The Memory Debate: An Introduction

THE STORY of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial underscores a very fundamental point. The shaping of a past worthy of public commemoration in the present is contested and involves a struggle for supremacy between advocates of various political ideas and sentiments. It is the creation of public memory in commemorative activities celebrating America's past and the dramatic exchange of interests that are involved in such exercises that constitute the focus of this book.

The debate over the Vietnam memorial involved two main sides. The dominant interest expressed in the memorial originated in the consciousness of ordinary people most directly involved in the war: veterans who fought there and people who cared about them. In the context of American society they represented a vernacular culture which formulated specialized concerns during the war, such as their critique of official interpretations of the conflict, and after the war, such as their reverence for the dead. They manifested these concerns in the memorial itself. Standing opposed to their concerns and ultimately accommodating them were the defenders of the nation-state. The structure of national power was safeguarded by national political leaders who saw in the monument a device that would foster national unity and patriotism and many veterans and other citizens who celebrated the ideal of patriotic duty. These guardians of the nation were representatives of an overarching or official culture which resisted cultural expressions that minimized the degree to which service in Vietnam may have been valorous.

Public memory emerges from the intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions. The former originates in the concerns of cultural leaders or authorities at all levels of society. Whether in positions of prominence in small towns, ethnic communities, or in educational, government, or military bureaucracies, these leaders share a common interest in social unity, the continuity of existing institutions, and loyalty to the status quo. They attempt to advance these concerns by promoting interpretations of past and present reality that reduce the power of competing interests that threaten the attainment of their goals. Official culture relies on "dogmatic formalism" and the restate-

ment of reality in ideal rather than complex or ambiguous terms. It presents the past on an abstract basis of timelessness and sacredness. Thus, officials and their followers preferred to commemorate the Vietnam War in the ideal language of patriotism rather than the real language of grief and sorrow. Normally official culture promotes a nationalistic, patriotic culture of the whole that mediates an assortment of vernacular interests. But seldom does it seek mediation at the expense of ascendency.[1]

Vernacular culture, on the other hand, represents an array of specialized interests that are grounded in parts of the whole. They are diverse and changing and can be reformulated from time to time by the creation of new social units such as soldiers and their friends who share an experience in war or immigrants who settle a particular place. They can even clash with one another. Defenders of such cultures are numerous and intent on protecting values and restating views of reality derived from firsthand experience in small-scale communities rather than the "imagined" communities of a large nation. Both cultures are championed by leaders and gain adherents from throughout the population, and individuals themselves can support aspects of both cultures at once. But normally vernacular expressions convey what social reality feels like rather than what it should be like. Its very existence threatens the sacred and timeless nature of official expressions.

Public memory is produced from a political discussion that involves not so much specific economic or moral problems but rather fundamental issues about the entire existence of a society: its organization, structure of power, and the very meaning of its past and present. This is not simple class or status politics, although those concerns are involved in the discussion, but it is an argument about the interpretation of reality; this is an aspect of the politics of culture. It is rooted not simply in a time dimension between the past and the present but is ultimately grounded in the inherent contradictions of a social system: local and national structures, ethnic and national cultures, men and women, young and old, professionals and clients, workers and managers, political leaders and followers, soldiers and commanders. Its function is to mediate the competing restatements of reality these antinomies express. Because it takes the form of an ideological system with special language, beliefs, symbols, and stories, people can use it as a cognitive device to mediate competing interpretations and privilege some explanations over others. Thus, the symbolic language of patriotism is central to public memory in the United States because it has the capacity to mediate both vernacular loyalties to local

and familiar places and official loyalties to national and imagined structures.[2]

Public memory is a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future. It is fashioned ideally in a public sphere in which various parts of the social structure exchange views. The major focus of this communicative and cognitive process is not the past, however, but serious matters in the present such as the nature of power and the question of loyalty to both official and vernacular cultures. Public memory speaks primarily about the structure of power in society because that power is always in question in a world of polarities and contradictions and because cultural understanding is always grounded in the material structure of society itself. Memory adds perspective and authenticity to the views articulated in this exchange; defenders of official and vernacular interests are selectively retrieved from the past to perform similar functions in the present.

