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USKORENIE, GLASNOST' AND PERESTROIKA: THE PATTERN OF REFORM UNDER GORBACHEV

BY JOHN M. BATTLE

IN commenting on recent Soviet reform initiatives, Western analysts have tended to focus attention on the question of whether such initiatives will, in the long run, be successful. This emphasis has produced both positive and negative results. On the positive side, the types of changes being proposed by Soviet reformers have been clearly defined and discussed. On the negative side, the ensuing debate over long-term prospects for change and what such changes portend for the future of the Soviet Union has led to excessive speculation concerning the potential impact of reform on the economic, political, and social parameters of the Soviet system.

It is too early to say whether Gorbachev will succeed in bringing about a revolutionary transformation of Soviet society. That the General Secretary has successfully managed to engage a traditionally conservative society—a society used to secrecy, following orders, and unquestioning obedience—in a far-ranging debate over the need for openness, innovation and democracy, is a tribute to his personal charisma and political skill. In order to alter the nature of the system he inherited significantly, however, Gorbachev must still overcome numerous obstacles.

Despite substantial personnel changes in the party and state apparatus, the forces of opposition to reform have not been defeated.¹ Gorbachev continued to face serious opposition not only from within the Central Committee of the CPSU, which has shown little enthusiasm for the more radical aspects of his policies, but from within the Politbureau itself. The removal of Eltsin from his post as First Secretary of the Moscow party organisation has had the effect of strengthening the hand of conservatives such as Ligachev, while undermining the position of those supporters of Gorbachev who feel that the process of restructuring is not proceeding far enough or fast enough.² Added to this already substantial opposition is the growing resistance to reform among the millions of Soviet citizens presently ensconced in the party and state apparatus who are seeking to protect their position and privileges.

While struggling to overcome the opposition his policies have generated, Gorbachev must also surmount substantial structural barriers to reform. Problems created among planners, management, party personnel, and workers as a result of confusion over the establishment of new lines of authority, a lack of clarity concerning job definition and job performance, and the fear and uncertainty caused by reform, impede the successful implementation of new policies. This, combined with the lack of an infrastructure capable of supporting many of Gorbachev's economic and social policies, makes the type of comprehensive reform Gorbachev has in mind extremely difficult.

Attempts to predict whether the General Secretary will succeed or fail in his drive to modernise the Soviet system seem doomed to failure for three reasons. While Gorbachev has managed to build a strong coalition with the creative intelligentsia, he will ultimately need the support of a majority of Soviet workers if his policies are to succeed. At present, the average worker seems content to sit on the fence, neither opposing nor supporting the reform process. Whether or not this group will eventually throw in its lot with Gorbachev is still unclear.

To convince the uncommitted, and to strengthen his hand against the opponents of reform, Gorbachev will need, in a relatively short period of time, to improve his nation's living standard. Given that the first concrete proposals aimed at improving economic performance have only recently emerged, it will probably be two to three years before an accurate measure of success in this area is possible.

Finally, being no stranger to the Soviet political process, Gorbachev must certainly recognise that if he is to succeed he must be able to maintain order and tranquility at home and abroad. The failure to contain large-scale demonstrations like those in Yerevan, or prevent the type of rioting which took place in Sumgait, will clearly jeopardise Gorbachev's reform agenda and could lead to his ouster. Yet, the General Secretary has made great strides in consolidating his power, and now dominates all major policy-making and executive institutions. Further, there is at present no other individual capable of offering himself as a viable alternative to Gorbachev. Therefore, one cannot conclude that, in the short term at least, the General Secretary will be unable to both maintain his position and authority and successfully move his reform agenda forward.

This rare juncture in Soviet history does, however, present a unique opportunity. The implementation from above of a bold reform programme under the heads of *uskorenie* (acceleration), *glasnost*³ (openness), *perestroika* (restructuring), and democratisation offers, for the first time since the Khrushchev period, the possibility of analysing the motivational forces which shape and promote the process of reform. Given our scant knowledge of the inner workings of Soviet politics, this endeavour should add considerably to our understanding of the 'mechanics' of reform in authoritarian single party states such as the Soviet Union.

To understand the mechanics of reform more fully it is necessary to examine the ways in which Gorbachev is attempting to circumvent the substantial opposition he now faces. This paper will attempt to piece together recurring patterns which suggest that Gorbachev's reform agenda is both rational and goal-oriented, and that opposition to reform, rather than retarding the reform process, has been instrumental in his decision to broaden the scope of reform. In particular, the circumstances surrounding the institution of a particular reform programme will be identified. By so doing, I hope to demonstrate that substantial opposition to the basic goals outlined under the heading of 'economic acceleration' led to the recognition that social, cultural and political reform was a necessary precondition of economic reform.

In December 1984 Gorbachev declared 'accelerating social and economic progress' to be the 'most important task of our time'.⁴ At the 24 April 1985 CC plenum he argued that the development of society would be 'determined, to a decisive extent, by qualitative changes in the economy, including a determined

effort to shift to intensive growth, and a drastic increase in efficiency'.⁵ This was to be accomplished by 'the scientific and technical updating of production', the 'attainment of the highest world level of labour productivity' and 'the improvement of economic relations'.⁶

To accomplish these goals, the development of 'a reliable basis for rapid progress', 'profound changes in the sphere of labour and in the population's material and spiritual living conditions', as well as the 'invigoration of all political and public institutions, the deepening of socialist democracy, and self-government by the people', were deemed necessary.⁷ In all of his speeches, up to and including his address at the April 1985 plenum, Gorbachev held to the position that economic reform must form the basis of social reform. He stated:

... life and its dynamism dictates the need for further changes and transformations, for the achievement of a new qualitative state of society. ... This means, above all, updating scientific and technical production while attaining the highest world level of labour productivity. It means the improvement of social relations, first of all economic relations. ... The development of Soviet society will be decisively determined by qualitative changes in the economy, by its switch onto the tracks of intensive growth, and by an all out increase in efficiency.⁸

In his plenum speech Gorbachev did not deny the need for, or the importance of, social reform. He argued that political stability and optimism for the future were enhanced by such 'permanent values' as 'broad access to spiritual culture', 'respect for dignity and the rights of the individual' and 'the steady expansion of working people's participation in management'. However, Gorbachev made it clear that economic reform must be accorded the highest priority. The development of Soviet society would be determined 'by qualitative changes in the economy'. In short, it was the economic policy of the party that would determine the nature and pace of reform:

In continuing to develop the centralised principle in the accomplishment of strategic tasks, we must advance more boldly along the path of expanding the rights of enterprises and their independence, introduce economic accountability and, on this basis, increase the responsibility and stake of labour collectives in the final results of work.

