Introduction: developing a state-in-society perspective

Comparative political study of developing countries is a scholarly subfield that for nearly four decades has been in search of a theoretical core. Both modernization and dependency schools, as well as their debates, have come and gone. Over the last ten to fifteen years, a more state-oriented approach has instead attracted considerable attention. The present volume continues the dialogue with these intellectual traditions by offering a state-in-society perspective. Proceeding both at a general and at country-specific levels, the contributors to this collection hope to persuade others to move in several related but new theoretical directions: to go beyond "bringing the state back in" by resituating the study of states in their social setting and thus adopting a more balanced state-in-society perspective; to disaggregate states as objects of study, both as an end in itself and as a means toward a better understanding of states and political change; to rethink the categories used to conceptualize the evolving and fluid nature of social forces in developing countries; and to be continually sensitive to the mutually transforming quality of state–society relations.

Following the usual pattern for intellectual changes, our theoretical perspectives have developed as reactions to some prevailing scholarly tendencies. Although this volume does not attempt a critical evaluation of other schools of thought, but rather to develop a state-in-society approach, it may help the reader see where we are headed if we briefly recall some of the scholarly antecedents. The debate between modernization and dependency schools is well known to political development scholars, so well known that it does not need to be reviewed in this brief introduction (for further discussion, see Chapter 11). The more Weberian state–society literature of the 1970s and the 1980s, in turn, developed as a reaction to both structural-functional and Marxist assumptions that undergirded these earlier approaches. More specifically, state–society scholars began with two distinctive "first assumptions." On methodological grounds, they dropped the goal of creating a general social or political theory, aiming instead for middle-level theories informed by empirical analysis. And second, on analytical grounds, they reacted negatively to the tendency of both

structural-functional and Marxist scholars to reduce politics to society, to see the nature of governments and states mainly as the outgrowth of certain social patterns. Instead, they argued for an analytical separation of state and society (authority and association) before proceeding with actual case studies. (An early statement of this theoretical position is Reinhard Bendix's *Nation Building and Citizenship* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977], ch. 1.)

The present volume shares these "first assumptions." The more recent state-oriented literature, however, which constitutes a subset of the larger body of Weberian scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s, has pushed some statist claims too far. (A prominent example of this genre of scholarship is Peter Evans, Dietrich Reuschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985].) State theorists have rightly pointed out that states have always been critical and direct agents of socioeconomic change, and this has been especially true in the twentieth century. Moreover, how state power is organized influences the incentives of social and economic actors, again contributing indirectly to patterns of change. These important assertions have helped sustain the case for "bringing the state back in." Nonetheless, we are of the view that some of the claims are overreactions and have misleading implications for development studies. It is time to offer some correctives.

States are parts of societies. States may help mold, but they are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are embedded. Once the state's importance has been emphasized, therefore, the intellectual attention immediately shifts to issues of why states do what they do, under what circumstances states are effective, and why states differ in their respective roles and effectiveness. These issues, in turn, cannot be discussed satisfactorily without looking at society, at the socioeconomic determinants of politics. So, although the important point that "states matter" has now been made – and, to repeat, it needed to be made – there is no getting around the mutuality of state–society interactions: Societies affect states as much as, or possibly more than, states affect societies.

More specifically, this volume asserts several interrelated claims – four of which we discuss here – that we hope will nudge the state–society literature away from a statist emphasis and toward a state-in-society frame of reference.

1. States vary in their effectiveness based on their ties to society. It is important not to mistake analytic constructs, such as the central role of the state in processes of social change or the autonomy of the state from society, for what happens in actual cases. In the real world, states are seldom the only central actors in societies and are almost never autonomous from social forces. By making these analytical claims into empirical ones, state-oriented theorists have mistaken what issues are important, for instance, privileging the study of states and their role in society over the study of social influences on the state's role.

They also have blurred the development of specific explanations; for example, a state's autonomy from society has come to be mistakenly viewed by some as a source of that state's effectiveness.

By contrast, we demonstrate that even where states were presumed to have been pervasive, domineering, and efficacious in the developing world, such as Maoist China and Brazil under military rule, the reach of the state turns out on closer inspection to have been limited. These limits of state power, in turn, draw attention to the rich social drama that has influenced processes of social change in low-income countries. Our shift in perspective also helps alter specific explanations. For example, we show that the concept of a state's "autonomy" is often an illusion and helps explain very little; a state's apparent disconnectedness from social groups turns out to be associated in some cases with "strength" (as in some rapidly industrializing countries) and in other cases with "weakness" (as in several African countries). We suggest instead that a state's relative effectiveness is a function of the varied forms in which state–society relations are interwoven.

2. States must be disaggregated. A second, related claim follows from the first. If states have to be viewed in their social contexts, it is important to study not only the peak organizations of states and key social groups, often located at the center of the polity in the capital city, but also state–society interactions at the periphery. Our suggestion is that in their engagements with and disengagements from the scattered elements of society, the various components of the state encounter the same pushes and pulls, the blurring of boundaries, and the possibility of domination by others that other social organizations face. The overall role of the state in society hinges on the numerous junctures between its diffuse parts and other social organizations. The essays in this book stress the need to disaggregate the state, paying special attention to its parts far from what is usually considered the pinnacle of power; to recognize the blurred and moving boundaries between states and societies; and to view states and societies as mutually transforming. Several empirical studies in this volume demonstrate how an adoption of such a disaggregated perspective leads to a better understanding of state power in developing societies.

3. Social forces, like states, are contingent on specific empirical conditions. If it is important to resituate states in their social setting, we also need to consider the adequacy of the categories in which we are accustomed to conceptualize politically salient social structures and social actions. This is our third claim. We adopt the view that the political behavior and the power capacities of social groups are contingent, at least in part; in other words, the political action and influence of a social group are not wholly predictable from the relative position of that group within the social structure. For example, several essays in this volume rework the concept and the empirical salience of social classes, and a

few others investigate the development of civil societies in a low-income setting. We suggest that classes, such as the proletariat or peasantry, do not have historically predesignated social roles and are not simply more or less powerful depending on their relative control over property. Although property clearly is a potent political resource, and the propertied often do get their way in politics, a range of political power balances involving the propertied and the propertyless are possible, even workable. Similarly, levels of nonclass associational activity do not covary in any simple or direct fashion with levels of economic development; the emergence of civil society is not automatic but requires close empirical study.

4. States and other social forces may be mutually empowering. Finally, we urge scholars to eschew a state-versus-society perspective that rests on a view of power as a zero-sum conflict between the state and society. Real-world power struggles seldom pitch large collectivities called states against large collectivities called societies. We accept that for some social groups, this is indeed an accurate rendering of the nature of their interactions with the state. But it is not always – and not even normally – so. Some interactions between state segments and social segments can create more power for both. Some, of course, favor one side over the other. Some vitiate the powers of each side. And in still other cases, state actors ally with select social groups against other groups. This real-world complexity suggests that our initial analytical position best avoid a statist perspective that is misleading insofar as it renders the state in an adversarial position vis-à-vis the society, and instead favor viewing the state as part of society.

In sum, we propose a state-in-society perspective for the comparative study of the state and politics in developing countries.

PART I

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1

The state in society: an approach to struggles for domination

JOEL S. MIGDAL

Ever since Thomas Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* in the seventeenth century, 150 years before the full blooming of capitalism, thinkers have grappled with the increasingly powerful state and its role in society. Following the Industrial Revolution, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and many others devoted themselves to what Karl Polanyi would later call the great transformation.[1] Like Hobbes, they too focused on the state, now in its relationship to the momentous social and economic changes overtaking European societies.

Some, such as the Hegelians, put the state – and the idea of the state – at the center of the social currents rushing through Europe. Others, including Marx, looked elsewhere for the source of historical change, notably to the organization of production. But even those who, like Marx, saw the primary motor of change outside the formal political realm felt called upon to address the notion of the transformative state. The new state was unquestionably a major component of life in the modern era and was understood by many as the driving force behind the astonishing changes of the time.

This statement holds true as much at the close of the twentieth century as in the latter decades of the nineteenth. Not surprisingly, then, the underlying questions dealt with in this volume echo the classical debates about major societal transformations and their relationship to the state. When and how have states been able to establish comprehensive political authority? When have they succeeded in defining the prevailing moral order or in determining the parameters of daily social relations, whether in preserving existing patterns or forging new ones? When and how have states been able to establish the economic agenda for their societies – to appropriate resources and to shape patterns of investment, production, distribution, and consumption? And when have other social forces, whether entire social classes or tiny cliques, large ethnic groups

I thank James Caporaso, John Keeler, Michael Keren, and members of several seminars for helpful comments on this essay. All the participants in the workshops leading to this book helped in the development of the ideas here. Atul Kohli took special time and care with my chapter.

or resourceful clans, thwarted or co-opted the state and had their own way in devising effective symbolic systems, molding daily social behavior, and shaping the patterns of economic life?

