3. Did Pueblos revolt to save their lives?

Van Hastings Garner

Seventeenth-Century New Mexico, the Pueblo Revolt, and Its Interpreters

In this essay, historian Van Hastings Garner disagrees with earlier historians who see religion as a primary cause of the Pueblo Revolt. Writing in the mid-1970s, and as apparently unaware of Bowden's work as Bowden was of his, Garner argues that Franciscan missionaries tolerated the continuation of Pueblo religious practices and recognized that it would be too much to expect Indians to convert immediately and fully. Franciscans, Garner argues, made Christianity tolerable for Pueblos by allowing them to maintain old beliefs while adopting the outward forms of the new religion (that is, to practice what he terms a "syncretic" religion). Historians, he says, had emphasized "the religious character of the rebellion . . . far out of proportion to its actual relevance."

Garner sees the essential causes of the Pueblo Revolt in immediate events — drought, famine, and Apache raids of the 1670s — the same events that Bowden and Gutiérrez see only as catalysts for a revolt caused by deeper religious and cultural differences. Garner acknowledges the Spaniards' growing intolerance of Pueblo Indian religious practices in the 1670s, but he explains the revolt in material rather than religious terms. When Pueblos ceased to profit by working for Spanish *encomenderos* and missionaries and when Spanish arms could not provide military protection against Apaches, Pueblos rallied around rebel leaders as they never had before. Thanks to their "acculturation" to the ways of Spaniards, Pueblos had knowledge of horses and guns that facilitated their victory. If the rebels seemed to focus their hatred

on priests and religious objects, Garner concludes, it was simply because "the Church was the focal point of Spanish-Indian contact," not because the Pueblos repudiated Christianity. To the contrary, he argues, the Pueblos' syncretic religion, with its Christian elements, remained intact.

Garner also differs with France Scholes's widely accepted view of the nature of social relations in seventeenth-century New Mexico. In the 1930s Scholes had drawn on previously neglected sources, particularly the records of the Inquisition, to portray New Mexico in the 1600s as a place where Franciscans, *encomenderos,* and governors fought bitterly with one another. Their failure to present a united front, Scholes said, weakened their authority in the eyes of Pueblos and contributed to the Pueblo Revolt. Garner disagrees. Drawing heavily on evidence presented by Scholes himself, Garner finds New Mexico a place of relative harmony until the 1670s.

Garner recognizes that Indians had tried to revolt on several occasions in what he sees as a relatively harmonious era before 1670. The revolts failed, Garner explains, because Spaniards remained unified and able to instill fear of military reprisals and because Pueblos remained relatively content and divided among themselves.

Van Hastings Garner completed his doctorate at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 1972. This article arose out of research he did for his dissertation. He is dean of the College of the Extended University, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, a position he has held since 1989.

Questions for a Closer Reading

1. In Garner's view, what group wielded the greatest power in New Mexico, civil officials or Franciscans?
2. What is "syncretism" and how does Garner believe it contributed to harmonious relations between Spaniards and Indians?
3. What did missionaries and *encomenderos* have in common, according to Garner?

4. How did Spaniards contribute to a breakdown of Pueblo relations with Athapascan peoples, according to Garner?
5. What does Garner believe Pueblos gained from the presence of Spaniards?
6. Why did Pueblos become disaffected with Spaniards, according to Garner?
7. Why does Garner think that the Pueblos' "acculturation" helped ensure the success of their revolt?
8. Does Garner believe the revolt could have occurred without Popé's leadership?

Seventeenth-Century New Mexico, the Pueblo Revolt, and Its Interpreters[1]

Unfortunately, it is customary to treat seventeenth-century New Mexico as an isolated frontier society with uncomplicated human relationships. Out of this misconception has arisen much confusion regarding New Mexican society and a misunderstanding of the events that led to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 as well as of the Revolt itself. The ideas set forth by France V. Scholes in his *Church and State in New Mexico 1610–1650* (1937) and *Troublous Times in New Mexico 1659–1670* (1942) offer convincing proof.

According to Scholes, the entire history of seventeenth-century New Mexico revolves around the themes that "the religious and economic motives of empire were antagonistic if not essentially incompatible,"[2] that all the provincial governors were "inspired by consuming self-interest,"[3] and that with few exceptions, these administrative officials were exploiters of people and resources. Nor were the governors the only ones who deserve condemnation; in most cases, Scholes believes, the governors found that "personal gain was best advanced by joining with the colonials in a conscious policy of exploitation."[4] Thus Spanish officialdom collaborated with

Van Hastings Garner, "Seventeenth-Century New Mexico," *Journal of Mexican American History* (1974): 41–70. Garner provided the fuller, more descriptive title used in this book.

the Hispanic population to form a secular community whose main aim was self-aggrandizement, usually at the expense of the Indian. Scholes further condemns the civil population by asserting that they abandoned the governor whenever it appeared to be in their best interests to do so. Adhering to the social and racial attitudes of his day, this historian intimates that the capricious nature of the local population intensified as the mestizo and mulatto grew in number. Fortunately for the reputation of the settlers, however, Scholes hastens to add that "this dark and gloomy picture must not blind us to the fact that there were several important families who were marked out above the rank and file."[5]

Standing against this horde, from Scholes's perspective, were the pious and generally staunch Franciscan friars:

> The Pueblo Indians, their lands and their labor, constituted the chief resources to be utilized and the soldier-settler oppressed them with a heavy hand. The Friars, realizing that exploitation of the Indians would thwart the success of their missionary program, resisted abuses with all the means at their disposal.[6]

While Scholes admits that the Indians sometimes suffered at the hands of the Franciscans, he assures us that most of their suffering was the necessary product of Christianization; if the Franciscans were harsh, it should be attributed to their efforts to stamp out the old ways of the Pueblos.

