Also by Richard Pells

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# NOT LIKE US

## *How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*

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# *Preface*

Early on a frigid morning in January 1979, I arrived in Amster dam. For years, I had fantasized about living in a foreign cul ture. Now I was in Europe for the first time in my life, on the brink o an adventure in a strange land with strange customs, knowing no one unable to speak the language, not sure what I was supposed to do o how I would be expected to behave.

I had departed Austin—a place filled with friends and familia sights, my home for nearly a decade—the previous afternoon and hac flown all night from Houston. I disembarked at Schiphol, an airpor noted for its modernity and efficiency but not for any qualities tha might be described as exotically Dutch. My instructions were to tak an airport bus to the KLM terminal on the Museumplein, and then taxi to the Fulbright Commission office on Reguliersgracht. At first gazing out the window of the taxi at the bright yellow trams and th bridges spanning the quaint canals, I felt that I was indeed no longe in America, a country where streetcars were abolished ages ago anc any surviving canals would have been considered an obstacle to urbar progress. But then, as we sped past the gabled houses of seventeenth century Amsterdam, the taxi driver switched on the radio, and I hearc the voice of . . . Willie Nelson. I had just traveled ten hours and thou sands of miles, crossing an ocean and landing on a different continent only to discover that I had not left America or even Austin behind.

At that moment, I was looking at one culture while listening tc another. The juxtaposition of Europe's sights and America's sound

came to symbolize for me the way that each culture collided with and depended on the other. It suggested as well the mutual infatuation and frustration that has marked the relationship between the two continents for centuries. The sense of conflict and entanglement—the ambivalence that shaped the personal, political, and cultural confrontations between Europeans and Americans—was what I encountered regularly in Amsterdam. These contradictory feelings became the inspiration for and a central theme of this book.

But I did not yet know that this was a book I wanted to write. That epiphany came several years later while I was living and teaching in Copenhagen. In the fall of 1983 I was invited to give a lecture in Czechoslovakia, at the University of Brno. After my pontifications on the "Americanness" of American culture, delivered to a group of bewildered students languishing (no doubt) behind the Iron Curtain, the rector of the university asked me to sign a guest book. He showed me as well the first postwar guest book, before the darkness descended upon his country. The year was 1947. The first name on the first page was F. O. Matthiessen, one of the giants of the American Studies movement in the United States and the author of *American Renaissance*, a classic interpretation of the works of Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, and Whitman.

I knew that Matthiessen had lectured in Czechoslovakia because in 1948 he published a book about his experiences there. He called it *From the Heart of Europe*, but the book got him into a lot of political trouble in the heart of America because he sympathized entirely too much with the goals of the Czech Communists. And 1948—when the Soviets blockaded Berlin and completed their Stalinization of Eastern Europe—was definitely the wrong year for an American writer to tell his fellow citizens that they should be more tolerant of their Communist enemies.

Peering at Matthiessen's signature, however, I realized that I was part of a tradition, another American lecturer bringing enlightenment to the benighted Europeans, espousing the virtues of the United States to an audience ready to acknowledge that intellectual leadership had long since passed from the Old World to the New. I wondered how and why that tradition began. What was Matthiessen doing in Brno? What was I doing in Brno?

The answer, I thought, lay in the alliance between American culture and Washington's foreign policy, an alliance that began on the eve of World War II and then flourished during the Cold War. The U.S.



government regarded culture as an important weapon in the contest with the Soviet Union. It was thus in America's strategic interest to establish the Fulbright program, open "America Houses" in West Germany, finance the Salzburg Seminar and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and send professors to Europe to lecture on American history and literature. Those of us who later found ourselves teaching and speaking at conferences in Europe were never told what to say, but we were serving (whether we wished to or not) as representatives of the United States in the eyes of our government.

This was a point driven home to me by the American ambassador to Denmark. The ambassador had asked me if he could attend one of my classes at the University of Copenhagen, just to see what the students were like. On the way to the classroom, he seemed befuddled about who arranged for me to come to Copenhagen. Had I been hired by the university? By some private foundation? By the Danish government? I informed him that I was in Copenhagen on a Fulbright grant. "Oh," he exclaimed: "*We* hired you."

Apparently, the ambassador believed that he and his supervisors back in Washington had hired me to persuade the Danes to become more like Americans. This mission, though, did not originate with the Cold War.

For nearly four centuries, the inhabitants of America presumed that they were a chosen people, a model society, and that everyone else either wanted to come to the new Eden or construct a replica of it in their own lands. Since most foreigners were unable to flee to America, they could at least follow America's example from afar. And Americans would aid them in their quest. By the twentieth century, well before the titanic confrontation between Washington and Moscow, American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of the Hollywood studios, were selling not only their products but also America's culture and values, the secrets of its success, to the rest of the world.

The government came late to this enterprise. But when officials in Washington tried to "reeducate" the Germans, or offered Europeans the Marshall Plan, or helped Hollywood reclaim its European markets, or defended the ideals of free trade in the face of Europe's cultural protectionism, they were acting on a set of assumptions rooted in America's Puritan and Jeffersonian past, and in its more entrepreneurial present. If—with assistance from America—people elsewhere were given the same democratic freedoms and the same economic

skills, if they modernized along American lines, if they purchased American consumer goods and learned English well enough to enjoy America's mass culture, then they would surely turn into "Americans" themselves.

Yet what if people abroad do not want to be just like us? What if they adopt our methods, buy our products, watch our movies and television shows, listen to our music, eat our fast food, and visit our theme parks, but refuse to embrace our way of life? What if they insist on remaining "foreign," un-American, even anti-American?

Europeans have been exposed more than anyone else to the full force of America's economic, political, and cultural power in the twentieth century. Western Europeans, in particular, have been the primary targets of Washington's attention since 1945. Nevertheless, the longer I lived and traveled in Europe, the more I recognized that the American government's role in expanding America's cultural influence overseas was only a small part of the story. In addition, I became increasingly convinced that America's culture—whether transmitted by Washington or by Hollywood—had not significantly altered the values or behavioral patterns of most people in Western Europe.

So, by the end of the Cold War in 1989, I had grown more interested in Europe's response to the totality of American culture, not just to those elements that Washington elected to advertise. I still intended to write about America's desire to transport its culture to Europe. But I also wanted to analyze the reactions of Europe's politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and filmmakers to American culture. I wanted as well to understand the attitudes of ordinary Europeans, as reflected in their replies to questionnaires and opinion polls, and in the American products and forms of entertainment they accepted or spurned.

My book, therefore, deals as much with Europe as it does with America. I argue throughout that the "Americanization" of Europe is a myth. A powerful and enduring myth, often cherished by the Europeans themselves because they can use it to explain how their societies have changed in ways they don't like, but a myth nonetheless.

It is true that in the Cold War years Britain, Scandinavia, and the countries of Western Europe surrendered much of their political and economic independence to the United States. It is also true that the U.S. government, along with America's corporations and the American media, exported their ideas and their merchandise to postwar Europe on a much greater scale than in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.



Still, despite the flood of American products, the undeniable impact of America's mass culture, and Washington's efforts to make Europeans more appreciative of American foreign policy, Western Europe did not become a miniature version of the United States. Nor were Europeans passive victims of America's "cultural imperialism." Instead, the people of Western Europe adapted American culture to their own needs, tastes, and traditions, ultimately "Europeanizing" whatever they received from the United States. Through a process of resistance and modification, each country in Western Europe was able to preserve its cultural distinctiveness no matter how strong were the temptations to imitate America.

Furthermore, the relationship between Europe and the United States in the last half of the twentieth century has not been as one-sided as European politicians and intellectuals have usually charged. Americans are as affected by European products and fashions as Europeans are influenced by American technology and mass entertainment. The result is a complex interaction between different and increasingly heterogeneous cultures and societies.

So heterogeneous, in fact, that to talk about "America" or "Europe" as if either were a unified whole is mostly a matter of verbal convenience. I am conscious of the enormous differences among the countries and cultures of Europe. Indeed, I have concentrated on Western Europe—especially on Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway—because America's cultural presence in Eastern Europe was severely limited during the Cold War. I am equally mindful of how culturally diversified the United States has always been. Yet I believe it is possible to generalize about the cultural dissimilarities between "America" and "Europe." Certainly, the Europeans have never hesitated to do so. As a Dutch friend once said to me, "we know what we mean when we refer to America's culture—your culture—because we live with it every day."

Americans live with it too. And not always happily. When they travel abroad, hoping to experience the idiosyncratic charms of other countries, they are often horrified by the extent to which foreign lands seem—superficially—Americanized. The new hotels and office buildings gleam just as they do at home; the shops sell Nikes and Levi's; the movie marquees publicize the latest Arnold Schwarzenegger epic; a Burger King is just around the corner.

But for many Americans, the effects of America's mass culture and its global economy are even more unsettling within the United States.

Americans are as ambivalent about what it means to be modern, computerized, and technologically sophisticated—attributes synonymous with the American way of life—as are Europeans. The fear of losing one's unique cultural heritage as one becomes an affluent consumer of America's goods and services, movies, and mass circulation magazines is as strong in the United States as it is in Europe.

Hispanic and Asian American parents, worried about the attractions of a homogeneous American culture, want their children to remain bilingual and remember the traditions of the old country while they strive to enter the white middle class. Native Americans try to hold on to their sacred customs and ceremonies even while they run casinos on tribal lands. African Americans are torn between their allegiance to the neighborhood—with its indigenous culture, its history, and its collective aspirations—and their yearning to escape its dangers and decay. Jews are uncomfortable with intermarriage despite their assimilation into American society. People in Charleston or Savannah or Austin welcome economic development as long as they do not have to jettison their small-town amenities and become "another Houston."

For Americans and Europeans alike, the problem is how to live in two different worlds—one global, the other local or regional—while reaping the benefits of both. Because the Europeans have withstood the barrage of America's products and culture, because they have been able to preserve to some extent their national and ethnic identities while participating fully in the modern global economy, they might now be in a position to teach the Americans a more valuable lesson than the Americans ever taught them.

Perhaps, then, my analysis of the European encounter with America's culture during the twentieth century may say more to Americans than it does about Europe. Yet as an American who has come to think of Amsterdam as his "home" outside the United States, but who discovered in Copenhagen (along with the Danes) the addictive joys of watching *Dallas*, I know how confusing it can be to live in two distinct but intermingled cultures at the same time. So I have tried in this book to maintain a dual sensibility—to convey what it has been like for Europeans to live uneasily and often reluctantly with America's culture, while explaining why that culture has captivated millions of people not only in Europe but all over the world.

When the taxi deposited me at the Fulbright Commission in Amsterdam on that January morning in 1979, Minke Krings was waiting outside to take me in hand. Her official responsibility had been to arrange for my housing, which turned out to be in a flat without a stove and with a bathroom several yards down an unheated hall. This is how I discovered that the Dutch (or many of them) lived rather differently from suburban Americans. But Minke also became my first friend in Europe, helping me to unravel the Continent's mysteries, offering her advice and wisdom whenever I asked, roles she has played in my life ever since.



Many other Europeans over the years have been instrumental in teaching me about their countries and cultures. Three were especially significant as I worked on this book. Renate Semler of the America House in Berlin set up innumerable speaking engagements for me, both in her own city and in eastern Germany. More important, she allowed me a glimpse of what her life had been like from her childhood in the shadows of World War II, through the turbulence of West Berlin in the 1960s, to the contemporary reemergence of the city as one of the great cultural capitals of Europe. And she did so while ignoring (I like to think) my periodic outbursts of anxiety and frustration. Christopher Wilkins, for many years the person at the U.S. embassy in London every itinerant American lecturer depended upon for scheduling and long-distance hand-holding, displayed inordinate patience while sending me on excursions, sometimes on airlines of dubious distinction, from Belgium to Bulgaria. Without his assistance, I could not have had the professional or personal encounters that enabled me to learn and ultimately write about Europe. Rob Kroes, director of the America Institute at the University of Amsterdam, invited me to lecture at conferences at precisely those moments when I was trying to refine my ideas. He too had the forbearance to listen and the willingness to encourage me, without letting on that he knew far more about the subject than I did.

In the United States, several people have been just as supportive. When I was wrestling in the early stages of the project with how to approach the material, Shannon Davies helped me understand the prewar experiences of American scientists in Europe and the centrality of the European migration to America in the 1930s. More than that, she made me feel that I could and should write this book. In Washington, Bill Bate and Judy Siegel endured my brief and not particularly memorable incarnation as a government servant (I was in 1985–86 the grandly titled but underemployed "Resident Scholar in American Studies" with the United States Information Agency).

Later, they both read portions of the manuscript, corrected my mistakes, pointed me in the right directions, and probably hoped their names would not be mentioned in these acknowledgments. Susan Glenn also read several chapters, asked me hard questions I had preferred not to consider, and spent long hours on the telephone exchanging therapeutic remedies for whatever ailed either of us. Above all, she was an intimate and invaluable friend on those many occasions when I needed her.

I have been fortunate to receive institutional and editorial support, again when I most needed it. Nearly all Fulbright grantees talk about how much the award changed their lives. It certainly changed mine. I would not have conceived of this book without the two Fulbright lectureships I had at the universities of Amsterdam and Copenhagen. I am equally grateful to USIA for giving me the opportunity to see how the agency operated, and to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the University of Texas for the fellowships and financial aid that permitted me to embark on the research and gave me time to think and to write. Responding (I hope cheerfully) to my perennial requests for their testimonials, David Oshinsky, Stephen Whitfield, Allen Matusow, and William Chafe wrote more letters of recommendation on my behalf than they could have ever envisioned when they first became my friends and colleagues. For this, they have my lasting gratitude. Steve Fraser demonstrated his interest and editorial expertise from the moment I first talked to him about the project, while Paul Golob proved to be a shrewd and skillful editor who knew how to make a book better than it might otherwise have been.

Finally, Molly Dougherty read every word, told me what she liked and disliked, persuaded me to alter my prose (which I sometimes did grudgingly though I knew she was always right), and made me cherish her extraordinary mixture of courage and curiosity. She has shared my travels and my life, while challenging me to reexamine my assumptions—intellectual and emotional—every step of the way. This book, then, is hers too.

# NOT LIKE US

# ONE

# *Cultural Relations Before 1945*

During the first half of the twentieth century, according to the conventional wisdom, the United States was a minor and fitful participant in the planet's crises, a force to be reckoned with only because of its economic dynamism. Europe, though considerably weakened as a consequence of World War I, was still the center of the Western world, politically and culturally. America remained on the periphery, affected by but relatively detached from Europe's problems and preoccupations.

World War II changed all that. The war transformed America into a global power. It also dramatically altered the relationship between the United States and Europe. Until America entered the war, the ties between the two continents seemed looser, the contacts more intermittent, than they were to be after 1945. Americans and Europeans appeared to inhabit their own separate worlds, however much they shared a common cultural heritage. Then, in the postwar years, the United States became intimately involved in European affairs, overseeing Western Europe's economic recovery and its political destiny.

But viewed from another angle, World War II did not represent such a sharp departure from the past. If anything, the war deepened the bonds and accentuated the controversies that had existed between

the United States and Europe long before 1945. The issues over which Americans and Europeans argued after the war—whether America should be a model for Europe, the impact on Europe of American products and investments, the influence of Hollywood and other manifestations of America's mass culture, the need for Europeans to resist the "Americanization" of their societies—were all very much a part of the transatlantic dialogue in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In truth, there was never a moment when the Old World and the New were not politically and culturally intertwined, or at odds over what each meant to the other. From the instant the first British settlers landed in Massachusetts and Virginia, Americans began telling their story proudly and loudly to the Europeans they had left behind. And Europe listened with a mixture of awe and bemusement, fascination and envy, empathy and exasperation. No American longings for disentanglement and isolation, no European feelings of unease and distrust, prevented people on both continents from indulging in a persistent and not altogether healthy obsession with one another.

Yet much of the conversation between the United States and Europe, before and after 1945, has been characterized more by an exchange of metaphors than by a sharing of information. For many Europeans, "America" was and is a symbol; a receptacle for fears and fantasies; a state of mind, rather than a real country. Americans, for their part, have regarded "Europe" as equally fictional. Both continents have indulged in the language of melodrama to portray the "other."

This flight to the realm of imagination has made it enormously difficult for Americans and Europeans to understand one another. But the resort to hyperbole, to the search for portents and hidden meanings, to interpretations more suitable for dreams and nightmares, also explains why the cultural and political connections between the United States and Europe have been so intense and so intriguing for so long.

## The New World and the Old

The idea of a "new" world, located somewhere beyond the boundaries and horizons of the known world, had inspired European explorers for centuries. The legend turned into reality when they stumbled upon the continent they named America. But the concept of a new world



quickly became, for Americans and for Europeans, a means of distinguishing between two entirely different civilizations. The dichotomy between new and old had not just geographic but normative significance: It pointed to a disparate set of values and attributes; it emphasized antagonistic ideals and patterns of behavior; it helped the people of each continent define their separate identities by using the other as a foil, a negative image, a lesson in what to avoid.

From the beginning, it was natural for Americans, as people who had escaped the political, religious, or economic constraints of Europe, to think of themselves and their environment as unique. The rhetoric of the earliest Puritan sermons portrayed America as a new promised land, a City Upon a Hill, a chance to start over and do it better, a model community for the rest of the world to emulate. By the late eighteenth century, at the time of the Revolution and the writing of the Constitution, the language had become secularized but it conveyed the same message: America would be different, exceptional, a place of infinite opportunity and possibility for all who settled there. A vast untapped and unspoiled continent beckoned. Americans were embarked on a special errand into the wilderness.

For eighteenth-century colonists and nineteenth-century immigrants, such notions led inevitably to an assertion of superiority. But the claim that America was more admirable and more virtuous rested on a series of contrasts that allegedly differentiated the United States from Europe. The polarities were simple yet compelling. America embodied innocence, youthfulness, vigor, confidence, optimism, freedom, and (once the wilderness was conquered) prosperity and modernity. Europe represented deviousness, cynicism, corruption, decadence, fatigue, poverty, social and ideological conflict, war.[1] This type of discourse—self-congratulatory, heavily moralistic, serene in its conviction that America was good and Europe was evil—had grown familiar by the early nineteenth century and remained central to America's image of itself as a real and symbolic alternative to Europe through much of the twentieth century.

But these beliefs concealed a sense of fear. If many Europeans were susceptible to certain strains of anti-Americanism during the years of the Cold War, Americans in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries were equally worried about an outbreak on their own continent of the "European" disease. America might not achieve its visionary aspirations if it were to lapse into European patterns of living and thinking. To prevent this from happening, Europe in all its manifestations had to be repudiated. Thus, the founding fathers, particularly

Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, warned against the erection of large European-style cities with their physical congestion, frustrated mobs, and social dislocations. Similarly, they deplored the factionalizing effects of European politics, with their tendency to set class against class, and they tried to create constitutional mechanisms that would neutralize the power of contending groups and restrain ideological strife. Their admonitions were repeated throughout the nineteenth century, even as America became more industrialized, more urbanized, and more vulnerable to wars and social disturbances within its own borders. Indeed, the more the United States began to resemble Europe, the more the Jeffersonian maxims were invoked. Yet the hope persisted that if Americans avoided a repetition of Europe's political and cultural experience, they could live free of the depravity, the historic intrigues, and the periodic upheavals of the Old World.

On the other side of the ocean, the New World-Old World duality was frequently reversed. From Europe's perspective, America appeared irredeemably materialistic, avaricious, frantic, violent, crude, without spirit or soul—in vivid contrast to the mature, tolerant, sophisticated, socially conscious, and responsible European civilization that was adept at creating and preserving the amenities of human life (no inkling here of Nazism, Stalinism, and two world wars, all lurking in the future). Most of these stereotypes were formed in the early nineteenth century and endured well into the twentieth. The impressions of American childishness and vulgarity were reinforced by the reports of nineteenth-century European travelers and journalists. They described a land populated by savages, none of them conspicuously noble. Greed ruled. Machines dominated every human activity. Slavery was barbaric, but conditions in northern factories were no better. The West was immune to law and refinement. Everywhere, people were culturally illiterate, indifferent to the very existence of music, painting, and literature. For French observers in particular (Alexis de Tocqueville aside), Americans lacked the sort of cultivation and taste so characteristic of France—a judgment that would shape French attitudes toward America throughout the twentieth century.[2]

The European view of a dangerous, uncivilized, even barbaric America revealed fears similar to those the Americans had of Europe. Just as Americans dreaded the creeping "Europeanization" of their own country, so European writers held up "America" as a somber warning of the fate that could befall Europe if it succumbed to the American example. The idea that each continent might be a moral and symbolic menace to the other was hard to relinquish; it retained a permanent grip on the imagination of intellectuals and ordinary people, both in Europe and in the United States.



For immigrant Americans, Europe was at least a place they could remember, if only to measure how much their lives had changed in the New World. But for those Europeans who remained behind, America served as a myth, an abstraction to be used for any number of often-conflicting purposes. Untroubled by the need to test their theories against the realities of American life, they invented a land overflowing with their own mixed emotions. The European image of America was never fixed. Depending on who was speaking, America could be either fascinating or appalling, a repository of hope or horror.[3]

In the nineteenth century, as after 1945, the contradictory appraisals of America usually corresponded to class. In the eyes of European aristocrats and wealthy members of the bourgeoisie, America was a nightmare threatening to obliterate all respect for tradition, culture, privilege, and social position. Frightened by the legacies of the American and French revolutions, suspicious of democratic appeals to freedom and equality, the European elite saw in the New World mostly radicalism and anarchy.[4]

But the apprehensions of British, French, and German conservatives were always counterbalanced by the magnetic attraction America exerted on Europe's lower classes and reform-minded intellectuals. For European workers, craftsmen, peasants, liberal and socialist activists—most of whom were prospective immigrants to the United States—America seemed not only a new Eden but a promise of redemption for the common folk. In this view, the United States was a gigantic political and economic laboratory in which the libertarian and egalitarian ideals of the eighteenth-century revolutions could be tested, modified, improved, and implemented.[5] Here, for people who experienced daily the poverty and oppressiveness of the Polish ghetto, the Italian village, or the Irish farm, the chance for advancement appeared real and visible. Letters from friends and relatives who had already settled in America confirmed this sense of mobility and expansiveness. The references to the steady increases in one's income, the chronicle of the move from the first tenement to a better neighborhood, and the pride in the vaulting aspirations of one's children were all unmistakable signs that in America the horizons looked broader, economically and psychologically. The encrusted institutions of Europe need not be overthrown; they could simply be abandoned in the journey across the ocean. The success of the democratic experiment depended not on rebellion but on flight.

Sympathy for America among the poor and the less affluent middle class sometimes ascended to the level of worship and wish fulfillment. It was difficult for the European masses to resist the fable that in America the streets were paved with gold, and that the newcomers could rise from rags to respectability if not to riches. To a considerable extent, these tales represented a moral and social rejection of the European status quo.

Yet by the late nineteenth century, Europe was itself changing, as were the attitudes of Europe's political and economic leaders toward the United States. Especially in Germany, where trade with America became increasingly important, businessmen began to admire American technology and industrial efficiency. German politicians saw in America's overseas policies an analog to their own imperial ambitions. The growing presence of American power, the emergence in the early twentieth century of Theodore Roosevelt (whose disdain for pacifism and faith in the destiny of strong nations sounded so familiar to contemporary German ears), encouraged a reevaluation of the United States among the elites not only of Germany but also of Britain and France.[6]

Despite the variations in Europe's portrait of the United States, and however much the European image of America differed from America's view of itself, there was one matter on which everyone appeared to agree. Culturally, America was a province, its literature a pale replica of Britain's, its regional art overshadowed by the achievements of the French modernists, its music and philosophy hardly a serious challenge to Germany's reign.[7] No one shared these perceptions more than America's own intellectuals and cultural arbiters. From the nineteenth century on, publishers and museum directors traveled to Europe to buy up the latest masterpieces. Meanwhile, American novelists, poets, artists, musicians and composers, scientists, and social critics assumed that their works were inferior to those of their counterparts in Europe—that one had to go to London or Paris or Rome or Berlin or Vienna to learn how to write or paint and even to think. Some stayed permanently: Henry James, T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Gertrude Stein. Others became temporary expatriates, absorbing as much as they could of Europe's art and ideas. But through the 1920s, the feeling that American culture was shallow, derivative, second rate, lacking in social texture and intellectual complexity, would not subside no matter how many Hawthornes, Melvilles, Twains, Faulkners, or Hemingways the nation produced.

During the nineteenth century, given their lack of substantive knowledge about each other, Americans and Europeans found it equally easy to maintain the mythic distinctions between the New World and the Old. At the dawn of the twentieth century, however, Americans and Europeans began to encounter one another more directly and in greater numbers. If their language and mental constructions remained largely the same, the nature of their relationship was about to radically change.