As in the classical debates, scholarship since World War II has seesawed between society-centered and state-centered theories to answer these questions. In the last decade or so, theorists have leaned toward state-centered approaches, explicitly acknowledging the central institutional role of the state in molding patterns of domination.[2] Although many state-centered researchers have written nuanced accounts of association and authority in various parts of the globe, the more theoretically oriented treatments have all too often tended to regard states in fairly undifferentiated terms. In presenting them as holistic, some scholars have given the misleading impression that states, at key junctures in their histories, pull in single directions. Some researchers have gone so far so as to reify and anthropomorphize the state, treating it as a unitary actor that assesses its situation strategically and then acts accordingly to maximize its interests. Unfortunately, by treating the state as an organic entity and giving it an ontological status, such scholars have obscured state formation and the dynamics of the struggle for domination in societies.

The participants in this book, coming from a variety of theoretical perspectives and drawing from the experiences of diverse regions, argue the need to move away from extreme state-centered theories. But we can go beyond simply establishing a balance in scholarship between state and society. We need to break down the undifferentiated concepts of the state – and also of society – to understand how different elements in each pull in different directions, leading to unanticipated patterns of domination and transformation. Once we think in more disaggregated terms, we can begin to imagine the engagement of state and society in very different ways from those found in existing theories.

By presenting a means to disaggregate the state, we do lose some of the elegance of nomothetic theories of power, such as those from the realist or rational choice perspective. These theories see the process by which states or specific social groups come to dominate, even in widely different circumstances and time periods, as occurring through a coherent logic, such as the single-minded drive of the state to garner larger revenues.[3] As inviting as such a logic is, an all-encompassing theory of this sort oversimplifies struggles for domination to such a degree that it obscures the actual outcomes in different societies. It also trivializes the question of state formation by trivializing historical contingencies and the struggles inherent in that process.

This essay and the following chapters point to the need for a theoretically informed, but more historically specific, treatment of power. Indeed, the ensuing chapters affirm the need for what the anthropologist Manning Nash has called "closely viewed crucial instances" – case studies reflecting the rootedness of the scholar in the society – in order to make persuasive comparative general-

izations.[4] A close, historically specific treatment of power still leaves us room to indicate how to discern the key building blocks of states and societies and the sorts of interactions among social forces leading to various patterns of domination, even if the varying combinations do lead to different results in different circumstances.[5] My central argument is that patterns of domination are determined by key struggles spread through what I call society's multiple arenas of domination and opposition. Officials at different levels of the state are key figures in these struggles, interacting – at times, conflicting – with an entire constellation of social forces in disparate arenas. Any individual part of the state may respond as much (or more) to the distinctive pressures it faces in particular arenas as it does to the rest of the state organization.

Different responses from within the state mean that we cannot simply assume that as a whole it acts in a rational and coherent fashion, or strategically follows a defined set of interests. Scholars and journalists alike have paid far too much attention to who controls the top state leadership positions, as if those at the summit speak and act for the entire complex state organization. Similarly, they have overemphasized the major battles among large-scale social forces (entire states, social classes, civil society, and the like) operating on some grand level. In many societies, attention to struggles in multiple arenas may explain far more than easy assumptions about unified bodies like states and social classes. For example, a state official implementing birth control policies in Orissa, India, may have to take local landlords, religious leaders, and businesspeople into account at least as much as distant supervisors and parliaments, and such consideration of these figures may lead to a distinctly different disposition of program resources from what was conceived in New Delhi. The point is that to glean the patterns of domination, one must focus on the cumulation of struggles and accommodations in society's multiple arenas.

Such a focus is possible only by first conceptually breaking down states and societies and the junctures between them. In some cases, the numerous struggles may move a society toward *integrated domination*, in which the state as a whole (or possibly even other social forces) establishes broad power and in which it acts in a coherent fashion. In other instances, the conflicts and complicities in the multiple arenas may lead to *dispersed domination*, in which neither the state (nor any other social force) manages to achieve countrywide domination and in which parts of the state may be pulled in very different directions.

Some arena struggles may be limited to a depressed urban slum or a far-off neglected village; others may be countrywide and extend to the seat of state power itself. In the various settings is born the recursive relationship between state and society, the mutually transforming interactions between components of the state and other social forces – a central theme of this volume. Conflicts flare up over specific thrusts and parries: attempts by the state to increase tax collection, efforts by local figures to gain control over particular state offices and resources, initiatives by state agencies to regulate certain behavior, attempts

by local strongmen to extend the area of their own dominance, and more. The struggles in these multiple settings end up reshaping both the state and society.

Often, state- or society-driven initiatives have been provoked by the fundamental changes associated with the great transformation – the growth of cities, the increased use of fossil fuels and other technological innovations, the decline of agriculture in terms of total domestic production, and so on. These changes have swept beyond Europe to every nook and cranny of the globe. Capitalism and the model of the strong European state have sent reverberations through every continent, precipitating massive dislocation and mixtures of appropriation of new ideas and methods, reactions against them, and their adaptations to local circumstances. These processes have constituted an onslaught on existing distributions of critical resources – land and other sources of wealth, personal connections, representation of meaningful symbols, and more – setting off new and renewed battles and accommodations throughout societies. At times these struggles have resulted in integrated domination as the state has played a leading role, but in other instances such centralization has proved elusive, ending in dispersed domination.

Whether the impetus for renewed struggle lies in the spread of world capitalism or in other factors, our first concern is the clashes and accommodations that these new circumstances have precipitated. We seek to develop an approach that can shed light on the nature of patterns of domination in society, that is, in where one might fruitfully look to study persistence and change. We also propose a number of educated guesses as to when and where we might expect to find certain patterns of domination prevailing.

Third World settings have thrown into stark relief the struggles for domination in societies.[6] In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, established social relations and institutions came under severe pressure during the last century as most areas outside Europe became what Eric Wolf called "dependent zones of support" in a single capitalist world.[7] Particularly in the period since World War II, state structures have been at the center of intense discord over how societies should deal with their integration into the larger world economy. The struggles are not simply over foreign economic policy but are, more fundamentally, about the very essence of how these societies are and should be constituted – their norms and rules, regulations and laws, and symbols and values. The dominance of state organizations in such domestic struggles cannot simply be assumed. People do not automatically consider the state to be the proper authority to settle the crucial questions or even the appropriate forum within which various social groups will struggle over the future course of the society. The role of the state is itself an object of the struggle.

We can think of the analogy of England and France as the last embers of feudalism were fading in Western Europe. The Wars of the Roses and the Fronde, among other struggles, illuminated the intense, ground-level disputes

between states attempting to impose their will upon their societies and the social groups resisting that force. Max Beloff put it well: "In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the modern idea of political sovereignty, the notion that over every man and every foot of ground, there must exist some single supreme authority was still something to be argued and fought over rather than the underlying presumption of all political action."[8] In the contemporary Third World, significant state autonomy and state capacity – so glibly, perhaps even teleologically, assumed and expected by some theorists – have not been assured outcomes at all.

Social science requires an approach that leads researchers to the struggles for domination that lie at the heart of twentieth-century social and political change. It is the elaboration of such an approach to which the participants in this volume aspire. In the sections that follow, I discuss the state, society, and state–society interactions in the arenas of domination and opposition. In these arenas, all sorts of social organizations, including components of the state, engage one another, attempting to impose their own stamp on ordinary life, everyday social relations, and the ways people understand the world around them. In brief, my aim is to draw the attention of those concerned with state–society issues to the appropriate focuses of analysis. The discussion highlights both a method of disaggregating states and societies as well as the recursive and mutually transforming nature of state–society interactions. Because such struggles may indeed be more obvious in the Third World than in the highly industrialized countries – just as in England and France in the seventeenth century – we hope that this volume's essays will also aid in understanding state and society where similar struggles are frequently veiled – in Europe, including the former Communist states, and in North America as well.

THE STATE

Any number of scholars have offered formal definitions of the state, most of which draw heavily on the notions of Max Weber.[9] These definitions have not differed markedly from one another. They have tended to emphasize the state's institutional character (as an organization or set of organizations), its functions (especially regarding the making of rules), and its recourse to coercion ("monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force").[10] At the core of these definitions lies the question of domination or authority in the state's claimed territory and the degree to which the state's institutions can expect voluntary compliance with their rules (legitimacy) or need to resort to coercion.