The central assumption of the acceleration campaign during its earliest phase was that substantial economic improvement would initiate equivalent improvements in all other areas of the system. This assumption changed in the months between the April plenum and the XXVII Congress in February 1986.

Gorbachev's comments at the April plenum do not reflect the nature or magnitude of opposition confronting his reform agenda. While the Kalinin and Tselinograd party committees were singled out for criticism over their management of the economy in their provinces, Gorbachev's comments read more like those of a schoolmaster admonishing errant pupils than a leader attempting to overcome strident opposition.⁹ In much of the speech Gorbachev lectures and cajoles, instructs and guides, all with a sense of urgency, but nowhere does he leave the impression that opposition to his policies is a serious problem.

The shift in emphasis away from socio-economic reform, and towards *glasnost* — a campaign designed to promote socio-political reform—would, however, seem to indicate the existence of substantial opposition to reform within the party, the bureaucracy, and Soviet society at large. A 1987 editorial by Aleksandr Tikhomirov on the main television news programme *Vremya* made it clear that substantial opposition to Gorbachev's reform agenda existed since its inception:

In summing up the results of the past year [1986] we consider it essential to speak again about openness [*glasnost*']. . . [Vladimir Pavlovich Kobaidze], one of the well-known organisers of production in our country, said to us. . . : "Prepare yourselves, there will be a great struggle". At that time we deleted this phase from the interview because we reckoned: What kind of struggle can there be if the party has decided? But now we are satisfied that it is indeed a struggle.¹⁰

It was further argued that officials and bureaucrats opposed reform because they were being held accountable for their actions. Tikhomirov concluded by stating that openness, contrary to the opinion of some, did not result in the party or the country being discredited, but helped in the restoration of Leninist norms.¹¹

Movement from socio-economic reform to socio-political reform, the effective difference between *uskorenie* and *glasnost*', was a result of two interrelated factors. First, Soviet economists could not agree on a blueprint for reform that would initiate qualitative changes without jeopardising political stability. And second, Gorbachev and his allies began to realise that the country's economic malaise was intrinsically linked to a deeper moral, social and cultural crisis. To decrease the alienation gap between government and society, a prerequisite of economic reform, Soviet reformers understood that they must first overcome public apathy and inertia. This could only be accomplished by promoting popular participation in the daily life of the country. If decisive changes are to occur, Soviet citizens must understand the need for, accept, and be willing to participate in the reform process. During the ten-month period between the April plenum and the XXVII Congress the *glasnost*' campaign was directed towards this end.

The primary objective of the *glasnost*' campaign was to reduce traditional constraints on the free flow of information. Media reform was based on three assumptions. First, more open mass media would better reflect the leadership's commitment to reform. Second, by increasing public discussion of social problems, individuals in the party, bureaucracy and state apparatus would be pressured to keep pace with the times. Third, and perhaps most importantly, more open media would act as a barometer, providing Soviet reformers with necessary feedback on the general acceptance or rejection of their policies.

After a slow start, and spurred on by constant criticism from Gorbachev, *glasnost*' began to have an impact. Television formats changed, and the printed media began to give serious and open coverage to problems not previously acknowledged in the Soviet Union. The readjustment problems experienced by returning Afghanistan veterans, such as personal disillusionment with Soviet society, vigilantism and drug addiction, introduced the Soviet public to a whole new version of the Afghanistan war. Likewise, reporting on criminal activity, prostitution and other social ills provided strikingly new fare for most Soviet citizens.

Beginning immediately after the April plenum, there was a significant intensification of the anti-corruption drive originally initiated by Andropov in February 1983, with almost daily reporting in the major newspapers and on television. Condemnation of corruption moved beyond a general discussion to focus on individual officials all the way up to the ministerial level. Charges that officials had placed themselves above the law and used their position for personal gain were mixed with those of bribery, theft of state property, poor work performance, wastefulness, excessive self-adulation and lack of criticism and self-criticism.¹²

A second aspect of the anti-corruption drive was the attack on the Soviet bureaucracy. In each of the aforementioned articles, and especially on television, considerable attention was paid to the problems associated with an excessive and unchanging bureaucracy. Every major Gorbachev speech and most editorials and commentaries drew attention to the continued foot-dragging of bureaucrats and their use of red tape to stifle reform.

The initiation of a broad, continuous and increasingly blunt discussion of social problems, including food shortages, poor housing, inadequate medical care, drug abuse, prostitution and excessive censorship, formed the basis of the *glasnost'* campaign. While increasingly radical debates over the nature and direction of economic reform continued, there was no longer any discussion of the ability of economic reform to solve social problems; rather, the reverse was true.

Other attributes of the *glasnost'* campaign included the publication and in-depth discussion of natural and man-made disasters, including figures on the number of casualties. To support their claim that the public was not only entitled to but wanted more openness, editors of major newspapers began publishing letters by readers demanding more information on topics affecting their daily lives.¹³ To encourage public participation in the reform process, Soviet reformers became more responsive to public opinion, publishing the results of surveys and opinion polls in such papers as *Izvestiya*. Readers' letters, including those in disagreement with policy, were published with increasing frequency.¹⁴

In direct contrast to the deluge of pro-Stalin material which appeared during the celebrations to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War, public criticism of Stalin began to emerge. Evtushenko's poem, 'Fuku', criticising Stalin's leadership, was published in the September 1985 issue of *Novyi mir*,¹⁵ and was praised in a *Pravda* editorial as 'a notable event in Soviet life and literature'.¹⁶ The Stalin period was again discussed in a negative light during the Congress of Russian Writers in December 1985, when Evtushenko argued that writers must confront the facts of Stalin's purges and the evils of collectivisation.¹⁷

After February 1986 the policy of *glasnost'* was pursued with renewed vigour. The spectrum of topics not only increased, but older themes were infused with a sense of greater importance. New themes included drug abuse;¹⁸ the deteriorating quality of the health care system; moral decay in Soviet society;¹⁹ excessive censorship; and perhaps most significantly, a public discussion of the need for reform within the party. This new aspect of *glasnost'* brought to the fore such topics as: permitting multiple candidates in party elections;²⁰ the need for greater party democracy through increased criticism and self criticism;²¹ a return to the

principle of collective leadership, especially at the level of provincial and regional party committees,²² and the abuse of party privileges.²³

