

ARTICLE



The culture of ban: pop culture, social media and securitization of youth politics in today's Russia

Ilya Kukulin

National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation

ABSTRACT

In today's Russia, one can observe aspiration of ruling political elites to securitize cultural politics, i.e. to present culture as an issue of state security. This process is very noticeable in youngsters' pop culture: in the 2010s, it became an object of close attention and "management" on the part of political actors and institutions. This article is focused on complex relationships between this policy of securitization and waves of moral panic regularly arising in the Russia's society. These moral panics can be entailed with many types of agents, from local state employees to conservative groups of parents. These panics can be used as a reason for the further securitization. This reciprocal interdependency of local agents and state-level subjects of cultural politics (and cultural policy) now experience a hidden crisis, caused with current processes of self-organization and growing politicization in the Russia's pop culture milieu.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 18 January 2020
Accepted 5 November 2020

KEYWORDS

Moral panics; securitization of cultural politics; contemporary Russia's pop music; prefigurative culture; censorship in Russia

In summer 2019, an acute political crisis broke out in Moscow, triggered when the city elections commission refused to register independent oppositional candidates to stand for the position of deputy of the city parliament – the Moscow Duma – accusing them of allegedly falsifying the signatures of voters supporting them. A number of large-scale gatherings and marches took place in Moscow, during which the police and national guard acted with shocking brutality. At the same time, the city authorities organized two festivals in quick succession featuring pop music and free meat dishes, inviting the leaders of all of the well-known rock bands, including even those that were politically on the left and therefore apparently nonconformist in their views (for instance, the St. Petersburg group 'Dvanov,' named in honor of Andrei Platonov's character) – in short, several of the invited rock musicians refused, having announced that they cannot play when innocent people are being arrested at that moment.

When city activists applied to hold a meeting on August, 10, in defense of the opposition candidates, they indicated that three pop groups would take part in the event and received the answer from city authorities that no musical performances would be allowed – in spite of the Russian legal system does not provide for such restrictions. The huge rally on Andrei Sakharov's Avenue that became a culmination of this protest, drew together a number of participants that was exceptional for Russia today (around 60 thousand people), and all three groups performed all the same. Immediately after the protest, Irina Kirkora, the director of a pro-government human rights advocacy, posted commentary to her blog on Facebook with the puzzled question: '... How did the coordination take place for the musicians who performed? Each performance was worse than the one before ... and clashed with the speakers' presentations.'¹ The word 'coordination'

[soglasovanie] is taken from Soviet bureaucratic language and suggests that the selection of performers was undertaken by a special commission, which of course was not so.

'Musical management' on the Moscow authorities' part, its arbitrary ban on musical performances at the protest, Irina Kirkora's claims – these are different aspects of one and the same process. One can suggest that the Russian political elite conceive of pop music as a powerful instrument of psychological influence that should be used in the interests of the current power institutions and never in the interests of the opposition.

Special attention of Moscow authorities and loyalist public speakers to a question of what pop stars may perform at what public events expresses a deeper and more general tendency – securitization of youth and cultural policy in today's Russia. This process is very noticeable at the intersection of youth and cultural policy, i.e. in the authorities' aspiration to overtly control an interest of younger parts of audience to pop singers and rappers. Their concerts in Russia are often being banned, but these restrictions make them more popular and possibly provoke a growth of psychological tensions between elder and younger generations.

In the countries like the USSR or Islamic Republic of Iran, where an specific state ideology is adopted (or was adopted in the past), culture is (or was) usually turned into a subject of consistent management of – or on behalf of – state or ruling party's organizations. In such a case, cultural policy is deeply instrumentalized. In Iran, in 2005, the term 'cultural engineering' was officially deployed (Tajmazinani 2018). In such countries, a strict censorship functions, and in whole, maintenance of culture's stability is considered as a matter of state security. In other countries, where (relatively) free market in cultural industries can be found, the 'texts' of pop culture (Hesmondhalgh 2019) or works of contemporary art can often become objects of moral panic and/or immediate aggression, but state institutions do not support these assaults – at least publicly. Here, one can recall attacks of Hindu and Muslim fundamentalist movements at writers, painters and filmmakers for 'blasphemy and outraging religion' in their work or for tackling issues such as homosexuality and widow remarriage in today's India (Isar 2018), or public shaming addressed to Kyrgyz feminist and pop singer Zere Asylbek for her 'body-positive' video (Sensey 2018). Russia represents a unique (or, at least, rare) intermediate case: in the second half of the 2010s, a 'grey zone' appeared in this country – a social and cultural space where 'grassroots' initiators of moral panics and state agents of securitization support and provoke each other. Such 'mutual stimulation' is especially noticeable in authorities' attitudes to youth pop music and to the youth Internet culture.

In this paper, I am going to analyze how this 'grey zone' functions focusing on securitization of cultural policy in the age of social media. Both securitization and cultural policy have one common goal that can be called *management of an imagined community* (Campbell 1992; Walker 1997; Morozov 2009; Paquette and Beauregard 2018; Anderson 2006). Modern political actors use to manipulate with images of 'we' and/or with moral norms for and limits of these communities (see on nationalism as shaping of moral norms and rules in an 'imagined community': Yack 2012). I argue that due to social media's functioning this kind of 'management' of political actors becomes visible and tangible. Moreover, as I detail in this article, in many cases, agents of securitization tackle the 'symbolic policy' (of 'policy of the symbols'): a new pop song, or a new fashion collection, or a new film can appear a threat to the values of the 'imagined community' much more often than previously because due to the Internet, all these 'texts' are very easily accessible. In the next section, I discuss some of key cases when some pop concerts or pop music videos were banned to show that these are not isolated events. These cases reveal the fear for future, particularly the fear for (and of) young generation, characterizing both the political elites and significant part of Russia's society. This fear has become an important factor in Russia's cultural policies.