Adherents to official and vernacular interests demonstrate conflicting obsessions. Cultural leaders orchestrate commemorative events to calm anxiety about change or political events, eliminate citizen indifference toward official concerns, promote exemplary patterns of citizen behavior, and stress citizen duties over rights. They feel the need to do this because of the existence of social contradictions, alternative views, and indifference that perpetuate fears of societal dissolution and unregulated political behavior.

Ordinary people, on the other hand, react to the actions of leaders in a variety of ways. At times they accept official interpretations of reality. Sometimes this can be seen when an individual declares that a son died in defense of his country or an immigrant ancestor emigrated to build a new nation. Individuals also express alternative renditions of reality when they feel a war death was needless or an immigrant ancestor moved simply to support his family. Frequently people put official agendas to unintended uses as they almost always do when they use public ritual time for recreational purposes or patriotic symbols to demand political rights.[3]

Most cultural leaders in the United States come from a broad group of middle-class professionals—government officials, editors, lawyers, clerics, teachers, military officers, and small businessmen. They are "self-conscious purveyors" of loyalty to larger political structures and existing institutions. Their careers and social positions usually depend upon the survival of the very institutions that are celebrated in commemorative activities. The boundaries of the leadership group are permeable, however, and can be crossed by rich and very influential

individuals. Seldom are they crossed by factory workers, homemakers, millhands, farmers, and others whose work and social position allow them little time and access to the organizations that shape most public commemorative events.[4]

The term "ordinary people" best describes the rest of society that participates in public commemoration and protects vernacular interests. They are a diverse lot, are not synonymous with the working class, and invariably include individuals from all social stations. They are more likely to honor pioneer ancestors rather than founding fathers and favor comrades over patriots as some did regarding the Vietnam memorial. They acknowledge the ideal of loyalty in commemorative events and agree to defend the symbol of the nation but often use commemoration to redefine that symbol or ignore it for the sake of leisure or economic ends. There is certainly patriotism in much of what they honor, but they do not hesitate to privilege the personal or vernacular dimension of patriotism over the public one. They are less interested than cultural leaders in exerting influence or control over others, and are preoccupied, instead, with defending the interests and rights of their respective social segments.

Because numerous interests clash in commemorative events they are inevitably multivocal. They contain powerful symbolic expressions—metaphors, signs, and rituals—that give meaning to competing interpretations of past and present reality. In modern America no cultural expression contains the multivocal quality of public commemorations better than the idea of the nation-state and the language of patriotism. On a cultural level it serves as a symbol that "coerces" the discordant interests of diverse social groups and unites them into a "unitary conceptual framework" which connects the ideal with the real. Officials use it as a powerful metaphor that stimulates ideals of social unity and civic loyalty. And its very real structure of local, regional, and national government constantly seeks loyalty and respect. But the component parts of the nation-state—its families, classes, ethnic groups, and regions—also attract loyalty and devotion. Citizens view the larger entity of the nation through the lens of smaller units and places that they know firsthand. And they frequently see the nation as a defender of their rights rather than simply a source of obligation.[5] The symbols of the nation-state and the patriot do what all symbols do: they mediate both official and vernacular interests. By themselves they do not privilege one interest over another. That task is performed admirably by men and women living in space and time.

Public commemorations usually celebrate official concerns more than vernacular ones. This does not mean that cultural differences are removed from the discussion over memory. Most citizens can honor

the basic political structure of the nation, for instance, and still vigorously disagree with cultural leaders about what the nation stands for and what type of devotion it merits. They often express this disagreement not in violent terms but in more subtle expressions of indifference or inventive historical constructions of their own. For instance, the pioneer was a popular historical symbol in midwestern commemorations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its appeal to ordinary people resided in its vernacular meaning of sturdy ancestors who founded ethnic communities and families, preserved traditions in the face of social change, and overcame hardship. These defenders of vernacular culture were especially important to midwesterners who were anxious about the pace of economic centralization and the impact of urban and industrial growth upon their local places. Their commemorations of pioneers were so pervasive, in fact, that officials attempted to redefine these figures from the past as builders and defenders of a nation rather than of small communities or staunch supporters of local institutions.