Gorbachev underlined the importance he attached to intensifying the *glasnost* campaign by redefining the goals of the programme. In a speech delivered in the city of Togliatti, he stated:

As a result of the campaign to increase criticism, self-criticism and openness on a broad scale, people have felt an influx of energy; they have become bolder and more active, both at work and in public life. . . . Public openness is not a one-shot measure but a norm of present-day Soviet life, a continuous, uninterrupted process during which some tasks are accomplished and new tasks—as a rule, still more complicated ones—arise.²⁴

To increase support for reform among the general population, public participation in policy formulation was accorded a high priority. Owing to the tremendous outpouring of criticism from experts and those concerned with potential ecological damage, the project for diverting northern rivers for the irrigation of land in the Don, Northern Caucasus, and Kuban regions was cancelled. This was not an isolated victory for public opinion. Substantial public opposition to the building of an unpopular war monument outside Moscow was credited as a key factor in the Politbureau's decision to halt construction on the project. Supporting the right of the public to participate in the decision-making process, Gorbachev declared:

. . . there is nothing stronger than the force of public opinion, when it can be put into effect. And it can be put into effect only in conditions of criticism, self-criticism and broad public openness.²⁵

Openness in the media also continued to intensify after the XXVII Congress. The coverage of national disasters not only intensified, but reached the public with less delay and more detail than was previously the case. Reporting on such events as the Chernobyl disaster, the sinking of the Admiral Nakhimov in the Black Sea, and the loss of a Soviet nuclear submarine off the coast of Bermuda, are several examples of the attention paid to so called 'unpleasant' news items.

Another important offshoot of *glasnost*, and an indication of the determination of the leadership to broaden the base of the reform agenda, was the appearance of an article on the front page of *Pravda* criticising the KGB for having 'overstepped the bounds of socialist legality'. Signed by Viktor Chebrikov, a Politbureau member and head of the KGB, the article described how the head of state security in Voroshilovgrad had abused his power in the case of a Ukrainian reporter who had tried to expose government corruption in a local coal-mining operation. The article ended by stating that such practices could not be tolerated, and that the station chief responsible had been relieved of his duties.²⁶

Despite the intensification of the *glasnost* campaign, the XXVII Congress marked a turning point in the approach to reform. The decision by Gorbachev to introduce the *perestroika* campaign at this particular juncture lends support to two assumptions. First, Soviet reformers now understood that meaningful economic reform was not possible without socio-political reform. And second, Gorbachev

and his associates were unwilling to settle for partial reform, desiring instead a rational, long-term reform agenda in which *glasnost* was but one part.

There would be little reason to accept the above assumptions if, after the XXVII Congress, there had been a levelling out of the reform process. Gorbachev's call for the restructuring of social and party relations, however, gave the reform process new momentum. The relationship between the *glasnost* and *perestroika* campaigns reinforced each other. Without the emphasis on greater openness, criticism and self-criticism, the process of restructuring would not be possible. And without the call for restructuring, the rhetoric surrounding the *glasnost* campaign would have appeared hollow.

If change were to take place, Gorbachev needed first to make clear what was acceptable and what was not. While *glasnost* provided Soviet reformers with necessary feedback, the programme was not designed to facilitate policy directives aimed at modernising Soviet society. The restructuring campaign allowed Soviet reformers to push their reform agenda forward while launching a determined attack on social and political barriers interfering with the implementation of policy.

The decision to initiate a restructuring of social and party relations appears to have resulted from continuing opposition to economic and socio-political reform. In outlining the goals of the restructuring programme, Gorbachev stressed the need for 'radical reform' and argued against limiting economic reform to 'partial improvements'.²⁷ It was suggested that progress would be impossible if people 'did not learn to work in a new way'. It was absolutely necessary to 'put an end to inertness and conservatism in any of their forms', and to 'assess the situation realistically, to see it as it actually is'. 'Things must be called by their proper names' and 'there should be exactingness, honesty, and a party conscience'.²⁸

Gorbachev's speech to the XXVII Congress clarified the difficulties associated with this task. The speech contained numerous references to individuals and groups 'who [had] failed to grasp the profound importance of the tasks confronting them'.²⁹ Opposition to change was said to be most firmly rooted in the bureaucracy. One of many examples cited by the General Secretary was the practice by various ministries and organisations of exercising petty tutelage over enterprises, thus preventing initiative and stifling productivity.³⁰ The blame for continuing opposition was attributed to 'adherence to the old, the absence of a feel for the time, a propensity for excessive organisation, the habit of speaking vaguely, and the fear of revealing the real state of affairs'.³¹

Opposition to reform did not emanate solely from the bureaucracy. Large portions of Gorbachev's address were devoted to criticisms of the party, both at the provincial and regional level.³² The Moscow party apparatus was chastised for losing 'the spirit of self-criticism' and allowing complacency to surface. He accused local party bosses of having 'evaded decisions on complex problems while parading [their] successes', which impeded their ability to 'make a principled evaluation of shortcomings'.³³

The entire party apparatus in Uzbekistan was severely criticised for preventing the process of criticism and self-criticism from occurring: as Gorbachev stated:

Having lost touch with life, the republic's former top leadership made it a rule to speak only of successes, paper over shortcomings, and respond irritably to any criticism. In the Republican Party organisation discipline slackened, and persons for whom the sole principle was lack of principles, their own well-being, and careerist considerations were in favour. Toadyism and unbridled laudation of those 'senior in rank' became widespread. All this could not but affect the state of affairs. The situation in the economy and in the social sphere deteriorated markedly, machinations, embezzlement, and bribery thrived, and socialist legality was grossly transgressed.³⁴

The persistence of shortcomings in party work, despite the 'modern' approach adopted by some party organisations,³⁵ was blamed on the decline of collective principles and the ability of a single individual to dominate, thereby side-stepping party norms and institutions.³⁶

Alliance building has been a central feature of each reform programme. With respect to the acceleration campaign, Gorbachev reached out to the scientific and technological intelligentsia, promoting reform-minded economists, sociologists, and technical specialists to new positions of authority. With the openness and restructuring campaigns, popular cultural and artistic figures, individuals who had been vocal supporters of a more open society during the Brezhnev period, have been promoted to important cultural and artistic posts.