## The American Impact on Europe in the Early Twentieth Century

In 1901, the British journalist William Stead published a book called *The Americanization of the World*. Whatever the author's intent, the title sounded ominous, and it was to reverberate throughout the twentieth century. In fact, the term *Americanization* originated in Britain in the 1830s, and it had spread across the rest of Europe by the 1850s. Initially, the word referred to America's mechanical inventions and technological ingenuity, phenomena that both intrigued and repelled Europe's statesmen and intellectuals. But once the United States had matured into a major industrial and military power at the beginning of the twentieth century, Europeans started to pay attention to America's influence and fear its economic and cultural intrusiveness.[8]

No event better demonstrated America's arrival as a significant force in European affairs than World War I. "The United States for the first time became an important element in my thought," the Norwegian Sigmund Skard recalled. Skard, who became one of the principal architects of the American Studies movement in Europe after 1945, was originally attracted to the United States by the charisma and visionary internationalism of Woodrow Wilson. Skard also remembered the war as a time when "there was a general feeling of fellowship between democratic Europe and democratic America." In his eyes, the war against imperial Germany reminded the British, the French, and the Italians of their common political heritage with the United States. It also taught the European allies that America could no longer be ignored.[9]

The spectacle of democratic solidarity, which Skard found so inspiring, may not have materialized spontaneously. In April 1917, one week after the United States entered the war, President Wilson authorized the creation of the Committee on Public Information, installing his former campaign aide and editor of the *Rocky Mountain*

*News,* George Creel, as its director. The committee's primary mission (and the source of its subsequent notoriety) was to sell the war to the American people—not a simple task in view of the divisions in public opinion and the vocal opposition of many politicians and intellectuals. But Creel's efforts were aimed at an international audience as well. Employing most of the techniques that came to be identified with twentieth-century propaganda, Creel enlisted advertising executives, filmmakers, newspapermen, playwrights, and anyone else with the skills and experience to publicize the Wilsonian dream of a world made safe for democracy. Creel and his colleagues designed posters, put together exhibits, and issued pamphlets describing the American way of life to unenlightened foreigners. His agents dropped leaflets behind enemy lines. The committee opened reading rooms overseas to acquaint people with American books and magazines, and offered them free courses in the English language to facilitate their conversion to American values. It brought foreign journalists to the United States to increase their understanding of America's objectives in the war. Creel's film division made documentaries and organized tours of Hollywood stars to familiarize other nations with American products and ideals. Finally, the committee made sure that Wilson's speeches and photographs were distributed everywhere. With all these devices, Creel hoped to portray the United States as a prosperous and democratic society that was worthy of emulation throughout the world.

Abroad, Creel's tactics might well have helped strengthen the sense of shared purpose among the Allies, at least until the goals of democracy and peace without victory crumbled at Versailles. At home, he was mistrusted and attacked. Disturbed by the manipulative and propagandistic aspects of Creel's crusade, Congress abolished his committee in 1919.[10] Nevertheless, Creel's endeavors were not entirely forgotten; they served as a precedent for the government's more exuberant embrace of political and cultural propaganda during and after World War II.

The majority of Europeans, however, were dazzled less by America's democratic virtues than by its natural resources and industrial efficiency. The economic superiority of the United States was clearly on display in the mechanized equipment, organization, and energy of the 2-million-man army it quickly raised and dispatched to France. Compared to countries exhausted by four years of military carnage, America seemed innovative, adaptable, and immensely powerful. The admiration of the Europeans was tempered with some irritation and



jealousy, especially on the part of the French who resented (as they would for the rest of the century) their excessive political and economic dependence on the "Anglo-Saxons." The British too were anxious about America's potential economic preeminence. Germans, on the other hand, attributed their defeat to material rather than military prowess, and thus were more eager to imitate American economic techniques.[11] Yet the lesson of the war was unmistakable: The United States no longer languished as an appendage to Europe, backward and marginal. America was now at the center, a symbol of modernity and an exemplar of success.

In many ways, America's impact on Europe following World War I was a precursor of what happened, on a much larger scale, after 1945. The United States had emerged by the 1920s as a formidable, though not yet dominant, influence in European life. But it was during this decade that America embarked on policies that eventually led to its economic and cultural supremacy. And the ambivalent reactions of European politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals anticipated the greater confusion of their successors about how to understand and cope with the "Americanization" of their continent in the second half of the twentieth century.

Economically, Europeans had been feeling the presence of the United States even before the 1920s. In the late nineteenth century, American companies began to sell more of their industrial products to Europe, in contrast to the earlier years of the century when the United States depended primarily on agricultural exports. This shift was due to a growing reliance on machines, assembly lines, and mass production. American companies were thus able to produce high-quality goods more cheaply and offer them at lower prices than could most of their European competitors who were still largely craft oriented. As a result, by the early twentieth century, American-made telephones, typewriters, sewing machines, cash registers, elevators, cameras, phonographs, toothpaste, and packaged foods became popular items in the European marketplace.[12]

Exports were not the only or the most important form of American economic penetration. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, American corporations purchased factories, established subsidiaries, and expanded their investments in selected European countries. The names of American companies—Singer, International Harvester, General Electric, Westinghouse, H. J. Heinz, American Tobacco, Carnation Milk—were increasingly recognizable to Europeans. With investments and the creation of branch plants came the potential

for managerial control, a tendency that Europe's political and economic leaders noticed and disliked.[13]

Building on these prewar foundations, American businesses intensified their activities in the 1920s. Now Europe experienced a much broader economic invasion. American investments soared, climbing steadily in value from nearly $700 million in 1919 to $1.3 billion in 1929. American corporations paid special attention to newer, technologically advanced, and profitable industries that manufactured products like electrical equipment, farm machinery, and automobiles. More American companies entered into local partnerships and set up factories in European cities: Ford, Monsanto Chemical, and Kodak in Britain; General Motors, General Electric, and Du Pont in Britain and Germany; International Business Machines and International Telephone and Telegraph throughout the Continent. These enterprises required lawyers, financial experts, and marketing specialists, whom the home offices in the United States were pleased to provide. American retail chains like Woolworth's and Montgomery Ward opened European outlets, featuring low prices and a cornucopia of merchandise. Advertising agencies (particularly the J. Walter Thompson Company) introduced Europe to American-style packaging and sales techniques. Given the rising tide of American investment and the abundance of American products pouring into Europe, it was not surprising that French automobile manufacturers fell behind their American counterparts in the production and sale of small cars for the European market, or that New York supplanted London as the world's leading financier. Nor was it strange that Europe's businessmen and politicians started to wonder if their countries might soon become economic colonies of the United States.[14]

The fear of colonization was heightened by the sight of more and more Americans traveling through or taking up residence in London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin. Europeans had always been accustomed to a small number of Americans in their midst. During the nineteenth century, perhaps as many as thirty thousand mostly affluent Americans annually undertook the grand tour of European palaces, cathedrals, art galleries, and historical monuments. By the 1920s, an average of a quarter of a million American tourists, businessmen, and expatriates flocked to Europe each year. Many of them were attracted more by the dollar's strength in relation to European currencies than by the artifacts of Old World culture.

The scale of tourism in this period was tiny compared to the mass of Americans who swarmed into Europe after World War II. But as early as the 1920s, Americans were making their presence known to their European hosts. Tourists and temporary residents affected local economies both by how much they spent and by their appetite for American products. In addition, they reproduced the kinds of institutions with which they were familiar at home. American-run churches, schools, hospitals and medical clinics, newspapers, university alumni associations, clubs, and sporting events flourished wherever Americans congregated. Europeans, especially Parisians, reacted to American tourists in the 1920s with much the same hostility that their successors displayed after 1945. From the European perspective, American tourists were loud, arrogant, materialistic, and provincial.[15] Still, these Americans—and the culture they brought with them—were difficult to avoid or ignore.



The combined effect of exports, investments, and tourism drove many European intellectuals to consider with a greater sense of urgency the meaning of *Americanism* or *Americanization* (the terms were often used interchangeably). By the 1920s, even more than in the nineteenth century, the United States had come to stand in a vague and symbolic way for modernity, and for a "future" that seemed inescapable. In language that was frequently apocalyptic, European writers described America as (in Sigmund Skard's words) "an indicator of direction," an exemplification of economic and cultural trends certain to happen everywhere, and an unwelcome harbinger of Europe's own destiny. More specifically, the United States had become synonymous with efficiency, advanced technology and industrial dynamism, the worship of machines and assembly lines, "streamlined" and standardized products, commercialism, mass consumption, and the emergence of a mass society. German artists and playwrights, in particular, were fascinated by a country they knew mostly from movies, magazines, and photographs. For them, America represented the triumph of "Fordismus," a savage but riveting and sometimes contradictory mixture of skyscrapers, slums, urban violence, organized crime, smoke-belching factories, Puritanism, sexual licentiousness, and raw human energy unmatched in the Old World. Above all, to Europeans (like the young British student D. W. Brogan, who had experienced the wartime devastation of France, the rise of Fascism in Italy, and the rampant postwar unemployment of his native Glasgow), America seemed indecently optimistic, a country that believed itself to be "immune from most human ills" and "to have conquered most human problems."[16]

Here again was a thoroughly imaginary America, a land somehow

exempt from the burdens of history and human suffering, where the future had already arrived in the form of unbridled industrial power—a land filled with omens and prophecies of Europe's inexorable fate. Yet despite the warnings of European intellectuals, the actual economic and social impact of the United States in the 1920s was fairly limited. Ordinary Europeans might buy American products and encounter an increasing number of American tourists, but they did not live like Americans nor did they adopt "American" values. Much of the time, they experienced America vicariously. The degree of their exposure to the American universe depended largely on what they could read, see, and hear. For them, the most important commodity the United States exported to Europe was its popular culture.

As in the case of its economy, America's cultural influence preceded the 1920s. In the late nineteenth century, various types of popular entertainment had sprung up on both sides of the Atlantic. These included cheap novels, tabloid newspapers, circuses, amusement parks, and world's fairs. Their appeal was hardly elitist, and they were usually scorned by intellectuals (although Henry Adams was famously transfixed by the mystery of the dynamo at the Paris Exposition in 1900). The unique American contribution to nineteenth-century popular culture was the Wild West show. Combining history and spectacle, this extravaganza introduced Europeans to a simplified rendition of America's founding myth.

Europe's fascination with the American West had been growing throughout the century. The European tendency to romanticize the wilderness, to see in the violent and lawless frontier the key to an understanding of the American psyche, was fueled by the translations of James Fenimore Cooper's novels (which established Cooper as the most widely read American author in Europe during these years); by European fictional portraits of America's western saga like those of the German novelist Karl May, who sold 30 million copies of his books between 1875 and 1912; and by the paintings of the German American artist Alfred Bierstadt, whose monumental depictions of western landscapes and Indian lore were enormously popular when they were exhibited in London, Paris, Brussels, and Berlin.[17]

But no one captured the imagination of European audiences as spectacularly as William F. Cody, the legendary Buffalo Bill. Cody's Wild West show was a nineteenth-century version of the struggle between civilization and savagery that Hollywood would later perfect. Relying on sophisticated forms of publicity, from posters to newspaper and magazine advertisements, Cody's cast of aging scouts, cowboys, Indians, and trick-shot artists performed before enthusiastic crowds in England, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary between 1887 and 1906. The show certainly exploited Europe's fantasy about a land of open spaces inhabited by primitive but self-reliant individualists. Yet it also reinforced the European respect for law and social order since, according to the immutable formula of the drama, the West was always won and evil was always conquered.[18] The person who held these disparate emotions together was Buffalo Bill himself, a man of considerable theatricality who recognized that, given a choice, modern audiences would invariably prefer entertainment to authenticity. Buffalo Bill's charismatic demeanor and his intuitions about the predilections of his fans made him America's first international "star" of the twentieth century.



Until the 1920s, however, most people's contact with popular culture was episodic. A world's fair was not an annual event. Wild West shows toured infrequently. One had to wait for the circus to come to town. Because of the cold and dismal winters in northern Europe, amusement parks like Copenhagen's Tivoli Gardens stayed open only in the summer (a custom the late twentieth century creators of Euro Disney airily discounted). But by World War I, new forms of communication had been invented or refined, making popular culture a far more pervasive presence in the daily lives of Americans and Europeans. And as the country most adept at employing and controlling these instruments, the United States emerged as a significant force in the diffusion of mass entertainment.

Radios and phonographs facilitated the spread of American popular culture. One reason for America's leadership in developing and marketing these technologies was the close link between corporate needs and government policy. Washington believed that America's commercial and cultural goals were virtually indistinguishable. In this view, the country's continuing ability to export its products depended on greater knowledge overseas about the virtues of American life, precisely the sort of information the entertainment industry could provide. It would therefore serve the national interest if the government offered its support to businesses that were involved in the field of communications. Moreover, Washington wanted to undercut the traditional British monopoly over worldwide cable lines by persuading American corporations to construct their own independent cable and communications networks. Promising technical assistance from the navy, the government urged cooperation among companies such as General Electric, Western Electric, American

Telegraph and Telephone, and Westinghouse, all of whom could jointly strengthen America's position in international communications. In 1919, this collaboration resulted in the birth of the Radio Corporation of America, a leviathan that came to dominate global broadcasting for the next half century.[19]

Among the beneficiaries of the new techniques in communications and entertainment was American popular music, particularly jazz. During the 1920s, Europeans were introduced to jazz through phonograph records, radio broadcasts, and live performances. The primary port of entry was Paris, where black musicians, in flight from America's segregated cities, acquired a following in nightclubs, cabarets, and concert halls. Paris was also the point of departure for tours across the Continent. By the early 1930s, audiences in Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, and Scandinavia had heard of or listened to Louis Armstrong or Duke Ellington, not to mention many other less celebrated bands. American jazz especially attracted European intellectuals and self-proclaimed members of the avant-garde, for whom it seemed to symbolize America's devotion to experimentation, improvisation, and all things new and modern. The identification of jazz with rebellion and personal freedom was notably strong in Germany, which may explain why it provoked the fury of the Nazis in the 1930s. Even so, jazz continued to be cherished in underground clubs by a minority of young urban Germans, disenchanted with but unable to find any political ways of protesting against Adolf Hitler's regime.[20] In the meantime, European musicians began to copy American jazz bands, a testimonial to the growing power of America's popular culture in every area.

Yet of all the forms of mass entertainment that flourished in the 1920s, none was as captivating as the movies. Here, America exerted its greatest influence. It was in this decade that cinema became synonymous with Hollywood. The United States dominated every facet of popular filmmaking, and with it the power to "Americanize" the imaginations, if not the behavior, of audiences throughout the world.

Hollywood's ascendancy was not preordained. On the contrary, before World War I both the French and Italian movie industries regularly surpassed the United States in film exports. France was also ahead of America in manufacturing new equipment and developing new cinematic techniques.[21] After the war, most American and European film critics and intellectuals regarded Hollywood's efforts as infinitely inferior to the work of the German expressionists or the revolutionary Soviet directors. They might praise Charlie Chaplin or Buster



Keaton as film artists (at the same time reminding readers that comedy was about all one could expect from a fundamentally frivolous country, and that in any case Chaplin was really British). Few other American filmmakers in the 1920s could gain admittance to a European pantheon that included Sergei Eisenstein, F. W. Murnau, G. W. Papst, Fritz Lang, and Carl Dreyer.

Nevertheless, the war destroyed the ability of the European cinema to compete economically with Hollywood. British, French, and Italian productions were suspended or curtailed during the conflict, and the need to invest in economic reconstruction in the early 1920s meant that little money was left over in Europe for large-scale moviemaking. The United States, unscathed by the war, was the only country that had the resources to expand its film operations. As a result, Hollywood soon emerged as the leader in the production and distribution of movies to a worldwide audience, a distinction the European studios were never able again to challenge.[22]

The postwar decline of the European film industry was not the only reason for Hollywood's supremacy. The existence of a large domestic audience in the United States enabled American studios to recover the costs of production and make a substantial profit on a movie before they ever turned to the international market. Then, they charged lower rental fees overseas and undersold their European rivals. In addition, through the devices of block booking, the imposition of tariffs on imported foreign films, and other discriminatory practices, Hollywood effectively protected its home market against the encroachment of European moviemakers. The studios also adopted the assembly line techniques successful in other major American industries, signing their employees to long-term contracts, standardizing their product, creating "brand names" through the star system, and exercising firm control over their distribution networks. Meanwhile, related businesses shared in Hollywood's affluence. Kodak manufactured 75 percent of all the film used in the world. Western Electric produced most of the sound equipment that became so important for the "talkies" at the end of the decade. American companies owned half the most fashionable movie houses abroad, including three-quarters of all the theaters in France; not surprisingly, most of their screen time was devoted to American films.[23] All these elements combined to ensure that Hollywood and its subsidiaries would remain prosperous and powerful.

Still, commercial factors were just a partial explanation for the international strength of the American film industry. Many members of the audience, both in the United States and in Europe, believed that

Hollywood simply made better movies. The stories seemed more absorbing than those of European filmmakers, the "look" was more luxurious, and the stars were more magnetic. But whether the roots of Hollywood's domination were economic or stylistic, there was no doubt that American movies were immensely popular, particularly in Europe. By the mid-1920s, approximately 95 percent of the films shown in Britain, 85 percent in the Netherlands, 70 percent in France, 65 percent in Italy, and 60 percent in Germany were American.[24] These figures remained nearly the same for the remainder of the decade.

For many European intellectuals, and ultimately their governments, this preference for American movies was alarming. On one level, they worried that the health of the European film industry would continue to deteriorate, given the overwhelming popularity of Hollywood's creations. It was becoming increasingly difficult for European studios to raise money, develop and retain local talent, and produce films of high quality. These constraints, in turn, made it that much harder for them to attract audiences and compete with American films.[25] Thus, Hollywood represented a real threat, economically, to the very existence of the European cinema.

An even larger issue involved Hollywood's role as the primary instrument of Americanization. Through movies, it was argued, people became familiar with American products, lifestyles, patterns of behavior, and values. The opulence of the average Hollywood film made Europeans want to drive American cars, eat American foods, smoke American cigarettes, and wear American clothes. Even worse, according to some intellectuals, Europeans were losing respect for their native cultures and traditions. The seductive appeal of American movies was especially troubling to French writers, who suspected that Paris might not survive as a center of fashion, cuisine, or ideas. The fear that Hollywood somehow endangered the standards, customs, and tastes of the Old World might have been exaggerated, but it was by no means limited to France. Across the Continent, members of the political and cultural elite agreed that the national "identity" of each country was being undermined by American films, that governments were no longer exercising much influence over how their citizens spent their leisure time, and that this trend had to be resisted or all Europe would soon be engulfed by American habits and states of mind.[26]

The belief that Hollywood's power needed to be restrained arose for the first time in the 1920s, though it would reemerge on many occasions in the following decades. But the initial efforts of various countries in Europe to defend their national cultures by reducing the influence of American films is instructive, both for the methods used and why they failed.



Beginning in the mid-1920s, several European governments decided to limit the import, and thereby the impact, of American movies. From 1925 to 1927, Germany, Britain, France, and Italy all imposed quotas either on the absolute number of Hollywood productions that could be brought in, or on the amount of screen time exhibitors were permitted for showing American films. These regulations were designed both to exert some leverage over the domestic film market, and to open up more theaters to local moviemakers.[27]

The most striking consequence of the quota system was its inability to achieve any of its objectives. American studios overcame the new laws by investing in or directly financing inexpensive, poorly made German and British movies, called "quota quickies." These movies fulfilled the requirements for more "local" productions, but they were often so uninspired and feeble that audiences avoided them while retaining their affection for American films. The French government, seeking other alternatives, attempted to force American theaters to import French movies in exchange for American exports to France. This action resulted in a Hollywood boycott of the French film industry. In 1928, the studios announced their refusal to send any more American films to French distributors, or to allow French movies to be shown in the theaters the studios owned in the United States. The French government promptly relaxed its restrictions on American films, though this was of little help to French moviemakers: In 1929, only nineteen French films were exhibited in the United States.[28]

Eventually, the quota system collapsed. But the idea that the influence of American popular culture could be subjected to a set of numerical limitations lived on. European governments would try to enact quotas again, in the late 1940s and the early 1990s—though their efforts would be equally futile.

For a brief moment, at the end of the 1920s, some European critics and moviemakers imagined that sound might accomplish what quotas had not. Silent films, after all, transcended language barriers and could be universally understood. But the first American sound films distributed overseas were marred by inadequate subtitles, execrable dubbing, and inept synchronization between the movement of the actors' mouths and the words they spoke. It was therefore assumed that European audiences would at last turn to their own domestic productions, with performances in a language they could comprehend.

In fact, Hollywood's dominance was barely affected by the coming of sound. If anything, the heightened cost of producing a sound film forced Hollywood to rely even more heavily on the international, and especially the European, market to ensure its profits. And, as sound technology and equipment improved, subtitles and dubbing became more sophisticated and more acceptable to foreign audiences. In some cases, Hollywood simply made two versions of a film, one in English for American and British audiences, the other in French or German for audiences on the Continent.[29]

Meanwhile, sound increased the American film industry's need for talent both on and off the screen. In response, Hollywood (having always looked to Europe for artistic expertise) accelerated its import of European filmmakers, though not their films. Offering high salaries and assisted by the rise of fascism in Germany and central Europe, American studios welcomed a generation of British and continental directors, cameramen, editors, set and costume designers, and performers. Giants of the European cinema like Fritz Lang, Alfred Hitchcock, Greta Garbo, and Marlene Dietrich were transplanted to the United States, further crippling Europe's ability to compete with Hollywood. Movies had become at once truly international and distinctively American. Under these circumstances, it was appropriate that the role of Scarlett O'Hara, the quintessential Southern heroine of *Gone with the Wind*, should have gone to a virtually unknown British actress, Vivien Leigh. And that *Casablanca*, the ultimate movie tribute to exiles and refugees, featured a cast which was (except for Humphrey Bogart and Dooley Wilson) composed entirely of European expatriates.

Hollywood was thus able to hold on to its European market in the 1930s. American films occupied 80 percent of the screen time in Britain and 60 percent in the Netherlands. Many young Italian moviegoers were attracted to American films—especially Westerns, with their laconic heroes and elementary moral rules—because these movies offered some relief from Benito Mussolini's pomposity and grandiloquent rhetoric. Roger Asselineau, who later became a leading French critic of American literature, was struck in his youth by the ubiquity of American movies in France. On the pretext of learning English, he recalled, "I saw as many American pictures as I could, and there were quite a few to be seen in Paris in the middle and late thirties: *The Informer*, *Duck Soup* (which was my first introduction to American wisecracks), *Modern Times*, *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town* (which I saw several times), *Green Pastures*, *Dead End*, *You Can't Take It with You*, *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs*."[30] Asselineau's enthusiasm for American films—from comedies to Frank Capra melodramas to Disneyesque fantasies—was shared by millions of Europeans during the depression years.



A number of governments in the 1930s tried once again to protect their national cinemas through artificial restrictions on imports, subsidies, and harsh financial decrees, all in an effort to persuade audiences that domestic productions were worth seeing and supporting. But only the totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union finally succeeded in curbing Hollywood's power, mostly by investing large amounts of money to build up their own film industries while censoring or prohibiting American exports. After 1939, the Nazis banned American movies in every country they overran.[31] In resisting America's cultural influence, conquest was clearly superior to quotas. This was not a model, however, that most countries in Europe would be eager to emulate in the postwar years.

Before the outbreak of World War II, Hollywood had come to represent in the minds of many prominent European intellectuals everything they dreaded and despised about American mass culture. To these intellectuals, their governments' inability in the 1920s and 1930s to diminish the popularity of American films was an instance of Europe's greater failure to preserve its economic and cultural distinctiveness. But the question of how the European democracies could combat Americanization without resorting to the solutions of a Joseph Stalin or a Hitler remained unresolved.

No one effectively answered this question because, as in the nineteenth century, what was really at stake was not policy but symbolism. The conflict between Europe and America was seen once more as allegorical, two opposing civilizations and value systems—one with a reverence for tradition and the human spirit, the other modern and profane—both contesting for supremacy. Framing the issues in this way, European intellectuals found it easier to indulge in portentous generalizations about the dissimilarities between the two continents than to examine empirically how each had diverged from yet continued to mirror the other.

Still, this propensity to generalize, and to inflate subtle differences into moral categories, had a serious purpose. A number of writers thought it was imperative for them to identify and repudiate the special characteristics of American life in order to salvage what was left of Europe's declining power and prestige. Among those who undertook this mission in the late 1920s and early 1930s were the French authors

André Siegfried in *The United States Today* (1927) and Georges Duhamel in *America the Menace: Scenes from the Life of the Future* (1931), and the Dutch essayist Menno ter Braak in "Why I Reject 'America'" (1928). Their works were widely read and their judgments often quoted. They all focused on the kinds of problems that seemed endemic to the United States: urbanization, the grip of finance capitalism, the monotony of the assembly lines, racial strife, the omnipresence of advertising and the mass media.

Although writers like Siegfried and Duhamel had actually traveled to the United States, their impressions of America and those of their readers were frequently lifted from the novels and essays of Americans themselves. It was fashionable in the 1920s, as it would be again in the 1950s and 1960s, for Europeans to reaffirm their prejudices about the United States by relying on the works of America's most disenchanted and acerbic authors. In Britain, for example, the American writers who received the greatest praise in the 1920s were Upton Sinclair, Jack London, Theodore Dreiser, H. L. Mencken, and Sinclair Lewis. In France, the list was similar, augmented by Sherwood Anderson and John Dos Passos. Often, passages or characters from their books were used selectively to illustrate the inhumanity of mass production, the claustrophobia of the American small town, or the mediocrity of the middle class. No novel was more influential than *Babbitt* in exposing the banality of the classic American male; the name became part of the European vocabulary, a handy code word for American blandness and conformity.[32] It was therefore fitting that in 1930 Sinclair Lewis should be the first American novelist awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. Although Lewis graciously accepted the honor on behalf of his generation of American writers, he had probably been chosen by the Swedish academy as much for his indictments of American society as for his inherent skills as a novelist.

Whether they spent time in the United States or simply depended on images gathered from American books (and from those mindless but mesmerizing Hollywood films), European intellectuals were obsessed with certain "typical" American deformities. In placid Norway, Sigmund Skard was horrified by the violence and racism of the Ku Klux Klan, and by the "shameless corruption" of the American legal system as revealed in its persecution of Sacco and Vanzetti. In Holland, Menno ter Braak feared that America's popular entertainment, vulgar and excessively commercialized, would if allowed to infiltrate Europe destroy all respect for art and literature. In Britain,



D. W. Brogan recalled, everyone agreed that American culture was "shallow, naively optimistic, barren, without ideas—as all the best American authors pointed out."[33]

Most of all, in the view of Siegfried, Duhamel, and other writers, Americans were automatons, chained to machines and assembly lines at work, and hypnotized (like Babbitt) by gadgets and material possessions at play. They wore identical clothes, purchased identical products, and held identical opinions.[34] From this perspective, America seemed the archetype of a modern mass society, one that was relentlessly hostile to all signs of eccentricity, with no appreciation for the person who did not fit in or for the benefits to be derived from maintaining social and class distinctions. In sum, America by the 1920s and 1930s had become (and not just for Aldous Huxley) the Old World's nightmarish vision of a "brave new world."