To Scholes the Indians for the most part were incapable of appreciating the benefits of the new culture. As he sees them:

> The Pueblos were not unwilling to accept the externals of the new faith but found it difficult to understand the deeper spiritual values of Christianity. The burden of labor and tribute might have been tolerated if offset by recognized advantages, but the new faith was no more efficient in guaranteeing a harvest or success in the hunt. What has been gained by accepting Spanish overlordship?[7]

In a sense, then, the Indians were like children in a new world and entrapped in the struggle between the Franciscans and the Hispanic community. Seeing their parents quarreling, the Indians were demoralized and longed for the old times when life was much less complicated.

Unfortunately, the Europeans were also split in their attitude toward the Indian's reaffirmation of his old ways. In Scholes's analysis of the situation, when the Indians began to return to their native culture and to dance their *catzina,* the friars' efforts to eradicate such heathen practices were obstructed by the civil population. As a result of this moral uncertainty and

lack of discipline, the children did indeed reject the new culture and made the final break with it in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. Scholes paternalistically concludes: "We cannot blame them if they were more conscious of present burdens than the spiritual benefits that accrue mostly in the future."[8]

Despite the fact that Scholes's obvious ethnocentrism leads him into several basic errors, it must be acknowledged that his pioneering works[9] did make a substantial contribution to an understanding of New Mexico prior to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. Also, he proved that seventeenth-century New Mexican history could be written without the New Mexican archives, which were destroyed in the Pueblo Revolt.

Then, too, Scholes had undertaken a sizeable task. As anyone working with the borderlands knows, skimpy documentation fortified by conjecture is often necessary in uncovering the history of the Spanish Southwest. Consequently, Scholes makes some understandable mistakes.

Motivated by a deep love for the pious fathers, relying on the basic assumption that the "religious and economic motives of empire were antagonistic if not essentially incompatible," then driven by a need to moralize and affix blame, Scholes warps the character of the colonial governors. Using admittedly biased sources and citing a few unquestionably corrupt officials, he arrives at his generalization that all of the governors were "inspired by consuming self-interest." As with most men, self-interest was undoubtedly a motivating concern, but the governors were inspired and driven by a variety of other motives, most of which Scholes ignores.

Likewise, Scholes never fully understands his idols, the intrepid Franciscan friars. They did not always stand firm against Pueblo beliefs and culture. As a matter of fact, his friars were capable of making some open-minded and pragmatic decisions in order to solidify a union with the citizen-soldier, whom Scholes claims they were continually resisting.

Scholes's emphasis on a church-and-state theme distorts his analysis of seventeenth-century New Mexico. While at first glance a theme of religious-civil struggle appears to dominate the entire century, and there were many conflicts between Franciscan father and citizen-soldier, the truth of the matter is that both of them needed and relied on each other. The reality of their interdependence is a crucial point to be borne in mind, for its significance weighs heavily in a valid interpretation of New Mexican history in the seventeenth century.

Nor does Scholes ever fully understand the Indians, whom he views from a Spanish perspective. Thus, to this historian the North American aborigine was morally, intellectually, and culturally immature, and most importantly, he was considered to be dependent on the Spaniards for his basic needs.

Scholes's feeling for the Indian was so paternalistic as to elicit a response from Jack Forbes in his work *Apache, Navaho and Spaniard.* Forbes counters

Scholes's description of the Indians with a pan-Indian interpretation. As he sees them, the Indians were hardly childlike figures; instead, they were full-grown men and women struggling to regain the liberty which had been wrenched from them by an imperialistic aggressor. Moreover, Forbes argues that the Athapascans and Pueblos were traditionally friendly and that the long-established cooperation between the two indigenous peoples continued after the Spanish Conquest in spite of the all-out effort of the Spaniards to destroy their good will.

Forbes emphasizes his belief that Spanish overlordship was maintained by cruel repression of an involuntary population. For this analysis of the colonial situation he relies on the assumption that the antagonisms were racial rather than cultural in origin. For this reason he finds it pointless to make differentiation among the various factions within the Spanish community. In Forbes's opinion, the Indians "in spite of harsh persecution by fanatically intolerant Spaniards . . . preserved their ancient religion and beliefs" and began a long struggle "for religious and political freedom."[10] Even the Navaho, traditionally described as a raider and pillager of both European and Pueblo, is rendered in Forbes's interpretation as a crusader against the European.[11]

Although the reader can appreciate the dignity Forbes is trying to give to the Athapascan and Pueblo, there are some critical flaws in his book. In the first place, his entire work is based on an acceptance of the premise (not yet proven) that pan-Indianism was a major theme throughout the period. His view is as pro-Indian as Scholes's is pro-Spaniard. Secondly, while the history of the Athapascan and Pueblo reveals their dignity, the nature of their resistance did not fit the stereotyped struggle of nineteenth- and twentieth-century peoples against the colonial oppressors. As will be seen, the Pueblo Indians made some intelligent and shrewd decisions in their relationship with the Spaniards. On the other hand, the Spaniards were hardly the "fanatically intolerant" masters described by Forbes. Also, it is unrealistic to picture the Pueblo Indians plotting the destruction of their oppressors for eighty years while cynically following the forms of Roman Catholicism and secretly maintaining their old beliefs and practices. The old beliefs were very important, but they were subjected to the syncretism condoned by both the Indian and European.

Scholes's and Forbes's misinterpretations are due in part to problems faced by the Latin American scholar, chief of which is the nature of the documentation. First of all, the sources are sparse, and those that are available are frequently the products of intensely partisan debate — hence rife with charges and countercharges. Such a situation creates source material characterized by pliability and helps to explain how even Scholes and Forbes, advancing two almost diametrically opposed positions, could support their

statements with practically the same documentation. One way to correct these misinterpretations is to take a much closer look at the period prior to 1681 and that which followed it. No longer can either period be viewed in isolation since each provides the researcher with clues about the other. This approach yields completely new interpretations of seventeenth-century New Mexican history.

Scholes and Forbes, though opposed in point of view, are essentially alike inasmuch as they describe a society based on relatively simple human relationships. Scholes sees the secular Spaniard fighting the Franciscans for the control of a comparatively mindless mass of Indians. Forbes sees a colonial struggle with the subjected people intent upon throwing off the shackles of Spanish imperialism. Neither simplistic view fits the reality of seventeenth-century New Mexico.