Ivan Frolov, now a special adviser to Gorbachev, replaced Richard Kosolapov as editor of the party's conservative ideological journal *Kommunist*. Frolov, who was removed from his position as editor of *Voprosy filosofii* in 1977, has been a vocal critic of T. D. Lysenko and an active advocate of greater freedom of expression for scientists. Sergei Zalygin, a modern day supporter of the New Economic Policy of the 1920s, and a man Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn called the second greatest contemporary prose writer after Yuri Kazakov, was appointed chief editor of *Novyi mir*. A founding member of the *derevenshchiki*, he has encouraged literary experimentation and promoted contemporary young writers.³⁷ The recent appointment of a number of other controversial figures to the editorship of major Soviet journals, men expected to aid not only in restructuring the literary field, but also in strengthening the alliance between reform elements of the leadership and the cultural intelligentsia, include Sergei Baruzdin at *Druzhba narodov*, Grigorii Baklanov at *Znamya* and Vitalii Korotich at *Ogonek*.³⁸

It is important to note that, in an area once dominated by conservative ideologues and the heavy hand of the censor, Gorbachev has actively encouraged the promotion of men with a proven record of speaking out against ideological conformity, excessive censorship and the stifling of artistic expression and creativity. Certainly, if Gorbachev was interested in surrounding himself with 'yes men', the individuals now being elected to key posts in major cultural institutions would not be likely candidates. While it is true that such individuals support the basic concepts of *glasnost'*, present indicators suggest that these same individuals will not be satisfied with a temporary cultural 'thaw', but will seek to influence the nature, pace and scope of change.

The most dramatic evidence of Gorbachev's willingness to tolerate individuals who are not only capable, but willing to demonstrate initiative and independence

in reshaping the parameters of their medium, came during the 5th Congress of the Cinema Workers' Union, held in May 1986. In a break with tradition, delegates at the congress broke ranks with the party and voted out the old guard. Sergei Schmemmann described the event:

Defying the time-honoured Soviet system of mechanically voting in an officially endorsed slate, younger, bolder film makers seized two-thirds of the 213 seats on the secretariat, sweeping out the staid buddhas who had long dominated the union. The main victim of the shake-up was Goskino, the state committee that had exercised control over all aspects of the film industry, from deciding which screenplays would be used to deciding which films would be released and how broadly.³⁹

The position of First Secretary passed to Elem Klimov, a controversial figure and a bold film maker who, in the past, had often challenged the *status quo* at Goskino. It took eight years before his film 'Agony', portraying the life of the religious mystic Rasputin, was finally released for public viewing. While his film 'Farewell' was made available to the Soviet public, Klimov was refused permission to enter the film in the 1982 Cannes film festival.

Klimov and members of the newly elected secretariat have begun to reshape drastically the way in which films are both produced and released. Films long banned are now finding their way into Soviet cinemas, censorship is being curtailed, and new and experimental films are being encouraged. As Klimov remarked:

Before there were two truths—the truth of newspapers, and the truth of individuals. Now this is no more. The main thing is that our union has taken an active position. In the past it did not fight for our suffering cinema. It had no word. . . . Now with the atmosphere of openness, people feel more independent. They sense that the fate of cinema depends on them, and they show real interest. . . . We want to make the process irreversible. Goskino was a monopoly, but now the creative outlook is in command.⁴⁰

Gorbachev has defined *uskorenie* as the process whereby Soviet citizens must 'work in a new way' to promote the process of 'renewal'. In a speech to car workers in Togliatti he declared that the process of reform could not take place unless Soviet citizens began to restructure their thinking, psychology and the organisation and methods of labour. 'I will say candidly that if we do not restructure ourselves, I am thoroughly convinced that we will not restructure either the economy or our public life in the spirit of the Congress decisions'.⁴¹

In an article published in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Fedor Burlatsky further clarified the theoretical parameters of the restructuring campaign. Under the title 'Lenin and the Strategy of Complete Change', Burlatsky argued passionately that the discussion of important themes was essential to the reform process: those he cited were: the concept of reform under socialism, the development of cooperatives, the family contract, the consistent implementation of Leninist economic accountability and a stress on the economic reforms of the NEP period, the role of trade and monetary relations and the socialist market, and the development of socialist self-government.⁴² 'Such ideas', Burlatsky stressed, 'must be passed through people's consciousness and be correctly understood, solidly mastered by all, and should

become a guide to action in the true sense of the term'.⁴³ To accomplish this, four elements were necessary. First, there must be an ability to face facts courageously while assessing the situation realistically. Second, individuals must have the means to reject old methods that have not worked. Third, a clear concept of constructive transformations must be developed. Fourth, genuine enthusiasts who are willing to work in new ways must be willing to stand up and lend their support.⁴⁴

Following the Burlatsky article, Gorbachev delivered a series of speeches in which he expanded the concept of reform beyond the guidelines set at the XXVII Congress. In a speech on 9 June 1986 to the Hungarian workers at the Csepel machine tool factory in Budapest, the Soviet leader declared: 'There is a need for more dynamism, more social justice, more democracy—in a word, more socialism'. He called for a 'bold reform' of the economy to be based on 'the improvement of central planning and full-scale cost accounting'.⁴⁵

In a speech to the Khabarovsk *aktiv* on 31 July 1986 Gorbachev went so far as to describe the restructuring process as revolutionary in nature.