One work, for example, considers "the state to be a set of organizations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force."[11] Another looks at the state as a power organization that engages in "centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many

aspects of social relations."[12] By the "power" of the modern state, authors usually mean what Michael Mann has called infrastructural power, "the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."[13]

Scholars understand the state to be the culmination of a process transcending the old localized organizations in societies, which had previously made the rules. It is "a more impersonal and public system of rule over territorially circumscribed societies, exercised through a complex set of institutional arrangements and offices, which is distinguished from the largely localised and particularistic forms of power which preceded it."[14] Since the sixteenth century, the theories maintain, the emergence of this new sort of public power with its large standing armies, formidable bureaucracies, and codified law has made the old forms of rule antiquated. The state has forged close-knit nations out of peoples who had been but loose associations of local groups. It is simply assumed that there is no longer any dispute that the state is the framework for the authoritative making of rules. "In the modern world only one form of political unit is recognized and permitted. This is the form we call the 'nation-state.' "[15]

Although there is much to recommend these definitions, they also pose certain problems. For one, they tend to feature one dimension of the state, its bureaucratic (or rule-enforcing) character. The accent on this side of the state highlights its capabilities, its proficiency in achieving a fixed set of goals and in implementing formal policies. Another dimension of the state exists that many of these definitions do not capture well: the formulation and transformation of its goals. As the state organization comes into contact with various social groups, it clashes with and accommodates to different moral orders. These engagements, which occur at numerous junctures, change the social bases and the aims of the state. The state is not a fixed ideological entity. Rather, it embodies an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of goals, as it engages other social groups. This sort of engagement can come through direct contact with formal representatives, often legislators, or, more commonly, through political parties closely allied with the state.

Resistance offered by other social forces to the designs of the state, as well as the incorporation of groups into the organization of the state, change its social and ideological underpinnings. The formulation of state policy is as much a product of this dynamic as it is a simple outcome of the goals of top state leaders or a straightforward legislative process. The results of the engagement with (and disengagement from) other social forces may modify the state agenda substantially; indeed, they may alter the very nature of the state.[16] Even as self-consciously an ideological state as that in postrevolutionary China – a state, as Vivienne Shue puts it, that set out to do nothing less than reinvent society – found itself transformed by its engagement with other social forces. Mao's China, to be sure, framed state policies in the language of class struggle,

defending socialism and raising revolutionary consciousness. But the state's goals and actions were colored by the social networks that, in Shue's terms, insinuated themselves into all aspects of economic, social, and political relations, affecting the character of the state at both local and national levels. In the specific instance of Shanghai, Elizabeth Perry notes how the Chinese Communist Party (and, later, state) changed in character as the result of incorporating the most skilled components of that city's working class. Similarly, as Reşat Kasaba demonstrates, the nineteenth-century Ottoman state's engagement with principally non-Muslim merchants fundamentally changed its goals and character, drawing it into many new roles and procedures.

Problems with existing conceptions of the state go beyond lack of interest in the changing foundation upon which state goals are built; problems exist even on the issue of capabilities, which is the heart and soul of such definitions. There is a troubling tendency of authors to take too seriously actual states' abilities to make binding their decisions for people. This penchant to exaggerate capabilities has stemmed from states' near ubiquity in the struggles and accommodations occurring in arenas of domination and opposition, as well as from the presumptions of state officials themselves.

In the twentieth century, there have been very few places on earth, whether in the most remote corners of a country or in the heart of a capital city, where the state organization has not been a key actor in struggles for domination. Sometimes the state's initiatives have triggered intensified social battles; in other instances, it has simply reacted to the forays of other social forces. At times, it has championed economic development and redistribution. In other cases, its agenda has been to preserve existing patterns of economic domination. But in only rare instances (a number of which have been in Africa)[17] during the last several generations has the state been largely absent during conflicts over who exercises power in any segment of society. Along with technological change and industrialization, the idea of the transformative state has been, to be sure, a defining characteristic of the modern world. Indeed, what has distinguished the modern state from most other large-scale political organizations in history, such as empires, has been its insinuation into the core identities of its subjects (thus the emphasis on the nation-state). In their ordinary lives, people have come to think of themselves, among other central social roles, such as father or farmer, as French or Pakistani or Brazilian. Indeed, transformative states go beyond trying to establish people's personal identities; they aim to shape people's entire moral orders – the content of the symbols and codes determining what matters most to them. This penetration into people's daily lives means that a transformative state simply cannot let any struggle over domination within its official boundaries go uncontested;[18] state leaders want the state to matter most, enough to die for.

With only isolated exceptions, political leaders have sought to head a transformative state. They have seen it as an organization that can (or, at least,

should) dominate in every corner of society. It should dictate the rules of daily behavior or, minimally, authorize and defend other social organizations to undertake some of those tasks. Even in recent cases of privatization and liberalization of markets, for example, a frequent underlying assumption is that the state should not entirely abdicate economic questions to markets. It should seek to carve out the limits to the autonomy of those markets and, at the same time, to authorize, regulate, and defend their operation.[19]

In short, throughout the territory they claim to govern, most political leaders have maintained that the state should have primacy. In some instances, that has meant privileging powerful social groups with which state leaders are allied as well as the organizations those groups dominate, such as markets or churches. But commonly the quest is for the state to exercise control directly – to impose its own systems of meaning and boundaries for acceptable behavior centrally on its subjects, in everything from sexual unions to labor–management relations.

State leaders attempt to create an aura of invincibility about the state. The more the state seems all-powerful, the more likely are subjects to accept it in their ordinary lives and, in the process, reduce the burden of enforcing all its dictates. In fact, those social scientists who, wittingly or unwittingly, exaggerate the capabilities of the state become part of the state's project to present itself as invincible. State sovereignty, the actual imposition of supreme state authority over its claimed territory, has simply too often been taken for granted.[20]

Despite their best efforts and to their never-ending frustration, state leaders have not had a clear way in imposing their domination – their systems of meaning, their rules for social behavior, and their economic plans – upon society. Like any other organizations, states have real limits to their power: what they can do and what they cannot do, when they can collect taxes and when not, which rules they can make binding and which not. Ambitious goals for states – aims of actually penetrating throughout the society, regulating the nitty-gritty of social relations, extracting revenues, appropriating resources that determine the nature of economic life, and controlling the most dearly held symbols – have seldom been achieved, certainly not in most of the new or renewed state organizations in the Third World.

The manner in which recent literature presents states results in consistently overestimating state power and autonomy. All too frequently the focus has been on the very top leadership, as if it alone constitutes the state, as if its collective will is re-created faithfully throughout the labyrinth of state branches and bureaus. "My principal interest," writes Mann, "lies in those centralized institutions generally called 'states,' and in the powers of the personnel who staff them, at the higher levels generally termed the 'state elite.' "[21]

But states surely consist of far more than this. As in ideology and policy formulation, policy implementation also reflects the state's engagement with other social forces. To study this, one must look at the multiple levels of the

state through a new "anthropology of the state." A number of writers have elaborated what a truly cross-disciplinary political anthropology might look like.[22] Although the state as an institution has rarely been the central concern of these works, their insights could profitably lead to works shedding new light on the state. An anthropology of the state would lead to at least three advantages.

First, emphasis would change from what anthropologist Laura Nader called "studying up"[23] (focusing attention at the tops of agencies and institutions) to investigation at different levels of the state, including the lowest rungs on the organizational hierarchy where direct engagement with society often occurs, and the interaction among the levels. In short, such an approach helps us disaggregate the state and study its engagement with society.

Second, an anthropology of the state would open the study of its institutions to new methods, particularly participant observation. Techniques now commonly used to study state officials and others "are highly useful in dealing with articulate introspective respondents when those individuals are not otherwise engaged in socio-political behavior."[24] Participant observation would focus on the process of engagement of state officials in the contests of power with others inside and outside the state organization.

Finally, such an approach could go beyond the common concern with the theoretical study of the relationships of power to the interplay of power and symbols in state–society relations. No state can monitor all its rules; each needs what Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman called "legitimating universes,"[25] a constellation of symbols justifying state domination. It is this need that lies behind the attempts by states to shape the moral or symbolic order of their populations. Political anthropology, notes Abner Cohen, "specializes in unfolding the political implications of symbolic formations and activities – the 'mumbo-jumbo' of modern society – which are manifestly non-political."[26] It is the transformation of people as they adopt the symbols of the state and the transformation of the state as it incorporates symbols from society – both seemingly "non-political" processes – that an anthropology of the state can illuminate.

As Atul Kohli shows in the case of India, various levels of the state organization operate in markedly different structural environments. An anthropology of the state directs us to these distinctive environments and to the interaction among the levels. An understanding of the Indian national government's paradoxical growing inability to govern, even as it centralizes functions, demands that students of India look beyond the difficulties in New Delhi, to politics at the district and state levels of the country. This sort of approach, then, would not anticipate a single strategic and rational response of the state to its crisis of growing impotence. Indeed, political outcomes may not at all be in line with what seem to be the overall state's "interests," but may stem instead from the complex interaction of the different levels of the state and the peculiar pressures faced at each level.

