ASIA-PACIFIC: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
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The Limits of Okinawa

Japanese Capitalism, Living Labor, and
Theorizations of Community

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DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Durham and London
2015

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper ∞
Typeset in Whitman by Westchester
Publishing Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Matsumura, Wendy, 1977–
The limits of Okinawa : Japanese capitalism, living labor,
and theorizations of community / Wendy Matsumura.
pages cm —
(Asia-Pacific: culture, politics, and society)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8223-5788-9 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-8223-5801-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-8223-7604-0 (e-book)
1. Okinawa-ken (Japan)—Economic conditions.
I. Title. II. Series: Asia-Pacific.
HC463.O4M387 2015
330.952'2903—dc23 2014037967

Cover art: Yukinori Yanagi, *Banzai Corner*, 1991. Plastic toys (approximately 380 pieces) and mirror, 90 × 240 × 240 cm. © Yukinori Yanagi.

FOR MY PARENTS,
EIKO AND RICHARD MATSUMURA

or thrifty managers of the household. Their actions reflect their desires to produce, live, play, reproduce, and make decisions about their bodies and their work on their own terms. When seen as part of broader attempts to transform gender roles and expectations in Okinawa, the collective refusal by female weavers to accept the terms of the proposed community take on deeper meaning: they were simultaneously an articulation of a new social configuration founded on contempt for everything and everyone who sought to mutilate their bodily rhythms and practices. As the following chapters reveal, the persistence of these rhythms, particularly in agrarian villages, reveal the difficulties that capitalist actors faced. The people they targeted understood exactly what they stood to lose if they capitulated to the leaders of the so-called Okinawan community.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PLANTATION SUGAR IN OKINAWA

World War I and the Refusal of Enclosure

The prerequisites for the real subsumption of Okinawan labor into capitalist society were laid with the completion of the land reorganization project in 1903. The project clarified the boundaries of land ownership, classified lands according to their yield and function, and established private property relations on all the islands in the prefecture. The government distributed certificates of land ownership in order to make the assessment and collection of taxes more uniform and efficient. As a result, individual heads of households rather than the village as a whole became responsible for fulfilling tax obligations, and the customary practice of periodic redivisions of lands was formally abolished.[1] The purported goal of these reforms was to secure the government's financial foundation. Moreover, by commodifying the land, the project theoretically freed the Okinawan people from their locales and provided one essential prerequisite for the commodification of their labor power. As I argued in chapters 2 and 3, this transition was an outcome of the Miyako Island Peasantry Movement's struggles against existing policies that kept commoners in service of a corrupt local elite and, simultaneously, a reflection of the shifting importance of the region in the Japanese empire from a supplier of sugar to a supplier of labor power and taxes like the rest of the nation.

In addition to providing certificates of land ownership to individual households, the land reorganization project converted a range of lands into state-owned and -managed property, whether the lands had been held communally by villages, owned by local municipalities, or owned privately by

individuals. Despite the best efforts of local intellectuals like Jahana Noboru to resist this process of enclosure, which had begun with the reclamation projects of the 1890s, the prefectural assembly decided in 1908 that all communal lands whose status had been deliberately left ambiguous during the land reorganization project would be transferred to the state or municipalities as public lands in order to facilitate their conversion into areas devoted to large-scale sugar cultivation. After 1908 most of Okinawa's communal lands became publicly owned, and individual farming households were formally deprived of access to forest lands and materials that had been vital components of their household economies in the past.[2] Small producers did not accept the expropriation of communal lands without a fight, and their struggles against this process informed the way that industrial development took place in the region.

In his chapter on so-called primitive accumulation in *Capital*, Marx traced the dissolution of the agrarian villages that accompanied the process of enclosure and understood the latter to be a tactic that bourgeois states deployed in order to drive people out of their communities and into industry. In the case of Japan and many other regions of the world, these two processes did not take place at the same time, with agrarian villages remaining intact despite the loss of communal lands that were vital to the survival of small cultivators. This phenomenon and the crises that emerged as a result were collectively called the agrarian question and required resolution in order for proper capitalist development to take place.[3] In his works on the agrarian question that spanned the wartime and postwar years, the Japanese Marxist Uno Kōzō warned against seeing Japan's version as an exception and pointed out that the process of capitalist development that Marx described was simply one historically and geographically grounded example that could not simply be grafted onto other national contexts. Uno explained, "capitalism does not demand the capitalization of the agrarian village any more than is necessary for its own development."[4] In cases where the development of capitalism was not accompanied by the dissolution of the agrarian village, he observed, villages functioned for decades as repositories of theoretically commodified labor power awaiting their free valorization by capital. That is, they contained the industrial reserve army that Marx defined as "a mass of human material always already ready for exploitation by capital in the interests of capital's own changing valorization requirements."[5]

In Okinawa, where conditions of incorporation into Japanese capitalism necessitated policies that strategically kept old administrative systems and

tax collection methods intact, the agrarian question arose during the conversion of many small peasantry (shōnō) into sugar producers.[6] One major task of this chapter is to examine how Okinawa's small producers who lost access to their communal lands responded to their further inclusion into the commodity economy through the entry of mainland sugar companies around World War I. I argue that the specific appearance of the agrarian question in Okinawa was not simply a result of the different way that the prefecture was incorporated into the Japanese capitalist state, but was the outcome of small peasantry's struggles against their transformation into dead labor that enabled capital's realization of surplus value. These struggles, informed by recent memories of dispossession, were key rather than merely ancillary factors in shaping the contours of the prefecture's agrarian question.

Three axes of confrontation will be examined in order to illuminate the complexity of positions that emerged as Okinawa became embedded into the national and global economies in the early twentieth century. In the first axis, Okinawa's intellectuals elaborated new understandings of national community that affirmed the original unity of Okinawans and Japanese. Local political leaders mobilized this new definition of community to argue that Okinawans were fully capable of governing themselves—an assertion that gained urgency as the Japanese empire expanded its presence into the peninsula. Small producers responded to this new definition of Okinawa with a mixture of disinterest and cynicism.

A second axis of confrontation developed between the small peasantry in Okinawa who produced brown sugar and local industrialists who bought into the economic nationalism that Ōta Chōfu first articulated in the late nineteenth century. They rejected efforts of local bourgeoisie like Ōta and Miyagi Tetsu to formulate industrial policies based on their belief that reorganizing Okinawa into a capitalist gemeinschaft would enable the ideal condition of Okinawans benevolently exploiting their fellow Okinawans.[7] The failure of medium-sized reform-style factories advocated by proponents of an Okinawa capitalism for Okinawans reveals that the organic community—whose interests local industrialists were so desperate to protect—lacked a constituency that was invested in its own defense.[8]

Finally, small peasantry who resided in regions at the jurisdictional boundaries of large-scale sugar factories owned by Okitai Takushoku Seitō Gaisha (hereafter Okitai Seitō) and Tainan Seitō Kabushiki Gaisha (hereafter Tainansha) that entered the prefecture in the 1910s organized a series of nonselling alliances between 1916 and 1920 that seriously impeded the

development of the prefecture's sugar industry.[9] These struggles reflected small peasantry's rejection of both local industrialists' and mainland sugar capital's efforts to mold them and their social relations in the pursuit of broader economic goals. The scope of these alliances were quite small—even the largest case affected just 10 percent of the arable lands owned by Tainansha—and documentation regarding these events is almost nonexistent. However, a consideration of these alliances that developed during the peak years of Okinawa's sugar industry reveals the antagonisms that emerged between cultivators and mainland sugar capital during the last years of the Meiji era.[10] The constant inability of large sugar companies to procure enough cane from cultivators limited the proletarianization of Okinawa's agricultural population and reflected their failure to dismantle deeply embedded networks of social, cultural, and economic ties that continued to exist as counterforces to enclosure, even as cultivators became integrated in the broader commodity economy.

Instead of considering the relatively low levels of proletarianization of agricultural labor as evidence that an extreme version of the agrarian question existed in Okinawa, we should see the difficulty that mainland sugar capital had in transforming small producers into pure cultivators of raw material as an example of the antagonisms inherent in any process of converting people's labor into surplus value. As I explained in earlier chapters, these antagonisms have been theorized by autonomists as struggles between living labor—that part of labor associated with the needs and desires of workers and producers—and dead labor—the uncreative and unproductive part of the organic composition of capital. As such, these conflicts must be understood as a broad rejection of all social structures, relations, and ideologies that enabled capital's valorization of the surplus value of producers.

Iha Fuyū's Theory of Shared Origins

Marxist theorists argue that the establishment of private property relations in a territory is accompanied by a concealment of the true relationship between the state and the people through the idea of the nation. In Okinawa the state was not the most aggressive proponent of this subjection. After initially contesting Okinawa's incorporation into Japan, as we have already seen, by the end of the nineteenth century many of Okinawa's intellectuals had accepted a definition of the relationship between the Japanese and Okinawan people that called the disposition an integral part of the process of reunification of long-lost siblings. It is difficult to conclude that this was

purely a strategic move that local leaders made in light of shifting geopolitical conditions, but it is necessary to consider just how much the propagation of this discourse was informed by the threat of colonization that loomed over them. In any case, in the twentieth century they became the most skillful manipulators of national ideology and the most active proponents of Okinawa's full inclusion in Japan even as they continued to hold onto their economic nationalism.

Iha Fuyū was instrumental to this call for inclusion. He returned to Okinawa in 1906 after receiving a graduate degree in linguistics from the Tokyo Imperial University, and in 1906 he published in the local newspaper a social-scientific elaboration of the historical relationship between the Okinawan and Japanese people called the theory of shared origins (*nichiryū dōsoron*).[11] Almost immediately the theory of shared origins replaced the theory of dual subordination to Japan and China that had been preeminent in explaining the relationship among Ryūkyū, Japan, and China during the second disposition in 1879.[12] Dual subordination was a useful notion for a former kingdom appealing to Chinese officials for aid, but calling for Okinawa's full inclusion into the Japanese nation-state required a radical reformulation. Iha made his first comprehensive argument about the shared origins of the Ryūkyū and Yamato people (*minzoku*) in "Okinawajin no Sosen ni Tsuite" ("Ancestors of the Okinawan People"), as noted above.[13] He agreed with the prominent Japanese historian Shiratori Kurakichi that the two peoples collectively composed the race of the descendants of the gods (*tenson jinrui*).[14] They were separated from each other and began their respective moves across Asia around 3000 BC. The faction loyal to the Jimmu emperor entered the Yamato region and conquered the indigenous Ainu people. In the meantime, the ancestors of the future Okinawans floated around until they finally arrived at the Okinawa archipelago, where they too defeated the Ainu and settled. A careful reading of their national histories—the *Kojiki* and the *Omoro Sōshi*—revealed to Iha that despite their long years apart, communication between the siblings never ceased completely.[15] He concluded that there was unequivocal proof that "the qualifications of the Okinawan people to be Japanese are fundamentally different from that of the Ainu or the Taiwanese barbarians (*seiban*)."[16] Their reunification under the emperor system through the Meiji Restoration was a fortuitous opportunity to restore a relationship that had weakened through time and distance. He concluded: "Now, we are united with our sisters from whom we were separated 2,000 years ago and live under the same political system as them."[17] In this skillful, yet forgetful, revision of the existing memory of the

1879 disposition as a violent second invasion, Iha erased the fierce struggle that took place between the Meiji state and former kingdom officials in the 1870s and 1880s from his narrative and chose to present the region's annexation as a triumphant reunification of siblings who had been separated for centuries by circumstances beyond their control.[18]

It should be clarified that reunification here did not mean the complete assimilation of the Okinawan people into Japan. That is, Iha did not advocate an elimination of all qualities or practices that were unique to the Okinawan people, nor did he call on the people to blindly adopt all Japanese practices. In fact, in several of his works, Iha advocated intermarriage or "the mixing of blood" between Okinawans and Japanese in order to physically reunite the two groups.[19] The ascendance of this theory of shared origins reflected a general shift in political allegiance by Okinawa's elite as well as a fundamental change in the way that the categories of Okinawa and Japan were defined. For local intellectuals who had accepted their inclusion into the Meiji political system by the end of the nineteenth century, this theory granted them the right to demand equal treatment and a rationale for differentiating themselves from subject populations that did not enjoy this relationship with the Japanese people. Previously they had been able to call for the enactment of identical laws and rights in Okinawa only on the basis of the Meiji state's benevolence and their constitutional right as subjects, but now Iha's scientific demonstration of the natural community of Okinawans and mainland Japanese gave local intellectuals a sense that it was their natural right to be treated equally. This made the differential treatment and discriminatory attitudes held by state actors even more injurious. Ōta was one Okinawan who was emboldened by Iha's theory of shared origins to argue for political equality during the late Meiji period.