Although it can be said that in this frontier of New Spain both society and government were less formalized than in most other areas of the empire, it does not follow that human and governmental relationships were less complicated. The northernmost province consisted of a variety of distinct aboriginal and nonaboriginal peoples who, in spite of occasional strife, managed to coexist by means of complex accommodations, some of which were even unconscious ones. The associations that the various interest groups had with each other had been established during the eighty years of post-conquest New Mexico — associations which were continually adjusting and often failed to follow the religious or racial patterns described by Scholes and Forbes. Although their interests and even their identities often seem blurred, a number of groups emerge with enough consistency to be differentiated. There were the Athapascan and Pueblo of the aboriginal peoples; among the nonaboriginal population, there were the missionaries, the bureaucratic representatives of Mexico City, the *encomendero*, and the non-*encomendero* members of the Hispanic community.

The Franciscan missionaries quickly established themselves in a position of dominance. These churchmen from the beginning enjoyed advantages which put them in a strategic position for any play in power politics. As Scholes accurately points out:

> All of the clergy were members of Friars Minor. Consequently the church was not weakened by rivalry between various monastic orders or by quarrels between secular and regular clergy. Second, no bishop exercised effective jurisdiction in New Mexico prior to 1680 [or, in fact, for some time thereafter].[12]

The mainstay of Franciscan power, to be sure, rested in the missionaries' relationship with the Indians, a fact which the friars immediately

recognized. When, in 1608, it looked as though the Crown might abandon the province, the Franciscans baptized seven thousand Indians within a two-month period in order to force a reversal of the Crown's plans.[13] Within a few years virtually all the Pueblo Indians had been baptized. In those early days the missionaries could hardly be strict about doctrinal matters; the number of conversions was the crucial issue. As Scholes notes: "In the beginning a few elements were stressed such as veneration of the cross, respect for the clergy, instruction concerning the sacraments, the teaching of a few simple prayers, and the regular attendance at religious services."[14] The very incompleteness of so many conversions both required and encouraged considerable latitude and adaptability on the part of Indian and missionary alike: the Indian had to integrate the new teachings into his long-established world view, while the Franciscans had to ignore the hybrid religious forms that inevitably resulted from these rather sudden adjustments.

A typical expression of syncretism is an encounter with the Mansos Indians described by the early chronicler, Fray Alonso de Benavides:

> It was a sight to see those who came on their knees to see the holy cross and to touch and kiss it as they had seen me do. And among others I saw an Indian with a toothache. With great trouble she opened her mouth with her hands and brought her molars close to the holy cross.[15]

The incident clearly demonstrates the syncretism that the meeting of the Old World's Roman Catholic and the North American Indian cultures produced.

Syncretism was hardly a new phenomenon for Spaniards, who did not resist the Mozarabic rite to remain in Toledo. The famous Bishop Juan de Zumarraga had effectively utilized syncretism in central New Spain. In fact, it would be surprising not to find the New Mexican Franciscans utilizing the tradition, since it represented a compromise that was satisfactory for all concerned. On the one hand, it made possible the remarkable incidence of Indian conversions and saved the province for the missionaries; on the other hand, it made acculturation much more tolerable for the Indian.

Even with the advantages, however, the task of limited conversions and acculturation for thousands of Indians in an area extending from Nueva Vizcaya to Taos was a formidable undertaking indeed. To facilitate the inception of this enterprise the Franciscans had to organize the Indian population into rigid and workable entities; the pueblo became the unit of cohesiveness.

Cognizant of political realities, the Franciscans based their rule on a form of directed and controlled self-government. Administrators were first chosen from the Indian leaders, and thereafter an elective method was used. In this manner the missionary bureaucracy was limited in number, and the system, as Bolton observes, "helps to explain how two missionaries and three or four soldiers could make an orderly town out of two or three thousand savages."[16]

With the Indians as a power base, the Franciscans successfully resisted both direct and indirect attacks on their authority. They managed to avoid all attempts at secularization and to elude the authority of the Bishop of Durango. They also resisted most of the frontal attacks launched by the governors.

Contrary to Scholes's thinking, the missionaries had few serious encounters with the *encomendero*. In reality, the missionary and the *encomendero* have much in common. Both had a stake in the survival of the colony, and they depended on each other to maintain it. Both reconciled themselves to a mutual exploitation of the Indian population: the *encomendero* had a degree of military power but lacked legitimate means to keep the often migratory Pueblo from abandoning the *encomienda;* the missionary had the legitimacy but needed the *encomendero*'s power to hold those Indians not coerced by the Franciscan presence. Protection against Athapascan raids was another duty of the *encomendero*. With the reward of souls for the missionary and tribute of maize and cotton *mantas* for the *encomendero,* the two factions entered into a lasting partnership. Even Scholes recognizes their interdependence: "The permanence of the missionaries depended upon the growth of a sizeable nonaboriginal colony."[17] Given the power of the Church in New Mexico, there is little doubt that had the *encomenderos* been at cross purposes with the missionaries, the *encomenderos* would have been eliminated. The seventeenth century offers plenty of examples of the precarious existence of the *encomienda* throughout the empire. The survival of the *encomienda* and the power of the missionary establishment in New Mexico are largely explained by the fact that both factions made pragmatic and durable accommodations.

Scholes is again mistaken when he fails to distinguish the *encomendero* from the governing Spanish bureaucracy.[18] The *encomendero* was usually united with the missionary against the governor and his bureaucracy. Of course there were some antagonisms, especially in the formative period; trouble often erupted when the missionaries moved into new areas already dominated by *encomenderos* though not yet subject to the Church. There were conflicts between overzealous churchmen and equally zealous settlers. Instances of *encomenderos* grumbling about the power of the missionaries and of churchmen complaining about harassment of their charges are by no means fabrications; but these instances were the exceptions and happened in an environment of general accord.