Chasing the youngsters: how Russia's political elites stimulate a moral panic in the society

Political studies (especially IR) widely use the term 'securitization' to describe a situation in which the representatives of the political elite present the most varied aspects of social or economic life as a question of national security. Many scholars noted that securitization is deeply connected to the idea of the state of emergency or emergency measures: the affirmation that something is a problem of national security many times was and now can be used to justify breaking or curtailing the normal activity of known laws and rules in their relevant spheres (Deudney 1990; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). Securitization and increasing usage of different types of state of emergency is one of the most important trends in contemporary world politics (Agamben 1998). Its intensification is tied to crises springing from globalization – in particular, the influx of immigrants from the Middle East into Western Europe in the 2010s – or to the new authoritarian-populist tendencies in countries ranging from Hungary to the United States (Müller 2016). According to Müller (2016), populism is a rhetoric aimed at glorification of a majority that is equated with 'everybody,' an image of a 'people' as a whole social body. In such a case, securitization can mean stigmatizing and demonization of minorities, their tastes and their styles of life.

However, the rhetoric of securitization can have more or less influence in different countries. Its influence depends on the powers of the political institutions, systems of checks and balances, the behavior of political elites and the attitudes of the population. In Russia, due to the weakness of such institutions, along with a host of other reasons (to be discussed further below), the rhetoric of securitization is often used and is entirely operative. The issue of national security can be derived from matters of energy exports, of the export and import of food, and indeed of any discrete area regulated politically in social and economic life ('content politics'); the Russian politicians love to discuss the issues of 'energy security' or 'food security'. However, in the area of cultural politics this rhetoric is noticeable both on the levels of the higher political elites and of the 'grassroots' policy. '... Preservation of the Russian language, literature, our culture is a matter of national security, of maintaining identity in the global world,' claimed Vladimir Putin at a plenary session of the congress of the Russian Literature and Language Society on 26 May 2016; later in this same speech, he spoke out still more energetically: 'What we are really talking about here is the preservation of nothing less than our very national identity [...] for Russians, this is a question of being and remaining Russian' (Putin 2016). This was reinforced by Russia's Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinskii, who stated with satisfaction: 'at the state level, culture is assessed as a part of national security' (Medinskii 2016).

In March 2018, the website of the Russian Ministry of Culture published the Concept for a new Law on Culture. The text of the concept is literally overflowing with the rhetoric of securitization. The nearing danger to the country – which the authors of the document argue must be opposed by adopting this new law – is declared to be 'a humanitarian crisis,' that carries with it 'the deformation of historical memory, the negative evaluation of notable periods in national history, the spread of the false understanding of Russia as historically backward.' Another threat was 'the lowering of Russian society's cultural level and the degradation of specific kinds of art and cultural activity' (Concept 2018). According to the Concept's authors, in this situation 'a person, especially a young person, begins to seek his spiritual and ideological foundations outside of culture (sic!). This explains the effectiveness of Internet propaganda for radical Islam, the spread of various destructive sects, the recruitment of children and youths to [...] nationalist organizations, the provocation of youths to take part in unlawful protest actions, and so forth' (ibid).²

In the Concept a distinct logical link is observed: without the tough moderation of cultural life on the part of state organs, young people will supposedly be distracted by 'dangerous' ideas. This association is a good demonstration of how the securitization of youth politics is emerging. It is also very easy to trace such securitization in Russian political life. For instance, the secretary of the Russia's Security Council, former head of the Russian secret service FSB (the former KGB) Nikolai Patrushev

consistently speaks out about the need to save the Russian youth from 'dangerous influences' on the part of western special services that supposedly act as the arms of Russian opposition organizations (Patrushev 2019a, 2019b). He avers that the 'manipulation of teenage consciousness through social media' is intensifying and has promised that teenagers inclined to commit offenses (including, in all likelihood, attending opposition protests) will be sent by the police to 'military-patriotism-oriented camps.' However, what that exactly means is still not clear (Patrushev 2019a).

In 2018 to 2019 alone, the securitization of youth politics entailed a whole array of legislative measures (on the previous stages of the youth politics in today's Russia see: Laruelle 2011, 2015; Hemment 2015). On 18 December 2018 the State Duma adopted a law on punishment for 'involving minors in unsanctioned protests' (Novaia gazeta 2018a). Independent civil rights experts immediately pointed out that the law did not define what 'involvement' means, and suggested that this law could be used to punish any given participant in a protest action (ibid).³ Their suggestion was quickly borne out. On 25 March 2019, 18-year-old Ivan Luzin was sentenced under the new law by the Central Regional Court of Kaliningrad to a fine of 30,000 roubles for photographing two of his friends, 16-year-old young women, holding signs in the city center against police torture, after which the 'protest' immediately dispersed – they were there all of a few minutes (Paramonova 2019). However, after the photographs were posted on social media, Luzin was detained by the police.

On 21 March 2019, the Government of the Russian Federation published a decree by which the federal agency for youth affairs (Rosmolodiozh) acquired the right to block sites without trial for information 'oriented toward influencing or otherwise involving minors in the commission of wrongful actions ...' (Decree 2019). Official commentary declared that this measure was necessary to fight against websites and social media groups that persuade teenagers to commit suicide or do crime. In 2018, an epic campaign had unfolded in the Russian press: authors in both pro-government and opposition newspapers wrote articles that showed that children needed to be saved from the influence of the Internet, where dangerous criminals were persuading children to commit suicide in the guise of a game; both the game and the groups were supposedly called the 'Blue Whales.' An investigative group of anthropologists under the leadership of Aleksandra Arkhipova described this press campaign as a case of moral panic, that is, a kind of collective hysteria, and proved that cases of teenage suicide supposedly committed under the influence of the Internet were better explained in reality by conflicts in their cohort and/or a difficult home life (Arkhipova et al. 2017). The Decree on Rosmolodiozh was formed in reaction to the social alarm expressed in this moral panic, but used this reason so as to increase a state pressure on the Internet.

The first researchers into phenomenon of moral panic had already underscored its political meanings as stigmatize 'dangerous' social groups (Cohen 1972) and accrue cultural dominance to the panic's initiators (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994); moral panic being an instrument of cultural and social control (Hier et al. 2011). The current Russian leadership sometimes starts moral panics on its own: the stigmatization of the LGBT community is one such, or everything connected to Ukraine. However, the leaders of Russia – on both local and federal level – also instrumentalize moral panics that have *already arisen* as the grounds for adopting regulatory decisions, including those that strengthen government control over the cultural and public spheres.

In the adoption of the decree on Rosmolodiozh's right to censor the Internet one can see two important patterns in action. First, moral panics are becoming the intermediate nexus between politics and policies, they 'prompt' the political elite to make concrete ad-hoc decisions that are at once populist and repressive in character. Second, Russian leadership is increasing the number of agents of censorship. In contemporary Russia, there is a growing list of those who are permitted to control at their own discretion the dissemination of information on the Internet. This expansion creates an effect of irradiation: any organization, especially a conservative one, can take the role of cultural censor upon itself. Ever more often, they choose not rational, but emotional grounds for forbidding this or that "text" circulating in the cultural field.