As we saw in the previous chapter, Ōta believed that the most important task for the local bourgeoisie and intellectuals was to prevent the human and material resources of the prefecture from being exploited by mainland capitalists. Once they gained the "right to pay taxes," Ōta and other local leaders sought to win the right to send their own representatives to the National Diet, an urgent matter because political autonomy was a sign of their competence to make important decisions about matters that directly affected Okinawa's residents.[20] Ōta explained: "Minors, idiots and those with mental illnesses do not have the right or obligation to dispose of their property because they do not have the capacity to do so. Furthermore, those who have committed crimes and those who have been negligent are sometimes declared incompetent. These people are deemed incapable of taking care of themselves and are not considered full-fledged human beings. The term *autonomy* is nothing more than saying that one can take care of oneself. Regional autonomy means that people do not need others to intervene or take care of their region."[21]

He fiercely debated Jahana in the late 1890s over the timing of political reforms, but once the land reforms were completed, Ōta's main priority shifted to obtaining political equality with the mainland prefectures. The vast powers that the Okinawan governor held—which were above and beyond those enjoyed by his counterparts on the mainland—concerned him, particularly since the administration was in the midst of formulating aggressive plans for the modernization of the sugar industry. Its invitation to mainland sugar capitalists to enter the prefecture under favorable terms led Ōta to fear that those who entered the local industry would eventually parlay their economic advantages into control of policy making. He believed that if such conditions materialized because Okinawans still had not received voting rights, they would be no better than "minors, idiots and those with mental illnesses" or the Taiwanese people from whom he and his colleagues worked so hard to distinguish themselves. This concern about the need to separate themselves from these categories of inferior people who were incapable of making their own decisions conditioned the policies that Ōta and other members of the Okinawan bourgeoisie advocated for the sugar industry.

The Entry of Large Sugar Capital into Okinawa

The prefectural administration took an increasingly assertive role in developing a modern sugar industry in Okinawa after the land reorganization.[22] In 1907 it established a testing site—sanctioned by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce—in Nishihara Village, in the Nakagami region. In 1908 the prefecture used machinery it had procured from Glasgow to build at the site a factory that could produce a hundred tons of sugar a day. It also acquired a medium-size tract of land (2.75 chōbu) that served as a testing site for cane cultivation. The factory, constructed next to the Nishihara testing site, was designed to encourage rational cultivation methods like the selection of stalks, planting, fertilizer, irrigation, and extermination with the goal of improving yields.[23] In 1909 the Nishihara factory manufactured *bunmitsutō* for the first time.[24] The state's establishment of this large-scale

modern factory transformed existing social and production relations in the area, as Nishihara's small producers became suppliers of cane for the factory.[25]

After conducting tests for two years, in 1911 the prefecture sold the Nishihara factory for 100,000 yen—to be paid over seven years, with no interest—to Okinawa Seitō, the first mainland sugar company to stake a claim in Okinawa.[26] Three men who had strong ties to the local political scene brought the company into the prefecture: Asabushi Kanjō, a career bureaucrat and head administrator (*gunchō*) of the Nakagami region at the time; Taira Hōichi, the president of Okinawa Kyōritsu Bank; and Hibi Shigeaki, the current governor.[27] They invited Yokohama's Abe Shōten, which had already established a branch office in Naha, to handle commercial transactions for the sale of brown sugar to mainland buyers and installed Narahara Shigeru, the former governor, as chairman of the board of directors.[28] Abe Kōnosuke represented Abe Shōten as president of the company, and Yano Keitarō, a well-known industrialist from the Kansai area, became its first CEO.[29] Under the management of Okinawa Seitō, the Nishihara factory expanded its capacity from 100 tons of sugar a day to 250 tons. Using the leverage that it had obtained from this transaction, Abe Shōten entered Taiwan's sugar industry through the purchase of a Japanese-run company already engaged in manufacture in November 1912. Following this foray into Taiwan, the company changed its name to Okitai Seitō and focused on expanding its operations in the empire's two southwestern territories. In Okinawa, Okitai Seitō continued to grow, particularly in the central and southern parts of the main island. After expanding the Nishihara factory (figure 4.1), it built a factory that could produce 400 tons of sugar a day approximately twelve miles northwest, in Nishihara's Kadena Ward; the new factory (figure 4.2) began operations in January 1912.[30] In its first year of operation, the Kadena factory manufactured many different types of sugar, but it switched completely to bunmitsutō in 1913.[31]

Following on the heels of Okitai Seitō, Tainansha—established by Abe Shōten's rival Suzuki Shōten, a sugar merchant company based in Kōbe turned Konzern—also set its sights on Okinawan sugar.[32] Tainansha was a relatively new company that began its operations in 1913 in Taiwan and entered Okinawa in August 1917 in dramatic fashion, purchasing Okinawa Seitō, a company that had just been founded, and acquiring all three of the factories of its rival, Okitai Seitō, in December.[33] In 1920, Tainansha also absorbed Miyako Seitō, which had been established on Miyako Island just the year before.[34]



Fig. 4.1 The Nishihara and Kadena factories came under the control of Tainansha following its takeover of the mechanized sugar industry on Okinawa Island in 1917. Nishihara sugar factory, The University of Hawaii at Manoa Library Sakamaki/Hawley Collection, from *Bōkyo Okinawa*, vol. 5, 85.



Fig. 4.2 The Kadena factory was the site of a tense confrontation between Tainansha and two hundred employees in the summer of 1930. Kadena sugar factory, The University of Hawaii at Manoa Library Sakamaki/Hawley Collection, from *Bōkyo Okinawa*, vol. 5, 84.

Though these mergers and acquisitions seem to indicate success for mainland sugar companies, from the start of their operations in Okinawa, their inability to secure supplies of cane from nearby cultivators threatened their ability to turn a profit. Acquiring enough cane to keep factories running at or near full capacity became the companies' biggest concern. Okitai Seitō took the first step toward creating a steady supply of cane in 1912 when it purchased a vast tract (400 chōbu) of fields and forest land in Yomitan Village in the Nakagami region that the former royal family had initially received from the prefecture to conduct reclamation.[35] It purchased all of the Shō family's holdings in Kudoku and Goeku Wards of the village and planned to convert these lands into small plots on which tenant farmers could cultivate cane for the Kadena factory.[36] The company encouraged movement onto these lands by offering rents at half the normal rate of 1.7 sen per tsubo to 250 families. These low rents indicate the company's intention to profit less from rents and more from forcing tenants to cultivate cane on these lands through a contract. A company manager who oversaw the cultivation supervised these tenants and was responsible for making sure that raw material of the highest quality was submitted to the factory after harvest. Tenants were also bound to the land by loans that the company extended to them for fertilizer and equipment.[37] Finally, the company managed a commission system in which profits that accrued from subsidiary industries were divided among producers after a certain number of years. Tainansha continued a similar arrangement in Yomitan after it absorbed Okitai Seitō in late 1917.[38]

In addition to binding tenants to the land through debt and surveillance, the companies hoped that small producers would eventually decide on their own that submitting the cane that they harvested exclusively to the factories was the most advantageous path for their household economies. The factory supervisor of Okitai Seitō expressed his company's vision for the future of Okinawa's sugar industry in a trade paper, the *Okinawa Jitsugyō Shimpō*, in 1914. He asserted that by investing capital to build factories and using advanced technologies, the company would bring about an economically complete division of labor under one order in Okinawa. As this change progressed, the company would eventually be able to fulfill the dream of all capitalists: to "employ large numbers of workers who engage in labor all day long."[39]

Okitai Seitō's lobbying efforts in Okinawa through the 1910s was consistent with this vision. The company appealed to the prefectural administration for financial assistance and political support for a comprehensive

plan to promote the bunmitsutō sugar industry at the expense of brown sugar, which continued to employ the majority of Okinawa's small producers and cultivators. The company aggressively pushed proposals for laying railroad tracks between factory regions and Naha, where the market and port were located, and succeeded in convincing the prefectural assembly to approve a prefecture-operated railway that began operations in October 1914 (figure 4.3).[40] This resulted in the construction of a coastal line connecting Naha and the eastern coastal port of Yonabaru approximately two and a half miles south of Nishihara. This line transported charcoal and sugar barrels from Yonabaru port to Naha (figure 4.4). Soon after operations commenced, extension lines were built to connect the sugar companies' storage facilities and factories to each other. Additional factories and facilities quickly sprang up around the train stations.[41] Newspaper articles reported train cars filled to the brim with sugar going back and forth on the extension line between the Nishihara factory and Yonabaru station during the busy manufacturing season.[42]

In addition to lobbying for infrastructural development, sugar companies made road repairs, conducted irrigation projects, and tested new cane varieties to establish the foundations necessary for the healthy and con-



Fig. 4.3 Yonabaru station in Okinawa was completed in 1914. The Yonabaru line connected Naha and Shimajiri's Yonabaru, which was a center of bunmitsutō production. Yonabaru station and employees, Okinawa Prefectural Archive, document no. 0000036057.



Fig. 4.4 Brown sugar dominated Okinawa prefecture's sugar industry. Brown sugar manufactured by small peasants made its way to the poorer agrarian villages of mainland Japan, while more affluent consumers purchased the preferred white sugar. Loading of brown sugar barrels, Naha City Museum of History, photo no. 02000201.

tinuous operation of their factories. The stark contrast between these large, well-capitalized, steam-powered modern factories, which had the most advanced machinery and funds at their disposal, and the small sugar huts that were operated by the energy of humans and their livestock led Ōta to fear as early as 1912 that the prefecture's "46,000–47,000 isolated producers" would soon lose their autonomy in production and manufacture.[43] He predicted that Okinawa's small peasantry would be turned into cultivators who exclusively supplied these companies. Only the sugar producers' reluctance to transform themselves into nothing more than raw material producers kept Ōta's fears from being realized.

Local Intellectuals' Response to Mainland Sugar Capital

Despite their aggressive efforts to establish large-scale bunmitsutō factories and to construct the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the transport of their commodity, sugar companies regularly failed to collect enough cane from small cultivators in the nearby regions to operate their factories at full capacity. Furthermore, outside the Nakagami region, where many of these factories were located, few improvements had been made to the method of sugar production. Small peasantry in regions without bunmitsutō factories continued to manufacture their own sugar through small-scale, labor-intensive, unmechanized methods. The substantial increase in traditional brown sugar factories since the arrival of Okinawa Seitō indicated that although the entry of bunmitsutō in the prefecture stimulated cane production, the peasantry preferred to absorb as much of their increased yields as possible in their own communal brown sugar factories.[44]

The difficulties that the prefecture's bunmitsutō factories faced was of particular concern for Governor Ōmi, who arrived in the prefecture in June 1914, because the overall weakness of the prefecture's economy had led to higher levels of tax arrears and defaults on loans through the 1910s. Ōmi believed that a comprehensive plan for industrial development was necessary to improve conditions in Okinawa. To this end, he established a ten-year plan for industry and promulgated the Sugar Factory Laws (Seitōjō Kitei) in 1915.[45] The industrial plan stipulated that traditional brown sugar manufacturing huts be replaced with larger capacity, reform-type mechanized factories to gradually shift the emphasis in the prefecture's sugar industry from brown sugar to bunmitsutō, which Ōmi claimed would be more profitable to Okinawa in the long run.[46] It is not impossible that Ōmi had visions of great wealth for Okinawa's sugar industry, since around this time he witnessed mainland refining companies aggressively infiltrating Taiwan to fuel their refineries back home.[47] Conversion to bunmitsutō was necessary in Okinawa because these refineries accepted that, not the less pure ganmitsutō that small producers communally produced.