Ironically, Scholes draws attention to cases of common union between

missionary and *encomendero* and their mutual antagonism toward the royal government. In the strife between Father Isidro Ordonez and Governor Pedro de Paralta, many of the leading citizens opposed the governor's actions. When Peralta's dissatisfaction with the *encomendero*-Indian relationship led him to interfere, it was Father Ordonez who ordered the governor to cease and desist since the Franciscans were generally satisfied with the *encomenderos'* treatment of the Indians.[19] The satisfaction was largely mutual; for when Peralta finally decided to arrest Father Ordonez, the *encomenderos* abandoned the governor.[20] There are countless other examples of Church-*encomendero* cooperation and their joint opposition to the governing bureaucracy. In 1627 and 1628 Fray Alonso de Benavides received testimony from a group of *encomenderos* charging the governor with heresy, blasphemy, and immorality. Francisco de la Mora Ceballos, governor from 1632 to 1635, also earned the ill-will of both clerical and lay factions, and many of the prominent citizens testified against him.[21]

Governor Luis de Rosas appears on paper to have had a great following and the support of the *cabildo,* but the image is somewhat weakened when one realizes that Rosas controlled the elections that filled the local offices.[22] Of the few *encomenderos* who actually supported him, most held their position only because Rosas had redistributed certain *encomiendas* as spoils.[23] To prove the point, when Rosas left office the *cabildo* elections were held again, and the pro-Rosas nature of the *cabildo* disappeared.[24] By the end of Rosas's term, 73 out of 120 soldiers actively supported the clergy.[25] Rosas was eventually killed with the aid of some highly placed New Mexican citizens; also, and as final proof of cooperation, after the *cabildo* took over control of the government functions, Church-state relations became remarkably smooth.[26]

Furthermore, the governor lacked any real base of power. Whereas the missionary and *encomendero* had the Indian and each other, the governor's power resided in his ability to form usually fragile alliances with disaffected members of the community, to dispense a few fee-paying bureaucratic positions, and to distribute a limited number of *encomiendas.* This diplomacy and patronage, and his prestige as a representative of Mexico City, were the derivations of such power as the governor could muster until 1659 when the power of his office began to increase.

The limited power of the governor brings into question Scholes's interpretation of the governor as an unbridled tyrant. Indeed, even though the missionaries and settlers might bave serious differences, they could always rally around one cause: limiting the power of the governor. It is therefore difficult to envisage the plunder ascribed to him by Scholes, who seems a long way from proving his point here. True, the governors were generally profit-oriented; but this merely confirms the nature of Spanish bureaucracy and is hardly a reflection of character. Moreover, in this connection, it should be borue in mind that, in that early period, rarely could economic activities be effectively converted into political power. Missionary and settler each maintained his political and economic prerogatives within the bounds of his own accommodation.

The reason the governors of early New Mexico are interpreted in such negative light is that the documents are strongly biased against them. The explanation should hardly be regarded as strange since the Franciscans' power depended on their ability to neutralize that of the governor, and their most effective way of undermining his power was to produce reams of complaints and attacks. The effects of their *modus operandi* many students of Spanish borderlands tend to underestimate, and Scholes is conspicuously ambivalent in this respect. For instance, he could generalize about the evil character of all governors, yet at the same time he admitted that Governor Peralta (1610–14) was abused by the friars led by Father Ordonez, and he had little criticism of Goveruor Bernardino de Ceballos, who left office in 1618. Although Governor Juan de Eulate (1618–26) is heavily attacked in *Church and State in New Mexico 1610–1650,* Scholes himself apologizes for the biased nature of his sources. And between 1626 and 1632, Scholes acknowledges there was relative peace.[27]

Even with respect to Governor Francisco de la Mora Ceballos (1632–35), who gave every indication in the literature of being a corrupt tyrant, the documents reveal a pair of noteworthy considerations: (1) his chief accuser was Friar Esteban de Perea, whose antagonism toward all governors was well established; and (2) when Mora returned to Mexico City "he was able to present an adequate justification of his record to the authorities in Mexico City, for he was later appointed commander of the garrison and alcalde mayor of Acapulco."[28] The point here is that it is unrealistic to generalize about the character of the governors since it is impossible to substantiate or refute most of the charges made with the documentation available. What is certain is that the governor often infuriated the clergy, and as a consequence the clergy often exercised all the coercive power at their command to destroy the governors who crossed them. But much is heard about the opposition of the settler group for the obvious reason that they were less prone to fight battles with pen and paper. The absence of documentation cannot justify the conclusion that the settlers supported the governors, as some historians have emphasized. In any event, the existence of a war of words is not conducive to nonbiased documentation.

The independent farmers did not constitute an influential political group during this early period. As the population of New Mexico grew, however, this class of inhabitants gained in relative numbers since the population of other factions was essentially fixed. As shall be pointed out later, the

independent farmer was to add a new dimension to New Mexican politics: he furnished a power base for the governors of the later period, and he also complicated relations with the Indian population. With practically no stake in the missionary-*encomendero*-Indian relationship, the farmers contributed to the breakdown of the peace which had been maintained for half a century.

The fact remains that despite occasional small uprisings on the part of the Indians, remarkably stable European-Indian relations prevailed. Such stability was not the product of repression; on the contrary, Spanish-Indian relations grew out of mutual needs. In return for their labor and their souls, the Indians benefited from Spanish military experience, organizational ability, and technology. Much of the aboriginal culture continued — some of it openly, some of it through syncretism, and in still other instances, hidden from view.