In 2010, Stanislav L'vovskii wrote that small children had become one of the main 'objects of securitization' in Russia of the 2000s: the varied political powers could agree on the need to 'protect'

children from adoption in Western countries, extremely severe punishments were established for distributing child pornography and for pedophilia, and many in society agreed that lynching was appropriate for criminals who attacked children (Lvovskii 2010). The moral panics that L'vovskii described, based in 'fear for our children,' became a pretext for the adoption of a new law on 28 December 2012: 'On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation.' This law, which is more commonly called the Dima Yakovlev Law, directly forbade U.S. citizens from adopting orphans from Russia. The true reason for the law was U.S. sanctions on a host of official personages guilty of human rights violations in Russia in agreement with the 'Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012' (the name the press used was the Magnitsky Act).

In the 2010s, the 'objects' of securitization were no longer small children, but teenagers and young adults: a substantial shift.⁴ The children in media campaigns of the 2000s were represented as strikingly defenseless beings, dependent and incapable of independent moral reflection (Lvovskii 2010). In current campaigns, teenagers and young adults are presented as not having their own subjectivity, but potentially ready to become the instruments of a foreign conspiracy. From the point of view of the political elite, they need not only protection, but to be 'guided onto the right path' in order to avoid becoming weapons in 'alien' hands.

This perception coincided at the end of the 2010s with a political concept that was devised in the 2000s, primarily on the initiative of the PR-manager and politician Vladislav Surkov, who served as an aide of President Vladimir Putin (2004–2008 and 2013–2020). Surkov proposed that the state should become the main promoter of youth culture and conducted a series of unofficial meetings with Russian rock musicians, trying to obtain their loyalty. By all appearances, he succeeded at this task, even if several of his 'clients' subsequently went to the opposition.⁵ Incidentally, rock music and youth pop-music had already become signs of 'modernity' and 'fashionability' in Russian politics in the 1990s: Boris Yeltsin danced to pop singer Evgenii Osin's smash hit at an election rally in 1996, and the video of the president dancing spiritedly became enormously famous. Surkov's position is a direct genetic descendent of the combination of cultural practices characteristic of Soviet society in the 1970s: young generation's enthusiastic interest in the 'imaginary West' (Yurchak 2005) and its pop culture – and understanding common in the 1970s Soviet press that pop culture was, first of all, one of the most important instruments of the West for a 'Cold War' (see on this period, in particular: Bright 1985).

Surkov's efforts to 'tame' post-Soviet rock music had the goal of making it a device of control over youth attitudes. Surkov well remembered that in the Perestroika era, rock music in the USSR had become a symbol of freedom and facilitated the transformation of the public sphere. Some of the most eye-catching visual (and audial) expressions of Perestroika were televised performances of Western and Russian rock groups (Troitsky 1991). A most important trend in 2019 has been the politically oppositional compositions recorded by famous pop singers who had previously refrained from making politically charged public comments. On 21 November 2019, the popular rap band 'Kasta' published a new piece, 'Our Anthem of Russia'; in their YouTube video, the musicians directly address Vladimir Putin and report that the official Russian anthem (which is very similar to the Soviet anthem) does not arouse strong feelings in them, and that they wrote their own anthem that 'arouses such feelings.' More accurately, this song would be more fitting as an anthem of the Russian liberal opposition.

We fall for a grand idea, believe in lies
 And suddenly another leader has us lined up in columns
 This is us
 Starving each other down, letting our own folks rot in imprisonment
 By designing laws corresponding to this
 We may get infected by it again
 This is us⁶

In 2018–2019, the political elite tried to mobilize support for current Russian power from those who they thought could become an authority for today's youth: rappers and videobloggers. However, no one declares this task out loud – politicians declare that they are simply trying to 'fence off' the youth from the 'dangers' that threaten them. On 15 December 2018, at a session of the President's Council on Culture, Vladimir Putin called on the meeting's participants to 'lead and direct' rappers and 'set up work' with them, so that Russian rap would not be 'the propaganda of addictions.' Just before that, on December 5, Dmitrii Kiselev, a television news anchor and one of the main propagandists for Putin, had announced that he would direct a music festival, Rap Koktebel, on August 28–30, 2019 in Russia-occupied Crimea; true, the most famous Russian rappers refused to take part in this festival, for which Kiselev called them 'rotten.'¹⁷ And in 2017, an official State Duma Council of Videobloggers had been created – however, its work was limited to just one meeting.

On the whole, such unity on the securitization of youth and cultural politics is giving rise to a trend that could be called the *securitization of identity*, a concept that has been proposed by researchers to conceptualize the politics of the European Union, where the identity of a 'European' is based on the preservation of EU borders against immigrants (Huysmans 2000; Lazaridis and Wadia 2015). In the Baltic countries, which are part of the EU, securitization of identity refers to a policy of selectively restricting citizenship rights (Kuczyńska-Zonik 2017). This term applies well to the case of Russian popular culture. Vladimir Putin anointed the 'preservation of national identity' an issue of state security, or in other words, the use of propaganda and cultural politics to construe an 'imagined community' identity that could 'pass on a legacy' to the next generation. It is characteristic of Putin to call this identity Russian (*russkii*, in a limited, ethnic sense, rather than *rossiiskii*, in a broader civic sense), although Russia is a multinational state; in another speech in 2012, he affirmed that one could call individuals from all of the ethnic groups of the Soviet Union 'Russians,' as the USSR is the same as Russia:

To the planet, we have been and remain a single people, regardless of the ethnicity we belong to. I recall one of my meetings with veterans. There were people of various nationalities there: from Tatars to Ukrainians to Georgian to, it stands to reason, Russians. One of the veterans, not a Russian by nationality, said: "For all the world we are one people, we are Russians." So it was in wartime, so it was always. (Putin 2012)

Here it is suggested that there is no necessity to differentiate between political, cultural, and gender identity. For Putin, the most important element of identity is 'being Russian' and 'being a former Soviet citizen', i.e. 'an heir of the Soviet Union' and 'an heir of the Soviet way of life'. In such an approach, youth politics take on paramount meaning. The anthropologist Margaret Mead wrote about how the modern world is transitioning to a prefigurative culture, where not only the young learn from the old, but, no less often, the old learn from the young (Mead 1970). Today this is obvious if only because children grow up as digital natives and teenagers quickly not only master new forms of communication, but experiment with them, discovering new potentials as yet unknown to adults. However, in the framework of the securitization of identity in the Russian style *any inclination toward prefigurative culture becomes politically dangerous*: the teenaged generation must be the object of control and is forbidden its own political and cognitive subjectivity, as Patrushev's presentations substantiate.