Ōta and other members of the local bourgeoisie reacted to Ōmi's prioritization of the conversion of Okinawa's sugar production to bunmitsutō with great discomfort. Inaka Akira, an industrialist who was not fundamentally opposed to increasing the production of bunmitsutō, explained why he opposed the governor's plan in a proposal that he submitted in December 1917 to the prefectural assembly.[48] His main concern was article 5 of the sugar factory law, which required anyone wanting to establish reform-type or machine-based sugar factories to get permission from the governor.[49] Inaka pointed to the similarity of this stipulation to laws passed in 1905 and 1912 in Taiwan that prohibited the formation of joint stock companies owned exclusively by natives under the rationale that "the Chinese are incapable of running a company by themselves."[50] Though Inaka's proposal did not refer directly to Taiwan's regulations of its sugar industry, he characterized Ōmi's proposed plan as unconstitutional and stated that such measures "may be acceptable in colonial areas but absolutely should not be permitted within a prefecture of the empire."[51]

Inaka's proposal, submitted during a prosperous time for Okinawa's sugar industry, revealed that mainland sugar capital's appeals to the governor had made local leaders fear that Okinawa would become a colony. This fear was exacerbated by the governor's condescending attitude toward the people of Okinawa, which the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* chronicled throughout 1915: the governor asked local officials if they had ever received an education, complained that many of them did not understand standard Japanese, called for mainland military officers residing in Okinawa to run for office, increased the police presence, and so on. Local leaders feared that unless they could find a way to curb Governor Ōmi's power, Okinawa would find itself in a predicament not dissimilar to that of its close neighbor in the southwest. An article in the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* expressed these anxieties: "His [Ōmi's] is a politics that looks at the land but does not look at the people. It is a politics that does not treat the indigenous people as Japanese subjects and instead treats them as a type of machine. It holds down the indigenous people and protects the rights and interests of the Japanese people. Since colonial politics needs only to use the land and the people, there is no need for harmony and cooperation between the indigenous people and the rulers. In order to attain their objectives, they must conduct superpolice politics and manage the indigenous people in a despotic manner."[52]

Ōmi's political despotism and favoritism toward mainland sugar capital radicalized local intellectuals, turning even those who favored full inclusion into anticolonial critics of mainland Japanese expropriation. They came to believe that the only way to counter these powerful forces was by strengthening cooperation and associations, starting at the village level. Resisting the political and psychological threat posed by the governor's policies necessitated refusing certain economic relations that facilitated the exploitation of the region by outsiders. These conditions made it impossible for many members of the local bourgeoisie to advocate the uncritical establishment of capitalist relations of production, even though they understood this to be the most advanced form of socioeconomic organization. In this period, Okinawa's leaders were forced to understand the treatment of the peasantry by mainland capital and politicians as an example of the way that Okinawa as a whole was being treated by the Japanese state and capital. The condition of the small peasantry—the main target of mainland sugar capital's exploitation—took on greater importance than ever before, and their defense became key to preserving Okinawa's independence.

It is in this light that we must understand Ōta's resistance to mainland sugar capital's intention to turn Okinawa's peasantry into a pure agricultural

proletariat and his advocacy of a network of communally or prefecture-owned mechanized sugar factories that would use the cane supplied by each region's peasant households. He differentiated the system he envisioned from that of mainland sugar capitalists: "There are those who say that the prefecture's sugar industry will develop if large-scale factories are built in the agrarian villages and if cultivation and manufacture are completely separated. This opinion only looks at the development of the sugar industry and not at the interests of the peasantry. I believe that the interests of the peasantry will not be fulfilled if cultivation and manufacture are separated."[53]

Instead of a pure separation of cultivators and producers that worked to the advantage only of mainland capital, Ōta and Inaka proposed combining the existing sugar huts called *satō goya* that were communally operated by groups of neighboring families called *satō gumi* into larger-scale, medium-size factories that could produce more sugar more efficiently so the families would not have to become entirely dependent on large factories owned by big capital (figure 4.5). Ōta described what this arrangement might look like in a 1914 *Ryūkyū Shimpō* article. He explained that ten satō gumi could form a production association that would operate a reform-type sugar



Fig. 4.5 The sugar factory owned by the people of Takamine Village was the best known reform-type sugar factory that was communally owned by villagers. However, it was eventually taken over by mainland sugar capital. Takamine Village sugar factory, The University of Hawaii at Manoa Library Sakamaki/Hawley Collection, from *Bōkyo Okinawa*, vol. 5, 84.

factory that was approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. This type of regionally based combination could keep production in the hands of the cultivators and strengthen the position of the 46,000–47,000 sugar producers. In contrast to the 400-ton daily capacity of Okitai Seitō's Kadena factory, the output of these factories would be closer to the 40 tons a day, but that would go a long way toward rationalizing production and reducing costs for the producers.[54] Ōta simultaneously advocated that the production associations use the prefectural agricultural bank, the Okinawa Nōkō Ginkō so they could get low-interest loans for the purchase of agricultural implements, machinery, and fertilizer and to facilitate irrigation, road repairs, and forestry projects.[55] Inaka also critiqued attempts by the prefectural administration to block efforts by local residents to establish their own reform-type sugar factories.[56]

Ōta argued that the success of the industrial associations hinged on greater harmony and cooperation—which he labeled *Okinawa-shugi*, an expansion of the economic nationalism that he had articulated during the land reorganization project—in the prefecture's agrarian villages and the end of petty conflicts over power and profits that had obstructed communal production based on industrial associations in the past. He explained that the long history of the Okinawan people's communal systems and internal village laws that emphasized mutual responsibility and assistance made it quite likely that a prefecturewide system of industrial associations could be successfully implemented. In this new context, Ōta had to pull back slightly from the enthusiasm that he had shown just a decade earlier for reforming old customs. Now he supported small cultivators' practices of mutual exchange and cooperation as a strategy to counter large mainland capital's attempts to proletarianize Okinawa's peasantry. Much to his disappointment, Okinawa's small-scale sugar producers were reluctant to organize production associations and establish reform-type factories despite a declining domestic demand for brown sugar that forced most to sell at least part of their cane as raw material to bunmitsutō factories. They continued to resist attempts to reorganize production on an expanded scale, even as the structure of Okinawa's economy was transformed to favor concentration following the outbreak of World War I.[57]

The years immediately after the war brought an unprecedented level of prosperity to the prefecture because Europe's beet sugar production sites were destroyed by war and Taiwan experienced bad harvests. As a result of significantly reduced global supplies of sugar, the price of brown and bunmitsutō sugar on the Naha market spiked like never before. What the agricultural economist Mukai Kiyoshi called the "golden years of Okinawa's brown sugar industry" (1918 and 1919) corresponded to the period of the "dance of the millions" in Cuba.[58] In Okinawa's case, the price of first-grade brown sugar, which averaged 9.2 yen per picul in 1918, rose to the 22 yen mark in 1919 and peaked in January 1920 at 35.89 yen.[59] This sugar boom in Okinawa followed Tainansha's domination of the prefecture's industry in 1917. The consolidation of its monopolistic position in the realm of bunmitsutō production transformed the relationships that many small peasantry had to their lands.[60] The growth of bunmitsutō production effected by the company led to a gradual but significant decline in the amount of energy used by farming families to cultivate sweet potato for home consumption and a reduction in the amount of time and resources devoted to the maintenance of subsidiary industries among families that supplied cane to the factories.[61] The merger and the wartime boom pointed to a greater degree of class differentiation in the agrarian villages.

Despite the growth that the prefecture's sugar industry experienced, cultivators who lived as tenants on the lands directly owned by the company did not enjoy the fruits of this expansion. They continued to be subject to stringent regulations regarding their agricultural activity. They enjoyed relatively low rents, but the cash that they received for operating funds and living expenses from the company meant that between one-third and one-half of their harvest went to repay the company. According to the terms of a sample contract printed in a 1929 study of the conditions of Okinawan tenants conducted by the Home Division of Fukuoka's prefectural administration, following the settlement of their advance repayments, tenants were required to sell the remainder of their harvest to the factory at a price that the company determined each season. Disagreements over the price of the portion of their harvest that they sold to the factory as nonrepayment cane brought these tenants of Tainansha and brown sugar producers who resided in the same carrying-in region but did not live on company-owned lands together in a series of disputes that erupted in the Nakagami and Shimajiri regions of the main island between 1916 and 1920.[62] The central question

that the remainder of this chapter investigates is why the latter group—cultivators living near large sugar factories who engaged in cane cultivation and small-scale manufacturing of brown sugar on their own—did not choose the path of proletarianization, even though the economic conditions of World War I seemed to favor increased submissions of cane to the large factories.

In cane cultivating regions, the method of brown sugar production continued as before and used preexisting modes of socioeconomic organization, although the revenues that flowed into the countryside during the sugar boom afforded savvy cultivators the opportunity to update their technologies. The satō goya that Ōta wanted so desperately to combine and rebuild into communally owned bunmitsutō factories remained important parts of the village landscape long after his suggestion to combine them into production associations. Data from 1917 reveal that there were approximately eight satō gumi in each single sugar-producing village, and an average of seventeen families in each satō gumi.[63] A single satō gumi was in charge of the management of the satō goya and the kiln, as well as creating a schedule for farming families to manufacture their harvested cane. The group collectively owned a single sugar hut and was responsible for managing all of the machinery, tools, additional cattle, and workers that were needed to complete the manufacturing process. In addition to the upkeep, management, and procurement of necessary inputs, the group was collectively responsible for deciding on the rotation of workers during the manufacturing season—approximately six people were needed for the entire process—and distributing payment to its members. After manufacturing was completed between April and May, the satō gumi would conclude its sugar-related tasks by settling accounts with each family in the group and would calculate the operating expenses that each family owed based on the amount of cane that each had manufactured. In this way, satō gumi members were inextricably linked to each other through collective labor, financing, and management.