An anthropology of the state, then, allows us to dismantle it analytically and to discern the distinct structural environments of its different components and the interaction among them. One possible way to disaggregate the state is to break it down into four levels, which differ markedly in the kinds of pressures they face from other state components and from nonstate actors. From bottom to top, they are:

(1) *The trenches.* Here stand the officials who must execute state directives directly in the face of possibly strong societal resistance. They are the tax collectors, police officers, teachers, foot soldiers, and other bureaucrats with the mandate to apply state rules and regulations directly. Their contacts are with the intended clients, targets, and beneficiaries of official state policies. Supervisors tend to be somewhat distant in district or regional capitals.

(2) *The dispersed field offices.* A notch higher are the regional and local bodies that rework and organize state policies and directives for local consumption, or even formulate and implement wholly local policies. They include the bureaus, legislative bodies, courts, and military and police units that work exclusively in a circumscribed territory within the larger territory claimed by the state as a whole, making key decisions about local appropriation of resources funneled through national ministries or garnered locally. Where will state schools be built? How will local postal distribution be organized? Which villages will benefit from the digging of new tube-wells or irrigation canals? Who will be hired in the trenches? They are more likely to face large, well-organized regional social forces, as well as direct intervention from the capital city, than those in the trenches.

(3) *The agency's central offices.* In the capital city are the nerve centers where national policies are formulated and enacted and where resources for implementation are marshaled. These agencies are technically responsible to the top political leadership, but they are also often in intense negotiations with each other and are targets for influence by large, well-organized interest groups at the national level.

(4) *The commanding heights.* At the pinnacle of the state is the top executive leadership. While top leaders depend on those in lower levels for everything from tax collection to keeping order, they may not fully identify with any other component of the state. Those other components become yet other pressure points among an array of large-scale domestic and international forces seeking to influence the top leadership.

Leaving aside momentarily the issue of nonstate forces, both domestic and international, that impinge on the various parts of the state, three sets of pressure from within the state organization itself bear directly on each level of the state. Those pressures are, first, from supervisors (at least for those neither elected nor at the very top of the hierarchy); second, from underlings, those that one directly or indirectly supervises; and third, from peers, staff in other agencies or politicians at roughly similar levels. Given the different constellations of these forces at each level, let alone the differing nonstate forces officials face, it is not

surprising that states seldom generate a single, homogeneous response to an issue or problem, or even necessarily a varied but coordinated set of responses. The different constellations of forces each part of the state faces mean that various units have diverse histories of their own, leading to differing degrees of esprit de corps, purposefulness, and insularity. Political outcomes – the formulation and implementation of the state's policies – reflect the aggregation of a series of different actions based on the particular calculus of pressures experienced by parts of the state at each level.

There is certainly little guarantee that such outcomes will represent some harmonious mesh. They can just as likely be a sum of ill-fitting responses that stem from the different components of the state as they respond to their various pressures from within the state and from the broader environment. Shue writes of Maoist China, for example, "Frontline officials, despite their status as agents of the state, frequently found it advisable, or easier, or more natural, or just in accord with their own convictions, to throw in their lot with local people and departmental associates, against the impersonal requirements of the state bureaucracy above them."

At different points in the state organization, the calculus of pressures on state officials differs markedly, depending on the particular array of forces in their arenas and their relative weight. To speak of the overall autonomy of states, as some recent theory does, might not at all be the best initial point of inquiry for those studying politics and society. Researchers must first ask about the autonomy of the various components of the state, for which the calculus of pressures differs so markedly. What sorts of social forces predominate at different points in the state hierarchy, and why? Does the calculus of pressures allow for discretionary room for state officials and representatives? Do supervisors influence decisions of state offices, or are they outweighed by other social forces?

To conclude this section, there has been an unfortunate tendency in social science to treat the state as an organic, undifferentiated actor. Scholars have assigned the state an ontological status that has lifted it apart from the rest of society. As a result, the dynamics of the struggles for domination in societies, in which components of the state have played differing roles in various arenas, have been obfuscated. Those struggles have not only been about who seizes the commanding political heights in society. They have involved alliances, coalitions, and conflicts in multiple arenas, including various components of the state and other social forces. The cacophony of sounds from the wildly different arenas in which components of the state and social forces interact often have resulted in state actions that bear little resemblance to the original schemes or policies conceived by leaders of the state or by particular state agencies.

The more diverse and heterogeneous the arrays of pressures that various components of the state encounter on their different levels, especially when strong pressures are applied by multifarious domestic and foreign social forces, the less likely the state is to end up with complementary behavior by its many

parts and the less likely it is to convey successfully a coherent system of "legitimating universes." Despite its international stature and its sheer bulk in society, the state may be a crippled giant in the quest for domination. Its bulk guarantees it cannot be ignored in conflicts over domination in society, but more meaningful initiatives and more coherent actions may come, if they come at all, from other social forces.

THE SOCIETY

We can start our discussion with a depiction of society offered by Liah Greenfeld and Michel Martin: Society's "only definitive characteristic is that it is the outermost social structure for a certain group of individuals who, whatever might be their attitude toward it, view themselves as its members and experience their identity as being determined by it."[27] This is a fairly loose characterization, which avoids assuming that there necessarily exists a central force guiding the disparate parts of society. Indeed, many of the difficulties in analyzing state–society relations arise from the tendency by theorists to impose some general analytical framework that can help discern patterns for all (or most) of society's disparate parts. Social scientists drawing on Marxism have thus portrayed the ruling class or the hegemony generated by a combination of the ruling class and the state as dominating across society and giving it a distinctive shape. Where society is seen as pulling in different directions, the struggles are then understood to be between this class and other broadly constructed social classes.

Like the Marxists, liberal social scientists have often accepted axiomatically that the existence of society presupposes the exercising of some sort of hegemony, or society-wide domination. For them, the integrated framework is the consensus of norms, partially expressed within the authoritative structure of a somewhat constrained state, about how individual and group competition proceeds over the question of who gets what.[28] Social struggle comes through a set of plural interests competing for influence on public policies, all under the umbrella of well-established rules of the game. Recent state-centric theories have, implicitly or explicitly, tended to accept the notion of society-wide domination or hegemony, with the important qualification that they have been more prone than either Marxists or liberals to focus explicitly on the frameworks and authority created by the society's state organization.[29]

The approach to society offered here accepts some of what the state theorists have presumed; namely, in the modern world, societies as we know them – their contours and boundaries, their sense of shared experience – have been products of state formation. At the same time, we must raise questions about theorists' presumption of a unifying framework (whether a ruling class, a consensus of norms about competition, or the state) to explain overall patterns of domination and distribution in Third World societies. We must ask a prior question: Have the outcomes of struggles in multiple arenas aggregated to

create, in fact, broad classes with cohesive projects that can shape a society or a widely agreed upon normative framework or a state organization capable of containing competition? And, if we indeed find such classes or frameworks or states, must we assume that they will hold together beyond the short- or medium term?

In the case of the Marxists, unified social classes and wide-ranging social struggles for dominance – class struggles – have often been easier to find in imaginative theorizing than in real societies. Class, notes E. P. Thompson, has become a broad heuristic device when, in fact, it is the particular result of historical conditions in only certain places and times. "Class, as it eventuated within nineteenth century industrial capitalist societies, and as it then left its imprint upon the heuristic category of class, has in fact no claim to universality."[30] Referring to the mix of capitalists and large-scale agriculturalists in nineteenth-century England, Thompson states, "It arose, like *every* real historical situation, from a particular equilibrium of forces; it was only one of the seemingly infinite number of social mutations (in which each, nevertheless, maintains a generic affinity to others arising from a comparable conjunction) which actual history provides in such profusion."[31] In other countries of Europe and in other parts of the world, cohesive classes, which can lead society or around which the primary struggles in society revolve, may or may not exist at all or, when they do, may or may not succeed in achieving some sort of broad class project. Whatever the general utility of a "theory of class," then, our cases seem to indicate caution against an overgeneralizing tendency.

For example, the Egyptian business elites of the 1930s, as Robert Vitalis demonstrates, could in limited instances engage in broad forms of collective action. But in some of the critical issues revolving around state-fostered markets, the business leaders, despite all their privileges, did not develop unified class domination. Instead, rival coalitions of businessmen aligned with different elements of the state, each coalition seeking to secure access to the state's investment resources. The results were not only deep conflicts among the business elites themselves but the undermining of the state and its policies as well. Isma'il Sidqi, the strong-armed leader who took over the government in 1930, needed the businessmen as much as they needed him. In the end, however, neither could achieve their goals: Sidqi was forced to resign by 1933 and businessmen continued to pursue their conflicting interests in multiple arenas, with no semblance of pulling society in a single direction. The idea of a unified social class working toward some large class-project that can reshape society may be an elegant metaphorical device, Vitalis points out, but these metaphors "can obscure as much as they reveal about the nature of the institutions, strategies and power of capitalists."