Because the expression of patriotic and nationalistic texts, moreover, reflects both the interests of cultural leaders and ordinary people, it does not follow that an equitable compromise is reached. Negotiation and cultural mediation do not preclude domination and distortion. Usually it is the local and personal past that is incorporated into a nationalized public memory rather than the other way around. Local, regional, class, and ethnic interests are sustained in one form or another in the final product, but the dominant meaning is usually nationalistic. And this does not seem to be particularly wrong to most citizens. In fact, it appears to be "fundamentally true." As Maurice Godelier argues, it is when ideologies do not appear to the "exploited" as illusions or as instruments of their exploitation that they contribute effectively to persuading people to accept them. They can only do this if they incorporate—as the symbols of the pioneer and patriot do—meanings dear to a number of social groups that participate in the memory debate.[6]

One implication of the argument that the abundant patriotic messages of American public memory are rooted partially in the quest for power by leaders of various sorts is that patriotism is invented as a form of social control and that it does not naturally find resonance within the hearts and minds of ordinary people. Obviously this study cannot pretend to explore private hearts and minds. But it does present clues as to what the masses think and feel when they demonstrate loyalty to the nation-state. They certainly respond enthusiastically to patriotic messages and symbols with referential connections to their immediate environs and group. National commemorations

such as the 1976 bicentennial, for instance, celebrated both local, ethnic, and national history. But are they performing? Do they exhibit patriotic sentiments in the dramatic exchanges that take place in commemorative activities because they know that is what those in power want them to do? Or is the observation that American patriotism is "indigenous" and not fabricated as it is in Europe correct?[7]

This study of commemorative activity suggests several points on the matter. Leaders in the period under review here expended a very substantial effort to stimulate loyalty to large political structures. Ordinary people demonstrated a considerable interest of their own in expressing attachments to structures of a smaller scale such as local and cultural communities. Ordinary people also exhibited indifference to patriotic messages at times, especially when it came to paying for monuments, and a periodic determination to use commemorative time to pursue personal rather than civic interests.[8]

More suggestive is the widespread effort on the part of ordinary people to celebrate symbols such as pioneer ancestors or dead soldiers that were more important for autobiographical and local memory than for civic memory. In fact, because the vernacular dimension of memory would not go away it was susceptible to reformulation by officials. Constantly they honored pioneers for building a nation and fallen soldiers for defending it. But the patriotism they evoked on the part of ordinary people was not always grounded in official expressions but in the power of vernacular meanings officials tried to constrain.

Ordinary people do two things when they affirm loyalty to the nation. They do what leaders expect of them, but they also insist that much of what they value on a smaller and less political scale is important to them. The prominence of patriotism in American commemorative activities does not signify the complete triumph of the power of the nation-state. Patriotism itself embodies both official and vernacular interests, although most patriotic expressions tend to emphasize the dominance of the former over the latter.[9]

Indeed, a striking comparison could be made with French history. The pioneer symbol, regardless of the extent it served the interests of the nation, originated in the attempts of local communities and ethnic enclaves to mark their communal origins. In a similar fashion, Maurice Agulhon shows how the most powerful symbol of the French Republic by the late nineteenth century—a female figure named Marianne—originated in the vernacular culture of peasants in the south of France before it came to serve the official interests of national culture as well. The cognitive power of both Marianne and pioneers was certainly due in part to their ability to link the official and vernacular interests of political structures and ordinary people.[10]

It is not surprising to see several interests connected in the symbols that were most powerful, if we can accept the argument that the symbolic meaning of ideological systems emerges from a communicative process. Thus, both the pioneer and patriot symbols do what all symbols do: they restate social contradictions in a modified form. To the extent that public memory originates in discourse or the presentation of divergent viewpoints, it is not simply manipulated. Discourse can simultaneously be a servant of and a hedge against hegemonic interests. To put it another way, manipulation and invention do not go far enough in explaining how certain symbols assume dominance in public memory. In the United States, since the early nineteenth century, commemorative activity involved considerably more than manipulation of the past by officials. It involved the presentation of multiple texts or numerous kinds of symbolic communication.[11]

Discourse or communication over the past, moreover, is not only vital but pervasive. Forums for discussion exist in the commemorative activity of ethnic communities, towns and cities, states and regions, and nations. Invariably the interests that are exchanged are numerous, and those most powerful in the social structure are influential in the discussion and the construction of memory. The fact that forums are numerous actually insures that a number of interests are articulated. The multiplicity of forums, however, does not prevent some interests from distorting the discussion to a considerable degree.