Once the manufacture process had been completed and operating expenses had been calculated, each family received its share of the finished brown sugar and sold it at temporary markets (figure 4.6) or to middlemen between July and December. Middlemen handed off the sugar to brokers based in Naha or mainland Japan in exchange for commissions averaging 6–10 sen per barrel.[64] Brokers obtained additional sugar by collecting on the high-interest loans that they granted to producers through the sugar advance loan (satō maedai) system. These loans typically carried a 30 percent interest rate and approximately 20 percent of the total brown sugar pro-

Fig. 4.6 This postcard shows a temporary cane market in Naha that opened its doors during certain times of the year. These markets existed alongside more formal routes of buying and selling cane that were linked to large sugar capital. Sugar cane market, Naha City Museum of History, photo no. 02003600.

duced went to repayment.[65] Mainland sugar companies like Suzuki Shōten, Abe Shōten, and Masudaya, which entered the prefecture in the late Meiji period, doubled as these brokers, taking over this position from smaller operators who had links to the former kingdom's nobility.[66]

In addition to communally engaging in the manufacture of brown sugar, members of the satō gumi divided themselves into smaller groups of anywhere from five and eight people to complete tasks that were not directly related to manufacturing brown sugar. They entered into labor exchange agreements called *yuimaaru* through which farming families loaned each other labor power to complete the cutting of cane and its transportation to the sugar huts.[67] This arrangement was vital to the manufacturing process, as cane—an extremely sensitive plant—required cutting and transport in a timely manner to protect the quality of the final product.[68] The way that inequities in the process of labor exchange were settled remains a point of dispute among scholars, but the existence of ledgers containing transaction details indicates that there was some attempt to account for disparities either through the redress in labor at a later date or through payments in cash.[69] Furthermore, the existence of farming families of different scales in these groups reveals that this was not simply a process of communal exchange

and mutual assistance but served to reinforce intercommunity hierarchies whose details are not completely clear to us today. In any case, because most families did not possess enough labor power to get through the busy harvest and manufacturing season on their own and did not have the resources to hire day laborers from outside the household, labor exchange arrangements were indispensable for most cane-growing households, so they could complete their tasks in each production cycle.

Higa Ryōzui, an Okinawan poet who achieved acclaim for depicting scenes of life in the countryside, wrote a poem called "Satō Goya" ("Sugar Hut") during the height of the sugar boom that depicted the conditions in these small-scale, communally held sugar huts:

In front of the sugar hut
Where the light warmly reflects
The children make a racket.
The movement of the compressor is driven
By one skinny horse.
The reverberations of the old worn whip,
The shrieking of hysterical humans, and
The suspicious echoes of gears.
The sweet cane juices,
Their faint scent,
And the stench of smoke,
And the dejected sweat of the humans
Are all gifts sent from the gods.
The indescribable drops of sweat.
The faint smell of sweet cane juices.
The wretched understanding of humans, their pity.
In front of the sugar hut
Where the light warmly reflects
The children make a racket.[70]

Higa's depiction of the miserable conditions of a sugar hut that relied on a single horse to run the compressor during the dizzyingly busy period of manufacturing brown sugar provides a stark contrast to the large factories that enclosed the landscape of central and southern Okinawa and cast a cloud of black smoke over the island. The poem was one of the few works of its time to depict the life of sugar-producing families.

In contrast to Higa's description of the wretched conditions of brown sugar manufacturing, Iba Nantetsu—a poet from Ishigaki island, Yaeyama—

Fig. 4.7 Communal manufacture of brown sugar, including the use of mutual labor arrangements, was the main method of sugar production throughout the period before World War II in Okinawa. Sugar Mill in Loo Chooan Village, E. R. Bull's photographic plates, no. 17, Taisho era, Bull Collection, University of the Ryūkyūs.

wrote a piece called *Nangoku no Shirayuri* (*White Lilies of the South*) in 1927. This piece illuminated the embeddedness of sugar manufacture in village-level social relations and provides us with a better understanding of why it proved so difficult for sugar producers to transform themselves into pure cultivators to supply bunmitsutō factories. Iba's depiction of the sugar-producing countryside in the period between the world wars gives us valuable insight into the everyday concerns of cultivators living and working within a complex web of relations both old and new in their villages (figure 4.7).

In a section titled "Nōmin no Yorokobi" ("The Joy of the Peasantry"), Iba described a mesmerizing, almost ecstatic scene in which peasants were engaged in the communal production of brown sugar. He began with a sketch of the sugar-cultivating village during a normal season of harvest and manufacture: "Behind the pasture in spring that is like blue carpet laid out from corner to corner, young men and women become entangled . . . the young

girls' towels peeking out from the stalks."[71] He continued: "One hears the pure voices of young men and women singing folk melodies from behind the cane fields." Iba reported that he found this scene "irresistibly charming." Then he described the incredible skill that went into the harvesting of the cane: "How their hands move mechanically from years of experience . . . passersby stand still to watch, as the girls cut the cane without forgetting to sing their island folk songs."[72]

Through his description of the dress of young men and women who tended the fields, Iba illuminated the gendered division of labor that governed the process of manufacturing brown sugar from cane during the winter months after a long year of tending to the fields: "The strong young men of the village wear blue vertical striped cotton shirts and white knit shirts with shorts. . . . [T]hey cut down the swiftly grown canes with a thick sickle and are in charge of transporting them to the sugar huts."[73] In contrast, the young women of the village "wear simple cotton indigo-dye (*kasuri*) kimono and on top, a vermillion kimono cord the color of flames. They wear black bracelets on the back of both hands and wrap a towel around their heads. . . . They take the cane that the men transport and separate the leaves from the stalks. They bind just the mesocotyl into bunches approximately two shaku in diameter. Passersby stop and watch how their hands mechanically cut the cane—a result of years of experience."[74] Although Iba pointed out that there were occasional accidents during the compressing process if kimono sleeves or hands got stuck in the gears, he described a well-oiled but living machine that involved young men, women, children, cows, and horses, all of whom soldiered through the arduous process of manufacturing that lasted all day and all night by singing folk songs and urging each other along.[75]

Iba's work reminds us of the social character of production that entangled producers in small-scale credit and labor exchange relations that by design could not be settled in a single season or even with a single transaction between two parties. Work shaped much of the collective entertainment and play that villagers enjoyed during the busy seasons, beginning with songs that were performed during the planting, harvesting, and transport of sugar; the distribution of money to families after the sugar was sold; and the sharing of meals that were made with food that was purchased on a tab at the communal store. All of these activities remained part of a shared cycle of celebrations that accompanied each season of strenuous labor long after the official adoption of the Gregorian calendar and despite vigorous efforts by local reformers to restrict superfluous spending.[76] Although such an explanation risks romanticizing communal life if taken completely at face value, Iba's work points to the dangers of underestimating the importance of this type of shared experience for cultivators as they calculated the benefits and drawbacks to submitting cane to the nearby factory.

The Organization of Nonselling Alliances in Central Okinawa

Due to the socially embedded character of small-scale brown sugar manufacture described above, Tainansha's ability to increase the proportion of bunmitsutō in the total sugar production was frustrated even during the peak years immediately after World War I by difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies of cane from cultivators. Despite repeated injections of funds by the prefecture to increase production, bunmitsutō never exceeded 37 percent of total sugar production in any year before World War II and hovered around the 30 percent mark in most.[77] In many ways, communal production and mutual labor exchange arrangements enabled by membership in the satō gumi led cultivators to refuse the terms of purchase that Tainansha and other large sugar companies from the mainland tried to impose on them. The continuation of these village-level mechanisms long after large sugar capital's entry into the prefecture must be understood as a reflection of the desire of small peasantry to maintain as much self-sufficiency in their lives as possible. In this sense, their reluctance to transform themselves into pure cane cultivators was an act of anticapitalist refusal that obstructed the transformation of their work and lives into dead labor.[78] Small producers rejected cane submissions to factories as pursuits that brought short-term increases in cash income but also increased their vulnerability to external forces. As such, their refusals should be seen as much more than futile revolutionary acts or reactionary attempts to maintain feudal ways of life.[79]

In addition to the peasants' reluctance to transform themselves into pure cultivators, producers residing in carrying-in regions actively organized nonselling alliances in order to secure more favorable terms for the cane that they did choose to submit. The first of these alliances was organized in late 1916 and was spurred by a disagreement over the price that sugar companies set as small producers' cost of manufacturing brown sugar. Little documentary evidence exists about the alliance's leaders or members, but newspaper accounts indicate that the decision to boycott Okitai Seitō was supported by a large number of residents. Once representatives of the alliance

and the company started negotiations, the former held open meetings in Shimajiri and Nakagami to keep interested parties abreast of the discussions and to discuss future strategy.

For participants in the nonselling alliance, the price that sugar companies set as the cultivators' brown sugar manufacturing expenses was key to deciding whether they would agree to submit their cane or manufacture it themselves. Brown sugar manufacturing expenses—what sugar companies calculated as the costs that small producers burdened when they produced brown sugar in their communal sugar huts—was a crucial component in calculating the price that bunmitsutō factories paid cultivators for their cane. Companies determined that payment by subtracting the production costs from the average price of grade-two sugar on the Naha market during the ten days before the date when cultivators were to submit their cane. From the perspective of the peasants, it was to their advantage to have brown sugar production expenses set as low as possible, while the companies benefited from calculating it as high as possible, regardless of whether or not cultivators had actually spent this amount.

An article in the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* dated December 25, 1916, reported the details of the negotiations between the alliance representatives and Okitai Seitō. According to the article, alliance representatives held a meeting at Shinkyōji temple—near the port at Naha, where thousands of sugar barrels awaited loading onto cargo ships for the mainland—to determine a response to the company's refusal to budge from the figure of 2.1 yen per barrel for brown sugar production expenses.[80] The alliance members decided that the highest figure they could accept was 1.7 yen per barrel, which was based on the calculations of the Okinawa Sugar Production Association.[81] This meant that the two sides had to bridge a 20 percent gap.

The company was simply unwilling to make this kind of concession. Instead of negotiating further on the price, it decided to shift tactics. According to a newspaper article published on January 12, 1917, it proposed a rebate system called *warimodoshi*, which made conditions more favorable for the peasants who submitted larger quantities of cane.[82] Those who supplied ten barrels or more received 0.3 yen per barrel; those supplying fifty barrels or more received 0.4 yen; and those who supplied all of their harvest, regardless of quantity, also received 0.4 yen back from the company as an incentive payment.[83] This incentive system was the company's attempt to bridge the gap of 0.4 yen per barrel that separated its proposed price from that of the alliance, while simultaneously securing larger quantities of cane

from cultivators. It was also probably an attempt to divide the cultivators and break up the alliance.

Around the same time a nonselling alliance was also organized near the 250-ton capacity Nishihara factory also owned by Okitai Seitō. When this boycott began, company representatives met with prefectural authorities, who agreed to grant subsidies of 0.1 yen per barrel to cultivators as further incentive to submit large quantities of raw material cane to the company, in addition to the company's own payments.[84] The newspapers reported that these collective offers convinced cultivators to dissolve their nonselling alliances, but continued disputes in these regions following the takeover of Okitai Seitō by Tainansha indicates that these were merely temporary measures. Okitai Seitō's attempts to reverse some of the nonselling alliance's gains did not help its standing among the producers. Following its announcement that negotiations for a merger were in progress in October 1917, Okitai Seitō announced its intentions to revise its terms for purchasing raw cane for the 1917 season.[85] Instead of counting the sugar submitted to be grade 2, the company revised its guidelines downward so that they would only be accepted as grade 1.5, lower-quality sugar that was worth less on the Naha market.[86] This, along with the company's upward revisions of brown sugar production expenses, amounted to a substantial decrease in the value of the cultivators' cane. In the meantime, the incentive payment system would continue as it had in the past, with slight rate reductions. Those who submitted fewer than 20 barrels would receive 0.1 yen per barrel; those who submitted 20–49 barrels would receive 0.15 yen per barrel; and those who submitted fifty barrels or more would receive 0.2 yen per barrel from the company.[87] As a result of this sudden announcement of revised guidelines, many cultivators who resided in or near Okitai Seitō's factories refused to sign their tenant or supplier contracts.[88]

Following Okitai Seitō, Tainansha also published its regulations for cane purchases during 1917. The company announced its own encouragement monies to cane cultivators that increased in direct proportion to the length of contract they were willing to sign with the company. For a contract lasting one year, they would receive 0.1 yen per barrel; for two years, 0.25 yen; and for three years, 0.3 yen. As a further reward for ensuring a stable supply of cane to the company, Tainansha announced that once the Takamine factory reached a total output of 6,500 piculs and the Ginowan factory reached 3,500 piculs, 0.2 yen per barrel submitted would be distributed to all cultivators who delivered cane to the factories.[89]

The prefectural administration and sugar experts supported large sugar capital's aggressive efforts to entice cane cultivators to sell to their factories. However, cultivators in Mawashi, Tomigusuku, and Haebaru—all regions that supplied sugar to the 250-ton capacity Tomigusuku factory that was established in 1913—were not convinced of the advantages of selling raw material cane. For small producers, the conditions that Tainansha imposed, like longer contracts and incentives after quotas were met, left them further indebted to the sugar brokers, who offered high-interest loans in return for a promise of the bulk of a household's harvest by encouraging even more submissions to make up for the lower price. In addition, this system would leave peasants with little time to devote to brown sugar manufacture and subsidiary industries like livestock raising and sweet potato cultivation.[90] Their commitment to a single industry monopolized by large capital would also strip away from them the social and economic protections provided by their communities.[91] This rationale for remaining embedded in a village economy in which they performed agriculture as well as manufacturing indicates that although Okinawa's small peasantry may not have acted capitalistically according to Marxists who studied peasant behavior, they understood quite well the capitalist logic that governed decisions made by Tainansha.[92] Whether their responses were governed by economic, social, rational, or moral calculations is a complex question that cannot be answered by the sources at our disposal. However, examining the terms that small producers found acceptable can help illuminate their motives and desires.