Protection against Athapascan raids was an important service performed by the Spaniards. While there is some controversy about the nature of pre-European Athapascan-Pueblo relations,[29] it is known that after the arrival of the European these relations were seriously disrupted. Not only did the Spaniards obtrude themselves between the two Indian groups, they also introduced to the Athapascans the horse as well as a taste for beef. As relations between the two groups worsened, both the striking power of the Athapascan and his perceived need for beef increased. Athapascans began to be seen in a new light even as some of the old trading patterns continued. As Frank Reeve points out, the Apache found it harder and harder to distinguish his Pueblo neighbor from the Spaniard.[30] The Spaniards had early contributed to the deepening gulf between Athapascan and Pueblo; the first governor, Pedro de Peralta, went to New Mexico with orders to keep the Pueblos separated from the surrounding heathens.[31]

As Athapascan raids into Pueblo territory increased, the primary incentive became plunder. Yet Reeve argues that the raids were less economic than political, drawing attention to the number of Pueblo refugees to be found among the Athapascans.[32] The evidence, however, largely substantiates the economic motivation since the Athapascans' raids often meant to them the difference between life and death. As the old trade patterns broke down and the Franciscans gained tighter control over food distribution, Athapascans found friendly barter inadequate. When drought swept New Mexico, conditions became intolerable for all peoples, the bartering relation ended altogether, and the raids became more frequent. Evidence of the latter can be found not only in the dry year of 1641 but also during the disastrous period beginning in 1660.[33] The raids were not without success, as the sources treating 1641 make plain: that year the Pueblos lost 20,000 *fanegas* of maize.[34] The abundance of maize in Pueblo territory must have always been tempting to the Athapascans; but with the coming of the Franciscans, the storing of it became more and more concentrated as well as tempting.

Apart from the drought, the Athapascans' normal channels of trade began to be obstructed in more effective ways, especially after 1660.[35] As events progressed, the Pueblo Indian came to rely on the organizing talent of the European. The Indian was impressed, of course, by the efficiency with which this talent expressed itself in weaponry and military strategy. Since the Spaniards controlled defense, the Pueblos depended upon them for protection not only against the plundering Athapascans but from each other as well.

The Spanish talent for organization expressed itself in other ways. It brought a degree of prosperity to the Pueblo Indians. Spanish crops supplemented those cultivated by the Indian, and more importantly, new methods of storing food through the winter greatly aided in preventing starvation in the harsh New Mexican climate. It is well known that after the poor harvest of the late 1660s, the missionaries saved many Indians from starvation.[36]

Needless to say, the Spaniard's ability to organize gave him military advantage vis-à-vis the Pueblo. Spanish unity was maintained while the interpueblo animosity was fostered. The entire pre-1670 period abounds with instances of the governor of one pueblo informing on conspirators in others. For example, Indian revolts in 1645 and 1650 were put down as a result of information supplied by other Indians. As long as the Spaniards could obtain such intelligence and punish the offenders with little worry about a response from other pueblos, their military superiority was assured.

Thus, along with compromise, toleration, and a few real benefits, fear of military reprisal did much to keep the peace among the Pueblo Indians. As Fray Alonso de Benavides wrote:

> Though few and ill-equipped, God has assured that the Spaniard always come out victorious and has instilled in the Indian such a fear of the Spanish and their arquebuses that if he hears that a Spaniard is coming to his pueblo he flees.[37]

This fear was certainly instrumental in inducing the Indians to submit not only to the missionary fathers but also, at times, to abusive Europeans. Such military superiority could be maintained only as long as the environment of the Pueblo Indian was tolerable enough to allow interpueblo animosity to take precedence over anti-Spanish feeling.

Such a state of affairs significantly altered New Mexican politics from what could have been expected had Santa Fe been closer to the seats of

power. Military might had its limitations in so remote an area, and the policies of a generally intolerant Europe had to be compromised by the realities of the frontier. It must be remembered that most of the relationships between non-Indian groups were primarily shaped by the need to stabilize relations with the Indians. Hence, quite contrary to what might be expected from seventeenth-century Europeans, there developed in New Mexico a degree of tolerance and many mutually advantageous accommodations — all of which was first of all imperative for the survival of the European colony, and incidentally afforded to the Pueblo Indians, at least temporarily, a feeling of security, well-being, and peace. While holding no promise as a panacea for the problems of either race, it proved to be a fairly stable arrangement for a colonial frontier society since it lasted for nearly three-quarters of a century.

But in the 1670s the Spanish-Indian relationship fell apart, and the reason for its disintegration was that the Indian ceased to be a willing partner. His resistance grew and culminated in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. With the Indian now withdrawn from the social, economic, and political life within the province, the Europeans were compelled to adjust to the reality of a drastically changed situation.

Just why the Revolt occurred is the subject of much speculation. Scholes, leading one school of interpretation, saw the Revolt as the outcome of the church-state strife. He believed that the Indians became so demoralized by the irresponsible actions of the Hispanic settlers and their interminable feuding that the Pueblos decided to take matters into their own hands. John Francis Bannon is clearly a contemporary proponent of this school.[38] On the other hand, Charles Wilson Hackett saw the Revolt as the inevitable consequence of the century-long struggle of the Spaniards to suppress the religious beliefs, habits, and customs of the Pueblo. According to Hackett, the aggressive proselytism generated frictions which finally exploded in 1680.[39] Jack Forbes saw the Revolt as a result of not only long-term religious persecution but also racial and economic abuses. All three factors impelled the Indians to plot and overthrow the imperialist.[40]

Interpretations premised on a continuum of abuses have one basic fault: they assume that some sort of dialectic was operating — which clearly was not always the case in New Mexico. These widely accepted analyses of the outbreak derive mainly from a general misunderstanding of seventeenth-century New Mexican history and, in particular, of the documentary evidence concerning the Pueblo Revolt itself. For instance, fear and misinformation, growing out of faulty intelligence, induced the Spaniards to point to the religious character of the rebellion. As a result, modern historians have emphasized this facet far out of proportion to its actual relevance.[41]

Even more fundamentally, however, most of the interpretations are the products of a serious misunderstanding of the nature of human relations in

seventeenth-century New Mexico. The causes and the natnre of the Revolt grew out of these relations, which had themselves by that time grown both complex and precarious. What indeed happened was that the whole system of interaction weakened during the 1670s, and the progression of events culminated in the final break of 1680. The Spaniards had begun to fail in their part of the system; put simply, collaboration ceased to be profitable for the Pueblo Indian.

The chief impetus arose out of the problems created by the prolonged drought of the late 1660s and the great famines that followed it in the 1670s. The kind of peace that had been pervading New Mexico was contingent upon relative prosperity. Spanish improvements in food production, storage, and distribution had helped to create the surpluses needed to snpport the colony. The famine of 1670, however, was so severe that it set in motion the process which led to the complete collapse of the system.