Russia's younger generation and the new wave of the protests

All of these processes – the intensification of moral panics, the securitization of cultural and youth politics, and the securitization of identity – are happening for at least two reasons: the internal evolution of the Russian political regime and the politicization of the Russian youth. Analysts have spoken about the second trends beginning in 2017, when on March, 26, simultaneously in multiple Russian cities protest demonstrations took place after a documentary video was posted on YouTube, 'He is not Dimon to you,' which was shot on the initiative and with the participation of the opposition politician Aleksei Navalnyi. This film-investigation (which had received 30 million

views as of writing) was made in order to prove that Russian Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev had been entwined in huge corruption schemes. A notable number of the demonstrators of March, 26, were decidedly young, between 16 and 25 years of age, and in the following months approximately this age group began to post Internet memes and texts on political themes much more often than before (Orekhov 2017). It must be said, pro-government journalists said that supposedly not university students, but grade-schoolers went to the demonstrations: such a distortion made it possible to describe Navalny's strategy as the manipulation of 'underinformed teenagers.'

This youth politicization has arisen for a minimum of two reasons. The first comes from the fact that today's university students are people who do not remember any other leader of Russia besides Putin. Therefore, they cannot fear 'the return of the scary nineties' that television propagandists threaten. The second is that university students in Russia are tied in with global processes with the help of social media and therefore see how prefigurative tendencies are arising in culture in various countries and how, simultaneously, anti-authoritarian movements are strengthening, from #BlackLivesMatter to #MeToo. (On Russia's young generation of the late 2010s, see: Ayres 2018; Laruelle 2019.)

In 2018 and 2019, students' politicization has only intensified and, most importantly, articulated political statements of an oppositional and protest character have begun to appear in pieces by the 'stars' of the Internet and pop culture, who had earlier refrained from such statements. In winter 2019 the famous online journalist Iurii Dud', who had until then worked basically as an interviewer of television 'stars' and flashy public figures, shot and posted a video to YouTube that was more than two hours long: 'Kolyma, the Homeland of Our Fear,' where he spoke in detail about the Stalinist repressions and insisted that the fear born of state terror continues to be an obstacle in the struggle for political freedom in Russian society to this day. This film received 15 million views very soon. It's helpful to note that Stalin's repressions are covered very briefly in a high school, and the traumatic effect of state terror on contemporary society is a taboo theme in the Russian media. On 2 September 2019, Dud posted a 3-hour investigative film 'Beslan' on YouTube, where he argued that, through their harsh actions, the army units had caused the deaths of the children that the terrorists – armed supporters of Chechen independence – had taken hostage in Beslan in September 2004. In August 2019, Dud' called on his social media subscribers to come to a protest on Sakharov Prospect in Moscow. Along with Dud', the rappers Oxxymiron and Loquemean and the popular videoblogger and stand-up comedian Danila Poperechny also called for attendance – and attended themselves.

Political reasons of non-political bans: why pop artists scare local (and not only local) authorities

We return from 2019 to 2018. One of the notable innovations in the sphere of cultural politics in this year in Russia was the frequent cancellation of pop concerts. Usually a city or a town administration would call the administrator of the club where the concert was planned to demand that the event be cancelled so that the club would not experience unpleasantness. If the concert was moved to another club, they would call there too from the administration, or from the city branch of the special service, or they would hold a snap inspection that would require closing the club for one night. *Meduza* published a spreadsheet of the bans on its site at the end of 2018 (Meduza 2018); a summary makes clear that over 40 concerts were cancelled.

One can notice a strange character to these bans: the groups that fell under restrictions did not have much in common and their songs usually did not present political statements. Foreign journalists, commenting on the wave of scandals around pop music in Russia, often quoted a line from a song by IC3PEAK (lyrics by Anastasia Kreslina) as an oppositional statement: 'I go outside to stroke the cat/But he was run over by the cops' wheels,' but in Russia there are far more politicized rock groups whose songs come across as much more radical and consequential social-critical statements

than this song by IC3PEAK – for example, ‘Elysium,’ ‘lorsh,’ and ‘Pornofilmy’ (‘Porn Films’). They periodically run up against bans on concerts (Shenkman 2019), but all the same notably less often than for IC3PEAK in 2018.

Along with the rave electronic duo already named, among the most persecuted musicians were the mainstream rap performers Egor Krid and Eldzhei, the radical right rapper Husky, the alternative rapper Gone.Fludd and the pop group for teenagers ‘Frendzona’ (‘Friend Zone’) – none of whom had provoked political accusations. The main part of concerts were cancelled on the basis that the songs of the respective pop singers supposedly propagandize ‘sex, drugs, and same-sex relations.’ In November 2018, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs banned a clip from the rapper Husky’s ‘Judas’ because it supposedly showed how the figure in the clip makes a ‘stash’ from drug paraphernalia (Novaia gazeta 2019). The group ‘Frendzona’ prompted downright real hysterics among the Moscow authorities: on 21 May 2019 the Department of Labor of the Moscow government sent out a letter to its subordinate organizations about how this group’s songs are dangerous for children because the clips ‘contain pornography’ and stimulate children to commit actions dangerous to their lives and health – even though for half a year before, officially confirmed expert psychologists had determined that children older than 12 could listen to the group’s songs, and their conclusions had been published on the website of the government agency Roskomnadzor (Conclusion 2018). However, the Department of Labor’s letter demanded that all adoptive and foster parents not allow their children to watch clips of this group and to add information about this group to parental filters on home computers.⁸

This group became popular specifically thanks to the Internet. Commentators are already pointing to how ‘Frendzona’ is the first project in the history of Russian pop music where songs aimed at urban teens take all possible tastes and interests for the entire potential audience into account. The recordings give the impression of being expensive and highly professional, but the main medium for their distribution was directly via the Internet, not television or radio. Taking into account the reality of contemporary Russia, this means that teenagers learn of new recordings from ‘Frendzona’ earlier than their parents, as a rule, and the general undertone of teasing’ and provocation in this group’s songs can only frighten conservatives more.