Disputes between the cultivators and the companies finally ended in a truce in early January 1918, when representatives of the five villages that supplied the Nishihara factory finally decided to back down on the issue of the revised grade equivalents in exchange for extending the number of days after harvest during which cane could be submitted to the factory. The company had proposed sixteen days, but the representatives for the peasantry convinced the company to accept fifty days. This was a key point for small producers because the extra days gave them flexibility that would protect their ability to search for more advantageous conditions.[93] This extension would give them more time to decide whether to sell their cane to the factory or use it to manufacture brown sugar, which they would sell themselves.[94] In addition to increasing the number of days after harvest that cane could be sold to the factory, peasantry representatives succeeded in negotiating a lower quota for the cane that tenants living in factory-managed farms had to sell to the company.[95] No new disputes were reported in 1918, but in 1919

there were nonselling alliances that stretched over 10–20 chōbu, crossing two or three regions, and a 400-worker strike in a sugar factory in Daitōjima in November over wages.[96]

Despite the multiplicity of factors that governed small producers' decisions to organize nonselling alliances, observers attributed the peasants' resistance to transform themselves into raw material cultivators as a purely economic matter. In a report titled "Tōgyō Ikensho" ("Opinion on the Sugar Industry"), Miyagi Tetsu, a local sugar industry expert who worked for Tainansha, outlined the company's concerns and criticized farming households for focusing too much on their individual interests: "Because the peasants are always focused on the price of brown sugar they focused exclusively on the manufacture of brown sugar and waited for the price of sugar to rise so that they could sell at the most opportune time. They believe this to be the most profitable method and do not want to sell to the company."[97] On behalf of Tainansha, he requested the prefectural authorities to provide more resources to increase cane yields, provide encouragement for the sale of raw materials to the company, and restrict farming households from manufacturing brown sugar.

During its coverage of the 1916–19 nonselling alliances, the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* echoed Miyagi's view that the conflict between the cultivators and company was the result of the formers' obsession with squeezing even one sen more out of their crops. The newspaper reinforced the view that the peasantry's main objective was gaining the economic upper hand over the company. One article explained that once the company increased the rate of incentive payments that it provided to cultivators who sold a large amount of their sugar to the factory, "the peasantry fought to sell off, and in five days' time the company was able to obtain 20,000 barrels, which was an increase by 10,000 barrels from previous years."[98]

Representatives of the small peasantry who worked closely with the Sugar Production Association to come up with a more favorable calculation of brown sugar production expenses were no less guilty of the same simplification. One *Ryūkyū Shimpō* article mentioned above provides us with a glimpse into the detailed breakdown of expenses that peasants used to determine an acceptable figure. Wages were the highest, at 55 sen per barrel, followed by barrel costs (50 sen) and transportation costs (17 sen). Charcoal, rope, inspections, storage, maintenance, commissions, and association fees rounded out the items that were included in the expense column. The sum of these figures provided the alliance representatives with their figure of 1.7 yen per barrel. Although that was significantly lower than the 2.1 yen set by

the company, the inclusion of wages is notable, since the process of sugar production at the level of the satō gumi discussed in this chapter did not include the exchange of money for supplementary labor.[99] Sugar producers surely resented the inclusion of labor costs that in practice were settled through the mutual labor exchange system or through the intensification of their own labor activity during the manufacture season, precisely because they could not afford to hire workers who required payment in cash. In addition to the conflict over the wage portion of production costs, the fact that a single number was published and applied to all peasants was probably a source of frustration.[100]

The fact that the wage was the largest part of the production expense allows us to examine the dispute from a completely different perspective and enables us to see the truly antagonistic position that the nonselling alliance took as it faced off with Japanese sugar capital. As we have already seen, under the satō gumi system, brown sugar producers did not approach the exchange of labor in the same way as sugar capital did. For members of the satō gumi, labor transactions did not take place through a contract but were a messy process of exchanges that could not be squared away in a single season. The peasants' embeddedness in two very different economies and wage regimes enabled them to identify the sugar companies' uncritical inclusion of the wage as part of the brown sugar production expenses as an act that did not reflect the way that labor was exchanged in their everyday lives. They saw right through the sugar companies' attempts to naturalize the wage form—an act that performed a powerful societal function of concealing exploitation through what Marx calls the legal fiction of the contract.[101] Thus, though there were few nonselling alliances, the ones that appeared at the height of the global sugar boom were a sign of small producers' clear refusal of the extension of what some theorists have called the "code of abstract labor" into Okinawa's agrarian villages.[102] In opposition to "the extraction of wealth from a multitude of subjects that are constituted as basically interchangeable"[103] that the extension of this code enables, participants in the nonselling alliances rejected the extension of the field of abstraction into Okinawa's agrarian villages.[104] Large sugar capital came up short in this struggle over subjectivities.

Ōta's Calls to Counter Proletarianization in the Countryside

Okinawa's small producers also rejected the combination of sugar huts into the larger reform-type factories that Ōta and other local leaders pushed as alternatives to the large factories owned by mainland capital. The main

reason for the peasants' rejection of these midsize, village-level factories and the industrial associations charged with facilitating the financing of the transformation, procuring materials, and selling of the product was largely the result of their suspicion of village officials. Though local officials were less able than they had been to extract funds or overcollect taxes from inhabitants, reports of misused funds and corruption in the village offices were widely covered by local media outlets. Ōta was not unaware that village officials' blatant misuse of association funds for their personal use hurt the credibility of his proposals for a village-led organization of peasants. But he attributed the main cause of its failure to the peasants' inability to understand that it was the only organization that could make Okinawa's sugar industry competitive in the world while also preventing them from becoming an agricultural proletariat exploited by outside capital. In a desperate appeal to small producers, he called for increased harmony and cooperation—Okinawa-shugi beyond the village unit—and an end to the petty conflicts over power and profits that obstructed the organization of communal production based on industrial associations. Ōta argued that if Okinawans could not work together to keep out mainland officials and capitalists, they would be right back where they started in 1609: "Unless we can stand shoulder to shoulder with the other prefectures, no matter what form the system takes, in reality we must be considered the indigenous people of a colony."[105] Like the author of the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* article cited earlier, Ōta failed to understand that the policies that he advocated were rooted in an abstract category—Okinawa—that had not taken hold among small peasantry who continued to work, celebrate, mourn, and struggle together with the other residents of their small satō gumi communities.

Finally, the social and economic difficulties of extracting oneself from brown sugar production based on the *satō gumi* stemmed from the notion of community that A. V. Chayanov described as "eating from the common pot."[106] This fact can help to explain why Ōta's vision of large-scale production based on a prefecturewide industrial association that implicitly required producers to accept their membership in a larger, organic Okinawan community also failed to take hold in the prefecture.[107] Despite Ōta and Inaka's attempts to alleviate the burdens for cultivating families through the formation of broader associations linked to more advantageous financing sources, the number of satō goya increased from 1,657 factories in 1903 to 3,320 in 1909 and 4,329 in 1917.[108] This increase took place as the number of farming households that manufactured sugar declined, reflecting increased productivity on the part of individual farming households and a

contraction in the number of families involved in a single communally held factory.[109] The so-called community that Ōta envisioned was too large and ungrounded in the daily cycles of work, rest, play, and struggle for producers to wholeheartedly embrace, even at times that seemed opportune for prefecturewide organization.

Conclusion: Continued Struggles against Mechanized Sugar Production

As we have seen, the small but determined nonselling alliances that small peasantry organized during the sugar boom in World War I reveal their reluctance to abandon the entire web of communal resources, social relations, and supplementary activities at their disposal in exchange for their transformation into tenant farmers who produced raw material for factories. This can be seen in the way that agricultural household composition was transformed in the Nakagami region, the center of Tainansha-led factory sugar manufacture. There, the percentage of jisaku farming families—which owned land that they farmed with family labor—increased, from 61.25 percent in March 1914 to 68.6 percent in June 1917. In the same period, the percentage of half-tenant farming families (*jikosaku*)—which owned some lands and rented additional lands from others, using family labor to work all the lands—fell, from 29.02 percent to 26.15 percent.[110] These changes can be attributed to the peasantry's turn to temporary migrant work and immigration to exhaust family labor instead of renting additional plots of land to continue agricultural production.[111] Many factors need to be taken into account to properly analyze these changes. However, it is important to note that amid these shifts in Nakagami's farming household composition, Tainansha and the prefecture continued to struggle to convert sugar manufacturers into cane cultivators. If additional family labor needed to be exhausted, farming families preferred to send a family member outside of the village, prefecture, or country rather than convert all the family's operations into supplying raw materials to Tainansha.[112]

Instead of being seen as evidence of the pervasive nature of feudal thought, sentiments, and customs among small peasantry and as a reflection of a drive to increase property through overwork, underconsumption, and exhaustion, the continuation of mechanisms below the village level long after large sugar capital's entry into the prefecture can be read as a manifestation of small peasantry's desire to remain embedded in communal forms of production, manufacture, and exchange. If read this way, the peasants' reluctance to transform themselves into pure cultivators of cane must be understood as a significant act of anticapitalist refusal that obstructed the transformation of their work and lives into dead labor, a process that would have remade them into alienated producers of raw materials or sellers of their labor power. Specifically, the struggles between mainland sugar capital and Okinawa's brown sugar producers reveals the necessity of understanding these refusals as conscious decisions that small peasantry made to reject pursuits that brought short-term increases in income but embedded them in the regime of abstract labor, rather than as reactionary attempts to maintain outmoded ways of life or holdouts designed only to extract more money from the companies.

The common thread that united these nonselling alliances and subsequent disputes that erupted in the interwar period between large sugar capital and Okinawa's small peasantry was that they revolved around the valorization of living labor—in the rejection of the wage form, disputes over rents, or strikes that demanded shorter working days and higher wages. Large sugar capital, which attempted to achieve stable procurement of cane by signing long-term contracts and providing incentives for large submissions of raw material, fought with small cultivators who understood that completely embedding themselves in this system would destroy the social and economic protections provided by their existing networks of communal production and lending—mechanisms that granted them the possibility of self-valorization and, most crucially, reminded them that a different type of rationality was possible.[113]

Finally, the small successes that the disputes against Tainansha from 1917 on achieved transformed the possibilities of belonging and action that Okinawa's small peasantry could imagine. Their resistance to incorporation into a prefectural industrial association advocated by the local bourgeoisie around the same time constituted a rejection of the idea of a natural community of Okinawans with shared interests and revealed the impossibility of Okinawa-shugi to satisfy the desires of everyone included in this category. The deeper impact of these wartime struggles can be found in the radicalization of the same agrarian village societies in the late 1920s and early 1930s, as the prefectural economy approached crisis conditions.[114]

the establishment of capitalist society in Okinawa. See Higa M., "Bi Kara Yaban E"; Miyagi, *Okinawa no Noro no Kenkyū*.