Restructuring is a capacious word. I would equate the word restructuring with the word revolution. Our transformations, the reforms mapped out at the April plenum and the XXVII Congress are a genuine revolution in the entire system of relations in society, in the minds and hearts of people, in the psychology and understanding of the present period, and, above all, in the tasks engendered by rapid scientific and technical progress.⁴⁶

Gorbachev left no doubt that restructuring was to take place 'within the framework of the system', but stressed that 'ingrained dogmas' could not be allowed to cloud people's eyes, impede progress, or keep individuals from creatively elaborating theory and applying it in practice in the given concrete historical stage through which Soviet society was passing. He concluded that 'restructuring proposes the creation of an atmosphere in society' which would 'impel people to overcome accumulated inertia and indifference, to rid themselves in work and in life of everything that [did] not correspond to the principles of socialism'.⁴⁷

The most significant aspect of the reform process since the initiation of the restructuring campaign is the attempt to shake up the party apparatus. There has been a marked change in tactics since the XXVII Congress. No longer content to rely on criticism alone, the General Secretary is, as a first step, endeavouring to initiate institutional reform. The first salvo, timid as it was, was fired by Gorbachev at the XXVII Congress when, in a single sentence unobtrusively wedged into the middle of his five-hour speech, he stated: '... it is apparently time to make necessary corrections in our electoral procedures'.⁴⁸

This theme was picked up again in a pivotal article published in *Literaturnaya gazeta* in September 1986, when the deputy chief editor of the journal *Sovety narodnykh deputatov*, Vsevolod Vasil'ev, lamented the fact that during local Soviet elections, and up to the level of first secretary, each electoral district had only a single candidate to choose from.⁴⁹ On 31 October, this time in a *Pravda* editorial, he again broached the topic of restructuring party elections. In somewhat stronger terms, he declared that election procedures needed to be changed in an effort to

eliminate problems arising as a result of 'formal' elements.⁵⁰ Finally, an editorial praising the multiple candidate system of elections in Hungary appeared in the journal *Argumenty i fakty*.⁵¹

Having publicised his case, and in an effort to capitalise on the momentum created, Gorbachev moved with more confidence to implement changes in the electoral process. In his speech at the CC plenum on 27 January 1987 he pointed out that the Politbureau had received numerous proposals to 'give full scope to the expressed will of all communists, without exception, during the election of secretaries of party bureaux and party committees', and to raise their accountability to those who elect them. This could only be accomplished, Gorbachev argued, by 'changing the procedure for the election of secretaries of district, area, city, regional and territorial committees of the party, and the Central Committees of the Union Republic parties'.⁵²

The new procedure would entail secret ballot voting for candidates up to and including the position of first secretary. Party committees would have the right to enter any number of candidates on the voting list. While Gorbachev stressed that the principle of democratic centralism would remain in place, he made it clear that the process of forming elective bodies was an integral part of his reform agenda.⁵³

Opposition to Gorbachev's call for institutional reform of the party was both obvious and substantial. At a weekly Moscow news conference on 19 February 1987 it was reported that the plenum had been postponed three times because of a lack of consensus.⁵⁴ This is a strong indication that the General Secretary is facing a potent challenge to his policies from within the Politbureau itself. Two factors support this proposition: speeches by other politbureau members were not published and the General Secretary's proposal on procedural reform was only partially implemented. It was agreed that democratic elections in party cells, local government bodies and at the enterprise level would be carried out on an experimental basis in Kemerovo oblast and Riga. The new procedures would not, however, be instituted on a system-wide basis as Gorbachev had wanted.

In two highly unusual statements for a General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev made it clear that the struggle over party reform had created divisions within the Politbureau and Central Committee. In referring to the January plenum as a critical test of his policies, Gorbachev is reported to have said: 'If the meeting had convened and arrived at the conclusion that restructuring is not justified and should be rejected, I would have said "I cannot work otherwise"'.⁵⁵ The public was given another rare glimpse behind the veil which usually obscures the world of political infighting in the Soviet Union when, during a televised speech in Riga, Gorbachev declared: 'People have to learn to work under conditions of democracy', and 'whoever has not yet understood this could find himself in a difficult position'.⁵⁶

Indeed, Gorbachev wasted little time in carrying out this threat. At the June plenum the former Kazakhstan First Secretary, Dimukhamed Kunaev, and the Minister of Defence, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, were relieved of their duties. To reinforce his claim that those who could not learn to work under new conditions would find themselves in a difficult situation, the General Secretary, in his speech to the plenum, singled out for criticism two of his own appointees, the director of

Gosplan, Nikolai Talyzin, and the head of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, Lev Voronin. Gorbachev made it clear that individuals would be judged on the basis of their job performance and not on the good will of their political patron in February 1988, when he dismissed Talyzin from his post.

To overcome mounting opposition, and in an effort to enhance his personal power base within the Politbureau, Gorbachev used the June plenum to promote three key allies—Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, Viktor P. Nikonov and Nikolai N. Slyunkov. Yakovlev, a former ambassador to Canada, held the post of Propaganda Chief prior to his promotion. He is a staunch supporter of Gorbachev and the driving force behind the anti-Stalin campaign. Nikonov, an agricultural specialist, was given Gorbachev's old portfolio as Central Committee Secretary in charge of agriculture. An ardent supporter of the need for agricultural modernisation, Nikonov has been fully supportive of Gorbachev's agricultural policies. Slyunkov, a protégé of the Prime Minister, Ryzhkov, while working at Gosplan, was promoted to the position of Belorussian First Secretary by Andropov. As a full member of the Politbureau, he now serves as one of Gorbachev's key economic advisors.

These three promotions and two demotions indicate that Gorbachev has been successful in bringing into positions of power men with convictions similar to his own. By making it clear that job performance and not political patronage would decide an individual's career path, he had managed to improve his political leverage greatly. Given the new structure of the Politbureau, it seems unlikely that, in the near future, the General Secretary will experience any difficulties in finding sufficient support within the Politbureau and Central Committee on questions pertaining to his reform agenda.

Gorbachev wasted no time in taking advantage of the political gains he made between the January and June plenums. Beginning with his comments at the January plenum, he moved to circumvent opposition to party reform by linking the success of *perestroika* to the democratisation of all spheres of Soviet society. The General Secretary made it clear that the process of democratisation would serve two purposes: to ensure that past errors were not repeated and to prevent the reform process from being reversed.⁵⁷ While the term 'democratisation' had been used previously during the Gorbachev period, the urgency placed on the need for 'deep-going democratisation of society' at the January plenum was reinforced at the June plenum, indicating that the reform process was again being revitalised.⁵⁸

During the interval between the January and June plenums Gorbachev went on the offensive. He continued to insist that the process of restructuring must include the 'all-round development of the democracy of the socialist system, the real and ever more active participation of the people in solving all questions of the country's life', and greater 'public control'. Indeed, restructuring was now considered possible 'only through democracy and due to democracy'.⁵⁹ According to Gorbachev, the entire process of reform now rested on a single pillar, the democratisation of the party and society. 'We will not cope with the tasks of restructuring if we do not pursue the line of democratisation firmly and consistently'.⁶⁰