As already noted, the missionaries did supply food to the Indians in the latter part of the 1660s; but the drought persisted, and the suffering it caused cannot be overstated. As Fray Francisco de Ayeta later wrote to the King:

> In the year 1670 there was great famine in these provinces which compelled the Spanish inhabitants and Indians alike to eat hides and straps of the carts. . . . There followed in the next year a great pestilence which carried off many people and cattle. . . .[42]

As it became apparent that the Spaniards could no longer ward off the natural disasters of drought and famine, the foreign settlers' control over the stores of food which still remained must have become conspicuously oppressive to the indigenous peoples.

Another effect of the famine of 1670 was the intensification of Athapascan raids. The drought undonbtedly forced the now mobile Athapascan from the mountains in search of sustenance. As Ayeta also wrote to the King:

> Apaches who were then at peace rebelled and rose up, and the said province was totally sacked and robbed by their attacks and outraged. . . . It is common knowledge that from the year 1672 until your excellency adopted measures for aiding the kingdom six pueblos were depopulated.[43]

Unrest mounted and Spanish soldiers began to suffer severe setbacks as their arms proved ineffective against the Athapascan onslaught.

Not only were the Athapascans humbling Spanish power, but the Pueblo Indians were contributing to its humiliation as well. In 1675, for instance, when Juan Trevino was governor, a group of Indians was arrested on

charges of bewitching the Padre Andres Duran. Four who admitted to the witchcraft were hanged; the others were sentenced to be lashed or imprisoned. As the prisoners were awaiting the implementation of justice, a telling event occurred. A group of Indian warriors entered the governor's house with the dual purpose of killing Trevino and rescuing the condemned Indians. To save his own life, the governor freed the prisoners,[44] and the Spanish military proved itself incapable of any sort of quick response to their fury. The mere loss of prestige itself had a devastating effect upon the now alarmingly outnumbered Spaniards, for the Indians were no longer to be intimidated as they had been since early in the century.

Also relevant here is the cause of the daring incident of 1675. Strong reaction against Indian ways had been developing among segments of the Hispanic community. In the 1660s, for instance, Governor Lopez de Mendizabal was forced to resist efforts on the part of the Church and some settlers to crack down on Pueblo religious and cultural activity.[45] It was the growth of such nativism that had led to the Trevino episode.

The reason for the movement toward nativism is open to speculation, but the growing number of mestizos may have had something to do with it. It could well have been that Indian culture was spreading through the population of mixed-bloods and thus receiving too much attention in the European colony. While syncretism was tolerated from the Indian community, when it began to show signs of diffusion throughout the Spanish colony, some sort of reaction was to be expected. If such were in fact the case, one could predict that the mestizo would play a confused role in the Revolt; and so he did, for during and after the rebellion mixed-bloods could be found fighting on both sides — hence against each other.

The tensions of the 1670s caused Spanish hostility to surface more flagrantly. As the Europeans' condonation of syncretism began to fade, the very foundation for Indian tolerance of Spanish rule began to disappear too.[46] The reactionary attitude of their Spanish rulers became at once a threat to the fundamental nature of Indian culture and a source of frustration to mestizos who had found identification in both worlds. A counter nativistic movement was indeed a more than likely response.

Certainly there was no lack of leadership for such a movement. Benavides quoted a shaman as once having screamed:

> You Spaniards and Christians, how crazy you are! And you live like crazy folks! You want to teach us to be crazy also. . . . You Christians are so crazy that you go all together flogging yourselves like crazy people in the streets, shedding your blood. And thus you wish that the Pueblo be also crazy.[47]

Pueblos of this mind were probably active in many of the earlier aborted revolts, such as that of 1645 which resulted in the execution of forty Indians,

or the one in 1659 in which nine Indians were executed and many enslaved.[48] Yet those earlier revolts were sporadic and involved little interpueblo cooperation.

But the fact that this caliber of leadership had not been at all uncommon theretofore among the Pueblos raises a question as to how strategic was the contribution of the famous Popé in fomenting the final Revolt of 1680. Although in the documents he is consistently referred to as its prime instigator, there is little evidence marking Popé as a unique Indian leader beyond the fact that the Revolt of 1680 was a success. He was a shaman and had been arrested in 1675 for that very reason. The 1670s had simply presented that set of conditions in which this kind of leadership could be effectual. Together, the disappearance of the positive attitudes and elements of Spanish rule and the growth of Spanish nativism understandably encouraged both disaffection and nativism among the Indians themselves. Much of the misinterpretation of the Revolt of 1680 can be attributed to an overemphasis on the contribution of this one man and singling out his conspiracy as the cause of the Revolt.[49]

Actually, the one-time collaborators had now become resistors and for crucial reasons. When Popé issued his call to arms, he was merely echoing the feeling of most of the people. The harsh conditions of existence of the 1670s together with the Spaniards' move toward nativism, demonstrated by their developing religious and cultural intolerance, made it plain that Indian culture, well-being, and even survival were in jeopardy. Somewhat ironically, the program which Popé offered to his people was in many ways similar to that offered them by the Spaniards in the past. The revival of Indian culture which he championed was mostly symbolic in nature and a reaction to those facets of the Spanish culture which either had failed or were most threatening the cultural existence of the Pueblo.

Paradoxically, it was acculturation which had in the long run made the Revolt of 1680 possible. In the years of contact with the European, the Indian's technological disadvantage in warfare had been appreciably narrowed. The *cabildo* of Santa Fe described the Indians of this time as "good horsemen and as experienced as any Spaniard in the use of firearms, [and] well acquainted with the entire territory of New Mexico."[50]

Even apart from religious conflict, the Church was the focal point of Spanish-Indian contact and consequently received the brunt of the Revolt. The relationship between the Church and the Revolt has been another source of misinterpretation. In examining this problem two questions must be asked: (1) what aspects of church life were rejected by the Indians? and (2) did their rejections represent a drive for religious freedom, or were they a thrust against a secular force?