Similarly for liberal theorists, battles over the distribution of authority have not always produced dominance for specific rules of competition. The struggles in societies have often been over who establishes the procedures, rather than

competition on the course of public policy within an overarching legitimate framework for all of society. The establishment of legitimate authority over a large territory in which plural competition can occur has, like unified class rule, been exceptional in twentieth-century history and the result of distinctive historical conditions.[32] Even in as established a democracy as India, as Kohli argues, integrating frameworks of authority are difficult to find today. In fact, the opportunities provided by democracy for mobilization have opened the way for new groups, especially the lower and lower-middle strata, to expand their participation in politics substantially. The result has been an unanticipated one; instead of providing a long-term "solution" to management of conflict, democracy has increasingly facilitated the creation of fragmented politics, with few institutional or normative frameworks that could contain growing and increasingly vitriolic competition.

State-centered theories encounter similar difficulties when they assume the state organization is powerful and cohesive enough to drive society. Again, not only is that claim open to empirical verification, the theoretical assumption has frequently led to the tendency to strip the other components of society of their volition or agency, portraying them as malleable putty in the hands of the most powerful element of society, the state.[33] Such a perspective leaves us at a loss to explain such instances as Senegal. Rather than finding an increasingly capable state in the postcolonial years, Catherine Boone observed that political practices seemed to undermine the administrative capacities and resource bases of the Senegalese state. The state itself came to be based on a system of patronage in which chiefs and other local-level authorities exercised a tremendous degree of discretion in local arenas. These local patterns of domination came to be rooted in the state organization, crippling it and rendering it unable to deal with the pressing problem of eroding national production that left the state with a drastically declining tax base. Authoritative and autonomous forces in society shaped the state as much or more than they were shaped by it.

Social forces in society represent powerful mechanisms for associative behavior. These forces encompass informal organizations (such as Senegal's patron–client networks, or friendship groups and old-boy networks in other societies) as well as formal organizations (such as businesses and churches). They can also be social movements, including those held together by common, strongly motivating sets of ideas (even where obvious organizational ties are absent).[34] Such movements may range from those dedicated to squatters' rights to ones focusing on questions of ecology. All these sorts of social forces' ability to exercise power starts with their internal organization. The efficiency of their hierarchies, their ability to use resources at hand, their adroitness in exploiting or generating symbols to which people develop strong attachments, all affect their ability to influence or control behavior and beliefs.

But there is another dimension as well. Social forces do not operate in a social vacuum. Their leaders attempt to mobilize followers and exercise power

in environments in which other social forces are doing the same. And there is rarely a neat division of the population or of issues that keep various social forces from conflicting. The focus here is on precisely those environments – those arenas of domination and opposition – where various social forces engage one another over material and symbolic issues, vying for supremacy through struggles and accommodations, clashes and coalitions.[35] These are not simply "policy arenas" in which various groups attempt to shape public policy. In addition to contestation over governmental policy, struggles and accommodations take place over the basic moral order and the very structure within which the rights and wrongs of everyday social behavior should be determined: Who has the right to interpret the scriptures? Who is to be respected over others? What system of property rights will prevail? How will water and land be distributed within the context of the prevailing system of property rights?[36]

Various social forces endeavor to impose themselves in an arena, to prescribe to others their goals and their answers to these and related questions. Their aims may vary and may be asymmetrical. Some use social forces to extract as much surplus or revenue as possible; others look for deference and respect or doing God's will or simply power to rule other people's behavior as an end in itself. Whatever the motivation and aims, attempts at domination are invariably met with opposition by others also seeking to dominate or by those trying to avoid domination. Rarely can any social force achieve its goals without finding allies, creating coalitions, and accepting accommodations. Landlord and priest, entrepreneur and sheikh, have forged such social coalitions with power enough to dictate wide-ranging patterns of belief and practice. Frances Hagopian, for example, demonstrates how in Brazil, the authoritarian military regime found it had to reinstate accommodations with local traditional, oligarchic elites after it had instituted a political system of domination that it believed had rid Brazilian politics of these very forces. "The military was no more successful at cleansing the political system of patronage politics than it was at purging the state of the traditional political elite." The old patrons' ability to manipulate resources in order to achieve domination in local arenas forced the state's leaders to seek an implicit coalition with them.

Coalitions and accommodations may transform as well as enhance a social force's ability to attain its goals. As a social force's constituency changes, it may incorporate a new material basis as well as new ideas and values into its constitution. To state this point in slightly different terms, in addition to a social force's capabilities, its social and ideological basis (whom it serves and with what goals or agenda) also may change radically as a result of its interactions in an arena. It makes little sense, then, to try to understand outcomes by deriving actions from a fixed set of goals, as too much social science does today. Those ends themselves may very well be in flux. In China, both the Nationalist regime in the 1930s and the Communist one from the late 1940s on were themselves

transformed as they recruited different segments of the Shanghai working class as pivotal constituencies. Perry's chapter notes how deeply affected the Kuomintang was as it used organized crime to help it incorporate semiskilled workers from North China and how the Communist state absorbed the goals of the labor elite as it attracted the more skilled artisans from the south.

Power or social control can expand along three dimensions in order to extend a social force's domination. First, within an arena, a social force can dominate in an increasing number of issue areas, from dictating what crops to grow, through providing credit, to defining the nature of salvation. Second, arenas themselves can grow to incorporate a larger share of the population and a larger territory. The alignment of forces over which language people should use, for example, may begin in a particular city and spread to incorporate large portions of a country and its population. Third, a social force can use the resources it garners in any one arena to dominate in other arenas, with different sets of social forces. Chiefs in some countries of postcolonial Africa, for instance, used their command in tribal territories to catapult themselves into national questions such as issues of family planning.

Social forces attempt to appropriate the resources and symbols at hand to further their goals, and they often have wildly different abilities to do that. The mix of key elements in an arena – its physical geography, material resources, human resources, forms of social organization, and trove of beliefs – are the raw materials with which the patterns of relationships among social groupings are determined. Patterns of domination come as social forces, with their already unequal abilities and access to resources, seek to utilize and manipulate these key elements of the arena's environment. The introduction of new factors into an arena, such as additional capital, compelling ideas, or innovative forms of social organization, or the depletion of old elements, also benefits and harms social forces in very different ways. These new factors set off new and renewed struggles in arenas, ranging from struggles that proceed slowly and quietly to ones fraught with violence and recurring upheaval.

The struggles and accommodations of social forces in any local or regional arena of domination and opposition have not been hermetically sealed affairs. Resources have been reallocated from one arena to another in order to influence the outcome of struggles. Social forces have enhanced their position by sporting resources garnered from outside, by reassigning trusted personnel, or by riding on the backs of pervasive and powerful symbols. Factors such as the overall structure of production in society, existing institutional arrangements, and the saliency of certain symbols all influence who is in a position to reallocate resources and symbols from arena to arena.

Creating the conditions for domination in society and maintaining dominance – the reproduction of power within society – are the products of the multiple ongoing arena struggles and accommodations. Our approach to society

analyzes whether particular social forces can create an integrated domination. That is, can they prevail within given arenas to produce resources and support – a material base and a normative framework – that can be used to dominate locally and then be carried into other domains to create society-wide domination? Or do the struggles in the arenas result in a pattern of dispersed domination by limiting the creation of authoritative, legitimate forces that can dominate broadly across society?

THE JUNCTURES OF STATES AND SOCIETIES

In the modern world, it is impossible to understand the term "society" without the state. The formation of the state has created and activated society. If society is the outermost limits with which people identify, then it is the state that initially determines those limits or social boundaries. But that does not mean that the state simply molds the groups that make up society. Indeed, interactions of state and society are mutually transforming. The results of the engagement and disengagement of states and other social forces are tangible, even momentous, but outcomes rarely reflect the aims and wills imbedded in either. The clash of social forces, including the state, is mediated through the struggles and accommodations in society's numerous arenas. For the social scientist, the challenge is to understand how those diffused struggles alter society's disposition of resources, the nature of its stratification, the character of its gender relations,[37] and the content of its collective identities. In the end, those local interactions cumulatively reshape the state or the other social organizations, or, most commonly, both; these interactions are the foundation of the recursive relationship between the state and other social forces.