America was also the embodiment of everything Europe was not. Throughout these years, European intellectuals, like their predecessors in the nineteenth century, insisted that the United States and Europe stood for antithetical ideals. If America was industrialized, France was pastoral; if Americans were conformists, the British were individualists; if American social life was rootless and unstable, German society was harmonious and communal. In the New World, products were standardized and uniform; in the Old World, the craftsman remained supreme. The contrasts could not have been purer, or more flattering to Europe. Unfortunately, the more invasive America became, the harder it was for Europe to remain "European." And so the cultural and economic defense of "Europe" automatically entailed a rejection of every trait associated with "America."[35]

Of course, Europe could hardly be considered a unified entity. This was, after all, an *interwar* era. Thus, the definition of what was uniquely European often changed to suit the needs of particular countries. Intellectuals in small nations like the Netherlands, feeling more vulnerable to American influences, usually identified with Europe as a whole in the hope of strengthening their own cultural fortifications. British and French writers, more confident of their countries' cultural resources, frequently spoke of Europe as if it were a collection of national virtues, most notably the regard for individual idiosyncrasies so evident in Britain and France. The German version of Europe, especially after the rise of fascism, tended to glorify the collective spirit of the people.[36]

But whichever Europe writers invoked, the message was clear. America must be resisted or Europe—any form of Europe—would eventually vanish. This was not so much a strategy as a premonition,

and one that sounded more than a little paranoid. At the moment these warnings were delivered, the United States remained a distant force, its culture not yet global, its economy not yet dominant, the weight of its political and military power still to be felt. The European effort to deal with the consequences of Americanization may have been premature; it was in any case superseded by the far graver crises of depression and war. But the problem reemerged after 1945 with greater intensity, and it demanded a more complex response from European intellectuals and their governments than either had furnished in the years between the wars.

## American Foundations and European Refugees

For all the talk of America and Europe as adversarial civilizations, more artists, writers, and professors were moving back and forth across the Atlantic in the 1920s and 1930s than ever before. Most of this interchange was privately organized and financed, with little or no governmental supervision. The people involved were scholars, scientists, painters, musicians, novelists, and students. Few seemed to be in any position to affect the economic or political destinies of their respective countries. But ultimately, they had as much to do with the shift of power from Europe to the United States as did Hollywood or the major American corporations.

Such a shift might not have happened at all had it not been for the guidance and resources supplied by America's philanthropic foundations. Between the two world wars, the Rockefeller and Guggenheim Foundations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Commonwealth Fund dispensed fellowships for Americans to study abroad, sponsored conferences and international journals, funded libraries and visiting lectureships, and recruited European scholars and scientists to university positions in the United States. In an informal yet systematic fashion, the foundations functioned as the channel through which Americans were able not only to learn about but to domesticate the latest European ideas. Constructing a network of personal and professional relationships among intellectuals and academics on both sides of the ocean (which turned out for many of the Europeans in the 1930s to mean the difference between life and death), the foundations helped to close the cultural gap between the continents.



Of all these, the Rockefeller Foundation was the most encyclopedic in its cultural pursuits, and the most influential in heightening America's visibility overseas. From its inception in 1914, the foundation financed programs in medicine and public health, particularly in China. During the 1920s, it broadened its efforts, offering fellowships for American faculty and graduate students to study in Europe, and helping to launch the Social Science Research Council, which funded many European projects in the natural and social sciences. Often, the foundation made grants for specific purposes. It gave $2 million to Oxford for the renovation of the Bodleian Library. Similarly, the foundation gave money to the Niels Bohr Institute at the University of Copenhagen for work in theoretical physics (thereby forging a bond of increasing importance to the United States by the eve of World War II); to the universities of Kiel, Heidelberg, Rotterdam, and Stockholm and the London School of Economics for the study of the modern economy; and to the University of Munich and the University of Berlin for programs in psychiatry and anthropology, respectively. By 1934, the foundation had allocated nearly $18 million for the social sciences and $15 million for academic exchanges.[37] These expenditures enabled the United States to play a significant role in European intellectual life for the first time, while simultaneously exposing young American scholars to the theories of their more eminent European counterparts.

The day when the Rockefeller and other foundations could function as private ad hoc agencies, indulging their own cultural interests without having to worry about political or social upheavals, soon came to an end. By the 1930s, American philanthropists could no longer devote themselves to the lofty task of uplifting minds. They turned now to the grim business of saving thousands of people from the realities of terror and extermination.

No single person was more responsible for transforming the role of the foundations and the cultural balance of power between Europe and the United States than Adolf Hitler. In the spring of 1933, three months after he became chancellor of a new Reich, Hitler launched a massive purge of German intellectual life. Libraries were "cleansed," books were torched, and professors (many of them physicists, mathematicians, chemists, economists, and sociologists) were fired. In October of the same year, psychoanalysis was anathematized as a "Jewish science," and its expositors were prohibited from practicing therapy or holding academic positions. In 1937, following a Nazi-inspired exhibition in Munich of "degenerate" (i.e., modern) art, a large number of

Jewish museum curators, art dealers and historians, architects, and painters were deported. The devastation inflicted on German culture was enormous. Approximately twelve thousand scholars and intellectuals had been discarded by the end of the decade. In the universities, 39 percent of all faculty members were dismissed; among social scientists, the figure rose to 47 percent. In time, 60 percent of those who lost their jobs left Germany.[38]

The flight from Germany was only the beginning. As Nazi armies marched into Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, the number of refugee intellectuals climbed. With Germany's conquest of Poland in 1939 and its invasion of western Europe in 1940, an entire generation of endangered writers and scholars sought to escape the Continent.

During the mid-1930s and certainly before the war broke out, many émigrés hoped that Nazism might be a temporary phenomenon and that with its collapse, they would be able to return to their homelands. Since they were only in the early stages of their migration, they did not want to think of their exile as permanent. So a substantial number initially elected to stay in Europe, resettling in nearby countries, particularly Britain, Holland, France, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, funds were limited and there were never enough university positions either in Britain or on the Continent to absorb the majority of the refugees.[39] As the years passed and the war approached, they had to consider another, more distant, sanctuary.

Although the United States eventually admitted the largest proportion of refugees, it seemed at first too provincial and far away, too preoccupied with its own domestic problems, and too inhospitable to the classical culture of Europe. Yet America, the traditional land of immigrants, came to be an ideal destination for intellectuals who were already uprooted and in transition. Before they even reached America, most of them had psychologically deserted Europe. As Jews or Marxists or both, they were regarded by many of their countrymen as outsiders; as writers and artists, they felt marginalized and alienated; as people of high education, they were cosmopolitan but cut off from their native societies.[40] They were ready, consciously or not, to move on.

Moreover, the conditions for their journey to the United States had been prepared in the 1920s. Intellectual life, especially in the sciences, had become internationalized, not least because of the fellowships, exchanges, conferences, and journals paid for by the American foundations. With their help, American artists and writers learned about modernism in Paris and Berlin; American scholars and students



deepened their knowledge at European research institutes; Europeans visited one another to share the newest techniques and ideas, and accepted invitations to teach in the United States. Young American physicists like J. Robert Oppenheimer, I. I. Rabi, and Linus Pauling found it essential to continue their studies in Europe, while Enrico Fermi and Niels Bohr lectured, respectively, at the University of Michigan and the California Institute of Technology. Language barriers were rarely a problem, since international journals had made everyone familiar with the mathematics and symbols of the new physics. Similarly, American psychologists undertook the obligatory pilgrimage to Germany and to Sigmund Freud's Vienna, bringing back to their colleagues the most recent methodologies and theoretical insights.

A major result of this interaction was the improvement of teaching and research, and the establishment of a European-style academic community within American universities. Disciplines such as nuclear physics, experimental psychology, and psychoanalysis were already developing rapidly in the United States before the arrival of the European émigrés. So, at the moment the exodus began, the intellectual environment in America was highly favorable for the reception of the newcomers. American scholars had the structures in place, an awareness of the future needs of their own departments, and close contacts with their European counterparts. The Americans wanted the further inspiration and guidance the Europeans would provide, and were in a position to welcome and utilize the refugees as no other country could.[41]

In effect, the rise of Nazism reversed the migration of American expatriates to Europe. From 1933 on, European novelists, artists, intellectuals, musicians, and scientists fled to America, where they discovered that the New World now provided shelter and sustenance for the culture of the Old. Over seven thousand and five hundred came, two-thirds of them from Germany and Austria, and the rest from central and eastern Europe, Italy, and France. The great majority were Jewish.[42] Although the number may appear small, they included the most creative and productive members of the European intelligentsia.

The roster of émigrés to America—even a partial one—was extraordinary. Among the natural scientists, there were Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, Edward Teller, Leo Szilard, Hans Bethe, and Victor Weisskopf. Among the political and social scientists were Erik Erikson, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Theodor Adorno. The anthropologists Claude

Lévi-Strauss and Bronislaw Malinowski came, along with the psychologists Karen Horney and Bruno Bettelheim. So too did the philosophers Herbert Marcuse and Rudolf Carnap, and the theologian Paul Tillich. The most well-known refugee novelists and playwrights were Thomas Mann, Erich Maria Remarque, Vladimir Nabakov, and Bertolt Brecht. Yet their reputation was no greater than the musicians and composers: Igor Stravinsky, Béla Bartók, Arnold Schoenberg, Paul Hindemith, Darius Milhaud, Kurt Weill, Arturo Toscanini, Bruno Walter, Otto Klemperer, George Szell, Erich Leinsdorf, Dmitri Mitropoulos, Rudolf Serkin, and Gregor Piatigorsky. The art critic Erwin Panofsky arrived, in addition to architects and designers like Walter Gropius, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and Marcel Breuer. The painters and sculptors who fled to America were particularly notable: Marc Chagall, Wassily Kandinsky, Piet Mondrian, Marcel Duchamp, Fernand Léger, Lyonel Feininger, George Grosz, Max Ernst, André Breton, Jacques Lipchitz, Yves Tanguy, Salvador Dali, and Joan Miró. If one also added the names of the émigrés to Hollywood, the list would represent for Europe a hemorrhage of talent and intellect from which the Continent never recovered.

Clearly, the most important group in terms of their impact on America's national security were the nuclear physicists. The majority relocated at universities with strong physics departments, recruited by American colleagues who knew their work. Surrounded by sophisticated equipment and the expertise of American engineers, and given the freedom to improvise, the Europeans began to test their theories and refine their experiments.[43] At the close of the 1930s and with the onset of World War II, they and their ideas became increasingly indispensable to the American government. And so they graduated from academic classrooms and laboratories to the secrecy of the Manhattan Project and Los Alamos, there to ensure their fame forever with the creation of the atomic bomb.

For the less exalted refugees to flourish in America, some more systematic procedure to receive and place them had to be devised. The primary responsibility for this task fell, once again, to the foundations. In May 1933, at the beginning of the Diaspora, a group of university executives, scientists, and officials of the Rockefeller Foundation formed the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German (later Foreign) Scholars. The committee was to act as an employment agency, seeking to induce universities constrained by the depression to hire the refugees. With money obtained largely from Jewish philanthropies, the committee promised to pay half the annual academic salary of an



émigré, up to $2,000, for the first two years. The remainder would come from other private sources, which usually meant the Rockefeller Foundation. Under this arrangement, universities could add distinguished, even Nobel prize-winning, scholars to their faculty free of charge.[44]

For its part, the Rockefeller Foundation was following its tradition, originated in the 1920s, of supporting European scholars. Several of the refugees, especially in the natural and social sciences, had received assistance from the foundation in earlier years. After a decade in the business of cultural exchange, the foundation had better contacts, wider experience, and more effective personnel (including staff members at a permanent office in Paris) than any of the other rescue agencies. It was no surprise, then, that the Rockefeller Foundation became the primary financier of the intellectual migration to the United States, providing over 50 percent of the funds (or $1.4 million) to pay for the costs of 303 émigrés, a contribution that no other organization surpassed.[45]

For physicists and other natural scientists, whose qualifications were readily evident and whose skills were in demand, the process of relocation was relatively smooth. It was more difficult, at least initially, to place social scientists, literary critics, art historians, and museum curators in decent jobs. Despite the reverence American scholars felt for the pre-Hitler German educational system, and despite as well the financial incentives offered by the Emergency Committee and the Rockefeller Foundation, many universities hesitated before employing a host of Germans and central Europeans who might eventually overcome their gratitude for being given a class to teach and start inquiring about tenure. In addition, the American academic world was not itself immune to anti-Semitism. Quotas limiting the admission of Jewish students, and restrictions—if not outright prohibitions—on the hiring of Jewish professors, were commonplace at most of the elite universities in the United States. Hence, the Emergency Committee and the Rockefeller Foundation decided to assist only senior scholars with impeccable reputations who would not be competing for positions or for promotion with younger American academics just beginning their careers. They also tried to disburse the émigrés throughout the country in order to minimize whatever resentments and hostility the native-born faculty might feel toward an influx of foreigners and Jews.[46]

Nevertheless, certain institutions—usually those that had been recently created or were sympathetic to intellectual experimentation—

became known for their willingness to hire the refugees. From its inception in the early 1930s, the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton offered asylum to prominent Europeans. Its first appointment, in 1932, was Albert Einstein. Individual members of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (more often called the Frankfurt School) migrated to Geneva and Paris before reuniting at Columbia. New York City itself had a multiplicity of museums, galleries, and libraries; a large Jewish population; and a number of wealthy German Jewish families (the Guggenheims, the Warburgs, the Schiffs, the Rosenwalds, the Seligmans, and the Lewisohns) who had long supported the arts and were now subsidizing the rescue and relocation of the refugees. Consequently, the city became a new home for many émigré art historians, critics, and dealers, the majority of whom were Jewish victims of the Nazi expulsions. The Institute of Fine Arts at New York University was an especially important center for the refugees, offering Erwin Panofsky, for example, his first American position before he moved on to Princeton's institute. Other universities that were hospitable to the immigrants included Black Mountain College in North Carolina and Roosevelt University in Chicago.[47]

But the most reliable haven for refugee intellectuals was the New School for Social Research in New York City. The New School had been created in 1918 by liberal academics affiliated with the *New Republic* (John Dewey, Charles Beard, Thorstein Veblen, James Harvey Robinson) who wanted to stimulate critical research in economics and social theory, and make teaching more relevant to the problems of daily life. Alvin Johnson, the New School's director, shared his colleagues' desire for a university that was both intellectually innovative and politically engaged. During the 1920s, he had become familiar with the work and personalities of many European scholars when he served as coeditor of the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, another project funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. Johnson saw the refugee crisis as an opportunity for the New School to integrate the ideas of European social scientists with the needs of American reform. Toward that end, he opened a "University in Exile" at the New School in October 1933. Staffed mostly by German social scientists who were also social democrats, the University in Exile represented the prototype of the activist European intellectual community Johnson hoped to reconstruct in the United States. Here, the refugees could carry on their work under conditions similar to those they remembered in Weimar Germany, while also being able for the first time to communicate with American academics. Ultimately, with a $540,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, the greatest amount of money it gave to any university, Johnson recruited 178 émigré scholars to his faculty.[48] The New School thus became a shelter for the largest concentration of European immigrant intellectuals in America.



Yet for all the efforts of the Emergency Committee, the various foundations, individual philanthropists, and the universities, the problems of resettling the Europeans intensified, especially when the number of potential émigrés escalated after the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 and the German conquest of France in June 1940. Britain and the United States became the only safe countries left for those scholars who had taken refuge earlier in France, Denmark, or the Netherlands and were now trying frantically to get out of Europe.

The situation in America was bleak. By the end of the 1930s, the Emergency Committee had depleted its funds, and the academic job market for refugees—always limited—had virtually evaporated. Worse, at a time when more European intellectuals than ever before were begging for permission to enter the United States, the Department of State made it harder for them to emigrate. Unsympathetic to people it assumed were Jews, Marxists, and security risks, the State Department deliberately delayed issuing visas to Europeans trapped in Vichy France, Spain, and Portugal.[49]

Despite these impediments, both the Rockefeller Foundation and the New School believed that the latest crisis represented yet another opportunity to bring the best of European culture to the United States. The foundation had enough money to accelerate its rescue operations, and the political expertise to convince Washington that it should selectively relax its immigration policies to admit those émigrés who would be useful if and when America joined the war. Meanwhile, the New School acted as the employer of last resort for the refugees.[50]

Whereas the majority of the New School's appointees in the 1930s had been German or central European, the most significant group among the new arrivals in the early 1940s were Belgian and French. Men like Jacques Maritain and Claude Lévi-Strauss differed from their predecessors not only in nationality, but also in their attitudes toward America. The earlier wave of emigrants eventually came to accept the United States as their permanent home. The French, committed politically to Charles de Gaulle and the Gaullist wing of the resistance movement, and yearning to reconstruct their country after the war, viewed their residence in America as temporary. In February

1942, they constituted themselves as the École Libre des Hautes Études, an independent French university in exile within the New School. They taught their courses in French, defended the virtues of French culture, functioned as de Gaulle's emissaries to Washington and to the American people, and urged the United States to withdraw its support for Vichy and endorse the Free French instead. Once the Allied armies liberated Paris in August 1944, almost all of them repatriated to France.[51]

But notwithstanding their insistence on maintaining their autonomy, the French—like other émigrés—discovered that they had become part of a truly international community of scholars, intellectuals, and scientists, now gathered in America to contribute to the war effort either through the government's intelligence and communications agencies or in the race to build the atom bomb. Their language skills and their knowledge of European history and culture made them ideal consultants to the military, the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of War Information, the Rand Corporation, and eventually (in the case of Herbert Marcuse) the same State Department that had been so suspicious of the immigrant intellectuals. Evidently, "leftist" opinions, whether held by refugees in Washington or J. Robert Oppenheimer at Los Alamos, were irrelevant—at least for the duration of the war. Many of the New School's faculty, for example, were socialists, but they were also authorities on German affairs. Therefore, the government wanted their analysis of Germany's economic and military capacities, their special insights into Nazi politics and Hitler's mind, and their advice on how to deal with the German people after the war. Émigré art historians, otherwise apolitical, helped draw up lists of Italian monuments, churches, and classical buildings for Allied bombers to avoid. The French émigrés (Maritain, Lévi-Strauss, Denis de Rougemont, André Breton) tended to be more conservative but they were especially useful in broadcasting messages and information on the Voice of America to occupied France.[52]

In the end, it was the government that enabled the refugees to complete their journey from outcasts in Europe to important and influential members of American society. The bond between the émigré scholars and Washington would strengthen in the years of the Cold War, as intellectuals (both foreign born and native) shifted their focus from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union.

Beyond the immediate pressures of the war, the experiences of the Europeans in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s were a dramatic illustration of how much the intellectual vitality of the Old World had been preserved and transformed in the New. In large measure, the philanthropic foundations were responsible not just for the rescue of individual European scholars and scientists, but for the general migration of European culture and civilization to America. It remained only for the government to take advantage of what the private sector—the foundations and the universities as well as the corporations and Hollywood—had already achieved.



## The Origins of America's Cultural Diplomacy

Washington's willingness to employ the refugee intellectuals, or indeed intellectuals of any kind, in the pursuit of its military and diplomatic objectives was not unprecedented. But neither was it customary. From the American Revolution through the Civil War, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and his descendants, had all represented the United States abroad. Yet they were conspicuous exceptions in a country where, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, people of culture and intellect rarely entered the world of domestic commerce or politics, much less the labyrinth of foreign policy. There was a vast distance, as Henry Adams never tired of pointing out, between being a public figure, living in or serving the White House (as his great-grandfather, grandfather, and father had done), and observing the conduct of power from a secluded home on Lafayette Square.

So the notion of enlisting the talents of intellectuals occurred infrequently to government officials. The idea of using American culture as a whole for the purposes of diplomacy—despite or because of the experience with George Creel's World War I Committee on Public Information—was even more unimaginable. Examples of how culture might be made an instrument of foreign policy did exist overseas, but until the 1930s Washington remained oblivious.

France, predictably, was the first country to utilize its culture for transnational goals. After its defeat in the Franco-Prusssian War of 1870–71, the French government sought to repair the nation's shattered prestige by teaching the French language and literature in the colonies and elsewhere, creating the Alliance Française for this purpose in 1883. Presumably, as foreigners grew more familiar with the French intellectual tradition, they would come to sympathize with French economic and political policies. The projection of French

culture abroad thus became a significant component of French diplomacy.[53]

Italy and Germany were also concerned with their international images, as well as with the loyalties of millions of their emigrants now living in foreign lands. They too emphasized language instruction as a way of maintaining and extending their political influence overseas. The Italian government, following the model of France, founded the Dante Alighieri Society in 1889. Germany relied on a variety of private organizations in the early twentieth century before it formed the Goethe Institute in 1932.[54] The selection of Goethe as a symbol, like the Italian government's use of Dante, was designed to remind people everywhere of Germany's many contributions to Western art and literature. Still, Goethe was an inauspicious choice of names for a country about to entrust its cultural inheritance to Hitler and Joseph Goebbels.

These initial experiments with cultural diplomacy were incurably elitist. The focus on language and literature was likely to be effective only with a relatively educated clientele, one already predisposed to value a nation's culture. The French understood this better than anyone else, since theirs was the language spoken internationally by decision makers and opinion shapers. But for almost every major European government at the beginning of the twentieth century, the official uses of culture were clear: They were to help promote a nation's interests among people who inhabited the foreign ministries, the universities, and the boards of trade.

By the 1920s, however, the growth of overseas investments, the emergence of mass movements and ideologies, and the appearance of new forms of international communication made culture and foreign policy no longer the special province of intellectuals, career politicians, aristocratic families, and professional diplomats.[55] Now governments had to employ every device at their disposal to appeal to a broad, heterogeneous audience whose emotions and allegiances could fluctuate with each new message or passing impression.

Advertising, automobile races, aviation speed and endurance contests, international athletic events, short-wave radio broadcasts, the movies—all these could be used to reinforce a nation's reputation and stature. Radio was particularly important in explaining national policy to people in other countries, and European governments quickly launched overseas and foreign-language broadcasting services: the Soviet Union in 1926, the Netherlands in 1927, France in 1931, and Britain in 1932.[56]



No country deployed its media more spectacularly than Germany in the 1930s. From the moment Hitler assumed power, every facet of the "new" German culture was conscripted to serve the doctrines and objectives of the Nazi regime. Newspapers and magazines, schools and churches, student exchanges and German-language clubs, international radio broadcasts and the movies, torch-light parades, and the 1936 Olympics, all were weapons in the arsenal of Nazi propaganda.[57] Perhaps the most notorious, and the most skillful, example of how the media could be used to glorify the current national myth was Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will,* a documentary film that transformed the Nuremberg rallies into a mythic spectacle—a visual hymn to Aryan purity, the collective spirit of the German people, and the demonic passions of the Führer.

The ability of Nazi propaganda to mobilize the German populace at home astonished other governments. The Nazis' efforts to attract foreign audiences, especially those of German ancestry, were even more ominous. Responding to the growing threat of German (and Italian) influence overseas, the British government set up the British Council in 1934, an institution devoted to the more traditional techniques of teaching language and literature through libraries and cultural centers in major foreign cities. By the late 1930s, the British Broadcasting Corporation's Empire Service had expanded its foreign-language operations to cope with the competition from German, Italian, Soviet, and Japanese radio networks.[58]

For most of this time, Washington refrained from officially sponsored cultural activities, leaving intellectual and educational exchanges to the foundations and the dissemination of American values to Hollywood. But by the middle of the 1930s, the Roosevelt administration concluded that America's security depended on its ability to speak to and win the support of people in other countries. Cultural and educational programs were indispensable to this task. Yet the nation's traditional reliance on private efforts like those of the foundations seemed no longer sufficient. If the United States hoped to compete in a world where culture was increasingly connected to foreign policy and governments were intimately involved in reshaping and projecting their national images, then Washington would have to adopt some of the same strategies.

What induced the Roosevelt administration to pursue a more activist cultural policy was its alarm at the spread of German and Italian influence in Latin America. There were large numbers of immigrants from both countries living in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, many of whom were sympathetic to the fascist regimes in their homelands. In

addition, public and university libraries throughout Latin America were well stocked with German and Italian books, newspapers, and magazines.[59] In contrast, America's cultural presence—apart from its movies—was relatively small, a set of circumstances with dangerous political implications. In response, Washington launched a series of educational and cultural programs designed to promote Latin America's loyalty to the United States. For the first time since the demise of the Creel Committee in 1919, the American government was experimenting again with cultural diplomacy.

The initial, halting steps were taken in 1936 at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held in Buenos Aires. There, the American delegation agreed to a government-sponsored exchange of professors, graduate students, and secondary school teachers between the United States and the Latin American nations. This was followed in 1938 by the formation of a Division of Cultural Relations within the Department of State. The division's primary purpose was to supervise America's cultural and educational exchange programs in Latin America, and to open and operate libraries, American schools, and cultural centers in the capital cities. Although Washington promised that the exchanges would be reciprocal, they were from the outset one-sided. Latin American students and professors traveled to the United States, while America in turn sent its books and art exhibitions to Latin America, and offered English-language instruction as well as classes in American history and literature in its cultural centers.[60] Still, the programs in Latin America marked the beginning of America's permanent commitment to the use of culture as an element in its international relations.