149. Yamanokuchi, "Kaiwa." For a translation, see Yamanokuchi, "A Conversation."
150. Yanagita published his account of his travels in Okinawa in 1921 four years later (*Kainan Shōki*).
151. Ōta C., "Inaka Shokan," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 5, 9, 13, 1900, *Okinawa Kenshi Shiryō Joseishi (Jyō)* 16(1):133–35.
152. "Orimono Dōgyō Kumiai ni Tsuite," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, November 3, 1901, *Okinawa Kenshi* 16:351.
153. For more on southern expansion in the Meiji period, see Yano, *"Nanshin" no Keifu*, part 2.
154. "Okinawa no Dokuritsu Kaikei o Ronzu," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 16, 1908, *Okinawa Kenshi* 16:1028.
155. The demonization of the yuta culminated in the late Meiji and early Taisho eras. In the late Meiji period, a flurry of articles appeared in the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* that linked the yuta and women's belief in them to the financial ruin of the agrarian villages. For example, see "Inaka no Katei to Jidō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, October 23, 1908, *Okinawa Kenshi* 19:379–80; "Kinkō Mokuzetsu: Fujo to Moai," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, September 5, 1912, *Okinawa Kenshi* 19:542–43. There were also quite a few reports of policing of the yuta's activities in February 1913 that were linked to the trial of an alleged yuta named Nakachi Kamado at the Naha court. She was accused of spreading rumors that a huge fire would erupt in the Higashi District of Naha. In the end, it was revealed that the arsonist was a disgruntled employee of the Nakagami region. On the day that he committed the arson, he distributed to the municipal offices of Nakagami a document listing the prefectural administration's failures. For articles on the trial, see, for example, "Yuta no Kōhan," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, February 28, 1913, *Okinawa Kenshi* 19:565–67; "Naha Keisatsu no Yuta Seibatsu," *Okinawa Mainichi*, February 20, 1913, *Okinawa Kenshi* 19:562–63.
156. Newspaper articles reported the restrictions that were placed on tattooing and on the activity of yuta during the land reorganization project, which coincided with efforts to transform women's work into factory work. For example, see "Yuta to Inbaifu no Sōkutsu," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 27, 1899, *Okinawa Kenshi Shiryō Joseishi (Jyō)* 16(1):34; "Baifu to Nasu Aku Shūdan," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 27, 1899, *Okinawa Kenshi Shiryō Joseishi (Jyō)* 16(1):35.

4. The Impossibility of Plantation Sugar in Okinawa

1. For a recent English-language work on these redistributions in early modern Japan, see Brown, *Cultivating Commons*.
2. An important part of this process of enclosure, which was outlined in chapter 3, was the transfer of norokumoi lands controlled by priestesses to male heads of households or the state. Access to forest lands continued unofficially, even after the completion of somayama disposal but was subject to increased state supervision. See Miyagi, *Okinawa no Noro no Kenkyū*. For policies regarding the division of these lands in mainland Japan around the same time, see Totman, *Japan's Imperial Forest Goryōrin*.
3. For Marxists, resolution of the agrarian question was also necessary because the backwardness of agriculture and agrarian relations in the countryside were considered impediments to revolutionary struggle. Engels, Kautsky, and Lenin dealt explicitly with the agrarian question as both a theoretical and a political issue.
4. Quoted in Uno, "Nihon Shihonshugi no Tokushu Kōzō to Nōgyō Mondai," *Uno Kōzō Chosakushū* 8:162. All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted.
5. Marx, *Capital*, 784.
6. The changes that took place in mainland Japan in the first two decades after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 also worked through old systems and administrative units. See Kikekawa, *Meiji Chihō Seido Seiritsushi*. For an article that contrasts Okinawa and mainland Japan's administrative systems in the early Meiji period, see Uechi, "Okinawa Meijiki no Kyūkan Onzon Seisaku ni Kansuru Ichi Kōsatsu."
7. For more on gemeinschaft capitalism and Japan, see Harootunian, "Figuring the Folk," 150; and Hartoonian, *Overcome by Modernity*.
8. By the early Taisho period (before mainland capital entered Okinawa), there were twenty reform-style factories, but their numbers began to decline precisely when local industrialists were trying to advocate their spread. By the agricultural recession that followed World War I, there was just one factory in the entire prefecture. For these figures, see Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*, 74.
9. These nonselling alliances are essentially boycotts, but here I am translating directly from the Japanese phrase used by these actors, *hibai dōmei*, to express the pact-like nature of the agreement that sugar-producing families arrived at as well as the fact that they were not just boycotting the selling of their raw material sugar, but were refusing to sell their own labor according to the terms set forth by the sugar company.
10. Similar challenges frustrated sugar industrialists' initial efforts to establish modern factories in Taiwan. Though Taiwan formally became a colony in 1895, huge increases in sugar exports to Japan did not begin until 1909. A major reason for this was the planters' unwillingness to sell their cane to factories that were built on the island beginning in 1901 and their unwillingness to switch to the Sugar Bureau's desired type of cane, the Rose Bamboo from Hawaii. It took the 1905 sugar factory regulations, generous subsidies, and police supervision to convert planters into submitters of raw cane to modern factories like the Taiwan Seitō Kabushiki Gaisha. Like in Okinawa, capitalist farms operating in Taiwan that hired wage labor had difficulty competing with family farms that operated on the basis of intensive self-exploitation and had to resort to complex surplus-extraction mechanisms that were enabled by the cooperation of the colonial state. Police harassment aimed at bringing small producers under the control of company contracts was ultimately effective in bringing about a vast increase in the volume of annual sugar exports from Taiwan, from just over 42,000 tons at the time of its colonization in 1895 to over 250,000 tons by the first decade of the twentieth century. For details on key developments in Japan's sugar industry, see Ka, *Japanese*

Colonialism in Taiwan; Geerligs, *The World's Cane Sugar Industry*; Shadanhōjin Tōgyō Kyōkai, *Kindai Nihon Tōgyōshi (Jyō)*; Sagara, *Keizaijō Yori Mitaru Taiwan no Tōgyō*; Nōshōmushō Nōmukyoku, *Satō ni Kansuru Chōsa*. For more details on the development of the mechanized sugar industry in Japan as a whole during the modern era, see Kubo, *Kindai Seitōgyō no Hatten to Tōgyō Rengōkai*.

11. Iha first presented this theory to the public in an article titled "Okinawajin no Sosen ni Tsuite" that was published in the December 9, 1906, edition of the *Ryūkyū Shimpō*. For a full text, see Iha, "Okinawajin no Sosen ni Tsuite," *Okinawa Kenshi* 19:310.
12. This rearticulation of Okinawa's relationship with Japan since prehistory began with the work of mainland social scientists like Torii Ryūzō and Kanazawa Atsusaburō, whose anthropological, linguistic, and historical works on Okinawa were extensions of a general project that began in the 1880s to "register the territory and its residents into the state" (Tomiyama, *Bōryoku no Yokan*, 82). Social scientists classified different groups like the Ainu and Okinawans in relation to the Japanese people to provide scientific justification for the colonial and semicolonial treatment of different groups in the expanding Japanese empire. See Kano, *Okinawa no Fuchi*; Chamberlain, *Essay in Aid of a Grammar and Dictionary of the Luchuan Language*.
13. Iha, "Okinawajin no Sosen ni Tsuite," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 9, 1906, *Okinawa Kenshi* 19:310.
14. For more on the debate between scholars like Shiratori and Torii Ryūzō over the composition of the tenson jinrui, see Oguma, *A Genealogy of "Japanese" Self-Images*. Iha's acceptance of this argument of shared origins is significant because the tenson jinrui referred to people who conquered other lands through migration. They were considered superior to Western nations because of their ability to assimilate alien nations. Iha's inclusion of Okinawa into the tenson jinrui is notable because the debate about its character hinged on who was considered to be inside Japan proper and who was seen as outside it.
15. Iha published his studies of the *Omoro Sōshi*, a collection of ancient songs compiled by the kingdom government during the early modern period, throughout the prewar period. For a summary of his activities, see Beillevaire, "Assimilation from Within, Appropriation from Without."
16. Iha, "Okinawajin no Sosen ni Tsuite," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 9, 1906, *Okinawa Kenshi* 19:310.
17. "Kaikaichū no Okinawa Kenkai ni Nozomu, *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 12, 1907, *Okinawaken Gikaishi* 11(8):145.
18. Iha's conscious decision to rewrite the existing story of the former kingdom's abolition by the Meiji state to tell what he considered the more important story of the reunification of peoples may be criticized as his legitimation of Okinawa's semicolonization by the Japanese empire. However, his main concern was obtaining equality in the present, even if it meant erasing the violence inflicted on Okinawa in the past. The intention behind his work was fundamentally different from that of the mainland social scientists. See Tomiyama, "'Ryūkyūjin' to Iu Shutai."

19. "Kaikaichū no Okinawa Kenkai ni Nozomu," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 12, 1907, *Okinawaken Gikaishi* 11(8):145.
20. See chapter 3 for details on the local elite's pursuit of this right to pay taxes.
21. Ōta C., *Ōta Chōfu Senshū (Jyō)*, 326.
22. The state's active promotion of industry began in the 1880s, but at that time it focused more on providing subsidies to encourage cultivation than on mechanization. For more on the policy in the 1880s, see Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*.
23. The promotion of these "rational" agricultural methods were efforts by the Meiji state to increase yields and promote scientific knowledge related to the sugar industry. That is, they were aiming to inculcate new notions and practices of rationality among Okinawa's cultivators. For details on the measures the state promoted, see Yoshimura, *Nihon Henkyōron Josetsu*, 101.
24. *Bunmitsutō* is crude sugar that could be refined into white sugar at mainland refineries. It was the preferred type of sugar, compared to the brown sugar (*ganmitsutō*) that was mainly produced in Okinawa—sugar in which molasses and crystals are not separated in a centrifuge.
25. For details on the modernization of Okinawa's sugar industry, see Komatsu, "Seitōgyō no Hatten to Naha no Shokōgyō"; Fukuokaken Naimubu, *Okinawa Ken Kosaku ni Kansuru Chōsa*.
26. For Okinawa Seitō's dominance, see Nakae, "Okinawa Ken 'Tochi Seiri' to Shōhin Seisan Nōgyō no Tenkai"; Kinjō I., "Meijiki no Okinawa no Tōgyō."
27. According to the *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, Asabushi used despotic measures to bring development projects to the regions he represented. In 1908 he had come under fire for using his position to invest 3,000 yen of the communal funds he had collected from residents in a hospital that was being built on the coast near the source of the Gibo River. See "Haibyō Magirichō to Bōsatsu Naru Gunchō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, November 17, 1907, *Okinawa Kenshi* 19:345–46. Asabushi's name appeared in the newspaper again in January 1916, when he was gunchō of the Shimajiri region and agreed—without getting approval from the municipal assembly—to Okitai Takushoku's request to build a railway line to transport cane collected from the region to its sugar factory. See "Asabushi Shi no Sendan," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 22, 1916, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:708; "Jichi no Keni," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 25, 1916, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:709.
28. He became one of the major stockholders of the company.
29. Komatsu, "Seitōgyō no Hatten to Naha no Shokōgyō," 358.
30. The company also built a factory in Tomigusuku, a village on the southwestern coast of Okinawa.
31. Komatsu, "Seitōgyō no Hatten to Naha no Shokōgyō," 360.
32. For more on the transformation and consolidation of Japan's sugar industry run by Konzerns, refer to Ono, *Seito Konzern Dokuhon*.
33. Yano, the CEO of the first Okinawa Seitō, reestablished the company in 1916 and built a factory in Ginowan, in central Okinawa, that could produce 250 tons of sugar a day. After that, he purchased a communally owned factory in Takamine Village in the southern part of the main island that could produce 80 tons a day and expanded it into a factory that could produce 300 tons a day.