In an article, the sociologist and historian Evgenii Kazakov has already described the concert bans of 2018 as a result of moral panic (Kasakow 2019). However, it is important to know, why did specifically *these* group arouse panic? The journalist Aleksandr Pliushchev perspicaciously observed ‘the beneficiaries are various kinds of “social activists,” organizations that report their concerns about the rotten influence of this group or another. Every cancelled concert increases their influence over local authorities and simplifies access to grants and budgets’ (Pliushchev 2018). In 2019, the investigative journalist Ivan Golunov published an article showing that the social movement Common Affair coordinated the lists of groups aimed to be banned in various regions. In Golunov’s words, Common Affair cooperates with an Orthodox Bishop Tikhon (Shevkunov) – a far right church official who journalists consider Vladimir Putin’s confessor (Golunov 2019). This organization sends its representatives to schools for specially organized assemblies to exhort young people not to drink, smoke tobacco, or play computer games. In conversations with journalists, the members of Common Affair insist that young people may start using drugs or even committing suicide under the influence of pop music and ‘improper’ films.

With her coauthors, Aleksandra Arkhipova wrote about how in contemporary Russia ‘a multiplicity of the most varied groups and individuals construct moral panic, far from all of whom have official status’ (Arkhipova et al. 2017), because characteristics of this process include ‘... poly-agency, which has become especially evident as Web 2.0 has developed’ (ibid). In the opinion of Arkhipova and her coauthors, this panic can lead to mass mobilization against the groups determined for the role of ‘universal evil,’ but here we see a different development of events: since the bans on concerts are targeted against pop groups well-known among young people, they lead to the growth of the popularity of ‘forbidden’ videos and can indirectly provoke politicization of the youth.

One can suggest that the reason for moral panic in contemporary Russia is not the politicization of youth, but a more general process – growing psychological rupture between the elder and the younger generations. Both the moral panics and the politics that are undertaken on the ground of moral panics are meant to stigmatize and present as dangerous those practices that particularly bear witness to the emancipation of the younger generation, to the specificities of their tastes and attachments. Yet one more reason for the moral panics that put pressure on policy comes from how ‘youths’ ironize the customary symbolic orders that modern Russian society accepts as the last support of stability. Clearly, the video by IC3PEAK that most shocked conservatives was their video ‘There Is No More Death’ (29 million views on YouTube at the time of writing), in which two members of the group douse themselves with ‘gasoline’ on the steps of the government building of Russia (the so-called White House in Moscow) to the words ‘let everything burn, let everything burn’ – at this time photo- and tele-journalists are recording them – and later divide and eat a piece of raw meat while sitting in front of Lenin’s Mausoleum on the Red Square. Clearly this video is colored by its intonations of dark irony, wholly characteristic of the group, and it shouldn’t be taken seriously. However, such mockery of state symbols (both Soviet and post-Soviet in one video!), clearly acted as a psychological trigger in the current environment, after which the group became a victim of persecution on the part of the police, the FSB, and conservative social activists. ‘Two weeks after the clip came out we began to have our first problems – organizers started to call, to say that calls reached them from the special services with recommendations not to hold a concert,’ group soloist Anastasia Kreslina said in an interview (Kreslina, Kostylev, and Osmolovskaja 2020). In the same interview, a second member of the group, Nikolai Kostylev, attests that the repressions against their songs are caused by ‘a lack of a sense of humor and cultural context among the people in power.’

Fear of losing control: ‘culture of ban’

An older generation’s complaints against the immorality of the youth and their doubtful tastes is a phenomenon likely as old as human civilization. The earliest example of such a complaint is in *The Clouds*, written by Aristophanes in 423 B.C.E.: as it is well known, in the play the Athenian young people are accused of not respecting their elders and having chosen dangerous idols for themselves – Socrates and Euripides. The American writer John Seder gathered an impressive collection of analogous complaints from English-language literature and journalism of the 17th to 20th centuries (Seder 2013). However, already by the second half of the 19th century attempts to increase control over the youth began to summon more counterbalancing from the young people themselves. This can be traced in the history of the student movements that appeared at the time, particularly in Russia: they answered political repression with greater radicalization (Gessen 1932). Further on, both the degree of moralizing by the older generation and the degree of radicalization of the younger changed many times in various countries, but the general trend was preserved (Hobsbawm 1994) – even in the late USSR, with its mass escapism, including in the youth sphere. And so, in 1982, a group of writers and journalist wrote an accusatory article excoriating ‘Mashina Vremeni’ (‘The Time Mashine’), one of the first cult rock groups in the USSR, and demanding it be banned; the group’s members awaited repressions, but the newspaper *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, which published the article, received so many letters of protest with headers along the lines of ‘Hands off “Mashina Vremeni”!’ that no kind of persecution happened (Makarevich 1991).

Now, the rupture between tastes and lifestyles of different generations seems not wider than ever earlier, but it strongly scares the representatives of elder generation and especially of the political elites. There are some reasons for this fear. There are no significant projects of the common future in today’s Russia, and only conservative slogans, ‘invented traditions’ and dread of any changes that are associated with chaos and ‘the return of the nineties’ turn to be a ground for social consolidation. Many people consider dangerous communication of youngsters in the social media: representatives of the ‘adults’ suspect that bloggers and generalized ‘all this Internet’ can become more significant for teenagers and students than their parents. Today, many societies

are involved into a transfer to prefigurative culture, if basing on the classification of Margaret Mead (1970), i.e. to the new type of culture where not only children learn from the adults, but the adults 'usually learn from those younger than themselves'. In Russia, this transmission turns to be especially painful and conflictual.

Altogether, letters from state officials about 'Frendzona,' the ban on IC3PEAK concerts, and state official announcements create a fairly unusual variant of conservative moralism. The moralistic attack has many objectives, because its authors are really bothered first and foremost by the emancipation of the youth and fear that they will lose control over them. However, not one of the agents have decided to speak publicly of their fear – youth' emancipation as such is becoming an 'elephant in the room.' State rhetoric of securitization becomes a basis for moral panics by non-government actors, because public calling to control the youth is transforming into a constantly active political institution (or quasi-institution).