With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the global conflict prepared, economically and militarily, to fight a total war. This commitment included the mobilization of America's cultural and media resources beyond anything contemplated during World War I. In February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor, the federal government inaugurated a short-wave radio service called the Voice of America to reach and guide the unseen, unheard people of occupied Europe. The VOA quickly became America's most important means of projecting its messages overseas because its signals could be picked up almost everywhere. Its impact was supplemented by the Armed Forces Radio Network whose programs, though intended for American soldiers, also appealed to civilian populations.[61] In June, the Roosevelt administration went further, creating the Office of War Information. The OWI's mission, grandly conceived, was to coordinate



all of America's efforts to define for audiences at home and abroad the nation's wartime policies and its vision of the postwar world.

For the most part, the OWI engaged in a variety of activities that were now typical of modern cultural diplomacy. Working closely with Madison Avenue, Hollywood, the major publishing houses, and the radio networks, the OWI opened information offices and libraries in the unconquered or subsequently liberated countries of Europe; distributed magazines and inexpensive paperback copies of American books, both in English and in translation; printed excerpts of Roosevelt's speeches and digests of important newspaper articles and radio broadcasts; issued news releases and reproduced press photographs; kept in close contact with foreign newspaper editors and invited scores of exiled European journalists and political leaders to the United States; arranged for art exhibitions and the showing of documentary films; and conducted public relations campaigns with a blizzard of posters and pamphlets. The OWI was especially active in Britain, dispatching American intellectuals, scholars, and government officials to lecture at universities and secondary schools, before women's clubs and trade unions, over the BBC—in sum, to any audience deemed insufficiently knowledgeable about the United States. All these efforts, in whatever country they occurred, were designed to reacquaint Europeans (particularly those who had been cut off from the news by the Nazi occupation) with the latest accomplishments in American science, literature, the arts, and social reform.[62]

The OWI also assisted the military and the Office of Strategic Services in carrying out "psychological" warfare. After the Allied invasions of Italy and France, OWI personnel dropped 3 billion leaflets and set up loudspeakers encouraging German and Italian soldiers to surrender. In addition, the OWI commandeered movie theaters and radio stations, took over European newspapers, and operated mobile units close to the front lines, all in an effort to weaken enemy morale and hasten the end of the war. It was, of course, the Allied armies, rather than American propaganda, that ultimately defeated Germany. But the OWI gained considerable credit for its contribution to the climactic military campaigns.[63]

Toward the end of the war, both the OWI and the VOA turned their attention to the task of creating a more favorable impression of the United States in Europe. The OWI began to publish its own booklets and magazines, while the VOA put on programs designed to educate Europeans about America's wealth and productivity, about its democratic impulses, above all about its power to shape the destiny of

the postwar world. The picture the agencies painted was meant to be attractive and reassuring. Its purpose was to help Europeans better understand and appreciate America's values and institutions so that they might more easily accept America's benevolent rule.[64] These were themes that would be repeatedly emphasized in the postwar era.

Yet whatever successes the OWI enjoyed, its ability to survive World War II was always in doubt. By the summer of 1945, no one in the government could decide what role (if any) an agency like the OWI should have in peacetime. At this point, it seemed easier to put off any serious consideration of the nature and purposes of government-sponsored cultural programs until some new crisis arose. In August, President Truman abolished the OWI as an independent entity and transferred its few remaining functions, along with a diminished VOA, to the Department of State. There they resided—unloved, unwelcome, with no clear marching orders—until they were rejuvenated by the Cold War.[65]

But the idea that America's cultural ties with Europe should depend in part on government support did not entirely vanish. Neither did the notion that Europe ought to be remade in America's image. In the years after 1945, Europeans became the chief targets of Washington's renewed and more bombastic cultural diplomacy. The Europeans also found themselves trying more desperately than in the prewar era to resist or revise America's plans for their future.

# TWO

# *American Culture and the Cold War*

## *The Reshaping of Western Europe*

By the end of World War I, the United States had established itself as a significant presence in world affairs, a nation whose economy and popular culture affected the attitudes and consumption patterns of millions of people overseas. Yet throughout the 1920s and 1930s, America shared the international stage with Europe. The most important political and military decisions were still made in London, Paris, and Berlin. Until the rise of Nazism, the most advanced scientific theories were still being debated chiefly in European universities and research institutes, while the most provocative innovations in literature and the arts still originated in the cafés, salons, garrets, and studios of Europe's great cities. In its transactions with Europe, the United States was no longer a junior partner, but neither did it dominate the relationship. During the interwar years, Americans and Europeans seemed wary but respectful of one another, as one might expect from two evenly matched competitors in the global arena.

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By the close of World War II, any sense of equality between the United States and Europe had vanished. America stood alone as the world's mightiest nation. Its armies were triumphant. Its cities had escaped bombardment. Its civilian population had been neither uprooted nor terrorized. Its economy had recovered from the depression and was once again strong. Its standard of living was unsurpassed. Its technological superiority was unquestioned, and its mastery of atomic weaponry was—at least for the time being—unchallenged. In 1945, the United States had reached the summit of its power and prestige.

The contrasts with Europe could not have been more glaring. Americans, dreaming of new houses in the suburbs, stared uncomprehendingly at newsreels showing once-lively, near-mythical European cities now suffocating in garbage and rubble. American factories, returning to the manufacture of consumer goods after four years of war production, were beginning to flood the marketplace with automobiles, refrigerators, clothes, an infinite variety of soaps and toothpastes and breakfast cereals, the first television sets—in short, all the necessities of a modern consumer society. At the same moment, the specter of hunger and starvation haunted the European winters. The United States was exploding with energy and optimism: The future would surely be America's to shape and define. Europe, on the other hand, was wrecked, exhausted, finished as an international force—its influence and glory, its claim to represent the best in human civilization, all obliterated by the war and the gas chambers. Europe's very survival now depended on America's economic resources, political leadership, and military protection. Americans would decide on their own what the major issues were and how they should be resolved. In return for America's liberation of (Western) Europe, and its promise of assistance and guidance in the postwar era, the United States asked of Europeans only that they be grateful and properly deferential. Given the stark discrepancy between an exuberant America and a ravaged Europe, it was little wonder that Americans might regard themselves as the chosen people of the twentieth century, even though the Europeans often thought of the Americans as creatures from another planet.

Americans certainly inhabited a different world; whether it was Jerusalem or Mars hardly mattered. The United States could as easily be seen as a reincarnation of Rome. But if Americans were the newest Caesars, they arrived on the European continent both as conquerors and as custodians. Having subdued the vandals of the 1930s and preparing to fend off the territorial appetites of the barbarians in the



Soviet Union, Americans presented themselves to Europe as the guardians of democracy on the one hand and of Western civilization on the other. The dual image was not unpersuasive. By 1945, the United States had become the center not just of commerce and power, but also of art and ideas. Washington had replaced London and Berlin as the overseer of Western politics, and New York had replaced Paris as the home of Western culture.

The migration of European scholars, artists, and scientists to the United States contributed to America's intellectual preeminence at the end of the war. But the transformation of the United States from a cultural colony to a cultural colossus was more directly a product of America's political, economic, and military supremacy in 1945. American culture and American power were inextricably connected. Just as Europeans now had to pay close attention to America's domestic political disputes and diplomatic goals, so too did they need to familiarize themselves with America's literature, painting, science, social thought, and academic life. Where uncultivated Americans once traveled to Europe in search of enlightenment, Europeans in the 1940s and 1950s came to the United States to study America's past and learn from America's present. Here, in universities abundantly equipped with libraries and laboratories, they could absorb the unrivaled wisdom of American professors. They could listen to the opinions of American intellectuals; read the works and try to imitate the techniques of American novelists and poets; find out about the most recent developments in American art and architecture; and experience, if only temporarily, the exhilaration of living in the heartland of modernism. Europe—previously urbane and sophisticated—had become hopelessly provincial. America, in turn, was the embodiment of the cosmopolitan ideal.

Because the United States was now the leader and principal defender of Western civilization, it soon found itself inescapably engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union, a war waged as much for cultural influence as for political, economic, and military domination. Europe, physically and politically divided, with tensions mounting daily in Berlin, a continent that had been a breeding ground for crises and an eternal killing field, was pivotal to the outcome of the contest.

Ironically, the Cold War gave the Europeans, particularly the Western Europeans, some room to maneuver. They might be economically and politically dependent on the United States, but since they were also being courted by the Soviet Union, their loyalties could not be taken for

granted. What Western Europe's governing classes did, what the intellectual leaders and the ordinary people of Europe thought, how much or how little they understood and appreciated America, whether they grasped the moral distinctions between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether they were willing to choose sides or would try instead to maintain their emotional and ideological neutrality—these were questions of the greatest magnitude for the White House and the State Department. It was clear that in the battle for the allegiance of Western Europe, the United States would have to commit not only its armies and its wealth, but all its cultural assets as well. Thus, the marriage of American culture and American diplomacy, first proposed with some misgivings during World War II, was ardently consummated in the early years of the Cold War.

## The Reformation of Germany

For many Western Europeans during and after World War II, America's foreign policy and its culture were personified by the American army. The ubiquitous GI was often the first American most people in Britain, France, Italy, or Germany had ever met, the first American whose behavior they were able to observe at close range. The encounter was not necessarily pleasant. American soldiers—tossing chewing gum and chocolates to the natives, trading stockings and cigarettes for women's favors, threatening to flatten pedestrians as they roared through town in their Jeeps and luxuriously upholstered cars, noisily invading the neighborhood pubs, bulging with dollars to squander on the black market—aroused among their European hosts a mixture of feelings, from fascination to exasperation to envy.[1] As they swaggered down the street, brimming with health and confidence, looking larger than life and certainly more robust than the local population, the soldiers seemed the embodiments of a vulgar, flamboyant, mythological America.

In no country did the presence of the army more strongly reinforce the notion of how a typical American acted than in Germany. To Germans living in the American zone, the soldiers seemed more insouciant, more relaxed and informal, and more antiauthoritarian than any occupying force ever seen on the Continent. This was an army imbued with a civilian mentality. Its conduct contrasted sharply with the obedience displayed by Hitler's legions or the robotic demeanor of the Soviet army in the Eastern zone. But the most striking attribute of



the American army was its wealth. While Germans, as well as the British and Italians, struggled to survive on little food and less heat, the Americans—with no worries about the provenance of their next meal or the costs of electricity and gasoline—appeared to take their affluence for granted.[2] The American army, of course, was made up largely of people with vivid memories of their own impoverishment during the depression years. Yet this fact mattered little to the many Europeans for whom scarcity and destitution were now the norms of daily life.

American troops brought to Europe and especially to Germany not only their canned goods and cash but also their language, their attitudes, and their popular culture. Even if one did not come into direct contact with a GI (and fraternization between American soldiers and German civilians was at first discouraged), it was possible to learn a great deal about the United States simply by listening to the Armed Forces Radio Network. Although the programs on the AFN were aimed at military personnel, local inhabitants comprised 90 percent of the audience after the war. Through the medium of the AFN, Germans in the Western zones and in Berlin could hear American jazz, the latest songs and dance music, news and information about movies and politics, and a distinctive form of "American" English.[3]

Whether the Germans resented or admired the prosperity and culture of the average American soldier, the primary role of the army was to try to make the former Third Reich into a replica of the United States. And in this endeavor, there was no doubt, at least from the American point of view, that the Germans had been reduced to the status of colonials awaiting the commands of the mother country across the ocean, as transmitted to her proconsuls in Berlin.

Of all the cultural missions undertaken in Europe by the American government after World War II, none was larger or more ambitious than the effort to create within its own zone of occupation an entirely new Germany in the years between 1945 and 1949. The moment could not have seemed more propitious. Germany was prostrate and in need of every conceivable form of assistance; the American army was in complete control of a docile population; Washington could presumably accomplish whatever it wanted. Here was an incomparable opportunity for political reform, social engineering, and cultural rejuvenation—all of which would serve the interests both of America's democratic ideals and of its postwar foreign policy.

Yet despite America's power and Germany's helplessness, the United States was unable to achieve its grand design. Instead, America's

## FOUR

# *American Studies in Europe*

When Charles Frankel criticized the government's exchange programs for being too concerned with indoctrinating foreigners in the virtues of the American way, rather than with discovering what other societies might have to offer, he was questioning a central assumption behind America's cultural diplomacy in the second half of the twentieth century. Most government officials believed that the more people knew about the United States, the more they would come to admire its political and economic values, and its foreign policy. Unilateral instruction was therefore necessary, especially in the years of the Cold War. Reciprocity and mutual understanding, however worthy as educational goals, would have to wait.

Almost all the government's cultural efforts throughout the postwar era were aimed at introducing foreigners, and particularly Europeans, to a civilized and sophisticated America. Yet the America Houses and embassy libraries, the art exhibitions and jazz concerts, the touring ballet companies and symphony orchestras, could not erase the deeply ingrained notion, reinforced by Hollywood, that the United States was a land of enormous wealth, with modern appliances and efficient plumbing, but without an authentic culture or a respect for tradition.

To overcome these stereotypes, Europeans would need to learn





more about America's history and literature. This would not be a simple task, given the chronic resistance of European academics to the inclusion of American subjects in their classrooms and textbooks. Nevertheless, after World War II, the U.S. government embarked on a major campaign to incorporate the study of the United States into the curricula of European universities and secondary schools, and to help create chairs and institutes in American history and literature. American Studies became an essential component of Washington's cultural diplomacy, its importance enhanced by the recognition that this was one of the most effective ways to reach and influence a generation of students who would eventually acquire powerful positions in the government, the media, and the universities, passing on to the next generation their knowledge of and appreciation for the United States.

Over time, the American Studies movement in Europe accomplished many of the objectives visualized by its sponsors across the Atlantic. But it did not result in a transplantation of American values. Instead, European scholars used American Studies for their own purposes, reinterpreting American history and literature in terms that were relevant to European problems. In the end, American Studies became a lens through which Europeans could more clearly see and understand themselves, which was not what Washington originally intended when it set out to teach the Old World about the United States.

## Prewar Antecedents

In 1948, Harold Laski—the historian, political scientist, and leading theoretician of the British Labour Party—published *The American Democracy,* a mammoth work designed to make the United States "intelligible to Europeans." Toward the end of the book, Laski reflected on Europe's "absurd and willful ignorance of American institutions and culture" in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. "American literature was little read," he observed, while "few people, the scholars included, knew much of American history. . . . There was [no] serious effort to teach American history in the universities, let alone the schools."[1]

Laski's lament was echoed by others who remembered how little attention the United States received from European academics or intellectuals in the first decades of the twentieth century. "America played a very small role in the education of those [of us] who grew up in

Germany between 1910 and 1930," one journalist recollected. "We were taught almost nothing about its history" or "about the role it was beginning to assume with World War I." Similarly, Sigmund Skard—one of the principal advocates in the 1940s and 1950s of American Studies in Europe—confessed in his autobiography that his knowledge of America's history and literature had once been nonexistent. At the University of Oslo, where he was a student in the 1920s, "America was still largely ignored." At best, American history was treated as a "peripheral field in world history." The situation was the same in literature. Skard could not recall "having read even Hemingway that early, nor his other contemporaries. . . . Nor did I read the modern American poets at the time." Indeed, "not a single American writer was among my models."[2]

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, professorial indifference to America was common throughout Europe. In Britain, conservative dons at Oxford and Cambridge usually spoke of the United States with condescension. In their view, American history was dull, American intellectual life was insignificant, and American literature was merely an inferior by-product of British literature. These dismissive opinions were shared by Dutch, Norwegian, and Danish academics, who looked to both Britain and Germany for cultural guidance. French professors, preoccupied with the glories of their own civilization, were equally inattentive to developments in the United States. Authoritarian educators and politicians in Germany, Austria, and Spain seemed either incurious about or hostile toward America's democratic institutions. Even in countries like Italy, Greece, Poland, Sweden, and Ireland, where immigration to the United States was of considerable importance, few scholars displayed any inclination to find out more about the land to which so many of their people had migrated.[3]

This disinterest was exacerbated by the absence in European libraries of American novels, political tracts, newspapers, magazines, and government documents, materials that might have facilitated scholarly research. Consequently, most of the information about America in the nineteenth century came from travel books, many of which were filled with sweeping and often supercilious generalizations about American politics and social life that served only to harden the prejudices of European readers. In Frances Trollope's *Domestic Manners of the Americans* (1832) and Charles Dickens's *American Notes* (1842), the New World seemed a thoroughly unpleasant place, inhabited by people who were avaricious and uncouth, frantically pursuing (in Dickens's famous words) the "almighty dollar." Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835) was a far more perceptive and sympathetic depiction of life in the United States. But Tocqueville wanted primarily to warn his fellow-Europeans about the perils of the democratic experiment which, he feared, would lead either to anarchy or mass conformity. In *The American Commonwealth* (1888), James Bryce tried to evaluate the United States on its own terms, rather than as a verification of Europe's superiority. Still, his book was a lonely exception to the critical portraits of America that usually told Europeans what they wanted to hear.[4]



Meanwhile, European academics were content to focus on topics closer to home. Literature, philosophy, music, the arts—these were the specialties of Britain, France, Germany, and Central Europe. History was what had happened in classical Greece and Rome; in the medieval world; or, at most, in the Renaissance. America was entirely too new and too modern to have a past worthy of investigation.[5] And it was too distant, geographically and culturally, to be noticed or taken seriously.

There were sporadic signs in the early years of the twentieth century, and certainly after World War I, that the scholarly neglect of America might be coming to an end. The emergence of the United States as an economic and military power meant that Europe was no longer alone at the center of the universe. America's decisive intervention in the war, the presence of American troops in France, the way in which Woodrow Wilson and his entourage dominated the peace conference at Versailles, the impact of American products and movies in the 1920s, all these made it necessary for Europeans to know more about the United States.

Much of this attention took the form of a new interest in and respect for American literature. Despite their general disdain for American novelists and poets, European (and especially French) critics had long been fascinated with James Fenimore Cooper and Edgar Allen Poe. Now translations of Mark Twain, Bret Harte, Edward Arlington Robinson, and Jack London appeared, while the works of expatriates like T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and the young Ernest Hemingway raised the possibility that at least a few American writers were worthy of inclusion in the modernist pantheon. Two milestones indicated that, in the eyes of some Europeans, American poetry and fiction had come of age: the publication of D. H. Lawrence's *Studies in Classic American Literature* in 1923 and the awarding of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1930 to Sinclair Lewis.

Significantly, Lawrence was not an academician. Nor was his passion for American writing shared by the professoriate. Inside the universities, the acceptance of America as a subject of scholarly inquiry was more halting and less cordial. Still, a number of prominent figures in the European academic world began to publish books and offer courses on the United States.

The great Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, normally absorbed with medieval and early modern Europe, paused briefly to comment on America's literature and civilization in two books. *Man and the Masses in America* (1918) had its origins in a course on American history Huizinga taught at the University of Leiden during World War I, while *Life and Thought in America: Stray Remarks* (1926) was a collection of notes and observations from his one visit to the United States. Huizinga's assessment, like Tocqueville's, was decidedly ambivalent. On the one hand, Huizinga was charmed by the exuberant optimism of the Americans and their childlike faith in the benefits that an industrial economy could infinitely bestow. On the other hand, he disliked America's glorification of efficiency, its hunger for instant results, its love affair with machines, and its satisfaction with the superficial and the mass-produced. Along with other European intellectuals in the 1920s, Huizinga saw America as the embodiment of modernity, which only made him treasure the quieter, less acquisitive ambience of his native Holland.[6]

For Huizinga, the United States was an object lesson on what could go wrong if Europeans followed the American example. Other scholars saw America not so much as a symbol but as a country whose history and development needed to be explained. At the University of Oslo, in the years before and after World War I, Halvdan Koht became the first Norwegian to write and teach extensively about America. His approach was more favorable than Huizinga's, emphasizing America's idealism, its commitment to social reform, and the broadening of its democratic heritage as a consequence of its remarkable economic growth. Koht's influence was considerable, particularly on Sigmund Skard who married Koht's daughter in 1933, thus laying the foundations for Skard's personal and intellectual involvement with the United States during and after World War II.[7]

Between the wars, French academics also became more active in scrutinizing the United States. Universities in Paris, Lyons, Lille, and Bordeaux established positions in American literature and history, beginning with a professorship at the Sorbonne, held from 1919 to 1941 by Charles Cestre, who was primarily responsible for launching



the study of the United States in France. André Siegfried and Bernard Fay, the first French scholar to earn a doctorate in American history, taught courses regularly on America at other Parisian universities during the 1920s and 1930s. At the same time, French libraries slowly enlarged their meager holdings in American source materials, aided by American foundations like the Carnegie Endowment and the presence of the American Library in Paris, which opened in 1918.[8]

The Germans too devoted more attention to American subjects, which reflected both their expanding commercial ties to the United States at the dawn of the twentieth century and their defeat at the hands of the American army in 1918. As early as 1906, a bilateral exchange of scholars began, with German universities offering visiting posts to American academics, who were called Roosevelt Professors in honor of Theodore Roosevelt. One of these professors, John Burgess, a historian at Columbia, helped organize an American Institute in Berlin in 1910, complete with a library that housed one of the largest collections of Americana on the Continent. During the 1920s, interest in American culture intensified among German academics, artists, and intellectuals, though they were alternately captivated and repelled by what they heard and read about life in the United States. Even under the Nazis, teaching and research on the United States continued to flourish, at least for a while and in a heavily censored form. The number of courses on America steadily increased. In 1936, the University of Berlin established itself as the premier institution in Germany for American Studies by creating a professorship in American literature and cultural history. A year later, the government announced new regulations for examinations taken by secondary school teachers, requiring them to know as much about American as British literature. Nevertheless, the analyses and appraisals of American civilization had to conform to Nazi dogma, usually by pointing out the decadence of America's multiracial society.[9]

It was in Britain, however, that the magnitude and the limits of Europe's investment in American Studies were best exemplified. The academic links between Britain and the United States had been forged at the beginning of the twentieth century with the inauguration of the Rhodes scholarships in 1902, enabling Americans to do post-graduate work at Oxford. In return, the Commonwealth Fund, set up by the Harkness family in the United States in 1918, permitted British university graduates to study in the United States, starting in 1925. The Rhodes and Commonwealth awards were meant mainly for students. The teaching of American history in Britain awaited the creation in

1922 of the Harmsworth Chair at Oxford, intended for visiting American scholars, the first of whom was Samuel Eliot Morison. A few years later, in 1930, the Harkness family endowed a Commonwealth Professorship in American history at the University of London, designated as a permanent appointment for a British Americanist.[10] Both these positions were supposed to educate British students in the complexities of the American past, and make research on American topics more respectable in the British academic world.

During the 1930s, the development of American Studies in Britain depended largely on the largess of foundations in the United States. In addition to the Commonwealth Fund, which sent 361 British students to America between 1925 and 1939, the Carnegie Endowment paid for the trips of British historians to the annual conventions of the American Historical Association and gave small amounts of money to British universities for the purchase of books on the United States. The ability to travel to and around America was particularly important for Herbert Nicholas. Nicholas attended Yale from 1935 to 1937 as a Commonwealth Fund Fellow intending to become a historian of seventeenth-century England. But he found himself increasingly entranced by American literature and colonial history, as well as with the sheer size and diversity of America itself.[11] The experience prepared him for his eventual transformation into an Americanist after World War II.

Despite all of these efforts, American Studies remained weak in Britain throughout the interwar years. Universities were reluctant to make room in their curricula for courses on the United States, students' interest was negligible, materials for teaching and research were inadequate, and neither Oxford nor the University of London seemed willing to do much more than provide an institutional shelter for two otherwise marginal chairs in American history. Nor did the British and American governments see any reason why they should support educational initiatives to enlighten British students or the British public about the United States.[12]

The outbreak of World War II forced policymakers in London and Washington to revise their estimation of the importance of American Studies. Nearly everyone in Franklin Roosevelt's administration and in Winston Churchill's War Cabinet recognized that a close relationship between the two countries was now more imperative than at any time in the past. From the British standpoint, a political and military alliance with the United States was essential, first for survival and then for victory. Hence, it was desirable to strengthen Britain's cultural ties



with America. For their part, American officials believed that the British people needed to gain a better understanding of the social and political traditions of the United States, not only to cement the wartime partnership, but to prepare the local population for the 3 million U.S. soldiers and civilians who would soon be swarming into Britain. Educating the British about America's history and literature could help illuminate the common democratic heritage and shared destiny of the Anglo-Americans.

The war was thus a catalyst for the growth of American Studies, encouraged by both the British and American governments. In 1941, the American ambassador to Britain, John Winant, and the British minister of information, Duff Cooper, urged teachers in elementary and secondary schools to devote more time in their classrooms to American topics. To assist the teachers, the British Board of Education asked Allan Nevins, then occupying the Harmsworth chair and one of the leading authorities on the Civil War and the Gilded Age, to write a forty-thousand-word survey of American history for use in secondary schools. The board also arranged for teachers to attend week-long training seminars in American history. Meanwhile, Cambridge, which had not joined Oxford and the University of London in creating a position in American Studies during the 1920s, hurried to catch up, demonstrating its appreciation for the variety of life in the United States by inviting Henry Steele Commager, one of America's most eminent academic historians, and J. Frank Dobie, a specialist in Texas humor and folklore, to lecture on American history. In 1944, Cambridge went further, establishing the Pitt Professorship in American History and Institutions, to be held by visiting American scholars. Throughout the war years, British libraries received grants from the Rockefeller Foundation to expand their American collections. In addition, the Office of War Information supplied British audiences, in and out of school, with books, newspapers, films, and lectures by American intellectuals like Alfred Kazin—still youthful but already well known for his panoramic interpretation of modern American literature in *On Native Grounds,* who undertook a speaking tour for the OWI and the British Council in 1945.[13]

Nevertheless, the British government's enthusiasm for American Studies was inspired by the wartime emergency, not by some deeply rooted determination to improve the quality of teaching and research on the United States. By 1945, as the war neared its end, with American troops having left England for Paris and Berlin, Whitehall's interest in American history and literature subsided.[14] If professors in

Britain and Western Europe were going to devote more of their scholarly time to the United States in the future, the incentive for them to do so would have to come from Washington and from America's private foundations. They would also have to acknowledge, on their own and however reluctantly, that the history and culture of the world's newest superpower could no longer be belittled or ignored.