Superficially the Revolt appears to have been an outright repudiation of Roman Catholicism. Twenty-one fathers out of thirty-two were killed, and

the missions, when not destroyed, were defiled. Popé traveled from pueblo to pueblo demanding that his people burn the images, temples, rosaries, and crosses. He told them to forsake the names given them in holy baptism and advised the men to leave the women given them in holy matrimony. They were forbidden to mention the name of God, of the Blessed Virgin, and names of the saints or the Blessed Sacrament. He further ordered them to wash themselves with amole root in order to free themselves from the condition of holy baptism.[51]

On closer examination, however, one can see that Popé used syncretism to his own advantage in much the same way as the Spaniards had been doing since the beginning of the century. By 1680 many European concepts had been adapted to Pueblo world views, and Popé was utilizing these syncretic expressions along with the concepts of pre-European origin. For instance, he claimed to have contact with three gods, aud one of them, "father of all Indians, who had been so since the flood," had ordered him to tell the Indians to rebel.[52] Popé also claimed direct contact with the devil who he now argued was much stronger than the Christian God.[53] Both claims were said to have instilled deep fear in the natives. The conclusion is inescapable: instead of repudiating Christian concepts and legend, Popé often tailored them to fit the uew ueed. In this way, syncretism became a cornerstone of the revolution.

The Indians' fear of military reprisals, something the Spanish could no longer count on, became another element of Popé's strategy. He exploited it in order to develop the necessary adherence to the conspiracy and to insure secrecy as well as cohesiveness. It was common knowledge among the Indians that Popé had murdered his son-in-law in the belief that bis own daughter's husband was a security leak.[54] Popé also let it be known that those pueblos which refused to join in the Revolt would be destroyed and all their inhabitants with them.[55]

But while fear was a real factor in effecting compliance, Popé's leadership made a positive appeal to the native population and won their loyalty largely because the time was ripe. When captive Indians were interrogated by Otermin in 1681, they reaffirmed their determination to fight the Spaniards to the death if necessary in order to preserve their way of life.[56]

One of the positive elements in Popé's movement was his promise to end the incursions of the Athapascans. This objective, to be accomplished through a series of Pueblo-Athapascan alliances,[57] was a crucial one for the relatively sedentary people whose immobility dangerously exposed them to attack. While these alliances did not eliminate the Pueblos' vulnerability altogether, the small number of complaints registered in Otermín's inquest of 1681 amply demonstrates that the situation had vastly improved over what it had been under Spanish rule.

The great famines of the 1670s, as noted earlier, were a critical factor in generating a mood of rebellion among the Indian population. Although Popé failed to solve the problem, he unified and encouraged his people and incited them to action by means of grandiose promises of future prosperity. He pledged that,

> by living under the laws of their ancients, they would raise a great quantity of corn and beans, large bolls of cotton, pumpkins and watermelons of great size and musk melons, and that their houses would be filled and they would have good health and plenty of rest.[58]

Thus Popé became to his own people an acceptable alternative to the Spaniards. Not only did he promise to restore to them all that they had had prior to 1670, he also offered them an opportunity to preserve their cultural identity, the survival of which Spanish reactionary policies were then threateniug. As such an alteruative, however, he would be subjected to the same forces as the goveruors of New Mexico had been. Another famine hit the area, and the recultivated Athapascan friendship vanished.[59] Popé's cultural program eveutually got out of hand when he went so far as to prohibit the planting of all seeds save the traditional ones, corn and beans.[60] The original leader of the Revolt of 1680 soon fell from power. Popé, however, was not the revolution, for it persevered under new leadership. The movement was neither the expression of nor dependent on one sagacious Indian; rather, it was the consequence of the collapse of a long series of delicately balanced human relationships between foreign settlers and indigenous peoples. Popé was there to personify aboriginal frustration and antagonism.

Since the very existence of the province throughout its entire history depended upon Spanish-Indian relations, when these were disrupted, the fabric of Spanish society convulsed. Realignments of its several factions followed; in addition, there were signs of a class struggle with many mestizos and mulattoes aligning with the Indians against the Europeans and those aboriginal collaborators who had remained loyal. With total disruption of the balances that had enabled the Spaniards to rule, and with the Indians approaching technological equality in warfare, revolution had become almost inevitable.

The plan for the Revolt was tactically superb. Secrecy had been strictly maintained, and the plans had been quietly distributed among the leaders of all the pueblos — excepting that of the Piros who were not to be trusted. Knotted cords were left with each of the leaders; when the pueblos had agreed to the plans for a revolt on August 13, 1680, their leaders began untying the knots. Once the Revolt was started, the goal was complete annihilation of the foreigners. The Indians planned to regroup after the fall of

Santa Fe and proceed south to ambush the fleeing survivors.[61] Although not all the plans of the Pueblos came to fruition, the Revolt was well executed.

The situation in colonial New Mexico had been precarious for some time. In the years preceding the Revolt, conditions had worsened to the degree that Fray Ayeta had been ordered south to garner aid from the viceregal officials. He left Mexico City on February 27, 1677, with fifty convict soldiers and arrived at Santa Fe nine months later with 44,[62] six of the men having deserted en route; the rest, excepting three volunteers, would likely have fled had they not been chained to their saddles. Ayeta reported to the King on May 10, 1679, that as a result of the action taken, "the nascent spark did not become a conflagration to burn and lay waste these provinces,"[63] but that the situation was extremely insecure, and he asked the King for more men and a presidio for Santa Fe.[64]

The population figures alone are revealing. J. Manuel Espinosa estimates the entire Spanish population of New Mexico at the time as being not more than 2,800 with the Christianized Pueblo Indians numbering 35,000.[65] The Indian population is a matter of conjecture, however, and Espinosa's judgment seems to be exaggerated. Ayeta, basing his figures on church records, placed the number of Christianized Pueblo Indians at about 16,000.[66] An estimate from the *cabildo* of Santa Fe put the number at 17,000,[67] and since the *cabildo* was trying at this time to emphasize the strength of the revolutionary Indians, it would be unlikely that it would underestimate their number. Hence a figure between 16,000 and 17,000 would seem reasonable. Ayeta believed that 6,000 of these were capable of bearing arms. It is significant that Ayeta was counting the Pueblo Indians as part of the Spanish forces, and while stressing the scarcity of Spanish fighting men,[68] it would have been out of order for Ayeta to overestimate the size of the Indian forces. These figures do not include the heathen Athapascans, who were temporarily aiding the Pueblo Indians during the insurrection and increasing their numbers markedly.