Nevertheless, the use of 'moral panics' in 2018–2019 has hit against its limits. As of January 2019, the bans became much rarer. IC3PEAK regularly gives concerts and 'Frendzona' gave a major concert tour in autumn, 2019, regardless of the letter of the Department of Labor of the Moscow Government. This could happen because of events at the end of November and beginning of December in 2018. On November 21 in Krasnodar, the local procurator forbade a concert hall to hold the concert of the rapper Husky (Dmitrii Kuznetsov), saying that his songs contain incitement to suicide, extremism, and drug propaganda.⁹ When the concert was moved to another club, the electricity was quickly switched off. Husky began to deliver his compositions while standing on the roof of a car parked near the club; a crowd of fans surrounded him and, in the words of Husky himself, the woman who owned the car allowed him to perform this way. Soon the police arrived and detained the performer. Husky was sentenced to 12 days in jail for 'petty hooliganism.' Soon after, on November 26, the leading Russian rappers gave a collective concert in the enormous Moscow venue Glavklub. The participants announced that their main goal was to protest Husky's arrest and all of the repression of pop musicians. It's very important that rappers with liberal views took part in the concert – Oxxymiron, Noize MC, and also more loyalist-minded Basta, a former member of Kasta, which later recorded 'Our Anthem to Russia' – because Husky is known for his radical right-wing views, and the concert to support him became a manifestation of cooperation between rappers who held different positions. This cooperation was even more unusual given that rap culture is well known (in Russia as elsewhere) for digs at the competitors and insults in their direction.

Frightened by such political mobilization, the authorities rapidly freed Husky, but the concert took place all the same and abovementioned Aleksei Navalny, one of the leaders of the opposition, attended and reported from the concert on his Twitter account (Meduza 2018b).

Clearly, it was specifically the prospect of further solidarity in the pop music community that led to the sharp easing in the number of concert bans in 2019 by comparison with 2018. Human rights protectors turned their attention from musicians to arrests on directly political grounds, which continued – and continue – throughout 2019 and 2020. Nevertheless, public attacks by moral warriors on pop singers continue and, more importantly, have activated social groups in various cities that could be called volunteer local controllers (or censors). The journalist Andrei Arkhangel'skii found, 'a fear of any risk has become the dominant reason of social behavior' (Arkhangel'skii 2019). State support of such spontaneous control is already optional: political groups can now 'switch it on or off' at their own discretion, the system has gone over to a self-sustaining state – in all likelihood until the next serious crisis.

Conclusion

From the sociologist's point of view, contemporary Russia looks like a society of progressive demodernization. However, it is clear that the 'cultural bans' in Russia described here are the result of juxtaposing two tendencies: one of which is characteristic of countries in the modern West, and the other of which is characteristic of quickly modernizing archaic societies. One of the most noticeable trends in developed societies is the exacerbation of psychological and moral sensitivities.

Society, especially the younger generation, reacts ever more vehemently against statements and images come across as traumatizing. However, in various societies such vehement actions are attached to completely different statements. In Western countries, particularly the U.S., one of the most important ‘triggers’ were statements and images associated with sexual harassment, misogyny, and homophobia. In Russia, such ‘triggers’ are the images and statements connected to uncontrolled sexuality and the erosion of symbolic languages marked as ‘traditional’ and/or ‘sacred.’

In rapidly modernizing societies movements by ‘moral purity’ warriors often arise that invoke the religions traditional for that society and ready to commit repression against innovative social movements, such as, for instance, feminists. A characteristic example is Islamic fundamentalism in Southwest and Central Asia. Russian moral warriors to a great degree invoke not religion, but specifically the *conventional symbolic orders* that are understood as the last defense of a disintegrating society. That is why they experience the greatest alarm over rap, a cultural language founded from the beginning on transgressions and performatively eroding social norms.

Currently there is insufficient data to judge the effectiveness of this kind of politics in modern Russia. However, judging by indirect data in the media debate analyzed in this article, it is leading to a division of the younger generation into those who resist the pressure on the part of the authorities and those who accept as inescapable the need to agree to the ‘rules of the game’ presented by the older generations or, more precisely, by moral warriors *in the name* of these older generations, who do not speak for themselves.

Notes

1. The fact that at least one of the people participating in the rally, the journalist Leonid Parfionov, approvingly quoted a song performed by one of these musicians, the rapper Face, in his speech is just one piece of proof against this claim.
2. Regarding ‘unlawful,’ as the Russian Constitution guarantees the freedom of assembly, the current political elite use the jargon ‘unlawful’ to describe those protests and demonstrations that local administrative structures have refused to accommodate, even if the notifications about them were given in plenty of time and in agreement with the legal system.
3. The Duma deputy Sergei Vostretsov (‘Edinaia Rossiia’/‘United Russia’ party) even proposed depriving parental rights or fining the parents of teenagers who would be detained more than once at ‘unsanctioned’ protests (Novaia gazeta 2018b).
4. This situation changed once more in 2020: in October, the police became to prosecute the single men whose little children had been born due to surrogacy, arguing that these children could have been born in order to be adopted by the same-sex pairs. They threatened to withdraw these children and to pass them to the orphanages (Tskie dela 2020).
5. Boris Grebenshchikov, one of the most famous Russian rock musicians, held his meetings with Surkov in extremely high esteem and refrained for a long time from making any political statements, until he went over to the opposition in 2013, apparently due to his impression of the openly homophobic ‘Law on homosexual propaganda’ Russia’s Duma adopted.
6. Lyrics taken from the subtitles of the video on ‘Kasta’s’ Youtube channel: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hn4O7YwhRGQ>. Translation by Elise Thorsen.
7. There were not enough performers for three days, and the festival took place for all of two days, August 28–29.
8. ‘Frendzona’s’ most scandalous video, ‘Spin the Bottle’ (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKbozLYtWeM>), is a lachrymose ballad performed from the point of view of a high school girl who accidentally kissed a classmate at a pajama party and felt attracted to her; there is no erotic action besides the kiss on the lips is mentioned either in the song or in the video. Russian ‘morality warriors’ appraised ‘Spin the Bottle’ as ‘homosexual propaganda.’
9. The scan of the procurator’s decree was widespread via social media.