## The Postwar Setting

Twenty years after the end of World War II, American Studies had developed into a growth industry in Europe. The reason for this was hardly mysterious to Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary* and a member in good standing of the New York Jewish intelligentsia at a time when the world beyond Manhattan still looked like a Saul Steinberg cartoon. "Does Finland have a great literature?" Podhoretz asked in his 1967 autobiography *Making It*. "Does Afghanistan? Does Ecuador? Who knows or cares? But give Finland enough power and enough wealth, and there would soon be a Finnish department in every university in the world—just as, in the 1950s, departments of American Studies were suddenly being established in colleges where, only a few years earlier, it had scarcely occurred to anyone that there was anything American *to* study."[15]

The situation had indeed changed, as many European academics were forced to concede. Harry Allen, a British historian who became an Americanist soon after 1945, recalled in the 1970s the connection, so clear to his own generation, between the American Studies movement and American power. "It was . . . no accident," he observed, "that the rapid rise of American studies in Europe coincided with [the] international ascendancy of the United States in the years after World War II." A younger British scholar, noting the postwar expansion of American subjects in British universities and secondary schools, and the emergence of a "more respectful attitude toward American history" among his peers, saw these trends as having originated at precisely the moment "when the U.S. was asserting its role in the world." The importance of America, Sigmund Skard pointed out, was "obvious to everybody" in the European academic community, so much so that the historic "discrepancy between the position of the United States in the world and its place in syllabuses and curricula" seemed increasingly "intolerable."[16]

Despite the general European awareness of America's postwar pre-



eminence, the motivations for studying the United States differed from country to country. For many officials in the British government, teaching students about American history and literature was one way of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance in the midst of the Cold War, and of solidifying Britain's "special relationship" with the United States. The French too were anxious to know more about the United States, if only to bolster their resistance to America's cultural influence. In smaller nations like the Netherlands, Denmark, and Greece, the impact of the Marshall Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization made scholars and students less Eurocentric; a greater knowledge of American society and politics was now obligatory.[17]

No people seemed more eager to learn about the United States than the West Germans. Much of their curiosity was genuine, but it was also a matter of necessity, the Americans having arrived as conquerors and masters of West Germany's fate. The United States, as one German Americanist remarked, "was the overwhelming entity with which everyone had to be acquainted, if you were intellectually enterprising at all." The Germans may have wished to please the new authorities by displaying a scholarly interest in America, but they were equally keen to forget the war and get on with their lives. American Studies offered a path to the future for professors, teachers, and young intellectuals, as Alfred Kazin discovered when he taught a course on "American civilization" in Cologne in 1952. Half the city was still in ruins, but for Kazin's students "the war was over. The war was not to be mentioned. Not a word was said by my students about the war. They were busy getting ahead on the magic road of *Amerikanistik*."[18]

The popularity of American Studies in postwar Europe did not depend simply on the recognition that the United States was a mighty country whose culture and institutions ought to be better understood. After a century of skepticism, European academics might still not have accepted American history and literature as areas suitable for teaching and research without the active intervention of the American government and a massive infusion of American money.

Washington's willingness to support the American Studies movement in Europe was inspired by the onset of the Cold War. Later on, the idea that the United States promoted American Studies in order to advance its political agenda made some European Americanists uncomfortable, as if there may have been few indigenous or purely intellectual reasons for them to take up the field. Looking back on the early postwar years from the perspective of the 1980s, the British literary critic Denis Donoghue worried that the European participation

# EIGHT

# *Mass Culture: The American Transmission*

From the outset of the twentieth century, European intellectuals and political leaders defined "Americanization" in a variety of ways. They described it as the export of American products and values, as an investment strategy designed to penetrate and control the economies of other countries, as an effort to educate foreigners in the superiority of American institutions and the virtues of American diplomacy, and as a form of modernization. But sooner or later, any discussion of America's influence turned into a debate, or more often a complaint, about the spread of American culture.

When Europeans contemplated the "culture" of the United States, they were not thinking about America's postwar leadership in science, literature, painting, or architecture, as officers at the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency would have preferred. For Europeans in the 1940s and 1950s, even more than for their predecessors in the 1920s, American culture meant movies, jazz, rock and roll, newspapers, mass-circulation magazines, advertising, comic strips, and ultimately television. This was a culture created not for the patricians but for the common folk. And it was a culture whose sounds, images,



and subliminal messages had become so powerful and so beguiling by midcentury as to nearly drown out the competing voices in other lands.

What struck Europeans as new about American mass culture in the decades after World War II was not its presence—they had been going to American movies and hearing American music since the 1920s—but its pervasiveness. Throughout Western Europe, America's culture had become dominant, capturing (in the words of one Italian observer) the "collective imagination" of those who grew up in the postwar years. "Our cartoons were Donald Duck, Little Orphan Annie, Dick Tracy, and Superman," a Danish literary critic recalled. "Our favorite boys' games were cowboys and Indians, and the movies were westerns or Walt Disney productions. . . . The first records we bought were in English. . . . During our teen years we idolized James Dean and Marilyn Monroe, [and we] listened to Elvis Presley, Brenda Lee, and Jerry Lee Lewis. . . . Our food was Kentucky Fried chicken, burgers, fries, and Cokes, and our clothes were T-shirts, sweatshirts, and jeans. TV was full of *Bonanza* and *Laredo,* and our language became full of what seemed necessary words: 'groovy,' 'crazy,' 'cool,' and 'heavy.'" Indeed, as another Italian pointed out, American mass culture did not even feel like an import, so deeply imbedded were its conventions and formulas in the consciousness and daily experience of young Europeans.[1]

The ascendancy of American mass culture did not happen by accident. But neither was it the result of a conspiracy by Hollywood, the television networks, and the American government. To explain how figures as disparate as Madonna and Mickey Mouse, J. R. Ewing and Woody Allen, became international icons, one has to understand both the economics of the American entertainment industry and why that industry was so successful at making precisely the movies and television programs audiences everywhere wanted to see.

## The Export of News and Entertainment

For any nation wishing to project its culture and its political ideas throughout the world, the ability to communicate in a language the citizens of other countries comprehend is crucial. That was the reason the Foreign Ministry in Paris always emphasized the teaching of French overseas. Nevertheless, the French gradually lost the battle for

linguistic, and therefore cultural, supremacy to their eternal adversaries: the Anglo-Americans.

This did not mean, as many American tourists seemed to assume, that if you bellowed at a foreign waiter or salesperson in English, he or she would eventually understand what you were trying to say. Still, by the last decade of the twentieth century, 1 billion people on the planet did speak some recognizable form of English. In fact, people who had learned English as a foreign language outnumbered those who were native speakers. More important, English had become the international idiom for science, medicine, air travel and space exploration, business, diplomacy, and mass culture—a language used not only by the professional class in every country, but increasingly by ordinary citizens as well.[2]

The spread of English was a reflection, first, of Britain's commercial strength and imperial expansion in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and then of America's emergence as a superpower after World War II. Yet the diffusion of English was not dependent solely on the economic and military power of Britain or the United States. English was also a language eminently suited to the demands of mass culture and the mass media. More than other languages, English tends to have shorter words and a simpler grammar, and its sentences are often less abstract and more succinct. These qualities were especially useful if one was composing headlines and newspaper stories, captions or cartoons, song lyrics or advertising copy, movie subtitles, or the terse dialogue favored by film directors and television producers.[3]

The global preeminence of English meant that both Britain and the United States were able to disseminate their culture and their influence more easily than could France or Germany, Russia or Japan. But Britain not only exported its own culture; it also imported America's. Because the British were the primary recipients of American culture, they frequently acted as intermediaries—absorbing, modifying, and retransmitting American news and popular music to English speakers in Scandinavia and on the European continent, at least until the arrival of CNN and MTV. In countries like the Netherlands and Italy, much of what passed in the 1950s for "American" rock and roll was really a British mutation. The role of cultural broker, however, was not confined to London-based journalists, rock musicians, and record companies. By the 1960s, West German television was equally instrumental in filtering and reinterpreting America's popular culture for East Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.[4]

Though Britain and West Germany were important conduits for



American culture, the United States did not have to rely on foreign messengers to communicate with other nations. Even before it was possible to broadcast directly and instantaneously over international satellites and cable television networks, the American media succeeded in reaching a global audience.

The United States was in an especially advantageous position because it had developed and refined the techniques of mass communications before anyone else. Just as American industrialists had been pioneers in the use of mass production and in the creation of a consumer society, so too did American publishers early in the twentieth century determine the format of the modern newspaper with its mixture of stories, syndicated columns, photographs, comic strips, and advertisements. By the 1920s, they had also launched weekly news magazines, offering readers a brisk insider's view of politics, economics, science, sports, the theater, books, and show business. Similarly, Hollywood producers in the second decade of the twentieth century resolved that a feature-length film should tell a story and typically last two hours, a principle ultimately accepted by moviemakers in the rest of the world. In the 1950s, television became America's premier medium for news and entertainment at a time when TV programming in other countries had hardly begun and most people were still listening to the radio. As a result of their head start in all these areas, American media executives could influence the nature and shape of mass communications not only within the United States but also overseas.[5]

The power and primacy of the American media were particularly evident among the world's journalists. No other country's newspapers or magazines attracted as many foreign readers or were as widely imitated—a tribute as much to the style as to the content of American journalism. In Europe, as elsewhere, the journalistic models were American, especially after 1945. This was not simply a matter of the European press subscribing to the news services of the leading American newspapers. Rather, European publishers, editors, correspondents, and commentators were swayed by how the news was presented in the United States and what was considered worthy of coverage.

The American conception of the news was exemplified in the dispatches and wire photos distributed through the Associated Press and United Press International; in the stories printed in the *New York Times,* the *Washington Post,* the *Los Angeles Times,* the *International Herald Tribune, Time,* and *Newsweek*; and in the nightly newscasts on CBS, ABC, NBC, and CNN. In contrast to the old-fashioned, ideologically

tinged, often ponderous articles appearing in European newspapers and magazines, and the relative absence of eye-catching graphics and computer wizardry on European television, American news stories were aimed at a modern audience with a short attention span, an audience that wanted to be amused as well as informed. Consequently, American journalists blended objective reporting with gossip and punditry, grisly pictures of wars and earthquakes with restaurant reviews and investment advice.

Given the pyrotechnic style and visual theatrics of this form of journalism, it was not surprising that European readers and viewers in the postwar era might prefer their news delivered in the American way. By the 1970s, the European edition of *Time* outsold both *The Economist* and *L'Express*.[6] The popularity of the daily tabloids in Britain, the growing concentration on sex and scandals even in "serious" newspapers on the Continent, and the tendency of European newscasters to copy the sonorous delivery of a Walter Cronkite or incorporate into their programs material supplied by CNN were all testimonials to America's journalistic impact.

The widespread knowledge of English, combined with America's technological and stylistic ingenuity in the field of mass communications, were significant factors in facilitating the export of American culture to Europe and to other parts of the world. Yet these were not the only or even the most compelling reasons for the worldwide allure of American news and entertainment. The principal explanations for the globalization of American mass culture were economic and demographic.

It was clear from the 1920s on that Hollywood's studios benefited from a huge domestic market, a market far larger than any of their foreign competitors. Because there were so many Americans who could purchase movie tickets, the studios usually expected to retrieve their production costs and turn a profit solely within the borders of the United States. This enabled them to finance big-budget extravaganzas and to spend more money on stars, sets, script revisions, special effects, location shooting, and publicity—the very ingredients that attracted international audiences, as well as those at home, to Hollywood movies.[7] American publishing houses and television producers similarly profited from the sheer number of people in the United States who could buy books or boost the ratings of a TV show. While overseas sales of movies, videos, television programs, and books became increasingly important after World War II, the American media could always count on the home market for a substantial proportion of its earnings.



But the size of the American audience mattered less than its composition. The heterogeneity of America's population—its ethnic, racial, class, and regional diversity—forced the media to experiment with messages, images, and story lines that had a broad multicultural appeal, an appeal that turned out to be equally potent for multiethnic audiences abroad. Once American moviemakers, newspaper and magazine publishers, and television producers learned how to speak to a variety of groups and classes inside the United States, they had little trouble captivating people from different nations and backgrounds overseas. In sum, the domestic market was a laboratory for and a microcosm of the world market. On the other hand, the Europeans, operating for the most part in countries with homogeneous populations, had no incentive to communicate with a multicultural audience and were thus ill equipped to compete in the international arena.[8]

Those involved in the American media became extremely skilled at creating products that transcended internal social divisions, national borders, and language barriers. It was not that the dramatization of universal themes—romance, solitude, mystery, tragedy, humor, violence, and redemption—existed only in Hollywood movies. These preoccupations were just as evident, and often more explicitly treated, in European films. Instead, what made American movies and television programs distinctive and internationally popular were their riveting plots, their visual expressiveness, and their often eccentric but spellbinding stars.

European audiences frequently complained that the films made in their own countries were too languid, with too many characters talking interminably about abstract ideas.[9] American movies seemed less verbal and more cinematic. They were driven by their narratives, by action and spectacle that required no dubbing or subtitles, and by actors who did not need to use words to convey their deepest emotions. The most famous American performers were either laconic (Gary Cooper, John Wayne, Humphrey Bogart, Henry Fonda, Paul Newman, Jack Nicholson, Clint Eastwood, Kevin Costner) or inarticulate (Montgomery Clift, Marlon Brando, James Dean, Marilyn Monroe, Warren Beatty, Sylvester Stallone, Robert De Niro). Even those actors and actresses who were noted for their verbal agility—James Cagney, Cary Grant, Bette Davis, Katharine Hepburn—communicated as eloquently through their body language, their eyes, and the timber of their voices as by what they actually said on screen.

How else could Woody Allen be appreciated abroad? Not because foreign audiences understood the vernacular of a New York Jewish

neurotic obsessed with love, death, salvation, and whether in the hereafter you could find a restaurant that stayed open late. It helped, of course, if you got the jokes. But Allen's melancholy face, his obstinately unfashionable eyeglasses, the drab sweater or corduroy jacket that never seemed to change from one film to the next—these were as iconographic as Chaplin's cane or Groucho's mustache or Brando's torn T-shirt—all emblems of an attitude toward the universe that made language nearly superfluous.

Yet the presence of such symbols and visual cues did not, by itself, make a movie or a television program interesting or worth seeing. The attitude of producers, directors, writers, and actors toward the audience was much more important. All too often, European filmmakers seemed patronizing, as if they thought their job was to educate and elevate the masses, to introduce them to "art" and high culture. Hollywood, by comparison, was adamantly antielitist. The studios recognized that high-minded or well-meaning films could be both pretentious and soporific. The greatest American directors, from Orson Welles and John Ford to Robert Altman and Martin Scorsese, realized that their movies had to engage the audience before they could be challenging or enlightening. "The audience has a right when they sit down to be entertained," Woody Allen declared. "No matter how intelligent your message is, no matter how smart or wonderful [or] progressive your ideas are, if they are not entertaining, then they should not be in a movie." Sydney Pollack put it more bluntly: "My primary obligation as a film-maker . . . is not to bore the pants off of you."[10]

To many critics both in the United States and in Europe, this urge to entertain sprang from the need to sell a product, rather than create a work of art. In their opinion, the emphasis on entertainment was a sign of the commercialization of American culture, another example of how every art form had been "commodified" in a country devoted more than any other to the capitalist ethos. The European response was to insulate films and television programs as much as possible from the pressures of the marketplace. Until late in the twentieth century, European governments controlled the programming on radio and television, offered subsidies to their national film industries, and tried to limit cultural imports from America. In effect, the state guaranteed that a certain portion of screen and broadcasting time would be set aside for local productions. Supposedly, these protectionist policies ensured that European audiences would not be engulfed and their tastes polluted by the trash emanating from Hollywood and the American television networks.



If, however, you knew your television program would automatically be broadcast or your movie would be shown, why worry about whether anyone was watching? Why bother with such trivia as stories, characters, and performances when you could concentrate on being esthetically avant-garde? Unfortunately, the cultural strategies of the European governments often led not to artistic experimentation or social improvement but to greater self-indulgence on the part of writers and directors.

In the United States, moviemakers and television producers had to pay attention to the audience because if they did not, their films would quickly disappear from the theaters and their shows would be canceled within weeks. The hunger for a hit and the fear of commercial failure gave American films and television programs, as well as newspapers and magazines, their vitality, their emotional connection with viewers and readers, and their immense global popularity. Not infrequently, the effort to enthrall an audience also resulted in works that were original and provocative. In fact, the market had always served as a stimulant for art: Shakespeare cared as much as Walt Disney about box-office receipts. Despite the assertions (and the snobbery) of European and American media theorists, there was no inherent contradiction between commerce and culture. If anything, the relationship was symbiotic—a point that the European cultural ministries, unable to halt the decline of their film industries through the use of quotas and subsidies, might have done well to consider.

In the end, the reasons for the success of American mass culture were linguistic, technological, economic, demographic, *and* artistic. As a consequence, foreigners found it increasingly difficult to challenge America's supremacy in the global entertainment market. No matter how proficient the Western Europeans or the Japanese were in selling their automobiles or computers throughout the world, they could not compete with the United States when it came to the export of news, movies, videos, music, and television programs. The sale of American audiovisual products to Europe alone totaled $3.7 billion in 1992, while in the same year Europe sold just $288 million worth of its cultural wares to the United States. Mass culture had become America's second most lucrative export, exceeded only by the output of the aerospace industry.[11] Eighty percent of all the movies and television programs anyone, anywhere might see were either made in the United States or were financed by American studios and production companies.

Still, America's mastery of news and entertainment was not in-

evitable. During the postwar years, European governments struggled to preserve the independence first of their film industries and then of their television programming. The fight, though ultimately futile, was not only about mass culture. It involved as well the question of whether Europeans could, or even wished to, resist what many believed was the most insidious form of "Americanization."

## Hollywood, Washington, and Postwar Europe

Whenever Europeans pondered the effects of America's mass culture on their own societies, they focused primarily on the power and impact of American movies. For most of the twentieth century, those Europeans who wanted to limit America's cultural influence regarded Hollywood as their principal enemy. From their perspective, the studios—with the collaboration of the U.S. government—were bent on monopolizing the European film market, thereby destroying not just the local competition but all traces of Europe's distinctive identity. The Americans replied that they were interested only in free trade and consumer choice, in keeping markets open so that European audiences could decide for themselves what movies they preferred. The positions of Hollywood and its European adversaries often seemed irreconcilable. So the cinema became a battleground in a cultural war between Europe and the United States, a war that had begun in the 1920s and resumed with greater ferocity in the 1940s.

In this conflict, Hollywood enjoyed a number of advantages at the end of World War II. The film industries in many European countries were badly damaged by the war, much as they had been during World War I. Production had declined, equipment had deteriorated, and facilities had been commandeered for the war effort. In addition, the prospects for a rapid revival of European filmmaking did not look bright, given the overriding demands of postwar reconstruction. Meanwhile, because the Nazis had prohibited American movies from being shown in occupied Europe, Hollywood had a large stockpile of unseen films ready to be shipped to European theaters and to eager European audiences in 1945.[13]

The studios looked on the European market not only as a potential gold mine, but also as a partial solution to their growing problems at home. During the 1920s and 1930s, Hollywood had not been overly concerned with foreign revenues or with making movies that would



appeal to international audiences, since domestic ticket sales were normally sufficient to cover expenses and assure a profit.[13] By the late 1940s and early 1950s, the studios were no longer so complacent.

In 1948, the Supreme Court forced the studios to sell the theaters they owned in the United States and to end the practice of block booking. Thus, the studios lost control over the exhibition of their films; in the future, they could not count on a steady flow of domestic receipts as they had in the past. At the same moment, television—free entertainment one could savor in the comfort of one's living room—started to draw people away from the movie theaters. To make matters worse, the costs of making a movie sharply escalated because of inflation; higher salaries for stars, directors, and technicians; the tendency to shoot more pictures on location; and the production of wide-screen extravaganzas—Hollywood's way of competing, albeit ineffectively, with television in the 1950s. For all these reasons, it became increasingly difficult for the studios to depend on the home market alone. Now, foreign sales—particularly exports to Europe—often determined a film's success or failure, at least according to Hollywood's balance sheets.[14]

To penetrate and profit from the European market on a permanent basis, the studios needed to make sure that there were no artificial restrictions on the showing of their films, no import quotas or high tax rates imposed by European governments to reduce their earnings abroad. For help in achieving these objectives, Hollywood turned to Washington.

There was nothing new about the partnership between the movie industry and the government. Since the early twentieth century, officials in the State and Commerce Departments had recognized that films, along with radio programs, records, newspapers, and magazines, could be a splendid advertisement for the American way of life—and not incidentally for American cars, cigarettes, clothes, kitchen appliances, and hundreds of other products on sale overseas. For their part, Hollywood lobbyists always identified the industry's needs with the national interest. Rarely did they mention that assistance with a foreign government or special exemptions from the antitrust laws might also enhance the studios' profit margins.[15] Hence, Washington and Hollywood each benefited from what was essentially a marriage of convenience.

Until World War II, the motives for cooperation had been largely economic. During the war years, however, the Roosevelt administration began to emphasize the political and propagandistic importance

the efforts of Washington to persuade them to embrace the American model.

It is possible, moreover, that "models" based on a single national experience are outmoded. We are now exposed to the cultures of many countries. And within each country, there are regional, class, ethnic, and racial variations—further complicating the transmission of a unified "culture" from one land to another. That is what it means to live in a global culture while simultaneously retaining one's affection for a specific town or neighborhood.

Given these multiple influences, it was inevitable that the Marshall Planners, along with other American missionaries, should have failed to "Americanize" Europe. The Europeans did not then and do not today wish to be just like us. Nor have we ever wished to be exactly like them. People in Europe and in America have different cultures, different styles of living, and different expectations. But we can all thrive on the differences.

# *Notes*

The page numbers of all the *New York Times* articles, except for those published in the Magazine and the Book Review sections, are taken from the newspaper's national edition.

## Chapter One
## Cultural Relations Before 1945

1. For an extended discussion of these claims, see Melvin Lasky, "Litera ture and the Arts: Transatlantic Letters—Restoration but Not Renaissance, in Lewis Galantière, ed., *America and the Mind of Europe* (London: Hamilton 1951), p. 89; Marcus Cunliffe, "New World, Old World: The Historic Antithesis," in Richard Rose, ed., *Lessons from America: An Exploration* (Lon don: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 28–30; and Marcus Cunliffe, "The Anatomy o Anti-Americanism," in Rob Kroes and Maarten van Rossem, eds., *Anti-Americanism in Europe* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1986), p. 30.

2. There are many treatments of European attitudes toward Americ For examples, see Harold Laski, *The American Democracy: A Commentary and an Interpretation* (New York: Viking, 1948), p. 62; Edward Cheste *Europe Views America: A Critical Evaluation* (Washington, D.C.: Publ Affairs Press, 1962), p. 36; Allen Davis, "Introduction: The American Impa on the World," in Davis, ed., *For Better or Worse: The American Influence the World* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 7; Laurence Wyl and Sarella Henriquez, "French Images of American Life," *Tocquevil Review* 4 (1982), pp. 244–47; Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The Rebirth the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945–1958* (Can bridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), p. 411; and Guy Sorman, "United State Model or Bête Noire?" in Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Mari France Toinet, eds., *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century French Perception*, trans. Gerry Turner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 199

c. Paris 1986), p. 214. Hereafter, a publication date given in this fashion means that the copyright was, in this case, 1986, but that the pagination is from the 1990 edition.

3. For Europe's ambivalence about America, see Malcolm Bradbury, "How I Invented America," *Journal of American Studies* 14 (April 1980), p. 116; Davis, "The American Impact on the World," p. 4; Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Propagating the American Dream: Cultural Policies as Means of Integration," *American Studies International* 24 (April 1986), p. 64; Maurizio Vaudagna, "The American Historian in Continental Europe: An Italian Perspective," *Journal of American History* 79 (September 1992), p. 536; and Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 187–88.

4. See Sigmund Skard, *American Studies in Europe: Their History and Present Organization*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), pp. 27, 29, 236; and Kaspar Maase, "'Halbstarke' and Hegemony: Meanings of American Mass Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany During the 1950s," in Rob Kroes, Robert Rydell, and Doeko F. J. Bosscher, eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993), p. 157.

5. André Visson, *As Others See Us* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 230; Skard, *American Studies in Europe,* vol. 1, pp. 25–26, 210–11, 236; Sigmund Skard, *American Studies in Europe,* vol. 2 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), p. 405; Donald Heiney, *America in Modern Italian Literature* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 9; A. N. J. den Hollander, "On 'Dissent' and 'Influence' as Agents of Change," in den Hollander, ed., *Contagious Conflict: The Impact of American Dissent on European Life* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), p. 6.

6. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, pp. 232–33, 253; Maase, "'Halbstarke' and Hegemony," pp. 157–58.

7. For Europe's view of America's cultural inferiority complex, see Laski, *The American Democracy*, pp. 63–64; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, pp. 28, 47; and Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, c. 1983), p. 43.

8. See Davis, "The American Impact on the World," p. 11; Richard Rose, "America: Inevitable or Inimitable?" in Rose, ed., *Lessons from America*, p. 10; Marcus Cunliffe, "European Images of America," in Arthur Schlesinger and Morton White, eds., *Paths of American Thought* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 506; and Chester, *Europe Views America*, p. 129.