The cumulative result of engagements and disengagements in arenas has been that societies have assumed "all manner of shapes," as Anthony Smith puts it.[38] Smith's observation seems, at first glance, rather unremarkable; of course societies have ended up with all manner of shapes. But Smith's comment, as he notes, flies in the face of much prevailing social theory. In contemporary social science writing, where states and societies have been portrayed with broad brushstrokes, different states and societies have had an uncannily uniform look. So much contemporary scholarship blurs the rich diversity produced in various societies' multiple arenas. The meeting grounds between states and other social forces have been ones in which conflict and complicity, opposition and coalition, corruption and co-optation have resolved the shape of countrywide social and political changes. They have determined whether domination is integrated or dispersed, as well as the varying contours of integrated or dispersed domination.

Arenas of domination and opposition have achieved periods of stable relations among their social forces in different times and places, but these may have been more the exception than the rule. A Nicaraguan earthquake, a Bengali tidal

wave, the absorption of fundamentalist Islam in southern Lebanon, changing birth rates in Mexico, the penetration of the world economy throughout the Third World, all have created winners and losers and thus changed the balance of forces in arenas. Through its distinctive ideology and organization, the modern state has been at the core of destabilization of existing arenas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The common core of ideology among the leaders of transformative states has been to create a hegemonic presence – a single authoritative rule – in multiple arenas, even in the far corners of society. The goal has been to penetrate society deeply enough to shape how individuals throughout the society identify themselves, and the organization of the state has been to effect such far-reaching domination. It has included vertically connected agencies, designed to reach to all pockets within the territory, and specialized components to promote the state's system of meaning and legitimacy (e.g., schools), to make universal rules (legislative bodies), to execute those rules (bureaucracies), to adjudicate (courts), and to coerce (armies and police). Major policy initiatives by the state have led to a massive inundation of new elements (from fresh ideas to personnel and hard cash) as well as to the depletion of others through taxation, conscription, relocation, mass murder, or other means. Even the most benign states have made extraordinary demands on those they have claimed as their subjects: to sequester their children in state institutions for thirty hours a week, to dispose of their bodily wastes in only prescribed ways, to treat their sick exclusively with state-licensed healers, to prove a proprietary relationship to land solely through state-issued deeds, and so on. Whatever their specific programs, states have shaken up existing social relationships, renewing active struggles for domination.

In the multiple meeting grounds between states and other social components, some social forces have tied their own fortunes to that of the state or accepted it as the appropriate organization to establish the proper practices for all of society. In such cases, we can speak of the relationship between state and social forces as mutually empowering. But, in other instances, the engagement between the state and social forces is a struggle for agency, for the ultimate autonomy to take initiatives and to make decisions in given realms. Here, the struggle is one marked not by mutual empowerment but by mutually exclusive goals. Some forces, for example, have sought to appropriate resources, positions, personnel, even whole bureaus of the state for their own purposes. Still others in society, such as peasants or slum dwellers, who were already dominated by other social forces, have also, at times, actively or quietly resisted the attempts of officials to impose new state domination.

These struggles and accommodations in the junctures between components of the state and other social forces have produced a range of outcomes. We can capture these in four ideal types of results. First is total transformation. Here, the state's penetration leads to the destruction, co-optation, or subjugation of local social forces and to the state's domination. In such cases, the components

of the state successfully transform how the people of an arena identify themselves. Forced migration, replacement of the locals by a settler population, widespread use of violence, and other draconian means may nullify or destroy local dominating social forces and transform personal identity. Where there is no severe social dislocation, it is unlikely that total transformation will occur within a single generation. China, discussed in the two chapters by Perry and Shue, comes closest to this ideal type. The dislocation of the prolonged civil war, overlaid by the war against the Japanese, in addition to the later turmoil of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, gave the Chinese Communist state unprecedented opportunity to harness local forces. But even this case instructs us to proceed with caution in looking at transformative states; as both Perry and Shue demonstrate, China has fallen short of the ideal type. As the state incorporated new groups and engaged with old ones, it found itself transformed as well as transforming.

Second is state incorporation of existing social forces. In this type, the state's injection of new social organization, resources, symbols, and force into an arena enables it to appropriate existing social forces and symbols in order to establish a new pattern of domination. But it also forces changes and accommodations on the part of the state's components as they adapt to the specific patterns and forces in the arena. These changes in local components of the state may then affect the state's overall coherence – its ability to reallocate resources, establish legitimacy, and achieve integrated domination. Hagopian's chapter on Brazil illustrates this second type. The military coup there in 1964 brought a regime bent on transformation of society. But, for all the resources at its disposal, the state found itself reincorporating the old oligarchy at the provincial level and thereby relinquishing allocative discretion in key areas.

Third is existing social forces' incorporation of the state. In this type, the presence of the state's components spurs adaptation by dominating social forces, but does not produce radical changes in the pattern of domination. Or, in some cases, the new state presence does generate new patterns of domination, but ones in which new nonstate social forces rise to the top. In either case, the personal identity and moral order that result among the population are not the ones envisioned by state leaders. The organization and symbols of the state's components are appropriated by the local dominating social forces. In this scenario, the transformation of the local components of the state is so extensive as to harm significantly the state's overall chances of achieving integrated domination in society. Michael Bratton's chapter, for example, points to how the establishment of marketing boards and cooperatives for peasants in African states has precipitated arrangements not at all intended, or even imagined, by political leaders. Peasants reacted to the state initiatives by setting up their own informal trading networks. Bratton dismisses the notion that the interpenetration of parts of the state apparatus with this second economy implies some sort of state domination.

When public officials accept bribes to turn a blind eye to an illegal activity, they are not extending the state's authority but reducing it. And when officials engage in private accumulation and trade – even if only through relatives, intermediaries, and employees – they are acknowledging that their behavior is not governed by legal commands. The participation of state officials in the second economy amounts to a deconstruction of formal architecture of the state in the face of a more compelling set of social imperatives.

Again, with this ideal type, we must express some caution. Although African cases, such as that of Senegal discussed in Boone's essay, often demonstrate the co-optation of the state by particular social forces, even here the engagement between state and society may have mutually empowering aspects, a point brought out nicely in the chapter by Naomi Chazan.

Finally, the state may fail altogether in its attempt at penetration. Disengagement or lack of engagement of the state in the local arena will result in little transformative effect on the society – and limited effects of the society on the state. Failures to engage in arena struggles in even the most remote parts of the country can affect the state in the capital city by denying state components there resources and support from the larger society.

Only rarely have real cases in arenas approached the two extreme ideal-types, total transformation or disengagement. Most have offered some variant of the middle two types, where state components and other social forces have been involved in a recursive relationship, that is, mutually transforming struggles. In fact, states and other social forces not only may alter one another, they may also affect the very integrity of the other through encroachment. In the midst of arena struggles and accommodations, the boundary between the state and other parts of society may continually shift, as powerful social forces in particular arenas appropriate parts of the state or the components of the state co-opt influential social figures. Although state leaders may seek to represent themselves as distinct from society and standing above it, the state is, in fact, yet another organization in society. And, as one organization among many, it is subject to the pushes and pulls in society's arenas that can change the line between it and other social forces.

In parts of colonial Africa, for example, the British attempted to extend the scope of the colonial state by incorporating tribal chiefs as paid officials. Many chiefs, for their part, gladly accepted the salary and any other perquisites that they could garner but often ignored the directives from their superiors in the state hierarchy. The demarcation between the state and other parts of society in such instances was difficult to locate and was in constant flux. Chiefs were state officials but sometimes – indeed, many times – simply used their state office and its resources to strengthen their roles as chiefs.

To talk of the relations between state and society as if both always have had firm boundaries, as much recent social theory does, is to miss some of the most important dynamics of transforming struggles.[39] Chiefs, like other state employees and officials, play multiple roles. State organizations may succeed in

having them suppress roles with different norms (as members, for example, of kinship or tribal groups) while performing their state duty. The desire to mold special state norms and suppress the norms of other roles is one reason that states attempt to create their own space for officials, such as separate state office buildings or new capital cities. In state-designated space, the assumption goes, officials would be less likely to succumb to the logic of the struggle being played out in specific arenas. But states may fail to "capture" chiefs or other state workers, resulting in the domination of the norms of other social forces.

In arena after arena, then, social forces have reorganized to deal with the new reality of ambitious states. Where those forces have created or found the spaces and methods to sustain, sometimes even augment, their own social and economic power outside the framework of the state's moral order and its rules, the society comes to be characterized by dispersed domination. Here, neither the state nor any other social force has established an overarching hegemony; domination by any one social force takes place within an arena or even across a limited number of arenas but does not encompass the society as a whole. Social life is then marked by struggles or standoffs among social forces over questions ranging from personal and collective identity and the saliency of symbols to property rights and the right to use force. People's identities and moral codes remain remarkably diverse in such a society.