Acknowledgment

This article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE University). I am deeply grateful to Maria Lipman, Evgenii Kazakov, Vassily Gatov and the two anonymous peer reviewers of IJCP for valuable discussions and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Ilya Kukulin is an associate professor at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics (HSE) (Moscow). He has published widely on Russian literature (especially poetry), the history of education in twentieth-century Eastern Europe, cultural practices of internal colonization in Russia, unofficial social thought in twentieth-century Russia, and the political discourses of Russian social media. In 2015, he was awarded the Andrei Bely Prize for his monograph *Machines of Noisy Time: How Soviet Montage Became an Aesthetic Method of Unofficial Culture (Mashiny zashumevshogo vremeni. Kak sovetskii montazh stal metodom neofitsial'noi kul'tury)*, and in 2017, the Bella Prize for the year's best article on contemporary poetry.

References

- Agamben, G. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Anderson, B. 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised ed ed. London: Verso.
- Arkhangel'skii, A. 2019. "Kul'tura Zapreta. Predvaritel'nye Itogi Paternalizma V Rossii." *Republic* Internet journal. November, 8 https://republic.ru/posts/95140?utm_source=republic.ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=morning.
- Arkhipova, A., M. Volkova, A. Kirziuk, E. Malaia, D. Radchenko, and E. Jugaj. 2017. «gruppy Smerti»: Ot Igray K Moral'noi Panike. Moscow: RANKhiGS; ShAGI.
- Ayres, S. 2018. "Russian Millennials Look to Their Future: 'If We Don't Do Anything Now, We Will Keep Living like Our Parents'." *Los Angeles Times*. February, 23 <https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-russia-profiles-of-youth-20180223-htmlstory.html>.
- Bright, T. 1985. "Soviet Crusade against Pop." *Popular Music* 5: 123–148.
- Buzan, B., O. Wæver, and J. de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Campbell, D. 1992. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cohen, S. 1972. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*. London: MacGibbon and Kee.
- Concept. 2018. "Kontsepsiia Proekta Federal'nogo Zakona «O Kul'ture»." Ministry of Culture of Russian Federation Internet site https://www.mkrf.ru/press/current/kontsepsiya_proekta_federalnogo_zakona_o_kulture/.
- Conclusion. 2018. "Zakliuchenie Eksperta EIP7718-314 Po Rezul'tatam Ekspertizy Informacionnoi Produktzii." Roscomnadzor State Committee Internet site. December, 28 (https://rkn.gov.ru/docs/JEKspertnoe_zakljuchenie_na_teksty_pesen_gruppy_FRENDZONA.pdf).
- Decree 2019. "Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federatsii Ot 21.03.2019 № 295." Official Portal of Legal Information <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201903250016?index=1&rangeSize=1>.
- Deudney, D. 1990. "The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security." *Millennium* 19 (3): 461–476.
- Gessen, S. 1932. *Studencheskoe Dvizhenie V Nachale Shestidesiatykh Godov*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo vsesojuznogo obshhestva politkatorzhan i ssyl'noposelencev.
- Golunov, I. 2019. "Chto Za Organizaciya Prosila Proverit' IC3PEAK I Husky." *Afisha Daily*. June, 8 <https://daily.afisha.ru/music/12113-cto-za-organizaciya-prosila-proverit-ic3peak-i-haski-rassledovanie-ivana-golunova>.
- Goode, E., and N. Ben-Yehuda. 1994. *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hemment, J. 2015. *Youth Politics in Putin's Russia: Producing Patriots and Entrepreneurs*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Hesmondhalgh, D. 2019. *The Cultural Industries*. 4th ed. London & Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Hier, S. P., D. Lett, K. Walby, and A. Smith. 2011. "Beyond Folk Devil Resistance: Linking Moral Panic and Moral Regulation." *Criminology & Criminal Justice* 11 (3): 259–276.
- Hobsbawm, E. 1994. *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century. 1914—1991*. London: Michael Joseph.
- Huysmans, J. 2000. "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38 (5): 751–777.
- Isar, Y. 2018. "Cultural Policy in India: An Oxymoron?" In *The Routledge Handbook of Global Cultural Policy*, edited by V. Durrer, T. Miller, and D. O'Brien, 485–502. Abingdon; NY: Routledge.
- Kasakow, E. 2019. "Wider Den „niedergang Der Nation“. Die Kampagne Gegen Musiker in Russlands Regionen." *Osteuropa* 5: 107–121.