9. Sigmund Skard, *Trans-Atlantica: Memoirs of a Norwegian Americanist* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1978), p. 17; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, pp. 34, 134, 156; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, p. 478.

10. The aims and misfortunes of the Creel Committee are fully discussed in Thomas Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 5–7; John Henderson, *The United States Information Agency* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 24–26, 28–29; Alla Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942–1945* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 2–3; an Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic an Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982), pp. 79–81.



11. For Europe's reaction to America's wartime power, see Frank Costigli ola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relation with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987, c 1984), pp. 21, 167–71; Michael Harrison, "French Anti-Americanism Unde the Fourth Republic and the Gaullist Solution," in Lacorne et al., eds., *Th Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, pp. 170–71; and Judt, *Past Imperfect*, pp 189, 193.

12. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, pp. 19–21.

13. Ibid., pp. 23–26; Costigliola, *Awkward Dimension*, p. 149.

14. Costigliola, *Awkward Dimension*, pp. 139, 149–50, 154–55; Rosenberg *Spreading the American Dream*, pp. 122–25; David Strauss, *Menace in the Wes The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (Westport, Conn Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 100, 139–40, 145; Peter Masson and Andrew Thorburn, "Advertising: The American Influence in Europe," in C. W. E Bigsby, ed., *Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe* (Bowlin Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1975), p. 97; Nic Wilterdink, "The Netherlands Between the Greater Powers," in Rob Kroe ed., *Within the U.S. Orbit: Small National Cultures vis-à-vis the United Stat* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1991), p. 23.

15. For a discussion of American tourism in the late nineteenth centu and the 1920s, see Arnold Rose, "Anti-Americanism in France," *Antioc Review* 12 (December 1952), p. 473; Foster Rhea Dulles, *Americans Abroa Two Centuries of European Travel* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Pres 1964), pp. 1–3, 169; and Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*, pp. 172–73.

16. Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, p. 25; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. p. 31; Judt, *Past Imperfect*, p. 188; Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*, pp. 19–2 141, 167–68, 178, 183; Victoria de Grazia, "Americanism for Export," *Wed* 7–8 (Winter–Spring 1985), p. 74; Wilterdink, "The Netherlands Betwee the Greater Powers," pp. 21–22; Ralph Willett, *The Americanization of Ge many, 1945–1949* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 108; Michael Kimmelma "The Lure of Fordism, Jazz and 'Americanismus,'" *New York Times* (Fe ruary 11, 1990), sec. 2, p. 37; D. W. Brogan, "From England," and Peter vo Zahn, "From Germany," in Franz Joseph, ed., *As Others See Us: The Unit States Through Foreign Eyes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Pre 1959), pp. 3–4, 95–96.

17. Heiney, *America in Modern Italian Literature*, p. 9; John Sears, "Bie stadt, Buffalo Bill, and the Wild West in Europe," and Robert Bieder, "Ma keting the American Indian in Europe: Context, Commodification, ar Reception," in Kroes et al., eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions*, p 4–6, 21.

18. Sears, "Bierstadt, Buffalo Bill, and the Wild West in Europe," pp. 5–6, 9, 12, 14; Bieder, "Marketing the American Indian in Europe," p. 15.

19. For a more detailed description of America's early efforts to compete in the field of global mass communications, see Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, 88–92, 94–95; and Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*, p. 151.

20. See Paul Oliver, "Jazz Is Where You Find It: The European Experience of Jazz," in Bigsby, ed., *Superculture*, pp. 140–43; Davis, "The American Impact on the World," p. 12; Kimmelman, "The Lure of Fordism, Jazz and 'Americanismus,'" p. 37; and Reinhold Wagnleitner, "The Irony of American Culture Abroad: Austria and the Cold War" in Lary May, ed., *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 294.

21. Victoria de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920–1960," *Journal of Modern History* 61 (March 1989), p. 57; Peter Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), p. 17. In 1912, nearly 90 percent of all film exports came from France. See Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War*, trans. Diana Wolf (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 230.

22. For a discussion of the war's direct effect on European filmmaking, see William Read, *America's Mass Media Merchants* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 42; Thomas Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," in Tino Balio, ed., *The American Film Industry* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 465; Strauss, *Menace in the West*, p. 146; and Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, p. 17.

23. Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," pp. 465–66; de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty," pp. 57–58, 61; Strauss, *Menace in the West*, p. 147; Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, p. 101. Often, American distributors controlled centrally located theaters in such major European cities as Paris, Brussels, and Berlin, where they could premier Hollywood's new movies. See Ian Jarvie, "The Postwar Economic Foreign Policy of the American Film Industry: Europe 1945–1950," in David Ellwood and Rob Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994), pp. 158–59. Block booking refers to Hollywood's practice of forcing theater owners to exhibit several films released by a studio in order to receive the studio's most popular movies, which meant the ones that would sell the most tickets. In 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that this practice violated the antitrust laws.

24. De Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty," pp. 59–60; Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*, p. 176; Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, p. 232. Many other commentators have offered similar figures to demonstrate the preponderance of American films on European screens.

25. Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," p. 468.

26. On Europe's fears about Hollywood's cultural influence in the 1920s, see Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, pp. 101–2; Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*, pp. 22, 168, 177; Strauss, *Menace in the West*, pp. 147–48; and de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty," p. 53.



27. Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," p. 469; Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*, p. 177.

28. De Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty," p. 62; Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, p. 102; Strauss, *Menace in the West*, pp. 146–47.

29. Thomas Guback, *The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America Since 1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), p. 9; Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*, p. 177. *The Blue Angel*, for example, was released in both English and German in 1930, thanks to a coproduction arrangement between Paramount and the leading German studio, UFA. See Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, p. 234.

30. David Reynolds, "Whitehall, Washington and the Promotion of American Studies in Britain During World War Two," *Journal of American Studies* 16 (August 1982), p. 166; Heiney, *America in Modern Italian Literature*, pp. 22–24; Roger Asselineau, "A Complex Fate," *Journal of American Studies* 14 (April 1980), p. 70.

31. David Ellwood, "Hollywood's Star Wars," *History Today* (April 1994), p. 2; de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty," p. 62; Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media Are American* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 49; Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, p. 204.

32. See Brogan, "From England," pp. 4–5; and Strauss, *Menace in the West*, pp. 187–93.

33. Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, p. 19; Wilterdink, "The Netherlands Between the Greater Powers," p. 22; Brogan, "From England," p. 5.

34. The European descriptions of America in the 1920s as a mass society are fully discussed in Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 2, 12; Strauss, *Menace in the West*, pp. 175–76, 181; and Cunliffe, "European Images of America," p. 506.

35. Rob Kroes, "Americanization: What Are We Talking About?" in Kroes et al., eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions*, p. 303; Strauss, *Menace in the West*, pp. 82, 209; de Grazia, "Americanism for Export," p. 79; Judt, *Past Imperfect*, p. 189.

36. For an account of how different countries in Europe defined *Europeanism*, see Rob Kroes, "Among the Receivers: American Culture Transmitted Abroad," and Rob Kroes, "American Films in the Netherlands," in Kroes, ed., *Within the U.S. Orbit*, pp. 7, 76; Wilterdink, "The Netherlands Between the Greater Powers," p. 23; and Judt, *Past Imperfect*, p. 193.

37. For a more detailed description of the Rockefeller Foundation's activities, see Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963), pp. 316–17, 336; and Claus-Dieter Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research*, trans. Rita and Robert Kimber (Amherst: Univer

sity of Massachusetts Press, 1993, c. 1987), p. 33. The Rockefeller Foundation played a crucial role in helping to develop theoretical physics in the United States through its grants to American universities (especially the California Institute of Technology, Berkeley, Chicago, Princeton, and Harvard). The foundation gave money not only for scholarly exchanges but also for the construction of laboratories and expensive scientific instruments like particle accelerators and telescopes. On the foundation's support for physics in America, see Gerald Holton, "The Migration of Physicists to the United States," in Jarrell Jackman and Carla Borden, eds., *The Muses Flee Hitler: Cultural Transfer and Adaptation, 1930–1945* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983), pp. 176–77.

38. Marie Jahoda, "The Migration of Psychoanalysis: Its Impact on American Psychology," and Colin Eisler, "*Kunstgeschichte* American Style: A Study in Migration," in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds., *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960* (Cambridge, Mass.: Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History, 1968), pp. 420, 565–66; Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 11–12, 15.

39. See Herbert Strauss, "The Movement of People in a Time of Crisis," in Jackman and Borden, eds., *The Muses Flee Hitler*, p. 51; and Charles Weiner, "A New Site for the Seminar: The Refugees and American Physics in the Thirties," in Fleming and Bailyn, eds., *The Intellectual Migration*, pp. 218–19.

40. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, "Introduction," in Fleming and Bailyn, eds., *The Intellectual Migration*, p, 7; Jahoda, "The Migration of Psychoanalysis," p. 429; Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 14–17.

41. For the internationalization of intellectual life, especially in physics and psychoanalysis, and the readiness of American institutions to accept European refugees, see Fleming and Bailyn, "Introduction," pp. 3, 8; Weiner, "A New Site for the Seminar," pp. 191–97, 200–2, 215, 221, 227; Holton, "The Migration of Physicists to the United States," pp. 171, 175, 177–79, 183–84; Jean and George Mandler, "The Diaspora of Experimental Psychology: The Gestaltists and Others," in Fleming and Bailyn, eds., *The Intellectual Migration*, p. 373; Jahoda, "The Migration of Psychoanalysis," pp. 421–24, 429; and H. Stuart Hughes, *The Sea Change: The Migration of Social Thought, 1930–1965* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977, c. 1975), p. 4. In addition to Enrico Fermi and Niels Bohr, other famous European physicists visited or lectured in America during the 1920s and early 1930s. Among these were Albert Einstein, Arnold Sommerfeld, Ernest Rutherford, Paul Ehrenfest, Max Born, Erwin Schrödinger, Wolfgang Pauli, and Werner Heisenberg.

42. Strauss, "The Movement of People in a Time of Crisis," p. 54; Hughes, *The Sea Change*, p. 2.

43. Weiner, "A New Site for the Seminar," pp. 217, 225–26.

44. See Peter Rutkoff and William Scott, *New School: A History of the New School for Social Research* (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 93; Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 27–28; and A. M. Sperber, *Murrow: His Life and Times* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987, c. 1986), p. 52. The young Edward R. Murrow served for a time as assistant secretary of the Emergency Committee, coordinating its activities, raising money, interviewing refugees, and trying to find jobs for them in the United States.



45. Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 6, 23, 28–29, 32, 34.

46. Ibid., pp. 22–24, 28; Weiner, "A New Site for the Seminar," p. 214.

47. Rutkoff and Scott, *New School*, p. 96; Weiner, "A New Site for the Seminar," p. 207; Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 5, 158, 191; Eisler, "*Kunstgeschichte* American Style," pp. 546, 552, 568–69, 572, 582–83, 625.

48. Rutkoff and Scott, *New School*, pp. xii, 33, 84–86, 101, 106; Arthur Vidich, "Foreword" to Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. viii–ix; Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 32, 59–61, 68, 181.

49. Vidich, "Foreword," p. ix; Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 29, 86–88; Rutkoff and Scott, *New School*, p. 134.

50. See Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 80, 86. From August 1940 until September 1941, some of Europe's most important artists and intellectuals escaped from Vichy France to the United States. They were aided by a young Harvard-trained classicist, Varian Fry, who operated out of Marseilles as the representative of the newly formed Emergency Rescue Committee. Among those whose flight Fry arranged were Hannah Arendt, Marc Chagall, Marcel Duchamp, Jacques Lipchitz, Max Ernst, and André Breton. For a description of Fry's activities, see Cynthia Jaffee McCabe, " 'Wanted by the Gestapo: Saved by America'—Varian Fry and the Emergency Rescue Committee," in Jackman and Borden, eds., *The Muses Flee Hitler*, pp. 79–91.

51. On the French exiles in wartime America, see Fleming and Bailyn, "Introduction," p. 6; Rutkoff and Scott, *New School*, pp. 153, 156, 159, 170; and Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 84–85.

52. Vidich, "Foreword," p. xii; Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*, pp. 140, 161, 176; Hughes, *The Sea Change*, pp. 103, 174–75; Eisler, "*Kunstgeschichte* American Style," p. 584; Holly Shulman, *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), p. 29.

53. Duignan and Gann, *The Rebirth of the West*, p. 420; J. M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 23, 47.

54. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations*, p. 427; Duignan and Gann, *The Rebirth of the West*, p. 420; Philip Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 84.

55. See Charles Thompson and Walter Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), p. 32.

56. See Henderson, *The United States Information Agency*, pp. 28–29; Sorensen, *The Word War*, p. 8; and Shulman, *The Voice of America*, p. 4.

57. Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy*, p. 85; Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, p. 204.

58. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations*, pp. 19, 45; Tunstall, *The Media Are American*, p. 34.

59. Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 35.

60. Ibid., pp. 27–28, 38, 45; Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, pp. 205, 208; Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations*, p. 53.

61. On the centrality of the Voice of America, see Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, p. 211.

62. Ibid., p. 52; Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 52–53; Edward Barrett, *Truth Is Our Weapon* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953), pp. 25–26.

63. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, pp. 112, 115, 118–21, 125–28; Barrett, *Truth Is Our Weapon*, pp. 26–28; Sorensen, *The Word War*, pp. 19–20.

64. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, pp. 154, 156; Shulman, *The Voice of America*, pp. 130–31, 141, 151.

65. Shulman, *The Voice of America*, pp. 180, 184–85, 187; Sorensen, *The Word War*, p. 21.

## Chapter Two
## American Culture and the Cold War: The Reshaping of Western Europe

1. For the European image of the American soldier, see André Visson, *As Others See Us* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 224; and Dick Hebdige, "Towards a Cartography of Taste, 1935–1962," in Hebdige, *Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 53.

2. See Vittorio Zincone, "Moral America," in James Burnham, ed., *What Europe Thinks of America* (New York: John Day, 1953), p. 54; Kaspar Maase, "'Halbstarke' and Hegemony: Meanings of American Mass Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany During the 1950s," in Rob Kroes, Robert Rydell, and Doeko F. J. Bosscher, eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993), p. 153; and Peter von Zahn, "From Germany," in Franz Joseph, ed., *As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 97.

3. Charles Thompson and Walter Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), p. 93; Ralph Willett, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 90, 92; Michael Watts, "The Call and Response of Popular Music: The Impact of American Pop Music in Europe," in C. W. E. Bigsby, ed., *Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe* (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1975), p. 128; Stephen Kinzer, "The G.I.s' Legacy: Basketball and Sweet Memories," *New York Times* (September 27, 1994), p. A8; Sigmund Skard, *American Studies in Europe: Their History and Present Organization*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), p. 295.



4. Henry Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Forei Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p 17–18; James Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: "Reeducation" and Denazification American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 198 pp. 39, 53, 65–66.

5. See James Tent, *The Free University of Berlin: A Political Hist* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 374; and Tent, *Mission the Rhine*, pp. 36, 54, 83, 107, 159.

6. Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, p. 236; Tent, *Mission on the Rhi* p. 107.

7. For a description of Germany at "ground zero," see Skard, *Americ Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 291; Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Inst ment of U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 26; and Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 57–58, 69, 122.

8. The U.S. government also attempted to impose American-st reforms on its zone in Austria during its ten-year military occupati between 1945 and 1955. For a comprehensive discussion of these efforts, Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultu Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War*, trans. Dia Wolf (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 66–120.

9. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 10–11, 13; Leonard Sussman, *The C ture of Freedom: The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Savage, Md.: Ro man & Littlefield, 1992), p. 19.

10. Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Poli* pp. 24, 100.

11. Ibid., p. 59; Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 8, 161, 318. The quotatior from von Zahn, "From Germany," p. 98.

12. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 3, 8, 116–17; Kellerman, *Cultural Re tions as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 21, 23, 30, 59, 115–16; Ska *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 303. Americans were also eager to tra form the Austrian educational system and proposed many of the same ide See Reinhold Wagnleitner, "The Irony of American Culture Abroad: A tria and the Cold War" in Lary May, ed., *Recasting America: Culture and P itics in the Age of the Cold War*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 198 pp. 291–92; and Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, 150–53.

13. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 303; Willett, *The America ization of Germany*, p. 18; Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 124, 145, 1 167–68, 198–99, 207, 228, 238, 251, 310, 312; Kellerman, *Cultural Relations an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 22, 29–30; Thompson and Lav *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 78. The Austrians were equa recalcitrant, and Americans abandoned their educational experiments 1948. See Wagnleitner, "The Irony of American Culture Abroad," p. 2 and Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, p.154. The Fren and the British were no more successful than the Americans in reforming t

German educational structures in their zones. See Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 211, 309, 313–14.

14. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 2, 200; Willett, *The Americanization of Germany*, p. 27; Hans-Peter Wagner, "Stepping Out of Hitler's Shadow to Embrace Uncle Sam? Notes Toward a History of American Literary Studies in West Germany," in Huck Gutman, ed., *As Others Read Us: International Perspectives on American Literature* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1991), p. 101; Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 73.

15. Sigmund Skard, *American Studies in Europe: Their History and Present Organization*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), p. 583; Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, pp. 60, 89; Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 240–41, 314–15.

16. Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, pp. 68–69; 84–85; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, pp. 588–89.

17. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 288, 290; Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, pp. 41, 43, 64, 66, 85–86, 88, 90–91, 125–27, 131, 174.

18. For the American interest in and contributions to the creation of the Free University, see Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 332; Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, pp. 54, 74, 76, 78, 90, 93–94, 100–101, 147, 157, 173; and Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, p. 317.

19. Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, pp. 2, 93, 161–63, 166.

20. Ibid., pp. 96, 104, 174–75; Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, p. 299.

21. Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, pp. 98, 141, 209, 212, 227, 231, 267, 274; Francis Sutton, "The Ford Foundation: The Early Years," *Daedalus* 116 (Winter 1987), p. 69. One of the key intermediaries between the U.S. government and the Ford Foundation was Shepard Stone. A former *New York Times* reporter and editor, and a specialist on German affairs, Stone was director of public affairs under John J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany in the early 1950s, before he became head of the Ford Foundation's International Affairs Program. In his dual role as government official and foundation executive, Stone urged support for the Free University, describing it to his superiors as a bastion of democracy and anti-Communism in a politically suspect Europe. His arguments were extremely effective in obtaining funds for the university. Years later, as director of the Aspen Institute in West Berlin, Stone would lament the radicalization of the Free University during the late 1960s and early 1970s. For Stone's background and activities, see Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 233; and Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, pp. 209, 228–29.

22. Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 205; Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 75, 153–54.

23. See Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, pp. 167, 251, 253; and Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 35–36, 77.



24. Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 23, 65; Willett, *The Americanization of Germany*, pp. 20–21; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1 p. 331; Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p 122; Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, p 127. In the early 1950s, there were also twelve America Houses in Austria engaged in the same sorts of activities as their counterparts in West Germany. See Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Propagating the American Dream: Cultural Policies as Means of Integration," *American Studies International* 2 (April 1986), p. 67; Wagnleitner, "The Irony of American Culture Abroad," p. 289; and Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, pp. 129–35 198, 276. *Porgy and Bess* was a hit not only in Germany and Austria, bu throughout Western Europe.

25. Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media Are American* (New York: Columbia Uni versity Press, 1977), p. 154; Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument o U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 58; Willett, *The Americanization of Germany*, pp. 1 81, 85.

26. Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 7 Tent, *Mission on the Rhine*, p. 284; Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instru ment of U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 27, 98–99, 103, 107, 109, 159, 211, 236–3 240–41.

27. For an extended discussion of the results of the State Department's sur veys of West German visitors to the United States in the 1950s, see Keller man, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 215, 21 220, 235. For more general descriptions of the West German response t America, see Maase, "'Halbstarke' and Hegemony," p. 158; Tyler Marshal "American Culture Is Europe's Common Bond," *Austin American-Statesma* (June 5, 1994), p. C5; and Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, p. 152.

28. On the reactions of West German students to America, see Kellerma *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 214.

29. For an analysis of George Marshall's address, see Frank Costigliol *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II* (New Yor Twayne, 1992), p. 61; and David Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europ America and Postwar Reconstruction* (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 85–86.

30. Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reco struction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (New York: Cambridge Universi Press, 1989, c. 1987), pp. 103, 414.

31. Ibid., 89; Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 45; David Ellwoo "From 'Re-Education' to the Selling of the Marshall Plan in Italy," Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, eds., *The Political Re-Education of Ge many and Her Allies After World War II* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Book 1985), p. 227; Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern A Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War*, trans. Arthur Goldhar mer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, c. 1983), pp. 144–45.

32. For descriptions of America's efforts to influence postwar politics

Western Europe, see Cor de Feyter, "The Selling of an Ideology; The Long Term Economic Expectations of the Marshall Aid and Their Impact in the Netherlands," in Rob Kroes, ed., *Image and Impact: American Influences in the Netherlands Since 1945* (Amsterdam: Amerika Instituut, 1981), p. 58; Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 21; David Ellwood, "The Impact of the Marshall Plan on Italy; The Impact of Italy on the Marshall Plan," in Kroes et al., eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions*, p. 103; Ellwood, "From 'Re-Education' to the Selling of the Marshall Plan in Italy," pp. 219, 225; Frances Pohl, *Ben Shahn: New Deal Artist in a Cold War Climate, 1947–1954* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), p. 151; Costigliola, *France and the United States*, pp. 65–66, 78; and Visson, *As Others See Us*, p. 128.

33. Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 91; Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art*, p. 136; Rob Kroes, "The Nearness of America," in Kroes, ed., *Image and Impact*, p. 9; Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 45; Ellwood, "From 'Re-Education' to the Selling of the Marshall Plan in Italy," pp. 228–33; Ellwood, "The Impact of the Marshall Plan on Italy," pp. 100, 106–7; David Ellwood, "Introduction: Historical Methods and Approaches," in Ellwood and Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994), pp. 7–8; Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, p. 89.

34. Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, p. 71; Amaury de Riencourt, *The Coming Caesars* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1957), p. 322; Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 92; Kroes, "The Nearness of America," p. 11. The quotation is from Michel Crozier, *The Trouble with America*, trans. Peter Heineggn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 24.

35. For a discussion of the French "technical missions," see Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, pp. 70–72, 81, 91–93, 95; and Arnold Rose, "Anti-Americanism in France," *Antioch Review* 12 (December 1952), p. 481.

36. Luigi Barzini, *Americans Are Alone in the World* (New York: Random House, 1953), pp. 109, 173; Visson, *As Others See Us*, pp. 20, 124, 128. See also Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 43. Barzini, a longtime resident of the United States, was widely admired and read by Americans because they believed he understood and sympathized with their national mood.

37. For descriptions of how the Europeans felt about the Marshall Plan, see Barzini, *Americans Are Alone in the World*, p. 109; Visson, *As Others See Us*, pp. 12, 131, 231; Guido Piovene, "Ungrateful Europe," and Raymond Aron, "The United States as the Dominant Economy," in James Burnham, ed., *What Europe Thinks of America* (New York: John Day, 1953), pp. 119, 121, 192–93; Rose, "Anti-Americanism in France," p. 480; Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, pp. 31, 76; Ellwood, "From 'Re-Education' to the Selling of the Marshall Plan in Italy," pp. 234–35; and "Questions of Cultural Exchange: The NIAS Statement on the European Reception of American Mass Culture," in Kroes et al., eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions*, p. 328.



38. Visson, *As Others See Us*, pp. 125, 128; Barzini, *Americans Are Alone in the World*, p. 131; Julian Amery, "The American Choice," in Burnham, ed., *What Europe Thinks of America*, p. 138.

39. See Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, pp. 443–44; and de Feyter, "The Selling of an Ideology," pp. 59–60.

40. Aron, "The United States as the Dominant Economy," p. 197.

41. Gary Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book: The American Library Association and the Origins of United States Cultural Diplomacy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 231; Robert Summers, "Psychological Warfare: American Background," in Summers, ed., *America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare* (New York: Wilson, 1951), p. 12; Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 63.

42. See Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 110, 140, 145.

43. For Senator Fulbright's own descriptions of what he intended, and for examples of the wording contained in the various laws from 1946 to 1961 that authorized and justified the programs, see J. William Fulbright, "Foreword," in Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. viii; Dudden and Dynes, "Introduction," in Dudden and Dynes, eds., *The Fulbright Experience, 1946–1986: Encounters and Transformations* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987), p. 1; Sussman, *The Culture of Freedom*, p. 23; and Beverly Watkins, "Scholars Push for Revitalization of the Fulbright Program," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 34 (April 14, 1993), p. A42.

44. For details on the official roles and responsibilities of the agencies administering the Fulbright program, see Sussman, *The Culture of Freedom*, pp. 2, 20, 43; Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 60–61, 68; Philip Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 30; Dudden and Dynes, "Introduction," pp. 3, 5; and Watkins, "Scholars Push for Revitalization of the Fulbright Program," p. A42.

45. Robert Spiller, "The Fulbright Program in American Studies Abroad: Retrospect and Prospect," in Robert Walker, ed., *American Studies Abroad* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 5; Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, pp. 23, 114–16; Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, p. 76. The binational commissions in each country were normally chaired by the public affairs officer or the cultural attaché but sometimes by the deputy chief of mission. The funding for the Fulbright program remained heavily American until the 1960s, when certain countries whose economies had recovered from the war began to share more equally in the financial arrangements. Bonn agreed to underwrite 50 percent of the Fulbright program's budget in West Germany in 1962; by the 1970s and 1980s, it was paying for two-thirds to 80 percent of the costs. In 1963, the Austrian government also

started to assume two-thirds of the costs of the program. See Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 176, 254; and Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, p. 157.