Regardless of the number of forums that exist or the complexity of communication over the past, the commemorative activities examined here—anniversaries, monument dedications, landmark designations, reunions, and centennials—almost always stress the desirability of maintaining the social order and existing institutions, the need to avoid disorder or dramatic changes, and the dominance of citizen duties over citizen rights. Accounts of fundamental change in the past such as the American Revolution, industrialization, migration, or war are usually reinterpreted in ways that soften the idea of transformation and promote stories of patriotism and national growth. Dramatic episodes of citizens asserting their rights, with the exception of the colonists of 1776, are almost never commemorated. The point is that although public memory is constructed from discourse the sources of cultural and political power are not simply diffuse. They are also unequal. Public memory came to be what it was in the United States because some interests exerted more power than others in the discussion and actually distorted public communication to an inordinate extent. Thus, distortion took place not through simple coercion but through a more subtle process of communication which Leslie Good suggests involves the "prevention" of certain statements being made

in public in a meaningful way. Heavy doses of patriotism frustrate the expression, for instance, of state obligation toward its citizens. The power of large political structures and what Stuart Hall calls "cultural leadership" coexists with and dominates the power of smaller structures—communities, regions, groups—in the process of constructing public memory.[12]

By the latter part of the twentieth century public memory remains a product of elite manipulation, symbolic interaction, and contested discourse. Leaders continue to use the past to foster patriotism and civic duty and ordinary people continue to accept, reformulate, and ignore such messages. Because many had been so accepting for a very long time, in fact, the original design for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial came as something of a shock to some and raised the possibility that vernacular interests might be more powerful in the future. The deep emotional response evoked by the monument also revealed the continued power of vernacular culture and the fact that it had been sustained in symbols of commemoration that appeared to be more hegemonic than they actually were. This tension between official and vernacular memory and how it was resolved in commemorative events forms the core of the analysis in the following chapters. It will be explored in the communal forums of ethnic communities and large cities, the regional forum of the Midwest, the national forums of the National Park Service, and historic anniversaries relevant to the history of the nation. The intent here is to peel back the mask of innocence that surrounds commemorative events and reveal the very vital issues they address.

_____ C H A P T E R   T W O _____

Public Memory in Nineteenth-Century America: Background and Context

PUBLIC MEMORY in American commemorative activities was formed by the public presentation of multiple texts in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To an extent the evolution of this cultural exchange conformed to the arguments of Jürgen Habermas. It became less combative over time as the power of the nation-state came to mediate vernacular interests and dominate public communications. At the same time the supremacy of state power by the twentieth century should not obscure the fact that at times this power served the interests of one political group more than another.

Essentially, the balance of political power in the United States—the context of public memory—was shifting and fragmented before World War I. The nation-state, a growing business class, regional and local interests, and the concerns of ordinary workers, immigrants, and farmers all asserted themselves vigorously. No interest dominated the entire nineteenth century, but the nation-state was very influential in the aftermath of the American Revolution until the 1820s. It regained political and cultural power for a time after the Civil War. Its power, in terms of asserting its dominance over various vernacular interests, was effectively rivaled, however, in two periods and, unlike in the following century, could not be effectively sustained. Beginning in the late 1820s a rise in regional and class divisions led to sharp exchanges in commemorative activities and to something of a decline in the singleminded focus on patriotism and national unity that had reached a peak in 1825. Similarly, by the 1870s the consolidation of interests behind the effort to save the union in the North and leave it in the South gave way to a blatant drive for power by a growing class of businessmen and entrepreneurs and the efforts of workers, farmers, and ordinary people to restrain and control that effort. In the end this contest would help bring back the political and cultural power of the nation-state itself.

local residents who had been killed or had been wounded in action. In Winston-Salem, North Carolina, a brick memorial was built consisting of one brick for each of the fifty-eight local residents who were killed or missing in Vietnam.

14. Christie Norton Bradley, "Another War and Postmodern Memory: Remembering Vietnam" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1988), 17–27, 198. Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975) suggests that ordinary people—in this case writers in Great Britain—tended to remember World War I with the more somber metaphor of the "trenches" rather than with any metaphors of glory and valor.