Recognising the potential impact of democratisation on Soviet society in

general, and on the party in particular, and in an effort to silence intra-party opposition, numerous attempts were made to give the concept ideological legitimacy. In one instance Gorbachev argued: '...in the conditions of reorganisation, when the task of intensifying the human factor has become so urgent, we must return once again to Lenin's approach to the question of the maximum democracy of the socialist system under which people feel that they are their own masters and creators'.⁶¹ Invoking the sacred teachings of Lenin, Gorbachev further stressed the ideological correctness of democratisation. He emphasised Lenin's supposed claim that: 'We must be guided by experience, we must allow complete freedom to the creative faculties of the masses'. To accomplish this task, it was necessary, Gorbachev asserted, to follow Lenin's advice that 'the more profound the transformation, the more interest in it must be enhanced'.⁶² According to the General Secretary, this was 'the essence of democracy'.⁶³

It is no accident that the process of restructuring was widened to include the concept of democratisation. Gorbachev made it clear that the further democratisation of society was necessary to overcome inertia and conservatism. Rather than accept the advice of more conservative members of the Politbureau that a slower pace was needed, Gorbachev argued that growing contradictions in socialist society had acquired forms presaging a crisis. The solution, in his view, was to deepen the participation of the masses in the process of self-management of the affairs of society and the state. This could only be accomplished, he concluded, by speeding up the pace of democratisation.⁶⁴

Gorbachev's vision of democracy is closer to that of Dubcek than Jefferson. As Seweryn Bialer has accurately put it, democracy under Gorbachev appears to be the reverse of patterns in the West. It envisages elements of a grass-roots democracy at the microsocietal level—free elections at the enterprise, primary party organisation and local soviet level—but not at the macroinstitutional level which includes state and party institutions.⁶⁵

The democratisation campaign serves two purposes. Gorbachev has recognised that for modernisation to take place in the Soviet Union, citizens must feel a part of the decision-making process.⁶⁶ Behind this political logic, however, there is also an instrumental logic. Simply put, Gorbachev needs the support of the general population if he is to succeed in overwhelming elite and bureaucratic opposition. A strong alliance with the scientific-technological, cultural and artistic intelligentsia has not given Soviet reformers the broadly based support necessary to ensure the complete implementation of the reform agenda.

To enhance his authority, Gorbachev is turning to the Soviet worker. In the period of post-war construction, Stalin allied himself not with the Soviet worker, but with the middle class. In his 'Big Deal', the delivery of material benefits in exchange for political support, the worker as role model was supplanted by the image of the happy, satisfied careerist.⁶⁷ During the 1960s and 1970s worker morale continued to decline as Brezhnev promoted his policy of 'stability of cadres', a programme designed to guarantee the middle-class bureaucrat and party worker material and job security. It is not surprising that individuals in the middle echelons of the Soviet party and state apparatus are the ones who now pose the greatest obstacle to reform.

If, through the process of democratisation, Gorbachev can convince Soviet workers of his desire to improve their lot, they could prove to be a valuable source of support for his reform agenda. It is toward this end that Soviet reformers have turned their energy. In his speech at the AUCCTU Congress, Gorbachev told workers that 'it was time to bring socialist emulation back down to earth, to the production shops and teams, to make it a matter of the working people themselves'.⁶⁸ Democracy would 'guarantee against the repetition of past errors' and ensure that the diligent worker would be elevated both materially and morally.⁶⁹

This new 'Big Deal' offers the Soviet worker an increased stake in the formation and implementation of policy, greater control over economic decision making, increased health and safety measures in the work place, more favourable working conditions, including increased shift rotation, greater funding for new housing and social and cultural establishments, greater access to higher quality consumer goods and new legislation designed to protect workers' rights.⁷⁰

The democratisation campaign is designed to instil in the working strata of Soviet society a new sense of purpose, responsibility, and collective enthusiasm for reform. Gorbachev has promoted the worker to the forefront of the reform process. In his historic address to the Central Committee, delivered on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachev went so far as to claim that *perestroika* picked up where the October Revolution left off. He argued that 'the purpose of *perestroika* is the full and practical re-establishment of Lenin's conception of socialism, in which indisputable priority belongs to the working man with his ideals and interests. . .'.⁷¹ The fate of the restructuring process, according to the General Secretary, 'will be decided not in offices, but in the actual deeds of work collectives'.⁷² The essence of this latest shift in policy is clear. The work collective is to be considered 'the central cell in the restructuring effort' and it is the worker who will decide whether 'democracy or social inertia and conservatism' prevails.⁷³

In conclusion, it is important to point out that in his attempt to implement his reform programme Gorbachev now faces four important obstacles. The first and foremost obstacle continues to be bureaucratic opposition. The second presents itself in the form of what Gorbachev himself has referred to as the right opposition. Included here are individuals who, while not overtly opposing reform, believe that the pace of reform has begun to undermine the 'foundations of socialism' and must, therefore, be slowed.⁷⁴

The third obstacle to reform involves the survival of what Burlatsky has called an authoritarian and patriarchal political culture. According to Burlatsky, the decline in worker management is due to the lack of a general and political culture.⁷⁵ Herein lies Gorbachev's dilemma. To maintain momentum he must continue to broaden the base of his reform agenda. Yet a majority of Soviet citizens, accustomed to an authoritarian political culture, lacks the resources required to function successfully in Gorbachev's new world. Should the General Secretary move too quickly, he risks alienating those whom he most needs, the Soviet workers. Should he pull back, he risks jeopardising both his credibility and his authority.

This leads directly to the fourth obstacle to reform. Gorbachev has, since the April

1985 plenum, been struggling to overcome opposition from within the bureaucracy, the party, and from large conservative segments of the population. Now, and as the Eltsin affair aptly demonstrated, Gorbachev is, for the first time, faced with the problem of placating both those who wish to slow the pace of reform as well as those who believe that the General Secretary's policies do not go far enough.