46. On the initial Fulbright agreements and their orientation toward Western Europe, see Watkins, "Scholars Push for Revitalization of the Fulbright Program," p. A42; Richard Arndt and David Rubin, "The Forties: Creating the Myth" and "The Fifties: Growing and Flowering," in Arndt and Rubin, eds., *The Fulbright Difference, 1948–1992* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1993), pp. 13, 53; Dudden and Dynes, "Introduction," p. 3; Sussman, *The Culture of Freedom*, p. 20; and Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, pp. 25, 111, 209, 242, 250, 318. The program in China ended abruptly when the Communists seized power in 1949. Between 1948 and 1958, 22,000 Europeans came to the United States under the auspices of the Fulbright program, and nearly 10,000 Americans went to Europe. See Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, p. 157.

47. For summaries of the congressional trips and quotations from the various reports the representatives and senators wrote on their return to the United States, see Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 131–32; Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 66; Edward Barrett, *Truth Is Our Weapon* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953), p. 61; Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy*, p. 31; Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book*, pp. 230–31; and Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art*, p. 193.

48. The official title of Smith-Mundt was the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, cosponsored by two conservative Republicans: Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Representative Karl Mundt of North Dakota. On the purposes of the legislation, see Lois Roth, "Public Diplomacy and the Past: The Search for an American Style of Propaganda, 1952–1977," *Fletcher Forum* 8 (Summer 1984), p. 356; Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 64, 67, 70–71; Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 128–29, 133; Holly Shulman, *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), p. 189; Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book*, p. 232; Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, p. 17; John Henderson, *The United States Information Agency* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 40, 64–65; and Visson, *As Others See Us*, p. 119.

49. The quotations are from Tiziano Bonazzi, "The Beginnings of American History in Italy," and Harvey Feigenbaum, "Exchanges and Excursions in France," in Arndt and Rubin, eds., *The Fulbright Difference*, pp. 152, 361.

50. See Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, pp. 9, 27, 206, 241, 249, 254. Senator Fulbright's admission that his program had political implications can be found in Sussman, *The Culture of Freedom*, p. 57; the British comment is from Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," in Lewis Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S., 1945–1980*, vol. 2 (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus International Publications, 1985), p. 329.



51. Officially called the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Fulbright-Hays consolidated all the American government's cultural activities under one law. It sanctioned new exchanges and strengthened the legal basis for those that already existed. In addition, it authorized the translation of American books and periodicals, the operation of cultural centers attached to U.S. embassies, American participation in international festivals and exhibitions, the government's financing and sponsorship of international scholarly conferences, and support for American Studies programs abroad. See Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy*, p. 50; Roth, "Public Diplomacy and the Past," p. 370; Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, p. 28; and Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, p. 312.

## Chapter Three
## Truth, Propaganda, and Cultural Combat: The Contest with the Soviet Union

1. On the success of the Stockholm appeal in France, see Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 38.

2. The quotations from Truman's speech are reproduced in Robert Summers, ed., *America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare* (New York: Wilson, 1951), pp. 28–29, 31, 156. Edward Barrett, who had been in the Office of War Information during the war, returned to the government from *Newsweek* in 1950 to serve as assistant secretary of state for public affairs. He suggested that Truman call for a "campaign of truth" and directed its operations until 1952. For his ideas about what the campaign meant, see Edward Barrett, *Truth Is Our Weapon* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953), pp. ix–x, 72–73.

3. Holly Shulman, *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), p. 189; Barrett, *Truth Is Our Weapon*, pp. 79, 92–93, 214; Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, p. 25; Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II* (New York: Twayne, 1992), p. 88; Charles Thompson and Walter Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), pp. 81, 84–85, 204; Philip Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 33; Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 22; Thomas Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 43.

4. Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981),

and the Cold War" in Lary May, ed., *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold War*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 290; Pohl, *Ben Shahn*, p. 149.

33. For the language of the State Department directives, see Henderson, *The United States Information Agency*, pp. 236–37. See also Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 102; and Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, pp.136–37.

34. For the numbers and names of the banned authors and artists, see Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book*, p. 250; and Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, pp. 137–38.

35. For the language of the modified State Department policy, see Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 103–4. See also Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book*, pp. 250, 263.

36. On the criticisms of the "campaign of truth," see Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 96; and Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book*, p. 251.

37. J. M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 16, 19, 60, 168; Allen Hansen, *USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 161, 164, 167; Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy*, pp. 80, 82, 85; Leonard Sussman, *The Culture of Freedom: The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), p. 16; Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945–1958* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 422–25.

38. For the precise language of President Eisenhower's statement on USIA's mission, see Lois Roth, "Public Diplomacy and the Past: The Search for an American Style of Propaganda, 1952–1977," *Fletcher Forum* 8 (Summer 1984), p. 383. See also Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 98, 106–7; Sorensen, *The Word War*, pp. 46, 50, 71–72; and Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy*, p. 33. In 1978, all the State Department's remaining cultural activities were transferred to USIA.

39. Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 123–25; Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, pp., 81–82.

40. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, pp. xi, 199–200, 210–13. See also Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 123.

41. Thompson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 127; Sorensen, *The Word War*, p. 87; Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, pp. 127, 134.

42. At the time of the "kitchen debate," Hans Tuch was USIA's cultural and press attaché in Moscow. For his description of the exhibit and his memories of escorting Khrushchev through the displays, see *Communicating with the World*, pp. 62–64. See also Sorensen, *The Word War*, p. 110.

43. For the results of the 1960 poll, see Chester, *Europe Views America*, pp. 159–61; and Sorensen, *The Word War*, p. 179.



44. Sorensen, *The Word War*, pp. 82–83; Henderson, *The United State Information Agency*, p. 55.

45. On Murrow's importance to USIA, see Sorensen, *The Word War*, pp 123–24, 134, 219; and A. M. Sperber, *Murrow: His Life and Times* (New York Bantam Books, 1987, c. 1986), p. 632.

46. Sperber, *Murrow*, pp. 614, 620, 624, 635–36; Henderson, *The United States Information Agency*, p. 86; Sorensen, *The Word War*, pp. 126–27, 12 142; Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, p. 26. In 1963, President Kenned incorporated these promises to Murrow in a mandate outlining USIA responsibilities. For the language of the mandate, see Roth, "Public Diplomacy and the Past," p. 385.

47. On Murrow's lack of knowledge about the impending Bay of Pig operation, see Sorensen, *The Word War*, pp. 139–40.

48. Ibid., pp. 130–32, 250, 255; Shulman, *The Voice of America*, p. 191; Sperber, *Murrow*, pp. 624, 676–78.

49. These passages are quoted in Sorensen, *The Word War*, p. 145.

50. Tuch, *Communicating with the World*, pp. 88, 90–91; Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations*, pp. 219, 222; Hansen, *USIA*, p. 165.

51. For Murrow's contradictory attitudes toward and John Chancellor' uneasy tenure at the Voice of America, see Henderson, *The United States Information Agency*, pp. 164–65, 170, 191; Sorensen, *The Word War*, pp. 231–32 234, 239, 244, 248; and Sperber, *Murrow*, pp. 634, 643–44, 665.

52. Sorensen, *The Word War*, p. 134; Sperber, *Murrow*, pp. 629, 631.

53. Frankel, *High on Foggy Bottom*, pp. 11, 16. This book was Frankel' memoir of his experiences from 1965 to 1967 as assistant secretary of state fo educational and cultural affairs.

54. Ibid., pp. 26, 28, 193.

55. Charles Frankel, *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966), pp. 100, 104–5.

56. Ibid., pp. 138–40.

57. Ibid., pp. 142–44; Frankel, *High on Foggy Bottom*, pp. 36, 65, 164. See also Sorensen, *The Word War*, p. 74; and Roth, "Public Diplomacy and the Past," p. 372.

58. Frankel, *High on Foggy Bottom*, pp. 127, 130, 198, 205, 221, 228.

## Chapter Four
## American Studies in Europe

1. Harold Laski, *The American Democracy: A Commentary and an Interpretation* (New York: Viking, 1948), pp. ix, 722.

2. Peter von Zahn, "From Germany," in Franz Joseph, ed., *As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1959), p. 95; Sigmund Skard, *Trans-Atlantica: Memoirs of a Norwegian Americanist* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1978), pp. 12, 15, 21, 23.

3. For descriptions of the indifference displayed by European academics toward America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Sigmund Skard, *American Studies in Europe: Their History and Present Organization*, vols. 1 and 2 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), pp. 51–52, 60, 65, 153, 253, 366, 370, 404, 406, 423–24, 440–41, 443, 468, 515, 517, 528, 534; Sigmund Skard, "Fulbrighters in Norway," in Arthur Dudden and Russell Dynes, eds., *The Fulbright Experience, 1946–1986: Encounters and Transformations* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987), p. 245; Siegfried Beer, "The Development of Teaching and Research on United States History in Austria," in Lewis Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S., 1945–1980*, vol. 1 (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus International Publications, 1985), p. 178; Inga Floto, "The Development of United States History in Denmark," and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," in Lewis Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S., 1945–1980*, vol. 2 (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus International Publications, 1985), pp. 14, 309; Herbert Nicholas, "The Education of an Americanist," *Journal of American Studies* 14 (April 1980), p. 14; Rob Kroes, "Among the Receivers: American Culture Transmitted Abroad," in Kroes, ed., *Within the U.S. Orbit: Small National Cultures vis-à-vis the United States* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1991), p. 4; Tiziano Bonazzi, "American History: The View from Italy," *Reviews in American History* 14 (December 1986), p. 523; and Elzbieta Foeller-Pituch, "Catching Up: The Polish Critical Response to American Literature," and Rolf Lundén, "The Dual Cannon: A Swedish Example," in Huck Gutman, ed., *As Others Read Us: International Perspectives on American Literature* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1991), pp. 205, 236.

4. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 27; A. N. J. den Hollander, "Cultural Diversity and the Mind of the Scholar: Some Thoughts on American and European Thinking," in den Hollander, ed., *Diverging Parallels: A Comparison of American and European Thought and Action*, (Leiden: Brill, 1971), p. 219; Guy Sorman, "United States: Model or Bête Noire?" in Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, eds., *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, trans. Gerry Turner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, c. Paris 1986), p. 215; Laski, *The American Democracy*, p. 722.

5. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vols. 1 and 2, pp. 29, 136, 215, 518; Maurizio Vaudagna, "The American Historian in Continental Europe: An Italian Perspective," *Journal of American History* 79 (September 1992), p. 535.

6. On Huizinga's complaints about America, see Maarten van Rossem, "Le Defi Europeen," in Rob Kroes, ed., *Image and Impact: American Influences in the Netherlands Since 1945* (Amsterdam: Amerika Instituut, 1981), pp. 22–23.



7. Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, pp. 28–29; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, p. 432; Geir Lundestad, "Research Trends and Accomplishments in Norway on United States History," in Lewis Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S., 1945–1980*, vol. 3 (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus International Publications, 1985), pp. 250, 252.

8. Stanley Williams, "Who Reads an American Book?" *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 28 (Autumn 1952), p. 527; Skard, vol. 1, pp. 157, 163; Jeanine Brun-Rovet, "Teaching and Research on United States History in France," in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*, vol. 2, pp. 172, 174.

9. Skard, *American Studies Abroad*, vol. 1, pp. 235, 260, 280, 283, 290; Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, p. 139; Wolfgang Helbich, "United States History in the Federal Republic of Germany: Teaching and Research," in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*, vol. 2, p. 43.

10. John Hope Franklin, "A Modest Imperialism: United States History Abroad," and Harry Allen, "United States History in Great Britain and the European Association for American Studies: A Personal Memoir," in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*, vol. 1, pp. 32, 37, 49; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," pp. 311, 313; David Thelen, "Of Audiences, Borderlands, and Comparisons: Toward the Internationalization of American History," *Journal of American History* 79 (September 1992), p. 435.

11. For developments in Britain between the wars, see David Reynolds, "Whitehall, Washington and the Promotion of American Studies in Britain During World War Two," *Journal of American Studies* 16 (August 1982), p. 169; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 311; and Nicholas, "The Education of an Americanist," pp. 9–10, 12.

12. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 70; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," pp. 314; Nicholas, "The Education of an Americanist," pp. 13–14; Reynolds, "Whitehall, Washington and the Promotion of American Studies in Britain During World War Two," pp. 167–68.

13. Detailed accounts of the promotion of American Studies in wartime Britain can be found in Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," pp. 315–16, 320, 333; Reynolds, "Whitehall, Washington and the Promotion of American Studies in Britain During World War Two," pp. 165, 172–76, 183; and Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 73. Alfred Kazin recalled his experiences as a lecturer in "Carrying the Word Abroad," *American Studies International* 26 (April 1988), p. 62, as did J. Frank Dobie in *A Texan in England* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945).

14. Reynolds, "Whitehall, Washington and the Promotion of American Studies in Britain During World War Two," pp. 184–86.

15. Norman Podhoretz, *Making It* (New York: Bantam Books, 1969, c. 1967), p. 67; italics his.

16. Harry Allen, "American Studies and the Study of America: The Future of American Studies in Europe," *American Studies International* 17 (Spring 1979), pp. 13–14; Michael Heale, "American History: The View from Britain," *Reviews in American History* 14 (December 1986), p. 501; Michael Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History, 1945–1980: Some Reflections on a Liberal Moment," in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*, vol. 2, p. 372; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, pp. 634, 641.

17. Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 317; Heale, "American History: The View from Britain," p. 501; Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," p. 372; Floto, "The Development of United States History in Denmark," p. 14; Savas Patsalidis, "(Mis)Understanding America's Literary Canon: The Greek Paradigm," and Theo D'haen, "Cutting Loose: American Literary Studies in the Netherlands," in Gutman, ed., *As Others Read Us*, pp. 114, 193.

18. Henry Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 180; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 293; Wolfgang Helbich, "Interview with Maurizio Vaudagna," in Maurizio Vaudagna, ed., "Forum: American Studies in Europe," *Storia Nordamericana* 7 (1990), p. 130; Alfred Kazin, *New York Jew* (New York: Knopf, 1978), pp. 215, 218.

19. Denis Donoghue, *Reading America: Essays on American Literature* (New York: Knopf, 1987), p. 4; Stephen Spender, "We Can Win the Battle for the Mind of Europe," *New York Times Magazine* (April 25, 1948), p. 33; Max Beloff, "The Projection of America Abroad," *American Quarterly* 1 (Spring 1949), pp. 27–28.

20. For descriptions of the role of the U.S. government and the private foundations in promoting American Studies in various European countries during the postwar years, see Thomas Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 108; Robert Spiller, "The Fulbright Program in American Studies Abroad: Retrospect and Prospect," and Marcus Cunliffe, "American Studies in Europe," in Robert Walker, ed., *American Studies Abroad* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 5, 47; Robert Spiller, "American Studies Abroad: Culture and Foreign Policy," in Spiller, *Late Harvest: Essays and Addresses in American Literature and Culture* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 243; Carl Bode, "Narrowing the Ocean: A Memoir," *American Studies International* 26 (April 1988), p. 39; Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, p.182; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vols. 1 and 2, pp. 169, 413, 490; Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, pp. 117, 157, 160; Franklin, "A Modes' Imperialism," pp. 33–34; Beer, "The Development of Teaching and Research on United States History in Austria," pp. 180–81; Helbich, "United States History in the Federal Republic of Germany," p. 112; Brun-Rovet, "Teaching and Research on United States History in France," p. 181; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 320; and Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 122–23, 125, 135.



21. The quotations from Perry Miller in this and the preceding paragraph appeared in his preface to *Errand Into the Wilderness* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964, c. 1956), pp. vii, ix.

22. On the origins of the Salzburg Seminar, see Timothy Ryback, "Encounters at the Schloss," *Harvard Magazine* 90 (November–December 1987), p. 68; Henry Nash Smith, "The Salzburg Seminar," *American Quarterly* 1 (Spring 1949), pp. 30–32, 36; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, pp. 634–35; F. O. Matthiessen, *From the Heart of Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 10–11; Kazin, *New York Jew*, p. 111; and Kirsten Gallagher, "A Center for Intellectual Exchange," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 40 (January 19, 1994), p. A40.

23. Ryback, "Encounters at the Schloss," p. 70; Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, p. 122; Smith, "The Salzburg Seminar," pp. 32–33; Matthiessen, *From the Heart of Europe*, p. 11; Kazin, *New York Jew*, p. 168.

24. Matthiessen, *From the Heart of Europe*, pp. 6, 14; Kazin, "Carrying the Word Abroad," p. 63; Kazin, *New York Jew*, pp. 170–71; italics Kazin's.

25. See Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, pp. 636–37; Kazin, "Carrying the Word Abroad," p. 64; Ryback, "Encounters at the Schloss," p. 70; and Gallagher, "A Center for Intellectual Exchange," p. A40.

26. For a discussion of the Fulbright program's preference for lecturers over researchers and graduate students, see Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, p. 220; Leonard Sussman, *The Culture of Freedom: The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), p. 99; and Frank Freidel, "The Fulbright Program in American Studies Abroad: A Continuing Challenge," in Walker, ed., *American Studies Abroad*, p. 11.

27. Matthiessen, *From the Heart of Europe*, pp. 1, 107; Kazin, "Carrying the Word Abroad," p. 64; Leslie Fiedler, "Fulbright I: Italy 1952," in Richard Arndt and David Rubin, eds., *The Fulbright Difference, 1948–1992* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1993), pp. 88, 91. For information about other guest professors, see Nicholas, "The Education of an American-ist," p. 11; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 305; Perry Miller, "What Drove Me Crazy in Europe," in Miller, *The Responsibility of Mind in a Civilization of Machines* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1979), p. 89; Sussman, *The Culture of Freedom*, pp. 68, 71; Brun-Rovet, "Teaching and Research on United States History in France," p. 178; Edmund Wilson, *A Piece of My Mind: Reflections at Sixty* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956), p. 53; "Selected American Alumni of the Fulbright Program," *United States Information Agency* (July 1986), p. 2; and J. H. Plumb, "Introduction: 'O My

America, My Newfoundland,' " in Plumb, *The American Experience*, vol. 2 of *The Collected Essays* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), p. 9.

28. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, p. 650; John Garraty and Walter Adams, *From Main Street to the Left Bank: Students and Scholars Abroad* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959), p. 155; James Lacey, "Institutional Structures and American Studies at Universities in the Federal Republic of Germany," in Richard Horwitz, ed., *Exporting America: Essays on American Studies Abroad* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), pp. 241–42.

29. Allen, "American Studies and the Study of America," p. 23; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, p. 642.

30. Harry Allen, "Foreword," *Journal of American Studies* 14 (April 1980), p. 6; Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, pp. 34–35, 38, 40, 64.

31. Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, pp. 36, 41–46, 48, 51, 55–56.

32. Ibid., pp. 52–54, 58–59, 94.

33. Ibid., 58, 61, 67, 69–70, 78, 105. See also Lundestad, "Research Trends and Accomplishments in Norway on United States History," p. 249.

34. Skard, "Fulbrighters in Norway," p. 246; Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, pp. 67, 82–84, 88, 107, 110–11, 147.

35. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, p. 653; Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, pp. 77, 89, 95–99. See also Lundestad, "Research Trends and Accomplishments in Norway on United States History," pp. 253–54, 285.

36. Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, pp. 70–71, 87, 124–25, 128, 149, 182; Lundestad, "Research Trends and Accomplishments in Norway on United States History," p. 258.

37. For information about the careers of Mario Praz and A. N. J. den Hollander, see Donald Heiney, *America in Modern Italian Literature* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 96; Agostino Lombardo, "Introduction to Italian Criticism of American Literature," *Sewanee Review* 68 (Summer 1960), pp. 359, 361; Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, "Developments in the Netherlands Concerning United States History," in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*, vol. 3, p. 188; Rob Kroes, "Americanistics in the Netherlands," *American Studies International* 25 (October 1987), pp. 56, 60; and Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, p. 375.

38. Roger Asselineau, "A Complex Fate," *Journal of American Studies* 14 (April 1980), pp. 67, 73–75, 81.

39. Nicholas, "The Education of an Americanist," pp. 16, 18; Marcus Cunliffe, "Backward Glances," *Journal of American Studies* 14 (April 1980), p. 86.

40. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 102. Other European Americanists were equally envious of the British. See Willi Paul Adams, "American History Abroad: Personal Reflections on the Conditions of Scholarship in West Germany," *Reviews in American History* 14 (December 1986), p. 563. For a discussion of the "Atlanticist" perspective of the first generation of British Americanists, and their emphasis on colonial and diplomatic history, see Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 337; Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," pp. 369, 382–83, 388; and Heale, "American History: The View from Britain," pp. 502, 504, 506–8. A number of British Americanists published books in the United States between 1945 and the early 1960s, including D. W. Brogan, Marcus Cunliffe, Henry Pelling, Maldwyn Jones, and Esmond Wright. See Tony Badger, "Confessions of a British Americanist," *Journal of American History* 79 (September 1992), p. 521.



41. Cunliffe, "Backward Glances," p. 90. Cunliffe continually described himself in this essay as a missionary, though "in no danger of martyrdom"; see p. 88. See also Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 328; and Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," pp. 366, 369.

42. Malcolm Bradbury, "How I Invented America," *Journal of American Studies* 14 (April 1980), pp. 119–20; Cunliffe, "Backward Glances," p. 88. *Hoggartian* refers to Richard Hoggart, the British sociologist and communications specialist who studied the culture of the English working class in the 1950s. See his classic book, *The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working Class Life with Special Reference to Publications and Entertainments* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957). For a lengthier discussion of the British Americanists as "outsiders," see Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," pp. 329–30.

43. Allen, "United States History in Great Britain and the European Association for American Studies," p. 64; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 329; Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," pp. 379, 398.

44. D. W. Brogan, *The American Character* (New York: Knopf, 1956, c. 1944), pp. x, 4–5; Cunliffe, "Backward Glances," p. 87.

45. Cunliffe, "Backward Glances," p. 90; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," pp. 321, 323; Reynolds, "Whitehall, Washington and the Promotion of American Studies in Britain During World War Two," p. 187; Nicholas, "The Education of an Americanist," p. 23; Allen, "United States History in Great Britain and the European Association for American Studies," p. 67.

46. For information on the European Association for American Studies and other organizations in Western Europe, see Lacey, "Institutional Structures and American Studies at Universities in the Federal Republic of Germany," p. 261; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, pp. 637–38; Max Silberschmidt, "My Life Experience with the United States and Its History," in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*, vol. 1, p. 96; Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, p. 147; Marc Chénetier, "American Literature in France: Pleasures in Perspective," in Gutman, ed., *As Others Read Us*, p. 90; Laurence Wylie and Sarella Henriquez, "French Images of American Life," *Tocqueville Review* 4 (1982), p. 189; Reginald de Schryver, "The Development of Teaching and Research in Belgium on United States History," in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*, vol. 1,

p. 199; Sergio Perosa, "American Studies in Italy," and Tyrus Hillway, "American Studies in Austria," in Walker, ed., *American Studies Abroad*, pp. 81, 89; and Kroes, "Americanistics in the Netherlands," p. 64.

47. For a description of the professionalization of British Americanists, see Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," p. 370.

48. Willi Paul Adams, "Interview with Maurizio Vaudagna," in Vaudagna, ed., "Forum: American Studies in Europe," p. 129; Adams, "American History Abroad," p. 557.

49. Adams, "Interview with Maurizio Vaudagna," p. 131; Adams, "American History Abroad," pp. 557–60; Willi Paul Adams, "On the Significance of Frontiers in Writing American History in Germany," *Journal of American History* 79 (September 1992), pp. 466, 470.

50. For a discussion of the indifference displayed by postwar French historians to the United States, see Marianne Debouzy, "American History in France," *Reviews in American History* 14 (December 1986), pp. 542–44; and Brun-Rovet, "Teaching and Research on United States History in France," pp. 191–93.

51. For examples of how difficult European scholars thought it was to study U.S. history without access to primary sources, see Vaudagna, "The American Historian in Continental Europe," p. 534; Floto, "The Development of United States History in Denmark," p. 21; Robert Lawson-Peebles, "Dean Acheson and the Potato Head Blues or, British Academic Attitudes to America and Its Literature," in Gutman, ed., *As Others Read Us*, p. 32; Helbich, "United States History in the Federal Republic of Germany," pp. 84, 87; Adams, "On the Significance of Frontiers in Writing American History in Germany," p. 470; Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," pp. 404–5; and Heale, "American History: The View from Britain," p. 513.

52. For descriptions of how interdisciplinary programs fared in specific countries in Western Europe, see A. N. J. den Hollander, "Headaches, Harvests and Hopes: Fulbright Americanists in Europe," in Walker, ed., *American Studies Abroad*, p. 22; Robin Winks, "At Home Abroad/Abroad At Home," *American Studies International* 26 (April 1988), p. 76; Adams, "American History Abroad," p. 563; Lacey, "Institutional Structures and American Studies at Universities in the Federal Republic of Germany," pp. 242–43; Rob Kroes, "The Netherlands: A Contribution by Rob Kroes," in Vaudagna, ed., "Forum: American Studies in Europe," p. 174; and Bonazzi, "American History: The View from Italy," p. 525.

53. Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, pp. 39, 100; Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 182; Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War*, trans. Diana Wolf (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 154, 159; Franco Minganti, "Rock'N'Roll in Italy: Was It True Americanization?" in Rob Kroes, Robert Rydell, and Doeko F. J. Bosscher, eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993), p. 142; James Tent, *The Free University of Berlin: A Political History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 414; Michele Bottalico, "A Place for All: Old and New Myths in the Italian Appreciation o American Literature," in Gutman, ed., *As Others Read Us*, p. 155; D'haen "Cutting Loose: American Literary Studies in the Netherlands," p. 19; Lundén, "The Dual Cannon," p. 246; Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, p. 158; Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 71.