Chapter One
The Memory Debate: An Introduction

1. For a discussion of the dogmatic quality of some cultural forms and their ability to privilege abstraction over experience, see George Lipsitz, *Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 14. The impact of oral histories upon the dogmatic quality of traditional historical studies is addressed in Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 1988), 72–99. My use of the terms official and vernacular has been influenced by the discussion in Susan G. Davis, *Parades and Power: Street Theater in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 16–18.

2. On "contradictions" in the social system see Mark Poster, *Foucault, Marxism, and History: Mode of Production Versus Mode of Information* (Cambridge, Eng.: Polity Press, 1984), 48, 60, 84–85. On patriotism see Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (London and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 8, 87–88, 205–6; Raphael Samuel, "Introduction: Exciting to be English," in *Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity*, ed. Raphael Samuel, 3 vols. (London: Routledge, 1989), 1:xix-xl.

3. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 156, 201.

4. On the rise of middle-class professionals see Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 111–32, and Thomas L. Haskell, "Professionalism versus Capitalism: R. H. Tawney, Emile Durkheim, and C. S. Pierce on the Disinterestedness of Professional Communities," in *The Authority of Experts*, ed. Thomas L. Haskell (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1984), 180–225. Samuel, "Introduction: Exciting to be English," xix-xxx. For a discussion of the role of intellectuals in helping to generate cultural rather than political nationalism see John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation-State* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987).

5. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), argued the symbol of a nation attracted strong feelings of attachment partially because it incorporated many "natural" meanings such as kinship or home and because it appeared to be an

entity outside the exclusive control of any one group or class. The idea of symbols containing discordant meanings is drawn from Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

6. Maurice Godelier, "The Ideal in the Real," in *Culture, Ideology, and Politics*, eds. Raphael Samuel and Gareth Steadman Jones (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1982), 12–38. This mediation of diverse interests in symbols is part of the reason that most myths and symbols have what Victor Turner has called a "multivocal quality"; see Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977).

7. Victor Gondos, "Karl S. Betts and the War Centennial Commission," *Military Affairs* 27 (Summer 1963): 51–75.

8. Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, eds. Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–14, suggests that public commemoration was created mainly to serve the interests of national leaders and national power. His hegemonic notions allow little room for the role of public discourse and exchange in the creation of traditions or for an appreciation of the multivocal quality of such inventions. A hegemonic view of commemoration is contained in W. Lloyd Warner, *The Living and the Dead: A Study of the Symbolic Life of American Communities* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959), 116–20. For a more complex view on the creation of a usable past see the pioneering work of David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 35–73.

9. The distinction between personal or autobiographical memory and historical memory is made in Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (New York: Harper, 1980); T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *American Historical Review* 90 (June 1985): 567–93; and Samuel, "Introduction: Exciting to be English," lx.

10. Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 144, 181–84. Pierre Nora sees a democratization of national memory symbols in the latter part of the nineteenth century in France in "La Nation Memorie," in *Les Lieux De Memorie*, vol. 2, pt. 3, *La Nation*, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 747–58. See William Cohen, "Symbols of Power: Statues in Nineteenth-Century Provincial France," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31 (July 1989): 491–513.

11. Mary Douglass, *Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1975), 160–61. My argument that public memory could be simultaneously multivocal and hegemonic was shaped by a reading of the work of Anthony Giddens and Clifford Geertz. Both scholars stress the importance of public exchanges in the restatement of reality. But Giddens allows for a good deal of manipulation and hegemony by locating the origins of ideological expressions in specific regions of the social structure. For Giddens the study of ideological systems is ultimately the examination of how structures of signification are mobilized to legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups. He accepts the need for discourse but feels it cannot be free of distor-

tion. "The repressions which distort communication are equivalent," he claims, " to the social sources of ideology."

Geertz, on the other hand, tends to locate the power of ideology not in the sectional interests of the social structure but in the power of ideological representations and symbols themselves. He stresses the degree that culture is independent of social structure rather than the social origins of cultural systems. For Geertz the power of symbols lies in their cognitive capacities that help people grasp, formulate, and communicate. Metaphors, for instance, can integrate discordant meanings from reality in such a way that multiple meanings or positions are coerced into a "unitary conceptual framework." A multiplicity of "referential connections" to social reality exist and are expressed in the metaphors and semantic structure of ideological systems. See Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984), 45–49, and *Central Problems in Social Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 175–88; Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 210–16. The increasing multivocal nature of public discourse can be viewed over time in Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), 17–54, 216.