Even in cases of dispersed domination, the state has rarely been a negligible actor. The junctures of the state with other social forces have taken place in the multiple arenas of society, and in most instances the state's agencies have created a formidable presence, precipitating realignments of local forces. But the components of the state have not achieved total transformation or even successful state incorporation of local powerful social forces in all or most of these settings. This pattern contrasts with integrated domination, which is inclusive, or society-wide. In cases of integrated domination, the state, whether as an authoritative legal system or a coercive mechanism of the ruling class, is at the center of the process of creating and maintaining social control. Its various components are integrated and coordinated enough to play the central role at all levels in the existing hegemonic domination. That domination includes those areas of life regulated directly by the state, as well as the organizations and activities of society that are authorized by the state within given limits.

In analyzing the junctures of state and society, many theorists have simply assumed the existence of integrated domination. The concept of civil society has been widely used by a number of liberals, Marxists, and statists to capture the relation between state and other parts of society, reinforcing the presumption of integrated domination in society.[40] The notion of civil society, to be sure, has had different shades of meaning in various theoretical contexts – in the works, for example, of Hegel and Gramsci.[41] But despite their differences, for many theorists, civil society has been a convenient term with some surprising commonalties. Various writers have used the concept to acknowledge the existence

of sundry interests in society while still being able to treat them as if, on some level, the entire society (even the state, in many writings) pulls together in a single direction.[42] Note how Stepan, in his book on military politics, speaks of civil society in an anthropomorphic way: "Civil society must consider how it can make a contribution to the democratic control of military and intelligence systems."[43]

Civil society assumes the existence of a normative consensus or hegemony of fundamental ideas among social forces, even among contending groups; this consensus represents a prevailing moral or social order. For many writers, civil society expresses the ties that bind all, or nearly all, of society together, whether those are property rights or mutually felt needs or any other factors. Until the last decade or so, most theories posited a hand-in-glove relationship between state and civil society.[44] This interpretation does not mean there are never tensions between the state and civil society or questions about the boundary between the two. The concept of *pouvoirs intermédiares,* intermediary institutions, has been used to signify a civil society in which organizations guard a degree of autonomy from the state. Such autonomy leaves open the possibility of some differences between the state and nonstate associations.

But the critical point is that in most social science writing, state and civil society are mutually reinforcing, even when differences prevail between them. It is the existence of widely held norms, property relations, or modes of social behavior in myriad organizations across the totality of society – that is, the existence of civil society – which reinforces the dominance of the state and allows it to rule without constant recourse to coercion or without an outlay of resources that would cripple it. Conflicts may persist on particular issues, but implicit agreement prevails over the rules for interaction and competition. For the most part, it is the legal framework of the state that establishes the limits of autonomy for the associations and activities that make up civil society. If that framework is widely accepted, then the activities of the state and other social groups may be mutually empowering.

Only recently in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and even Western Europe has there developed a discourse that takes more seriously the possibility of civil society versus the state.[45] Even among those holding this position, the strain between civil society and the state is seen in overarching terms between these two integrative entities. Civil society is still an aggregate of diverse interests, which on one level pull in a single direction. Together, they attempt to oppose the state's moral order and impose one of their own.

There are several problems with analyzing the junctures of state and society through such a view of civil society. For one, as I have discussed elsewhere, even within civil society, various social forces are not always aggregative and inclusive, leading to a hegemony of fundamental ideas.[46] We need to develop a much more careful understanding of the constitutive elements in civil society and not assume it is made up only of interest groups and private voluntary

organizations, which tend to create a harmonious consensus in society. Also, an integrative view of civil society misses entirely cases of dispersed domination. *Society* and *civil society* are not synonymous; the heterogeneous struggles in society's multiple arenas of domination and opposition in which social forces pull in different directions also affect the state profoundly. The way the concept of civil society is most commonly used leaves no room for these dispersed struggles over society's moral order. As Chazan points out in her chapter, "Civil society encompasses only one portion of what has become a complex and diverse associational scene. What distinguishes those groups incorporated in civil society from other associations is their partial nature: They are separate from but address the state." Society as a whole may include other organized components (not just marginal individuals), which strive to make their own rules and institute their own moral orders, without addressing the state directly. Here, goals of these groups and goals of the state are mutually exclusive.

Many contemporary societies have included significant elements that have struggled against all or many of the claims of the state to be the organization in society with supreme authority. Some social forces have not lent their support to the state's universal pretensions or, for that matter, the pretensions even of a civil society pitted against the state. Their relation to the state has been one of resistance (overt or covert) or one in which they have sought to transform or appropriate part of the state for their own purposes. Similarly, their orientation to the other forces that make up civil society has often ranged from disinterest to outright hostility.

The multiple arenas of society and the interactions among them have been the cauldrons within which the contingent, particular historical outcomes have been brewed for each society and its state. The form of the state (democracy or some other type of government), its goals, its capabilities, its scope, its domination by particular social forces or its autonomy, as well as the form, systems of meaning, capabilities, and autonomy of other social forces – all these have been determined through these critical struggles and accommodations in the multiple arenas of society and the relationships among arenas. States do not succeed in establishing their own domination by default. In fact, they may end up as much the transformed as the transformative states.

In brief, scholars need to ask if and how the struggles in arenas carry over to other arenas and, possibly, to domination in the society as a whole. Have resources and support generated in struggles and accommodations in one arena then been carried into other domains in society, possibly to create an integrated domination? Integrated domination, whether by states, social classes, civil society, or any other groupings, results from successful reallocation of resources and support garnered from activities in one arena into other arenas.[47] What Sidney Tarrow has called the "vast issues, roiling conflicts, and deep-seated social and economic cleavages" in societies cannot be understood divorced from the more limited arena conflicts. It is in the latter that people "organize their

relations with the state, reconcile or fight out conflicts of interest, and attempt to adapt politically to wider social pressures."[48] The ability of any social force, including the state, to develop the cohesion and garner the material and symbolic resources to project a meaningful presence at the society-wide level depends on its performance in more circumscribed arenas. In those arenas, it must dominate successfully enough (close to total transformation or, at least, incorporation of existing social forces) so as to be able to generate resources for application in other arena struggles and, ultimately, the society as a whole. Whether any social force, from social classes to the state, will succeed as the basis for integrated domination is far from a foregone conclusion.

NOTES

1 Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).

2 My use of "domination" refers to the ability to gain obedience through the power of command. Weber used such a designation for domination in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. See Max Rheinstein, ed., *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 322–337. The motivation to obedience can be the coercion or voluntary compliance that comes when one sees the rule maker as the legitimate authority. (Weber speaks of the sources of domination in slightly different terms, seeing domination as a virtue of one's interests, the monopoly position of the dominator, or, by virtue of authority, the power to command and the duty to obey [p. 324].) "Domination," as used here, is thus more inclusive a term than just coercion or just legitimate authority. Domination can be localized or it can be exercised broadly over society. The term "hegemony," on the other hand, while also having elements of coercion and legitimate authority, includes only domination exercised broadly over society. For a discussion of the literature that focuses mainly on the state, see the "Conclusion" of Weber's volume, especially the references cited there in note 1.

3 For a good recent example, see Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

4 Manning Nash, *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. viii.

5 Ibid., p. 5, states, "Which building blocks . . . are invoked to construct a category and what boundary forged to set the category off from others is historically specific."

6 The term "Third World" is not used with any special precision or analytical rigor here. A good case for the limitations in the term and its utility, nonetheless, is found in Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), ch. 1.

7 Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 296.

8 Max Beloff, *The Age of Absolutism, 1660–1815* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, 1962), p. 20.

9 Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), vol. 1, p. 64; and Rheinstein, ed., *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, p. 342.

10 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78.

11 Dietrich Reuschmeyer and Peter B. Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation:

Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Reuschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 46–47.

12 Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1, *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 26.

13 Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 113. Also see John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, *The State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 1–14.

14 Roger King, *The State in Modern Society: New Directions in Political Sociology* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1986), p. 30.

15 Anthony D. Smith, "State-Making and Nation-Building," in Hall, ed., *States in History*, p. 228.

16 Alfred Stepan's use of the term "political society," which he adapted from Gramsci, opens the way to consideration of the changing basis of the state's symbolic system and its behavior. Political contestation, Stepan argues, is within the framework of "political society" and is about "control over public power and the state apparatus." Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 4.

17 Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, "Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and Guinea," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 29 (January 1987).

18 By transformative, we do not necessarily mean progressive. Even a state seeking to preserve an existing order must be transformative if it is to have its way in the context of international changes sweeping over its boundaries.

19 Evans and Stephens have noted, "The state is as central to the economics of development as to its politics." Peter Evans and John D. Stephens, "Studying Development Since the Sixties: The Emergence of a New Comparative Political Economy," *Theory and Society*, 17 (1988), p. 723.