In a direct reference to the October plenum Gorbachev derided those who use 'ultra-*perestroika* clichés' and advocate 'revolutionary phraseology' as having neither the composure nor the readiness necessary to assume responsibility. In responding to the furore over the resignation of Eltsin, Gorbachev admitted that the party's rebuff was 'viewed by some intellectuals, especially young people, as a blow at *perestroika*', but went on to argue that this was 'a great delusion'. He concluded by stressing that not demagogic phrases but persistent and lengthy work was the key to moving society forward to new frontiers.⁷⁶

The Eltsin affair has presented Gorbachev with his most serious political crisis since taking office. This does not mean, however, as some Western analysts have suggested, that Gorbachev 'has ceased to lead his revolution from the front'.⁷⁷ Gorbachev's remarks since October indicate that he has survived the Eltsin débâcle and come out fighting. In his January 1988 speech, he stated:

I want to stress once again that the main thing now is to boost the morale of the people, to back their struggle for restructuring. It is necessary to show *perestroika* in the real struggle of social forces. People want changes, they want to take part in the restructuring drive, but in many cases they simply do not know how. It is necessary to help people master new approaches. It is necessary to address oneself to past experience, to draw from it everything that could well serve our cause. We should act, so to say, using the method of dialectical negation: to absorb everything that is best, everything that once worked, served us at all stages. Everything that is obsolete and outdated must be discarded and replaced with new things. Such is our formula.⁷⁸

As the above paragraph, and indeed the entire speech indicates, Gorbachev is neither 'licking his wounds' nor in retreat.⁷⁹ Rather, he is beginning to concentrate his efforts on overseeing the successful implementation of those reforms already agreed. With the experience of the past three years behind him, he is, for the first time, following a more consistent and stable line.

That opposition to the reform process will increase as the new policies are enforced is certain. What is less certain is whether Gorbachev can overcome the obstacles now facing him. The June 1988 party conference will no doubt be an important proving ground for the General Secretary. Gorbachev, unlike Khrushchev, will not risk alienating important conservative interest groupings which he recognises must be brought into the reform process. He will accomplish this by allowing both the Soviet population and his allies an opportunity to adapt to the changes taking place. However, Gorbachev will not, and indeed cannot, suspend the reform process. If patterns already established and outlined here are any indication, we can expect Gorbachev to use the party conference as a mechanism for once again broadening the base of his reform agenda.

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¹ For a discussion of personnel changes under Gorbachev, see Archie Brown, 'Change in the Soviet Union', *Foreign Affairs*, 64 no. 5 (Summer 1986) pp. 1048–65.

² While details of the Eltsin affair remain sketchy, it would appear from what is known that Ligachev and his more conservative followers benefited from Eltsin's removal from office. See George F. Kennan, 'The Gorbachev Prospect—*Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* by Mikhail Gorbachev', in *The New York Review of Books*, 21 January 1988, pp. 3–7, and Peter Reddaway, 'The Battle for Moscow—*Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World* by Mikhail Gorbachev', in *The Atlantic*, 1 February 1988, pp. 34–37.

³ *Glasnost* is an extremely difficult if not impossible word to translate into English. The term literally means to make known, to publish or publicise, but in recent Western literature has most often been translated as 'openness'.

⁴ M. S. Gorbachev, *Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda* (Moscow 1984).

⁵ M. S. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 24 April 1985, p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Gorbachev's criticisms of the party organisations centre on their apparently uncritical attitude towards their tasks and a reluctance to take note of negative phenomena. See *Ibid.* p. 2.

¹⁰ 'Officials Said "Resisting" Openness Campaign', *FBIS*, III, 5 January 1987, p. R1.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² For a sample of the types of articles appearing which dealt with corruption, see *Izvestiya*, 29 May 1985 and 8 October 1985; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 4 August 1985; *Pravda*, 6 December 1985 and 24 December 1985, and *Kommunist*, 1986, no. 1.

¹³ See, for example, *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 6 October 1985.

¹⁴ See, for example, *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 26 April 1985; *Pravda*, 18 August 1985 and *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 8 January 1986.

¹⁵ Evgeny Evtushenko, 'Fuku', *Novyi mir*, 1985 no. 9.

¹⁶ Pavel Ulyashov, *Pravda*, 12 January 1986. This response is in direct contrast to a review of Evtushenko's *Yagodnye mesta* in the December 1983 issue of *Nash sovremennik*, which was extremely critical of an episode in which the author described the round-up of a group of so-called kulaks. In the episode, a man who is not a kulak is wrongfully arrested and deported. Evtushenko was accused of taking liberties with sensitive issues about which he knew nothing. The review concluded by suggesting that Evtushenko should stick to poetry.

¹⁷ Sergei Schmemmann, *The New York Times*, 18 December 1985, pp. A1 and A7. The anti-Stalin campaign has, since 1985, become an integral component of the reform process under Gorbachev, going well beyond what was accomplished by Khrushchev. Unlike Khrushchev, Gorbachev has begun to attack not just Stalin, but Stalinism. See Mikhail Gorbachev, *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues*, (Moscow 1987), pp. 17–28.

¹⁸ The problem of drug abuse was discussed openly and often in such widely circulated sources as *Sovetskaya Latvija*, *Moskovskaya pravda*, *Literaturnaya gazeta* and *Sovetskaya molodezh*.

¹⁹ One example of the willingness to discuss openly problems afflicting Soviet society was the 11 September 1986 interview on Radio Moscow with the writer and literary critic Georgii Kunitsyn, in which he declared that the process of moral decay had touched almost every person in the country. Discussions of this type in the media reflected a growing trend to show that corruption was not limited to a few events, but was in fact the general rule.

²⁰ On 17 September 1986 an article in *Literaturnaya gazeta* explored the idea of nominating more than one candidate in party elections. This idea has since been picked up by Gorbachev and pursued in some depth.

²¹ M. S. Gorbachev, 'Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', in *Socialism: Theory and Practice*, 1986 no. 4 (April) p. 98.

²² *Ibid.* p. 99.

²³ The announcement by Ligachev that the director of the Moscow Institute of International Relations had been expelled for extending favours to the children of officials who wanted to enrol was discussed publicly in a feature article in *Izvestiya* on 2 October 1986.

²⁴ *Pravda*, 9 April 1986, p. 2.

²⁵ M. S. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 2 August 1986.

²⁶ *Pravda* 4 January 1987.

²⁷ Gorbachev, 'Political Report . . .' p. 42.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 100.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 36.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 46.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 100.

³² Exposure of corruption at high levels of the party apparatus is undoubtedly part of an attempt by Gorbachev to remove political competitors and enhance his own power base within the party. I would suggest, however, that Gorbachev's comments concerning the decline of party collectivism and the downgrading of party bodies in favour of the rise to prominence of a single individual capable of issuing orders and side-tracking party procedure shed light on an equally important yet little discussed issue. Vera Dunham and Steve Cohen have maintained, and I feel rightfully so, that during the Brezhnev period a substantial amount of power shifted away from the Politbureau and into the hands of provincial and regional party chiefs. Such individuals, entrenched as they are, now represent a potent obstacle to reform.