12. Leslie T. Good, "Power, Hegemony, and Communication Theory," in *Cultural Power in Contemporary America*, eds. Ian Angus and Sut Jhally (New York: Routledge, 1989), 59–61; Stuart Hall, "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in Media Studies," in *Culture, Society, and the Media*, ed. Michael Gurevitch et al. (London: Metheun, 1982), 56–90.

Chapter Two
Public Memory in Nineteenth-Century America

1. Robert Wiebe, *The Segmented Society: An Introduction to the Meaning of America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 7–8.

2. Merrill D. Peterson, *The Jefferson Image in the American Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 13; Michael Kammen, *A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1986), 75–77.

3. Merle Curti, *The Roots of American Loyalty* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 140–41; Barry Schwartz, *George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 13–15, 31–45; Karal Ann Marling, *George Washington Slept Here: Colonial Revivals in American Culture, 1876–1986* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 53–84.

4. Philip F. Detweiler, "The Changing Reputation of the Declaration of Independence: The First Fifty Years," *William and Mary Quarterly* 19 (Oct. 1962): 559–73; Wesley Frank Craven, *The Legend of the Founding Fathers* (New York: New York University Press, 1956), 6–11; Fred Somkin, *Unquiet Eagle: Memory and Desire in the Idea of America, 1815–1860* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), 175–77.

5. Kammen, *A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the Historical*

Imagination (New York: Knopf, 1978), 38–43; Peterson, *The Jefferson Image in the American Mind*, 4–5. Mary Ryan, *Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825–1880* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 21, says that July 4th was the chief source of new holidays in the period.

6. Somkin, *Unquiet Eagle*, 131–63.

7. George Washington Warren, *The History of the Bunker Hill Monument Association* (Boston: J. R. Osgood, 1877), 9, 31, 94, 153, 231; David G. Hackett, "The Social Origins of Nationalism: Albany, New York, 1754–1835," *Journal of Social History* 21 (Summer 1988): 659–81.

8. William Tufant Foster, *Washington's Farewell Address to the People of the United States and Webster's First Bunker Hill Oration* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 45–47, 100–101.

9. Ibid., 100–101.

10. Warren, *The History of the Bunker Hill Monument Association*, 318–19.

11. "The Completion of the Bunker Hill Monument (June 17, 1843)," in *The Great Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1897), 145–46; "The Landing at Plymouth," ibid., 496–97. *Proceedings of the Bunker Hill Monument Association at the Annual Meeting, June 23, 1875* (Boston: Bunker Hill Monument Association, 1875), 143–51. At the fiftieth anniversary of the ground breaking in 1875 a much more complex set of interests were expressed that included pride in ethnic and religious heritages on the part of ordinary people as well as celebrations of patriotism and national unity.

12. Curti, *Roots of American Loyalty*, 126–28; Somkin, *Unquiet Eagle*, 63–64, 184–88; Richard Rollins, "Words as Social Control: Noah Webster and the Creation of the American Dictionary," in *Recycling the Past: Popular Uses of American History*, ed. Leila Zenderland (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), 50–52.

13. Craven, *Legend of the Founding Fathers*, 66, 86–89; Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Americans: The National Experience* (New York: Random House, 1967), 363; David Van Tassel, *Recording America's Past: An Interpretation of the Development of Historical Studies in America, 1607–1884* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

14. Boorstin, *The Americans: The National Experience*, 327–39.

15. Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Rockdale* (New York: Knopf, 1978), 312; see Susan G. Davis, *Parades and Power: Street Theater in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 67–71. Kathleen Neils Conzen, "Ethnicity as Festive Culture: Nineteenth-Century German Americans on Parade," in Warner Sollors, ed., *The Invention of Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 45.

16. Curti, *The Roots of American Loyalty*, 104–6; Eric Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 264–70; Sean Wilentz, *Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working-Class, 1788–1850* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 14.

17. George Appling, "Managing American Warrior-Heroism: Award of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 1863–1973" (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Cornell Univ., 1979), 11–32; Mary H. Mitchell, *Hollywood Cemetery: The History of a*