas explained that the "plan that is prepared should provide districts for negroes and Mexicans, giving them the same facilities as whites, that is, wide paved streets, standard size lots, and all of the public utilities. In this way, there will be no slums or blighted districts. . . ." (quoted in Orum 1987, 175).

Neither Dallas nor Austin succeeded at creating separate and equal facilities. Because of their excluded status and the lack of electoral competition, communities of color had no power to bargain for benefits. They had virtually no descriptive (much less substantive) representatives in elected and appointed positions. In 1971, Latinos made up only 5.5 percent of San Jose's police and fire forces, but composed 22 percent of the population, according to the 1970 census. In 1978, the city was threatened with a loss of federal general revenue funds for the inadequate hiring of Latinos (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). This lack of services provided to peripheral groups was in distinct contrast to other periods of these cities' histories in which peripheral residents were incorporated into political coalitions that faced risky elections and offered shares of municipal benefits.

Conclusion

In both machine and reform cities, securing dominance made governing coalitions less attentive to the broader public. When the electoral system became uncompetitive, groups outside of the monopoly coalition could not easily contest the hand that they were dealt. Biased systems allowed dominant organizations to reduce the size of their electoral coalitions, conserve resources, and reward key players. During the monopoly period, turnout declined as dominant regimes demobilized voters peripheral to their coalitions. Secure in power, monopolies directed benefits of municipal government toward core members and powerful governing coalition elites, while peripheral groups suffered. In nearly all of the cases analyzed here, those peripheral to the coalition were persons of color. In the reform cities, suffrage restrictions and vote-dilution

strategies ensured that black, Latino, and Asian Americans were limited from participating in the political process. The same outcome resulted in machine cities as an effect of the organizations' maintenance strategies—responsiveness to the preferences of the monopoly's core supporters. Those outside of the coalition were provided symbolic benefits, ignored, and at times attacked by the monopolist in power.

The text in this section is extremely faint and largely illegible. It appears to be a continuation of the academic analysis, possibly discussing the political strategies of monopolies and their impact on various groups. The text is too light to transcribe accurately.