20 King writes (*The State in Modern Society*, p. 51), that "the constitutional state is characterised by a unitary sovereignty which becomes manifest in a single currency, a unified legal system, and an expanding state educational system employing a single 'national' language. A literary tradition in this 'national' language erodes cultural particularism, and a system of national military conscription, which replaced the local recruitment of ancient military units, also tends to overcome 'peripheral' or localist identities."

21 Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," p. 112. The identification of the state with its top elites or leadership, with its own distinct interests and perspectives that are independent of specific other socioeconomic interests, does not mean that authors do not recognize what King (*The State in Modern Society*, p. 53) calls the "plurality of foci" of the state. But these focuses are seen largely as differentiated institutional expressions of a fairly singular will.

22 See, for example, Abner Cohen, "Political Anthropology: The Analysis of the Symbolism of Power Relations," *Man*, 4 (1969): 215–235; Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 55–72; Max Gluckman, *Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965); and Marc Swarz, Victor Turner, and Arthur Tuden, eds., *Political Anthropology* (Chicago: Aldine, 1966).

23 Laura Nader, "Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained from Studying Up," in Dell Hymes, ed., *Reinventing Anthropology* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 284–311.

24 David C. Schwartz, "Toward a More Relevant and Rigorous Political Science," *Journal of Politics*, 36 (1974): 130 (emphasis in original).

25 *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 171

26 *Two-Dimensional Man* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 17.

27 *Center: Ideas and Institutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. viii.

28 Vincent notes that the consensus that is assumed by liberal theorists is a collective good. But, he complains, "the pluralists seem at times to conjure this collective good out of thin air." Not all groups may accept the basic framework. "Groups can be as oppressive, mean-minded and destructive of liberty as any state." Andrew Vincent, *Theories of the State* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 216.

29 See Evans et al., eds., *Bringing the State Back In*. Vincent notes of the liberal pluralists that "they were trying to theorize an idea of the state incorporating maximal diversity of group life and some kind of central authority." He also notes that some have argued "that the State was smuggled in through the backdoor." Vincent, *Theories of the State*, p. 210.

30 "Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?" *Social History*, 3 (May, 1978): 150. Stedman Jones ends up taking a position different from Thompson's but is even more adamant about the tenuous relationship between heuristic devices and what was found in history. "One should not proceed upon the assumption that 'class' as an elementary counter of official social description, 'class' as an effect of theoretical discourse about distribution or production relations, 'class' as the summary of a cluster of culturally signifying practices or 'class' as a species of political or ideological self-definition, all share a single reference point in an anterior social reality." Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832–1982* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 7–8.

31 E. P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), p. 255 (emphasis in original).

32 In Gramsci's language, these historical contingencies are "conjunctural." *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Liberal theorists have tended to deny the existence of a real society in cases where an integrative framework, with clear rules of the game, does not exist. Shils, for example, has spoken of such cases as "proto-societies." But that simply accepts the reality of the bounded nature of society and the linking associative behavior and common memories while denying the status of society where conflict still exists over the framework for action. See Edward Shils, *The Constitution of Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 68.

33 "The inhabitants of countries also possess social attributes like language, a cultural heritage, and a common history. . . . Unlike the country's political structure, the common attributes of *society* do not possess any representative agency that speaks for the whole." Reinhard Bendix, John Bendix, and Norman Furniss, "Reflections on Modern Western States and Civil Societies," *Research in Political Sociology* 3 (1987): 2 (emphasis in original).

34 The existence of a social organization, formal or informal, necessarily implies domination. Note Weber: "A circle of people who are accustomed to obedience to the orders of leaders and who also have a personal interest in the continuance of the domination by virtue of their own participation in, and the benefits derived for them from, the domination, have divided among themselves the exercise of those functions which will serve the continuation of the domination and are holding themselves continuously ready for their exercise. This entire structure will be called organization." Rheinstein, ed., *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, p. 335. I use the broader term "social forces" to signify such relations of domination in organizations

but also where there is obedience in movements where no clear organization is present.

35 An arena is not necessarily spatially limited but, rather, is a conceptual locus where significant struggles and accommodations occur among social forces.

36 Arenas of domination and opposition thus differ in some fundamental respects from Lowi's arenas of power. Such arenas of power, he writes, include "events, issues, and leadership [which should] be studied within defined areas of governmental activity. These areas are, in effect, the functions of government defined more broadly than a single agency, more narrowly than government with a single political process." Theodore J. Lowi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 139. In contrast, arenas of domination and opposition are not functions of government (although they may include government actors), nor are they limited to governmental activity.

37 Of all elements concerning identity and the state, probably the least remarked upon has been gender. One good exception is a recent book by Parpart and Staudt. They write, "For us, gender is at the heart of state origins, access to the state, and state resource allocation. States are shaped by gender struggle; they carry distinctive gender ideologies through time which guide resource-allocation decisions in ways that mold material realities. Through their ideological, legal, and material efforts, states foster the mobilization of certain groups and issues. This mobilization usually benefits men rather than women. While over the long haul, state action may submerge and obscure gender conflict, over the short term, the obviousness with which male privileges are fostered may actually aggravate that conflict." Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen A. Staudt, "Women and the State in Africa," in Parpart and Staudt, eds., *Women and the State in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 6. Also, see chs. 2, 3, and 10.

38 Smith, "State-Making and Nation-Building," pp. 229–230.

39 I am indebted to Timothy Mitchell for illuminating the point about the shifting boundary between states and societies. See Timothy Mitchell, "The Effect of the State," paper presented at the "State Creation and Transformation" workshop of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on the Near and Middle East, Istanbul, September 1–3, 1989.

40 Hegel put forth the notion of civil society as one that emerges from the interdependence of individuals, their conflicts and their needs for cooperation. Those needs give rise to the state; and it is the law, the principle of rightness, that links civil society to the state. *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), pp. 122–123, 134–135. Marx reacted to Hegel's conception, arguing that the state is merely the mechanism to defend privileged propertied interests in civil society. He understood civil society in a material sense, the expression of particular property rights: " 'Bureaucracy' is the 'state formalism' of civil society." David McLellan, ed., *Karl Marx: Early Texts* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), p. 68. Gramsci noted that besides the educational agencies of the state helping maintain hegemony, there are, "in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities [that] tend to the same end – initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes." This, for Gramsci, is civil society. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 258.

41 One difference among them has been the direction of causality: Does the state create civil society or does civil society bring about the state? Whereas Hegel believed that society created the demand for the state, others, including Stepan, have argued that the state can create civil society. Otto Hintze alluded to this mutuality of the state and civil society and the role of the state in creating its own civil society, using the

term "nationalities" instead of civil society: "The European peoples have only gradually developed their nationalities; they are not a simple product of nature but are themselves a product of the creation of states." Hintze, "The Formation of States and Constitutional Development: A Study in History and Politics," in Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 161.

42 Bendix et al. do note that "civil society comprises only a segment of the population." Those not in civil society tend to be marginal sorts – those abandoned by their parents, homeless people who do not participate in the market, illegal immigrants, and the like. "Reflections on Modern Western States and Civil Societies," p. 23. John Keane sees even larger elements of European societies, which have been excluded from civil society (most of those who are not white, heterosexual male citizens). *Democracy and Civil Society: On the Predicaments of European Socialism, the Prospects for Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling Social and Political Power* (New York: Verso, 1988), p. 14.

43 Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, p. 128.

44 Bendix et al. note that "the independence of private associations is a synonym for civil society," and that for civil society to exist a "consensus" is required between state and society. "Reflections on Modern Western States and Civil Societies," pp. 14–15.

45 In the 1980s, the term "civil society" came to be used by analysts of Eastern Europe. They were looking for a way to break the theoretical umbilical cord between state and civil society. For them, civil society implied a spunky society, which develops autonomy through organizations in opposition to the state. See, for example, Andrew Arato, "Empire vs. Civil Society: Poland 1981–82," *Telos*, 14 (1981–1982): 19–48. For a critique, see Zbigniew Rau, "Some Thoughts on Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Lockean Contractarian Approach," *Political Studies*, 35 (1987): 573–592. On Western Europe, see Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (see, for example, pp. 31–32). On Latin America, see Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*.

46 Joel S. Migdal, "Civil Society in Israel," in Ellis Goldberg, Reşat Kasaba, and Migdal, eds., *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law and Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993).

47 In the United States, social theorists have been particularly reticent about admitting that the state is, in fact, exercising supreme authority. More often the emphasis has been on social organizations that regulate themselves, with little attention as to how the state creates the authoritative legal framework within which markets and other social organizations function. See Gary C. Hamilton and John R. Sutton, "The Problem of Control in the Weak State," *Theory and Society*, 18 (January 1989): 15–16.

48 Sidney Tarrow, "Introduction," in *Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 1.