54. Many Americanists commented, sometimes ruefully, on the dominance of literature over history in the American Studies programs of their own countries and throughout Western Europe. For examples, see Allen "United States History in Great Britain and the European Association for American Studies," pp. 58, 70, 62; den Hollander, "Headaches, Harvests and Hopes," p. 23; Roger Asselineau and Simon Copans, "American Studies in France: The New Face of a Tradition," in Walker, ed., *American Studies Abroad*, p. 64; Schulte Nordholt, "Developments in the Netherlands Concerning United States History," p. 188; de Schryver, "The Development o Teaching and Research in Belgium on United States History," p. 199; Hans Peter Wagner, "Stepping Out of Hitler's Shadow to Embrace Uncle Sam: Notes Toward a History of American Literary Studies in West Germany," in Gutman, ed., *As Others Read Us*, p. 106; Helbich, "United States History in the Federal Republic of Germany," p. 56; Adams, "American History Abroad," p. 562; Adams, "Interview with Maurizio Vaudagna," p. 122 Vaudagna, "Forum: American Studies in Europe," p. 143; Hillway, "American Studies in Austria," p. 93; Perosa, "American Studies in Italy," pp. 77–79; Sylvia Hilton, "American Studies in Spain: Recent Trends," *American Studies International* 32 (April 1994), p. 43; and Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, p. 497. See also Thelen, "Of Audiences, Borderlands, and Comparisons," p. 451; and Heiney, *America in Modern Italian Literature*, pp. 95, 97–98.

55. On conditions in Eastern Europe during the 1950s and early 1960s, see Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, pp. 581, 584–85, 593, 604–7, 616, 621, 623, 625; Janez Stanonik, "American Studies in Yugoslavia," in Walker, ed., *American Studies Abroad*, pp. 95–96; Marija Vilfan, "From Yugoslavia," in Joseph, ed., *As Others See Us*, p. 126; Foeller-Pituch, "Catching Up: The Polish Critical Response to American Literature," p. 206; Allen, "United States History in Great Britain and the European Association for American Studies," p. 71; and Cunliffe, "American Studies in Europe," p. 52.

56. Cunliffe, "Backward Glances," p. 95; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 1, p. 42. When he lectured in Western Europe during the 1950s Alfred Kazin was "aware of being both needed and resented." See Kazin "Carrying the Word Abroad," p. 64.

57. Burton Bollag, "Enrollment Soars in Europe," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 41 (September 7, 1994), pp. A59–A60. In Britain, Greece, and Portugal

the enrollment rate for those of college age in the early 1990s was 30 percent; in Denmark and France, it was 50 percent. In the United States, by comparison, 44 percent of twenty- and twenty-one year olds were enrolled in college in 1992.

58. Rob Kroes, "The Nearness of America," in Kroes, ed., *Image and Impact*, pp. 12–13. For the number of Americanists in Europe, see John Blair, "Directionality in Fulbright Transformations," in Dudden and Dynes, eds., *The Fulbright Experience*, p. 164.

59. Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," pp. 332, 337–38, 342; Helbich, "Interview with Maurizio Vaudagna," p. 123. Tony Badger exemplified the British Americanists in the 1970s and 1980s who sought to make their books indistinguishable from those written in the United States. See his "Confessions of a British Americanist," p. 516.

60. D'haen, "Cutting Loose: American Literary Studies in the Netherlands," pp. 194, 197; Brun-Rovet, "Teaching and Research on United States History in France," pp. 181, 183; Bonazzi, "American History: The View from Italy," pp. 528–29; Skard, *Trans-Atlantica*, pp. 123, 196; Helge Pharo, "The Teaching of United States History in Norwegian Universities," in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*, vol. 3, p. 241; Lundestad, "Research Trends and Accomplishments in Norway on United States History," pp. 270, 286.

61. For developments in West Germany, especially at the Free University of Berlin, see Helbich, "United States History in the Federal Republic of Germany," p, 44; Lacey, "Institutional Structures and American Studies at Universities in the Federal Republic of Germany," pp. 250–51; Adams, "American History Abroad," p. 560; and Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, p. 336.

62. Tent, *The Free University of Berlin*, pp. 409–13, 427, 433; Brun-Rovet, "Teaching and Research on United States History in France," p. 184; Marianne Debouzy, "The Influence of American Political Dissent on the French New Left," in A. N. J. den Hollander, ed., *Contagious Conflict: The Impact of American Dissent on European Life* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), p. 57; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 331.

63. For descriptions of the new trends in literary criticism in Europe, see Chénetier, "American Literature in France," p. 84; Wagner, "Stepping Out of Hitler's Shadow to Embrace Uncle Sam?" pp. 104, 109; Bottalico, "A Place for All," pp. 152–53; D'haen, "Cutting Loose: American Literary Studies in the Netherlands," p. 202; and Patsalidis, "(Mis)Understanding America's Literary Canon," pp. 128–29.

64. Marianne Debouzy, "From American Studies to American History: A French Point of View," *Journal of American History* 79 (September 1992), pp. 491–93, 498. See also Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," pp. 375, 386, 393; Heale, "American History: The View from Britain,"



pp. 512, 518; Badger, "Confessions of a British Americanist," p. 523; Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "Comparative Approaches from Germany: The 'New Nation' in Advanced Industrial Capitalism, 1860–1940—Integration, Stabilization and Reform," and Ferdinando Fasce, "American Labor History, 1973–1983: Italian Perspectives," *Reviews in American History* 14 (December 1986), pp. 601, 606–8, 615; and Bonazzi, "American History: The View from Italy," pp. 530–31, 535.

65. On the contraction of American Studies in Britain during the 1980s, see Allen, "United States History in Great Britain and the European Association for American Studies," p. 65; Jeffreys-Jones, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," p. 343; Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," p. 365; and Heale, "American History: The View from Britain," p. 516.

66. D'haen, "Cutting Loose: American Literary Studies in the Netherlands," p. 200; Debouzy, "American History in France," p. 549; Adams, "American History Abroad," p. 558; Bottalico, "A Place for All," p. 156.

67. For developments in Britain in the 1990s, see Alina Tugend, "A British Boom in American Studies," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 41 (April 14, 1995), p. A40; and John Darnton, "New Oxford Fashion: United States Studies," *New York Times* (September 6, 1995), p. A6. For analyses of the growth of American Studies in Poland and Eastern Europe from the 1970s to the 1990s, see "Poland: Maurizio Vaudagna Interviews Michal Rozbicki," in Vaudagna, ed., "Forum: American Studies in Europe," pp. 137, 144–45; Foeller-Pituch, "Catching Up: The Polish Critical Response to American Literature," p. 217; and Gallagher, "A Center for Intellectual Exchange," p. A39.

68. On the problems of the language barrier for scholars on the European continent, in contrast to their American and British counterparts who could write in English and expect to be read throughout the world, see Vaudagna, "The American Historian in Continental Europe," p. 534; and Adams, "On the Significance of Frontiers in Writing American History in Germany," pp. 469, 471. Adams's first book, published in German, got no attention in the United States. Only when it was translated with the assistance of a 1976 Bicentennial Award from the American Historical Association and was published in 1980 by the University of North Carolina Press (as *The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era*) did it receive, according to Adams, "full and expert reviews" in the United States "and [find] its way into American bibliographies and footnotes. Had there not been the translation ... the book for all practical purposes would not exist for American Americanists." See Adams, "American History Abroad," pp. 564, 568. Similarly, Reinhold Wagnleitner's *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War* originated as an Austrian dissertation, published in German in 1991. It was translated with support from foundations in the United States and Austria and was published in America in 1994, again by the University of North Carolina Press. By the early 1990s, the *Journal of American History* was making a concerted

effort to print articles by European Americanists. Meanwhile, all the relevant academic organizations in the United States—the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, and the American Studies Association—were regularly inviting European Americanists to present papers at their annual meetings.

69. Adams, "American History Abroad," p. 563; Vaudagna, "The American Historian in Continental Europe," p. 539. For a discussion of the same sort of dilemma that Polish Americanists faced after 1989, see Foeller-Pituch, "Catching Up: The Polish Critical Response to American Literature," p. 204.

70. Cunliffe, "American Studies in Europe," pp. 50–51; Badger, "Confessions of a British Americanist," p. 523. For more examples of this lament, see Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," p. 371; Bonazzi, "American History: The View from Italy," p. 537; and Debouzy, "American History in France," p. 551.

71. Badger, "Confessions of a British Americanist," p. 519; Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, vol. 2, p. 654; Bradbury, "How I Invented America," p. 134.

72. In reviewing a series of volumes on American culture and social life, published in Amsterdam, whose editors and contributors were largely European, Allen Davis pointed out the advantages of writing about America from the "outside." See his "American Studies: The View from Europe," *American Quarterly* 40 (September 1983), p. 413.

73. Vaudagna, "Forum: American Studies in Europe," p. 118. Rob Kroes was equally sensitive to the transformation of American Studies in its journey across the Atlantic. See his essay, "The Nearness of America," p. 13.

74. Tiziano Bonazzi, "The Beginnings of American History in Italy," in Arndt and Rubin, eds., *The Fulbright Difference*, p. 160; Debouzy, "American History in France," pp. 547–48; Heale, "Writings in Great Britain on United States History," p. 402; Adams, "Interview with Maurizio Vaudagna," p. 132.

75. Kroes, "Americanistics in the Netherlands," p. 59; Vaudagna, "Forum: American Studies in Europe," p. 147.

## Chapter Five
## Transatlantic Misunderstandings: American Views of Europe

1. Herbert Kubly, *American in Italy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1955), p. 16.

2. Edward McCreary, *The Americanization of Europe: The Impact of Americans and American Business on the Uncommon Market* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 238, 242. For other descriptions of how visiting Americans behaved in postwar Europe, see Francis Williams, *The American Invasion* (New York: Crown, 1962), p. 14; John Garraty and Walter Adams, *From Main Street to the Left Bank: Students and Scholars Abroad* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959), pp. 175–77; Joseph Wechsberg, "The American Abroad," *Atlantic Monthly* 200 (November 1957), p. 266; and Foster Rhea Dulles, *Americans Abroad: Two Centuries of European Travel* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), p. 170.



3. André Visson, *As Others See Us* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 29; Kubly, *American in Italy*, p. 27.

4. For analyses of postwar tourism, see Dulles, *Americans Abroad*, pp. 4, 169–70, 173–74, 176, 180; Daniel Boorstin, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America* (New York: Atheneum, 1972, c. 1962), pp. 79–80, 83–86, 90–92, 97, 99, 102; Horace Sutton, "Transatlantic Travel: 400,000 'Diplomats' on the Loose," in Lewis Galantière, ed., *America and the Mind of Europe* (London: Hamilton, 1951), p. 117; C. W. E. Bigsby, "Europe, America and the Cultural Debate," in Bigsby, ed., *Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe* (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Popular Press 1975), p. 2; Garraty and Adams, *From Main Street to the Left Bank*, pp 174–75; and Kubly, *American In Italy*, p. 199.

5. See Dulles, *Americans Abroad*, pp. 170–71; Bigsby, "Europe, America and the Cultural Debate," p. 3; and Wechsberg, "The American Abroad," pp. 265–66.

6. Edmund Wilson, *A Piece of My Mind: Reflections at Sixty* (New York Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956), pp. 61–62.

7. William Phillips, *A Partisan View: Five Decades of the Literary Life* (New York: Stein & Day, 1983), pp. 202, 221; Leslie Fiedler, "Italian Pilgrimage: The Discovery of America," in Fiedler, *An End to Innocence: Essays on Culture and Politics* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 91; James Baldwin, "The Discovery of What It Means to Be an American," in Baldwin, *Nobody Knows My Name* (New York: Dell, 1963, c. 1961), p. 23.

8. Wilson, *A Piece of My Mind*, p. 54; Edmund Wilson, *The Fifties: From Notebooks and Diaries of the Period*, ed. Leon Edel (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986), p. 139; Saul Bellow, "The French as Dostoyevsky Saw Them," "Writers, Intellectuals, Politics: Mainly Reminiscences," and "My Paris," in Bellow, *It All Adds Up: From the Dim Past to the Uncertain Future* (New York: Viking, 1994), pp. 39, 106–7, 232–33, 239.

9. Wilson, *The Fifties*, p. 378. For a general description of the attitudes of American intellectuals toward postwar Europe, see Harold Laski, *The American Democracy: A Commentary and an Interpretation* (New York: Viking, 1948), p. 61; and Guido Piovene, "Ungrateful Europe," in James Burnham, ed., *What Europe Thinks of America* (New York: John Day, 1953), p. 113.

10. Wilson, *The Fifties*, p. 392; Phillips, *A Partisan View*, pp. 202–3; Bellow, "My Paris," pp. 235, 237–38.

11. Mary McCarthy, *The Stones of Florence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1963, c. 1959), pp. 3–5, 37, 108, 110–11, 119, 130, 155, 181–82.

12. Ibid., pp. 39, 54, 87, 89, 107–8, 118, 126, 189.

21. For a more detailed discussion of Coke's expansion into the international, and especially the European, market from the 1930s through the early 1950s, see Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, pp. 52–53; Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 77; and Willett, *The Americanization of Germany*, pp. 100, 102–3, 105.

22. F. O. Matthiessen, *From the Heart of Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 60.

23. Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, pp. 54, 56, 68; Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 77.

24. Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, p. 68.

25. On developments in Eastern Europe during the 1990s, see Nathaniel Nash, "Coke's Great Romanian Adventure," *New York Times* (February 26, 1995), sec. 3, pp. 1, 10; and Allesandra Stanley, "Clinton Chooses Coke in Russia's Cola War," *New York Times* (May 11, 1995), p. C6.

26. Wyndham Lewis, *America and Cosmic Man* (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1948), p. 17; Raymond Aron, "From France," in Joseph, ed., *As Others See Us*, p. 71. The equation of America with the future is also discussed in Richard Rose, "America: Inevitable or Inimitable?" in Rose, ed., *Lessons from America*, p. 1; Snowman, *Britain and America*, p. 259; Duncan Webster, *Looka Yonder! The Imaginary America of Populist Culture* (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 180, 217; and Strauss, *Menace in the West*, p. 253.

27. A number of writers, both European and American, have commented on the connections between Americanization and modernization. For examples, see Rob Kroes, "Americanization: What Are We Talking About?" in Kroes et. al., eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions*, p. 303; Rob Kroes, "Among the Receivers: American Culture Transmitted Abroad," in Kroes, ed., *Within the U.S. Orbit: Small National Cultures vis-à-vis the United States* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1991), p. 6; Rose, "America: Inevitable or Inimitable?" p. 10; Snowman, *Britain and America*, pp. 230, 264; and Luigi Barzini, *Americans Are Alone in the World* (New York: Random House, 1953), p. 11.

28. See Snowman, *Britain and America*, p. 265; Hoffmann, "France: Keeping the Demons at Bay," pp. 12, 16; Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 404; Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War*, trans. Diana Wolf (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 292; and Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, p. 186.

29. Sigmund Skard, *Trans-Atlantica: Memoirs of a Norwegian Americanist* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1978), p. 153. For similar sentiments see Webster, *Looka Yonder!* p. 193; Michel Winock, "The Cold War," in Lacorne et. al., eds., *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism*, p. 75; and Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, p. ix.



## Chapter Eight
## Mass Culture: The American Transmission

1. Michele Bottalico, "A Place for All: Old and New Myths in the Italia Appreciation of American Literature," and Jan Gretlund, "The America Within: Danes and American Literature," in Huck Gutman, ed., *As Othe Read Us: International Perspectives on American Literature* (Amherst: Univer sity of Massachusetts Press, 1991), pp. 66, 156; Alessandro Portelli, "Th Transatlantic Jeremiad: American Mass Culture and Counterculture an Opposition Culture in Italy," in Rob Kroes, Robert Rydell, and Doeko F. Bosscher, eds., *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Cultu in Europe* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993), p. 130. For description of how ubiquitous American mass culture was in other Western Europea countries, see Daniel Snowman, *Britain and America: An Interpretation c Their Culture, 1945–1975* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), pp 262–63; Malcolm Bradbury, "How I Invented America," *Journal of America Studies* 14 (April 1980), p. 120; Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: Th Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993 p. 151; Theo D'haen, "Cutting Loose: American Literary Studies in th Netherlands," in Gutman, ed., *As Others Read Us*, p. 192; and Nico Wilter dink, "The Netherlands Between the Greater Powers," in Rob Kroes, ed *Within the U.S. Orbit: Small National Cultures vis-à-vis the United States* (Ams terdam: VU University Press, 1991), pp. 28–29. By the 1960s and 1970s America's culture was infiltrating Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. Se "Poland: Maurizio Vaudagna Interviews Michal Rozbicki," in Maurizi Vaudagna, ed., "Forum: American Studies in Europe," *Storia Nordameri cana* 7 (1990), p. 147.

2. Barry Newman, "Global Chatter," *Wall Street Journal* (March 2: 1995), p. A1; Peter Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema* (Austin: University c Texas Press, 1993), p. 67; William Read, *America's Mass Media Merchan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 14.

3. Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, p. 67; Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media Ar American* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 126–28.

4. For discussions of the role of Britain and West Germany as conveyc belts for American culture in Europe, see Tunstall, *The Media Are Amer can*, pp. 95, 130, 133; Mel van Elteren, "Reflections on Cultural Identity an 'Americanization' in Relation to the Cultural Dimensions of the Recer GATT Agreement," unpublished paper, Tilburg, the Netherlands, 199 pp. 12–13; Franco Minganti, "Rock 'N' Roll in Italy: Was It True Amer canization?" and Mel van Elteren, "Sounds from America in Holland: Th Counter-Culture of the Sixties," in Kroes et al., eds., *Cultural Transmissio and Receptions*, pp. 144, 172; Tiziano Bonazzi, "The Beginnings of Amer can History in Italy," in Richard Arndt and David Rubin, eds., *The Fu bright Difference, 1948–1992* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Book 1993), p. 152; and Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Col*

*War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War*, trans. Diana Wolf (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 293.

5. Read, *America's Mass Media Merchants*, pp. 11, 63, 70; Tunstall, *The Media Are American*, pp. 17–18, 75–77.

6. For a general discussion of the influence of American journalism on Europe, see Read, *America's Mass Media Merchants*, pp. 3, 118–19; Tunstall, *The Media Are American*, pp. 28–29, 31, 33–35, 45, 49; Snowman, *Britain and America*, pp. 206–7; and Claude-Jean Bertrand and Miguel Urabayen, "European Mass Media in the 1980s," in Everett Rogers and Francis Balle, eds., *The Media Revolution in America and in Western Europe* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1985), p. 41.

7. See Richard Stevenson, "Hollywood Takes to the Global Stage," *New York Times* (April 16, 1989), sec. 3, p. 8.

8. A number of analysts have commented on the heterogeneity of the American audience as a factor in the globalization of American culture. For examples, see Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982), p. 100; Read, *America's Mass Media Merchants*, pp. 40, 188; and Todd Gitlin, "World Leaders: Mickey, et al.," *New York Times* (May 3, 1992), sec. 2, p. 30.

9. Fabrice Montebello, "Hollywood Films in a French Working Class Milieu: Longwy 1945–1960," in David Ellwood and Rob Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994), pp. 227, 229.

10. The quotation from Woody Allen can be found in Annette Wernblad, *Brooklyn Is Not Expanding: Woody Allen's Comic Universe*, (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1992), p. 9. For Sydney Pollack's quotation, see his speech, "The Way We Are," reprinted in "The Controversy About Popular Culture," *American Enterprise* 3 (May–June 1992), p. 94. See also Gitlin, "World Leaders: Mickey, et al.," p. 30.

11. Charles Goldsmith and Charles Fleming, "Film Industry in Europe Seeks Wider Audience," *Wall Street Journal* (December 6, 1993), p. B1; Roger Cohen, "U.S.–French Cultural Trade Rift Now Snags a World Agreement," *New York Times* (December 8, 1993), p. C2.

12. On the wartime plight of European filmmaking and the consequent opportunities for Hollywood, see Thomas Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," in Tino Balio, ed., *The American Film Industry* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 470; and Thomas Guback, *The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America Since 1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), p. 16.

13. Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 3; Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, p. 17.

14. Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 9–10, 164; Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," p. 465; Paul Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 117–18. For a definition of block booking, see chap. 1, note 23. The fate of Kevin Costner's 1995 blockbuster, *Waterworld*, exemplifies the importance of the international market. *Waterworld* cost $175 million to make, but earned only $88 million in the United States. The movie was a commercial failure at home but by 1996 it had grossed $166 million overseas, thereby becoming a profitable film despite the predictions when it was released that it would lose a huge amount of money. See Louis Menand, "Hollywood's Trap," *New York Review of Books* 43 (September 19, 1996), p. 5.



15. David Ellwood, "Introduction: Historical Methods and Approaches," in Ellwood and Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe*, p. 9; Tunstall, *The Media Are American*, pp. 223–24; Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain*, pp. 114, 119.

16. Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 124; Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, p. 210; Reinhold Wagnleitner, "Propagating the American Dream: Cultural Policies as Means of Integration," *American Studies International* 24 (April 1986), p. 71.

17. Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 23; Ian Jarvie, "The Postwar Economic Foreign Policy of the American Film Industry: Europe 1945–1950," in Ellwood and Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe*, p. 157.

18. On the activities of the Motion Picture Export Association, see Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," pp. 471, 474; and Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 5, 94–95. The original members of the MPEA were MGM, Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Warner Brothers, Columbia, Universal, RKO, United Artists, and Allied Artists. See Reinhold Wagnleitner, "American Cultural Diplomacy, the Cinema, and the Cold War in Central Europe," in Ellwood and Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe*, p. 200–201.

19. For the purposes and results of the Informational Media Guarantee Program, see Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 17, 120, 132; Paul Swann, "The Little State Department: Washington and Hollywood: Rhetoric of the Postwar Audience," in Ellwood and Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe*, p. 182; Charles Thompson and Walter Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), p. 117; and C. W. E. Bigsby, "Europe, America and the Cultural Debate," in Bigsby, ed., *Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe* (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1975), p. 4.

20. Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 132; Swann, "The Little State Department," pp. 180, 195.

21. Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain*, p. 131; Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 17.

22. Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 20–21.

23. On Hollywood's ambitions in the West German film market, see Tunstall, *The Media Are American*, pp. 137–38; Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 104–6, 131, 134; and Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, pp. 244, 256. Hollywood's success in Germany led to its domination of

the Austrian film market as well. See Wagnleitner, "American Cultural Diplomacy, the Cinema, and the Cold War in Central Europe," pp. 205–6.

24. For the statistics on French film production before and immediately after World War II, and the state of the industry during the Vichy regime, see Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 21; and Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 201.

25. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, p. 240; Wagnleitner, "American Cultural Diplomacy, the Cinema, and the Cold War in Central Europe," p. 201; Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 23.

26. For the terms of the Blum-Byrnes agreement, its subsequent revision, and its impact on the French film industry, see Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, p. 19; Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," p. 475; Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 22; Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, c. 1983), p. 133; Michel Winock, "The Cold War," in Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, eds., *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, trans. Gerry Turner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, c. Paris 1986), p. 69; Jean-Philippe Mathy, *Extrême Occident: French Intellectuals and America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 153; Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II* (New York: Twayne, 1992), pp. 55–56; Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, p. 241; and Victoria de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920–1960," *Journal of Modern History* 61 (March 1989), p. 82.

27. Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 55; Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain*, p. 115; Jarvie, "The Postwar Economic Foreign Policy of the American Film Industry," p. 171. French theater owners and audiences were opposed to quotas for the same reasons. See Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 56.

28. Jarvie, "The Postwar Economic Foreign Policy of the American Film Industry," p. 165; Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain*, pp. 82, 147.

29. On Hollywood's dealings with Britain in the late 1940s, see Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain*, pp. 92, 100; Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, pp. 241–42; Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 19, 32–34; and Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," p. 474.

30. Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," p. 475; Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 26, 52; de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty," p. 82.

31. Herbert Kubly, *American In Italy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1955), p. 109.

32. Jarvie, "The Postwar Economic Foreign Policy of the American Film



Industry," p. 171; Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, pp. 249–50. There is considerable debate over exactly when Hollywood's international sales equaled its domestic box-office receipts. In 1995, *Variety* reported that for the first time, foreign grosses were roughly comparable to Hollywood's earnings in the North American market (which includes Canada). But other sources give much earlier dates for this accomplishment. Given the mysterious bookkeeping practices of the major studios, it is very difficult to get precise information about overseas profits. See Terry Pristin, "How to Do Boffo Abroad," *New York Times* (May 12, 1996), sec. 4, p. 5.

33. These quotations can be found, respectively, in Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art*, p. 136; Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, p. 242; and Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain*, p. 139.

34. Read, *America's Mass Media Merchants*, pp. 49, 53; Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 38, 40, 43, 45–46; de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty," p. 83.

35. Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, p. 9.

36. On the lowly status of foreign films in America before the 1950s, see Guback, *The International Film Industry*, p. 68, Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," pp. 467, 477; Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, pp. 4, 9; Swann, *The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain*, p. 96.

37. Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, pp. 8, 13.

38. For the factors underlying the popularity of European films in the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s, see Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 70, 73–74, 87; and Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, pp. 4–5.

39. On the nature and potential consequences of American investment in the European film industry, see Guback, *The International Film Industry*, pp. 35, 72, 166, 171, 200; Guback, "Hollywood's International Market," pp. 478–79; Thomas Guback, "Film and Cultural Pluralism," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 5 (April 1971), p. 45; Read, *America's Mass Media Merchants*, pp. 46–47, 52; and Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, pp. 24–25.

40. Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, pp. xii, 31, 68.

41. Aljean Harmetz, "Hollywood Sets Up Shop in Europe," *New York Times* (January 11, 1990), p. 17; Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, pp. 46–47, 52.

42. See John Rockwell, "Woody Allen: France's Monsieur Right," *New York Times* (April 5, 1992), sec. 2, p. 26; and Roger Cohen "Aux A France Rallies to Battle Sly and T. Rex," *New York Times* (January 2, sec. 2, p. 22.

43. For a general description of, as well as statistics on, the unequal relationship between the American and European film industries in the 1980s and 1990s, see Philip Schlesinger, "Europe's Contradictory Communicative Space," *Daedalus* 123 (Spring 1994), p. 40; Lev, *The Euro-American Cinema*, p. 26; Joseph Garncarz, "Hollywood in Germany: The Role of American Film in Germany, 1925–1990," in Ellwood and Kroes, eds., *Hollywood in Europe*