- Kreslina, A., N. Kostylev, and A. Osmolovskaja. "Gruppa IC3PEAK: V Rossii U Vlasti Plokho S Chuvstvom Iumora [IC3PEAK: Russia's Authorities Lack a Sense of Humour]." Baltcom Radio Station. (accessed 10 January 2020) <https://mixnews.lv/exclusive/2019/05/03/gruppa-ic3peak-v-rossii-u-vlasti-plokho-s-chuvstvom-jumora/>
- Kuczyńska-Zonik, A. 2017. "The Securitization of National Minorities in the Baltic States." *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics* 10 (2): 26–45.
- Laruelle, M. 2011. "Negotiating History: Memory Wars in the near Abroad and Pro-Kremlin Youth Movements." *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 19 (3): 233–252.
- Laruelle, M. 2015. "Patriotic Youth Clubs in Russia. Professional Niches, Cultural Capital and Narratives of Social Engagement." *Europe-Asia Studies* 67 (1): 8–27.
- Laruelle, M. 2019. "Beyond Putin: Russia's Generations Y and Z. PONARS Eurasia, Memo 579." http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepr579_Laruelle_March2019_0.pdf.
- Lazaridis, G., and K. Wadia, Eds. 2015. *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU. Debates since 9/11*. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lvovskii, S. 2010. "Pod Znakom Iuvenal'noj Justicii [Under a Sign of Juvenile Justice]." *Pro Et Contra* 14 (1—2): 20–41.
- Makarevich, A. 1991. *Vse Ochen' Prosto: Rasskaziki*. Moscow: Radio i sviaz'.
- Mead, M. 1970. *Culture and Commitment: A Study of the Generation Gap*. New York: American Museum of Natural History; Doubleday.
- Medinskii, V. 2016. 'Na gosudarstvennom urovne kul'turu stali rassmatrivat' kak chast' natsional'noi bezopasnosti'. An interview conducted by Maria Krivykh. Noev Kovcheg (a newspaper), October, No. 10 (285).
- Meduza. 2018. "V 2018 Godu Vlasti Sorvali Bol'she 40 Kontsertov. Posmotrite Tablitso." *Meduza* Internet Portal. November, 28. (accessed 10 January 2020) <https://meduza.io/feature/2018/11/28/po-vsey-strane-vlasti-sryvayut-kontserty-posmotrite-tablitso-tam-uzhe-bolshe-20-sluchaev>
- Morozov, V. 2009. *Rossia i Drugie: Identichnost' i Granitsy Politicheskogo Soobshchestva [Russia and [Its] Others: Identity and Limits of Political Community]*. Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie.
- Müller, J.-W. 2016. *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Novaia gazeta. 2018a. "Do 500 Tysiach Rublei. Deputaty Prinjali Zakon O Shtrafah Za Vovlechenie Nesovershennoletnih V Mitingi [Up to 500K Roubles. Deputies Adopted a Law on Fines for Involvement of the Minors in Rallies]." *Novaia Gazeta*. December, 18 <https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/12/18/147713-deputaty-prinyali-zakon-o-nakazanii-zavovlechenie-nesovershennoletnih-v-mitingi>.
- Novaia gazeta. 2018b. "Deputat Ot «edinoi Rossii» Predlozhit Lishat' Roditel'skih Prav Za Uchastie Detej V Nesankcionirovannyh Mitingakh." *Novaia Gazeta*. November, 7 <https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/11/07/146577-deputat-ot-edinoi-rossii-predlozhit-lishat-roditel'skih-prav-za-uchastie-detey-v-nesankcionirovannyh-mitingakh>.
- Novaia gazeta. 2019. "Roskomnadzor Ob'yasnii Blokirovku Klipa Rappera Haski «iuda» Soderzhashejsja V Nem Informatsii O Narkotikakh [Roskomnadzor Explained Husky's Video Ban with a Reference to Information on Drugs Allegedly Presented in It]." *Novaia Gazeta*. January, 9 <https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2019/01/09/148209-roskomnadzor-ob-yasnii-blokirovku-klipa-repera-haski-iuda-soderzhasheysja-v-nem-informatsii-o-narkotikakh>.
- Orekhov, S. 2017. "Politizatsiia Mema. Kak Izmenilas' Rol' Socsetei V Rossijskoi Politike [Politization of Meme. How the Social Media's Role in Russian Politics Has Changed]." Moscow Carnegie Center Internet site. (accessed 10 January 2020) <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/68620>
- Paquette, J., and D. Beauregard. 2018. "Cultural Policy in Political Science Research." In *The Routledge Handbook of Global Cultural Policy*, edited by V. Durrer, T. Miller, and D. O'Brien, 19–32. Abingdon; NY: Routledge.
- Paramonova, I. 2019. "Vpervye V Rossii Aktivist Oshtrafovan Za "Vovlechenie Detej" V Manifestatsiiu." *Radio Liberty* Internet site." March, 25. <https://www.svoboda.org/a/29841624.html>.
- Patrushev. 2019a. "Trunina, A. Patrushev Anonsiroval Mery Protiv Manipulirovaniia Soznaniem Podrostkov [Patrushev Announced Measures against Manipulation of Teenagers' Consciousness]." RBC Internet Portal, March 12 <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/12/03/2019/5c8799f19a79472e3510e620>.
- Patrushev. 2019b. "Filipenok, A. Patrushev Zaiavil O Vlijanii Satanistov I Inostrannyh Spetsluzhb Na Molodezh' [Patrushev Claimed on Satanists' and Foreign Intelligencies' Influence on Youngsters]." RBC Internet Portal, May 15 <https://www.rbc.ru/society/15/05/2018/5afaa5299a7947fd7c098af0>.
- Plushchev, A. 2018. "Zaprety Kontsertov V Rossii Vedut K Politizatsii Molodezhi." *Deutsche Welle* Radio Internet site. November, 29 <https://bit.ly/2QFRebU>.
- Putin, V. 2012. "Poslanie Prezidenta Federal'nomu Sobraniuu [The President's Address to the Federal Assembly]." The President of Russia Official Site. (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118>).
- Putin, V. 2016. "Zasedanie Obshhestva Russkoi Slovesnosti (A Minute Including Vladimir Putin's Speeches)." The President of Russia Official Site <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52007>.
- Seder, J. 2013. "15 Historical Complaints About Young People Ruining Everything." *Mental Floss*. August, 15 (accessed 10 January 2020) <http://mentalfloss.com/article/52209/15-historical-complaints-about-young-people-ruining-everything>
- Sensey, D. 2018. "Zere Asylbek: «moe Ponimanie Slova "Uyat" Sil'no Otlichaetsia Ot Mneniia Bol'shinstva» ["my Understanding of the Term "Uyat" Is Strongly Differing from the Opinion of the Majority]." *Radio Azattyq* Internet

- site. November, 11 (accessed 12 October 2020) <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/live-interview-with-kyrgyz-singer-zere-asylbek/29593299.html>
- Shenkman, I. 2019. "«luchshe Otmeni Koncert, Tebe Zhit'»." *Novaia Gazeta*, May 17 (accessed 10 January 2020) <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/04/16/80240-luchshe-otmeni-kontsert-tebe-zhit>
- Tajmazinani, A. A. 2018. "From Cultural Revolution to Cultural Engineering: Cultural Policy in post-Revolutionary Iran." In *The Routledge Handbook of Global Cultural Policy*, edited by V. Durrer, T. Miller, and D. O'Brien, 485–502. Abingdon; NY: Routledge.
- Takie dela. 2020. "TASS: Sledstvie Planiruet Arestovat' Gomoseksual'nyh Ottsov Po Delu O Torgovle Det'mi V Moskve (TASS: Investigators Plan to Arrest Gay Fathers in the Case of Trafficking of Children in Moscow)." Takie Dela Internet site. October, 1 (accessed 12 October 2020) <https://takiedela.ru/news/2020/10/01/lgbt-otcy/>
- Troitsky, A. 1991. *Rok V Soyuze: 60-e, 70-e, 80-e*[Rock Music in the USSR: The 60s, the 70s, the 80s]. Moscow: Iskusstvo.
- Walker, R. 1997. "The Subject of Security." In *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, edited by K. Krause and M. C. Williams, 61–81. London: UCL Press.
- Yack, B. 2012. *Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Yurchak, A. 2005. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Copyright of International Journal of Cultural Policy is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.