34. Once all of these mergers and purchases were completed, Suzuki Shōten's Tainansha operated as the only sugar manufacture capital in Okinawa Prefecture. For details of Tainansha's growth, see Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*, 307; Namitaka et al., *Shōwa Seitō Kabushiki Gaisha 10 Nen Shi*. For detailed statistics about Tainansha's operations in the period 1918–31, see *Tainan Seitō Kabushiki Gaisha Hōkokusho* (Okinawa Prefectural Archives retrieval code T00016045B).
35. This was granted by Governor Narahara, the most enthusiastic of Okinawa's leaders about carving up the prefecture's lands during his tenure. For more on Narahara's reclamation policies, see chapter 3 and Isa, *Jahana Noboru Shū*.
36. Not much is known today about this transaction, but the cane grown there very likely went to two factories: the Kadena factory and the Makihara factory. See Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*; Fukuokaken Naimubu, *Okinawa Ken Kosaku ni Kansuru Chōsa*; Komatsu, "Seitōgyō no Hatten to Naha no Shokōgyō."
37. For a sample Tainansha contract for Nakagami region, see Fukuokaken Naimubu, *Okinawa Ken Kosaku ni Kansuru Chōsa*, 472–74.
38. By this time, the value of the lands, which the former company had purchased from the Shō family for 70,000 yen, had risen to 300,000–400,000 yen. See Fukuokaken Naimubu, *Okinawa Ken Kosaku ni Kansuru Chōsa*, 93.
39. "Waga Ken no Jitsugyō Hattensaku Ikani," *Okinawa Jitsugyō Shimpō*, August 5, 1914.
40. For details of these deliberations see Kinjō I., *Kindai Okinawa no Tetsudō to Kaiun*.
41. Kinjō I., *Kindai Okinawa no Tetsudō to Kaiun*, 53–57.
42. In December 1917, soon after Tainansha took over all large-scale sugar operations in the main island of Okinawa, the Kadena line was approved by the prefectural assembly. It was completed in March 1922. Kinjō I., *Kindai Okinawa no Tetsudō to Kaiun*, 14–15.
43. Ōta C., *Ōta Chōfu Senshū (Chū)*, 314.
44. According to a study conducted for the compilation of *Okinawa Ken Kosaku ni Kansuru Chōsa*, despite the efforts of Tainansha to encourage the planting of large-stalk-type cane for submission to its factories, the ratio of home to factory use of the harvested cane was 7:3.
45. Ōmi explained his vision for Okinawa's industry in "Sangyō 10-Nen Keikaku Shushi," *Okinawa Jitsugyō Shimpō*, July 1, 1915.
46. This was similar to the policy that mainland sugar capital enacted with the support of the governor general in Taiwan, which reduced the power of local sugar industrialists and small manufacturers. See Ka, *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan*; Mazumdar, *Sugar and Society in China*.
47. Shadanhōjin Tōgyō Kyōkai, *Kindai Nihon Tōgyōshi (Ge)*, 2.
48. The first prefectural assembly elections were held in Okinawa in 1909. See Ōta M., *Kindai Okinawa no Seiji Kōsō*.
49. "Kengian Teishutsu Riyū," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 4, 1917, *Okinawaken Gikaishi* 11(8):857.
50. Quoted in Ka, *Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan*, 80. This description is from Yanaihara Tadao's seminal work on Japanese imperialism in Taiwan, *Teikokushugika no Taiwan* (1929), where he traces the transformations to the colonial economy following annexation in 1895. Inaka Akira and other Okinawan intellectuals observed the developments in Taiwan with extreme caution and saw the governor's proposed reforms to their sugar industry as an attempt to install colonial policies in the prefecture. For transformations to Taiwan's sugar industry in the first decade of the twentieth century, also see Geerligs, *The World's Cane Sugar Industry*, 84–85.
51. "Kengian Teishutsu Riyū," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 4, 1917, *Okinawaken Gikaishi* 11(8):858.
52. "Kinkō Mokuzetsu," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 9, 1915, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:660.
53. Ōta C., *Ōta Chōfu Senshū (Chū)*, 320.
54. Ōta C., "Honken Sangyō Kumiai to Tōgyō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 5, 1914, *Ōta Chōfu Senshū (Chū)*, 421.
55. Ōta C., "Honken Sangyō Kumiai to Tōgyō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 5, 1914, *Ōta Chōfu Senshū (Chū)*, 422. For a detailed history of the establishment of the Okinawa Nōkō Ginkō and other banks in the prefecture, see Yanagisawa, "Naha Shōgyō Ginkō no Keiei Bunseki."
56. Ōta and Inaka's visions also reflected their belief that the ability of villagers to successfully manage their own region's economy was a measure of their civilization. Their advocacy of an industrial policy designed to compensate for what the prefecture was formally denied—self-governance—must be seen as attempts to counter the state's unwillingness to extend constitutional rights to the people of Okinawa. They hoped that a network of industrial associations in all of the villages that was linked to the prefecture's agricultural bank could ensure brown sugar manufacturers' autonomy from mainland sugar capital that wanted to convert Okinawa's peasants into pure cultivators of raw material. These conversations about local autonomy in the sugar industry spilled into the political realm. Ōmi's tenure brought back fears of colonization that had subsided with the enactment of the special prefectural administration system (*tokubetsu fukensei*) in 1909, which granted the prefecture the right to send representatives to the National Diet for the first time. Ōmi was transferred out of the prefecture in April 1916 but his tenure made it clear to local leaders that in the wrong hands, the special system could be extremely damaging. This led to calls for the abolition of the system in late 1916, which were deliberated by the Diet in 1917 and 1918. See the Lower House of the National Diet's deliberations on a bill to abolish this system from March 13–15, 1918, *Okinawaken Gikaishi* 10(7):360–76. The bill passed unanimously, though it was not enacted for a couple of years. Inaka was one of 28 people who signed a petition dated December 3, 1917, opposing article 5. See "Seitōjo Kisoku Haishi Kengian," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 4, 1917, *Okinawaken Gikaishi* 11(8):857.
57. The immediate effect of the end of World War I in Japan was a tremendous economic boom, which resulted from the increased demand for and corresponding growth in the production of manufactured goods. Aldcroft observes that "the shortage of manufactured goods in Europe and restricted shipping space gave Japan a great opportunity to expand commerce by penetrating markets in the

Western Pacific and further" (*From Versailles to Wall Street*, 37–38). While much of Europe struggled to recover from the war, Japan, the United States, and the other Western Allies enjoyed "a boom of astonishing dimensions" that extended to the sugar industry (ibid., 64).

58. On Okinawa sugar's golden age see Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*, 19. On Cuba's sugar boom see Rowe, *Markets and Men*, 936, McGillivray, *Blazing Cane*, and Ayala, *American Sugar Kingdom*.
59. Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*, 14.
60. In 1917 Tainansha entered the prefecture and merged with Okitai Seitō and Okitai Takushoku, becoming the only Japanese sugar capital in the prefecture. Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*.
61. Fukuokaken Naimubu, *Okinawa Ken Kosaku ni Kansuru Chōsa*, 13.
62. Carrying-in regions were territories near each factory that sugar companies accepted raw sugar cane from. Companies had to designate these regions because sugar quality greatly depended on the speed with which cane could be delivered after cutting to the factory. On the unique challenges posed by sugar production, see Mintz, *Sweetness and Power*.
63. Nakachi S., "Senzenki Okinawa no Nōson ni Okeru Rōdō Kōkan Kankō no Kōzō."
64. Figures for 1917 are not available, but in 1916 brown sugar sold for approximately eight yen per barrel. One barrel is 1.2 piculs.
65. On the satō maedai, see chapter 1 and Kinjō I., "Meijiki no Okinawa no Tōgyō."
66. Komatsu, "Seitōgyō no Hatten to Naha no Shokōgyō," 353.
67. For more on yuimaaru practices and history in Okinawa, see Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*; Tamura, *Ryūkyū Kyōsan Sonraku no Kenkyū*.
68. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power*; Geerligs, *The World's Cane Sugar Industry*.
69. For details about the settlement of accounts, see Nakachi, "Senzenki Okinawa no Nōson ni Okeru Rōdō Kōkan Kankō no Kōzō."
70. Higa R., "Satō Goya."
71. Iba, *Nangoku no Shirayuri*, 28.
72. Iba, *Nangoku no Shirayuri*, 30.
73. Iba, *Nangoku no Shirayuri*, 30.
74. Iba, *Nangoku no Shirayuri*, 30.
75. Iba, *Nangoku no Shirayuri*, 32.
76. Tamura proves the continued existence of internal laws (*naihō*) that were enforced in Okinawa's villages. These ranged from the prohibition on women going to other villages at night and on men and women playing outside at night to prohibitions against cutting down certain types of trees, dirtying communal wells, not keeping chickens in pens, and taking cane from others without permission. For a full list of such laws from Kadena, see Tamura, *Ryūkyū Kyōsan Sonraku no Kenkyū*, 460–61.
77. Kinjō I., *Kindai Okinawa no Tōgyō*, 47. Specific figures on the yearly fluctuations in the production of different categories of sugar can be found in Okinawa Satō Dōgyō Kumiai, *Okinawa Satō Dōgyō Kumiai Gairan*, an account of the Okinawa Sugar Production Association (Okinawa Satō Dōgyō Kumiai) that was established in 1913. Most sugar producers on the main island were dues-paying members of the association. According to its figures, the proportion of brown sugar output in the total output per association member fell quite dramatically during the nonselling alliances, from 77 percent in 1917 to 73.5 percent in 1919 and 68 percent in 1921, despite subsidies granted by the prefecture to the companies in an effort to increase self-sufficiency in sugar.
78. Chayanov's argument that family farms prefer to maximize total income rather than profit when selecting their household strategies is informative on this point. Shanin's introduction to the English-language translation of Chayanov's *Theory of Peasant Economy* is useful here. See Shanin, "Chayanov's Message."
79. James Scott writes about the way that communities consciously select crops that are amenable to a nomadic existence or those that can be left alone for some time, such as root vegetables (*The Art of Not Being Governed*). This is useful for understanding why Okinawa's small peasantry (shōnō) were reluctant to give up their cultivation of sweet potato and other crops to focus solely on cash crops. Also see Mintz, *Caribbean Transformations*, 225–50.
80. "Gansha Baikyaku Mondai," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 25, 1916, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:798–99.
81. "Gansha Baikyaku Mondai," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 25, 1916, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:798–99.
82. "Seitōsha to Shasakumin," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 12, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:804–5.
83. Eighty percent of all sugar cultivators produced less than twenty barrels of brown sugar per year. Quite a few produced less than five barrels. See "Satō Dōgyō Kumiai Sono Shin Ninmu," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, November 18, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:803.
84. "Gansha Baikyaku Mondai Kaiketsu," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, February 15, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:806.
85. For this announcement, see "Ryōtō Gappei Kettei," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, October 17, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:864.
86. "Baishū Hō Kaisei Riyū," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, October 24, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:868.
87. "Genryō Baishū Hō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, October 24, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:871.
88. "Shasakumin no Ikō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, November 13, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:879.
89. "Genryō Baishū Kitei," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, November 16, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:881.
90. Raising pigs was a crucial form of supplementary income. Pork was an important part of the new year's celebration and was used in soup throughout the year and for medicinal purposes. In many cases, one pig was owned jointly by more than one family. The cultivation of sweet potato also played an important part in the overall household economy, as it was the small peasantry's staple food. The skin of the sweet potato, in addition to leftovers and tofu, was used for the pig's feed. It also fueled the communal manufacture of brown sugar. For sample breakdowns of the budgets of farming households in the Nakagami region, see Kinjō I., *Kindai Okinawa no Tōgyō*, 105–6; Fukuokaken Naimubu, *Okinawa Ken Kosaku ni Kansuru Chōsa*, 553–60.