³³ Gorbachev, 'Political Report . . .', p. 100.

³⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 100–101.

³⁵ The seven party organisations mentioned by Gorbachev as having made the effort to adopt new methods were those of Belorussia, Latvia, Sverdlovsk, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Krasnodar and Ulyanovsk.

³⁶ Gorbachev, 'Political Report . . .', pp. 100–101.

³⁷ In the story *Na Irtyshe* Zalygin openly displayed his anti-Stalin sentiments. In similar style he wrote the novel *Posle Buri*, in which the NEP period was portrayed as a time of social and spiritual transformations.

³⁸ By transforming the once conservative journal *Ogonek* into a trendsetting literary magazine, Korotich has demonstrated his willingness to test the limits of what is allowable under the banner of *glasnost*. Articles on such heady topics as youth gang violence and police brutality, mixed with reprints of Anna Akhmatova's poetry and the writings of Nikolai Bukharin, while provoking criticism from conservative segments of the Soviet hierarchy, have not yet forced a retreat. An important milestone for Korotich was the publication of excerpts from Anatolii Rybakov's novel *Children of the Arbat*, in which Rybakov details the horrors of life under Stalin. For excerpts from an interview with Korotich see Felicity Barringer, 'Moscow Magazine Is Leader in New Openness'. *The New York Times*, 22 March 1987, p. A18.

³⁹ Sergei Schmemann, 'Winds of Change Stir Soviet Film', *The New York Times*, 12 October 1986, p. H19.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Pravda*, 9 April 1986.

⁴² Fedor Burlatsky, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 16 April 1986, p. 2.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Pravda*, 10 June 1986.

⁴⁶ *Pravda*, 2 August 1986.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Gorbachev, 'Political Report . . .', p. 72.

⁴⁹ Vsevolod Vasil'ev, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 17 September 1986, p. 3.

⁵⁰ Vsevolod Vasil'ev, *Pravda*, 31 October 1986.

⁵¹ See *Argumenty i fakty*, 1986 no. 38.

⁵² M. S. Gorbachev, 'Report to the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, January 27, 1987', *Press Bulletin*, Press office of the USSR Embassy in Canada, 2 February 1987, p. 31.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 32.

⁵⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the news conference see Bill Keller, 'Gorbachev Presses for Vote with Choice of Candidates', *The New York Times*, 20 February 1987, p. A10.

⁵⁵ Gorbachev's implied threat to resign should he not be able to garner the support necessary to carry out his reform agenda is unprecedented in the Soviet period. This comment was attributed to the General Secretary by Egor Yakovlev at a Moscow news conference. See *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ The removal of top party candidates in the Ukraine is an indicator that Gorbachev's threat is not an idle one. Two provincial secretaries, Viktor Boiko of Dnepropetrovsk and Viktor Dobrik of Lvov, have been replaced by individuals favoured by Gorbachev. Whether these changes will lead to the removal of Vladimir Shcherbitsky, the Ukrainian party leader and one of the few remaining Politbureau members who owed their allegiance to Brezhnev, is difficult to predict. See *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Gorbachev reinforces this point in his recently published book. He states: 'The main idea of the January Plenary Meeting—as regards ways of accomplishing the tasks of *perestroika* and protecting society from a repetition of the errors of the past—was the development of democracy. It is the principal guarantee of the irreversibility of *perestroika*'. See *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, Mikhail Gorbachev (Harper and Row, 1987) p. 63.

⁵⁸ 'Report to the Plenary Meeting . . .', p. 12.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 24.

⁶⁰ M. S. Gorbachev, 'On the Party's Tasks in Radically Restructuring the Management of the Economy', Report to the Central Committee Plenum 25 June 1987, *Pravda* 26 June 1987, p. 3.

⁶¹ Gorbachev, 'Report to the Plenary Meeting . . .', p. 24.

⁶² Gorbachev, 'On the Party's Tasks . . .'.

⁶³ Gorbachev, 'Report to the Plenary Meeting . . .'.

⁶⁴ The topics of democratisation and the role of the worker in Soviet society have become an integral part of the reform debate. In his book Gorbachev argued that: 'The more socialist democracy there is, the more socialism we will have. This is our firm conviction and we will not abandon it. We will promote democracy in the economy, in politics and within the party itself. The creativity of the masses is the decisive force in *perestroika*. There is no other, more powerful force'. See *Perestroika* . . ., p. 63.

⁶⁵ Seweryn Bialer, 'Gorbachev's Move', *Foreign Policy*, no. 68, (Fall 1987) p. 64.

⁶⁶ This has become a common theme, repeated in most of Gorbachev's speeches and writings. See for example his remarks concerning alienation and the worker's constitutional right to have direct involvement in the affairs of state in *Perestroika* . . ., pp. 110–111.

⁶⁷ Vera Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middle Class Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge, 1976) pp. 18–19. See also Timothy Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1986) p. 47.

⁶⁸ 'Gorbachev Addresses 18th AUCCTU Congress', Moscow Television Service, *FBIS*, III (27 February 1987) p. R8.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. R5 and p. R11.

⁷⁰ In discussing control over economic decision making, Gorbachev stated: ' . . . the most important changes will be determined by the transformation of the economic mechanism, by the transition to cost-accounting, self-financing, self-repayment and self-management'. *Ibid.* p. R9.

⁷¹ Mikhail Gorbachev, *October and Perestroika*, p. 42.

⁷² 'Gorbachev Addresses 18th AUCCTU Congress', p. R8.

⁷³ *Ibid.* p. R8 and p. R6.

⁷⁴ M. S. Gorbachev, 'Democratisation is the Essence of *Perestroika* and Socialism', *Moscow News*, Supplement, 1988 no. 4 (3304), p. 2.

⁷⁵ Fedor Burlatsky, *Pravda* 18 July 1987, p. 3.

⁷⁶ Gorbachev, 'Democratisation is the Essence . . .', p. 2.

⁷⁷ Reddaway, 'The Battle for Moscow', p. 36.

⁷⁸ Gorbachev, 'Democratisation is the Essence . . .', p. 5.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 38.