91. People preferred to rely on *moai*, communal lending associations formed by kinship groups, villages, or other groups based on a principle of mutual accountability, than to obtain loans from banks. "Shasakumin no Ikō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, November 13, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:879.
92. Chayanov asserts that even in an environment clearly dominated by capitalism, peasant agriculture followed a logic characteristic of the operational logic of family farms within that broader society. Faced with a "diverse calculus of choices," they preferred a maximization of total income rather than profit or marginal production. Shanin, "Chayanov's Message," 4.
93. Chayanov points out that this quest for flexibility extended to keeping lands or means of production unused and ready for disposal (*The Theory of Peasant Economy*, 109). James Scott makes a similar argument: "By pursuing a broad portfolio . . . they [cultivators] spread their risks and ensure themselves a diverse and nutritious diet. . . . Particular crops have characteristics that make them more or less resistant to appropriation. . . . Roots and tubers after they ripen can be left safely in the ground for up to two years and dug up piecemeal as needed" (*The Art of Not Being Governed*, 195). In Okinawa, the poorer a household was, the higher its proportion of sweet potato cultivation to sugar production was.
94. As Mukai argues, the small peasantry would have more control over the income they received from selling sugar if they manufactured it on their own, because companies' contracts used whatever the price was at the Naha market on the day that the cane was delivered to the factory (*Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*).
95. "Gansha Baishū Rakuchaku," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 11, 1918, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:917. This settlement was negotiated between Tainansha's Nishihara factory and Nishihara village's Arakawa Saburō and the head administrator (*kuchō*) of Yonabaru, Adaniya.
96. After World War I, mainland capital entered Yaeyama and purchased local sugar factories. The *Yaeyama Shimpō* attributed the failure of mainland sugar capital to establish predominance in Yaeyama as a result of the same issues that plagued these companies on the main island of Okinawa. See Iritakenishi, *Yaeyama Tōgyōshi*, 107–8. For more information about the 1919 strike, see Aniya, *Okinawa no Musansha Undō*.
97. Quoted in Ikehara, *Okinawa Tōgyōron*, 60–61.
98. "Gansha Baikyaku Mondai Kaiketsu," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, February 15, 1917, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:806. The existence of an alternative path if negotiations over prices ended in failure was probably an important reason for small peasantry to maintain their strong position in brown sugar production.
99. Even in the counteroffer that was made by the representatives of the cultivators, the expenditure here was listed as 55 sen, which was close to one third of the total cost per barrel of sugar. See "Gansha Baikyaku Mondai," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 25, 1916, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:799.
100. Kinjō I., *Kindai Okinawa no Tōgyō*, 47. Under this arrangement, peasants who cultivated sugarcane had an incentive not to increase their production of brown sugar or hire additional laborers because their costs would go up. The structural inferiority of brown sugar that Tainansha was able to establish through its purchasing conditions for raw material and its aggressive promotion of high-yielding stalks is explained in more detail in Yoshimura, *Nihon Henkyōron Josetsu*.
101. Banaji, "The Fictions of Free Labour," 91.
102. Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method*, 111.
103. Read, *The Micropolitics of Capital*, 62.
104. Thus, they exposed the violence that was invisible in a society governed by the regime of abstract labor. In Marx's words, the worker's "economic bondage is at once mediated through, and concealed by, the periodic renewal of the act by which he sells himself, his change of masters, and the oscillations in the market-price of his labour" (quoted in Banaji, "The Fictions of Free Labour," 75).
105. Ōta C., "Yūwa Konitsu," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, January 12, 1918, *Okinawaken Gikaishi* 11(8):929.
106. Chayanov, *The Theory of Peasant Economy*, 30. Notably, Ōta and Inaka's vision of the establishment of a prefecturewide industrial association system to counter the penetration of mainland bunmitsutō capital also did not come to fruition. Although they succeeded in convincing the prefectural authorities to abolish restrictions on the establishment of reform-type sugar factories that produced brown sugar in 1917, the number of these factories declined from eighteen in 1916 to none at the end of 1919.
107. Komatsu, "Seitōgyō no Hatten to Naha no Shokōgyō," 355.
108. See Nakachi and Inaka, "Okinawa Tōgyō no Genjyō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, December 10, 1911, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:300.
109. Factors for increased yield may have to do with the spread of fertilizer use or the use of different varieties of cane. Per factory output fell by 25 percent between 1912 and 1917. For detailed figures, see Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizaishi*.
110. All figures are from "Honken Nōgyō Kosū," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, March 28, 1914, *Okinawa Kenshi* 17:479.
111. For details of this move and the communities that formed in these new spaces, see Tomiyama, *Kindai Nihon Shakai to Okinawajin*.
112. This was also the case with farming and fishing households in Yaeyama. Families began to move in significant numbers to Taiwan, even though opportunities for work increased in Iriomote mining and in large sugar factories that were built in Daitōjima in 1916. For contemporary accounts of these industries, see Yanaihara Tadao, *Teikokushugika no Taiwan*; Okinawaken Yaeyama Shichō, *Yaeyama Gunsei Yōran*. Women preferred to venture to Taipei to find work as maids and merchants because they saw Taiwan to be a more modern and attractive site of employment than their own hometowns. For more on the immigration of women from Yaeyama to Taiwan, see Kaneto, "1930-nen Zengo no Yaeyama Josei no Shokuminchi Taiwan e no Idō o Unagashita Puru Yōin"; Matayoshi, "Okinawa Josei to Taiwan Shokuminchi Shihai"; Matsuda, "Colonial Modernity across the Border."
113. For more on the distinction between dead and living labor, see Read, *The Micropolitics of Capital*, chapter 2.

114. The postboom agricultural crisis that ravaged Okinawa's countryside in the 1920s, known as "Sago Palm hell," brought the cultivators together with socialist and Marxist thinkers who began to organize in the prefecture in the beginning of the decade. The Social Science Research Incident, which took place between 1926 and 1928, was especially threatening to Tainansha and the prefecture because it linked the activists with the peasants and exposed the cooperation of the company and the prefecture in search of profit at the expense of ailing small producers. Two prominent Marxist activists, Yamada Kanji and Inoguchi Masao, along with twenty or so teachers from Nakagami organized the Social Science Research Group, which joined forces with the Okinawa Labor-Farmer (Rōnō) Party, founded in February 1928, to establish tighter coordination between thought, politics, and activism. "Tainansha e no Yokkyū," a leaflet dated December 27, 1928, represented the merging of Marxist thought and activism with a longer tradition of peasants' struggle against the exploitative practices of the company described in this chapter and inspired widespread agitation in the prefecture. The full text of this leaflet appears in Fukuokaken Naimubu, *Okinawa Ken Kosaku ni Kansuru Chōsa*.

5. Uneven Development and the Rejection of Economic Nationalism in "Sago Palm Hell" Okinawa

1. I define *crisis* as something broader than the crisis of capitalist valorization in terms of rise and fall of the rate of profit. Instead, I mean an all-encompassing sociopolitical and economic crisis that emerged out of the struggle between capitalist valorization and self-valorization and that necessarily required the production of subjectivity for capital and the production of countersubjectivity. Read explains: "There is a production of subjectivity for capital—docile, individual, flexible and productive—and there is the counter-production of another subjectivity. This counter-subjectivity is also produced in some sense for capital in that it is a necessary element of the valorization of capital, but it contains a supplement irreducible to the demands of capitalist valorization" (*The Micropolitics of Capital*, 100).
2. Here I draw on Negri's idea of the language of cooperation as social living labor (*Insurgencies*, 264).
3. Unlike the Sakishima islands, the northern region of the main island of Okinawa was not the target of industrial development projects or large-scale investment. It was referred to as Yanbaru, a derogatory term to describe its undeveloped state.
4. For more on this point, see the concluding section of chapter 4.
5. For a representative example of this approach, see Yoshihara, *Okinawa Minshū Undō no Dentō*.
6. Smith clarifies that the various spatial scales produced under capitalism are "a means to organize and integrate the different processes involved in the circulation and accumulation of capital" and notes that "these absolute spaces are fixed within the wider flow of relative space, and become the geographic foundation for the overall circulation and expansion of value" (*Uneven Development*, 181).

7. Uno, *Uno Kōzō Chosakushū* 8:25. All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted. As Goswami points out in *Producing India*, anticolonial economic nationalism was common in much of the colonized and postcolonial world.
8. In his seminal study of nationalism (*Imagined Communities*), Benedict Anderson responded to Marxists' inability to account for the formation of national consciousness. In this case, it appears that Okinawa's nationalists could not account for their subjects' sensitivity to class dynamics as they formulated their notions of community.
9. Uno brought attention to the nature of sugar as a global commodity in his 1944 *Tōgyō Yori Mitaru Kōiki Keizai no Kenkyū*. For how this is applicable to Okinawa, see Tomiyama, "From the Colonization of Outer Regions to Regional Economics."
10. Aldcroft, *From Versailles to Wall Street*, 64–65.
11. Yamamura, "Then Came the Great Depression."
12. Aldcroft, *From Versailles to Wall Street*, 67.
13. Yamamura, "Then Came the Great Depression," 184–85.
14. Kajinishi, *Nihon Shihonshugi no Botsuraku*, 8.
15. Dalton, *Sugar*, 40.
16. Dalton, *Sugar*, 42.
17. Uno, *Uno Kōzō Chosakushū* 7:150–52.
18. Uno, *Tōgyō Yori Mitaru Kōiki Keizai no Kenkyū*, 357.
19. Ōta C., *Okinawa Kensei Gojyūnen*, 316.
20. Uno identifies the differences between countries that produce sugar for self-sufficiency and those that produce it as a colonial commodity. His description of the problems facing Australia's sugar industry—"countries that began sugar production with the objective of self-sufficiency had to necessarily seek foreign exports and production costs were from the start higher compared to other colonial sugar sites"—can be applied to the challenges faced by the Okinawan sugar industry, which mainly supplied domestic consumers (*Tōgyō Yori Mitaru Kōiki Keizai no Kenkyū*, 357). For a 1940 work elaborating the challenges facing Okinawa's sugar industry, see Yamashita K., *Satōgyō no Saihensei, Jyō*.
21. Tomiyama, *Kindai Nihon Shakai to Okinawajin*, 79.
22. The development of modern industries was not pursued with much vigor by the prefecture and was left to municipalities.
23. The outflow of people from agrarian villages to domestic and foreign labor markets demonstrate this problem.
24. Shinjō Chōkō wrote "Hinshi no Ryūkyū" in 1925. It was reprinted in the *Okinawa Kyūsai Ronshū*, which was originally published in 1929 to appeal for relief funds for the prefecture. The phrase Sago Palm hell was used to refer the dire straits of the peasants who had nothing to eat but the fruit of the sago palm, which could be poisonous if prepared the wrong way. The seed is especially toxic, but people consumed the fruit after boiling it. The phrase hinted at conditions in Okinawa, whose economy had been transformed from a largely self-sufficient one to one that was excessively dependent on exports and imports.
25. This description is from Matsuoka Masao's response to Okinawa's crisis conditions, *Sekirara ni Mita Ryūkyū no Genjyō*, 1.