Ayeta concluded that the number of Spaniards who could bear arms was approximately 170, including the 44 he had brought up from Mexico City,[69] and added that not more than 20 Spaniards could be assembled at one time or place. At this time there were 32 missionaries among the pueblos, 21 of whom were later to be killed outright.[70] After the Revolt, the viceroy reported to the King that of the Spaniards, 380 had been killed, "not sparing the defenseless, of the women and children."[71] The *cabildo* reported the same figure, adding that among those lost were 73 men capable of carrying arms. Using Ayeta's and the *cabildo*'s numbers, about 100 men were left who were capable of bearing arms,[72] an estimate that is close to Governor Otermín's muster after the Revolt.[73] Excluding the Apache allies, the ratio

of revolting Indian warriors to fighting Spaniards was 60:1. Indians were no longer the acquiescent and defenseless souls of Benavides' day; now they were natives who had reached a high degree of acculturation in their three-quarters of a century of contact with the Spaniards.

The exact date on which the Revolt started is uncertain. According to a letter from Fray Ayeta to Otermín, it was August 10, 1680.[74] There is much evidence, however, that although it was scheduled for Augnst 13, the Revolt began on Augnst 9, the date fixed by the *cabildo* of Santa Fe in a letter to the governor[75] and based on reports from the Spaniards, Fray Juan Bernal, Fray Fernando de Valasco, and Captain Mario de Dehenzas.[76] On the same day, the governors of Tanos and Pecos issued a warning of impending revolt,[77] and these warnings were justified by intelligence gained from two captured Indian conspirators. On the next day reports of death in the hinterland began to filter into the villa, one of which came from a Pedro Hidalgo who reported the death of one Cristobal de Herrera on the previous day.[78] Some hostilities apparently did break out on August 9.

Although Otermín at first failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation, he was quick to admit his blunder and then lost no time in establishing a defense around Santa Fe. He organized this defense none too soon, for the Revolt quickly made its way to the doors of Santa Fe.[79] After a siege, described as having lasted either seven or nine days, the settlers petitioned the governor for an immediate retreat, and he agreed.[80] By this time there was hardly an alternative, for much of the villa had already been burned and the water supply cut off. With over a thousand persons huddled in the buildings still standing, the Spanish position was hopeless.[81] Provisions were so low that, as Otermín was later to write of the evacuation,

> I trusted divine providence, for I left without a crust of bread or grain of wheat or maize, and with no other provision for the convoy of so many people except four hundred animals and two carts belonging to private persons, and for food, a few sheep, goats, and cows.[82]

The plan called for supplying at Isleta, but this was impossible since Isleta had been abandoned before the refugees reached it. Over a month passed before the refugees obtained provisions other than those gleaned from the land or bought or stolen from the Indians.

While Governor Otermín and the other refugees were fighting for their survival as they continued south, the atmosphere in the El Paso district had become one of great confusion and wild speculation. Reports of revolt had been seeping in, and the belief was that all whites north of Isleta had been slaughtered, yet nothing was certain.[83] Although in late Augnst aid had

been sent north to the settlers who had abandoned Isleta, it was not until September 4 that it was learned that the Governor was still alive and leading the refugees south.[84]

Otermín soon united the Isleta and Santa Fe refugees into one settlement. But conditions were so miserable that despite even the use of force to hold the people together, desertion from the new settlement became a major problem. When the Governor concluded count on February 8, 1681, he still had 1,946 under his command. Of these only 150 could bear arms, and he counted only 171 horses and mules. The scarcity of fighting men, low state of his supplies, and the advice of his officers led Otermín to delay the reconquest.[85] At this moment, Spanish New Mexico was at the crossroads of its history.

Notes

1. The main thrust of my research has been in the period following the Puehlo Revolt of 1680, my interest being the economic, social, and political changes that occurred in El Paso as a result of the dislocations caused by the Revolt. (See an article to be published in the *Journal of the West,* "The Dynamics of Change: New Mexico 1680 to 1690.") The analysis of the data I collected clearly pointed to relationships that had not been described by experts on the period before the Pueblo Revolt. A desire to understand the inconsistency led me to examine the literature a little more closely and critically, and I found certain mistakes of evidence and logic that, unless they are understood, confuse the rest of New Mexican history. In this reexamination I never had any intention of re-researcbing or rewriting pre–Pueblo Revolt New Mexican history. I only intended to propose a plausible alternative which would be compatible with what I knew to be the case in the period following the Revolt.

2. France V. Scholes, *Church and State in New Mexico 1610–1650* (Albuquerque, 1937), p. 192.

3. France V. Scholes, *Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659–1670* (Albuquerque, 1942), p. 29.

4. Scholes, *Church and State,* p. 15.

5. Scholes, *Troublous Times,* pp. 7–8.

6. Ibid., p. 255.

7. Ibid., p. 116.

8. Scholes, *Church and State,* p. 195.

9. Since Scholes wrote a number of articles before publishing these two books, most of the same ideas are found in the articles which include "Church and State in New Mexico, 1610–1650," *New Mexico Historical Review,* XI (Jan., Apr., July, Oct., 1936), 12 (Jan., 1937); "Problems in the Early Ecclesiastical History of New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review,* 7 (Jan., 1932); "The First Decade of the Inquisition in New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review,* 10 (July, 1935); "Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659–1670," *New Mexico Historical Review,* 12 (Apr., Oct., 1937), 13 (Jan., 1938), 15 (July, Oct., 1940), 16 (Jan., Apr., July, 1941); "Civil Government and Society in New Mexico in the 17th Ceutury," *New Mexico Historical Review,* 10 (Jan., 1935); "The Supply Service of the New Mexico Missions," *New Mexico Historical Review,* 5 (Jan., Apr., Oct., 1930).

10. Jack D. Forbes, *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard* (Oklahoma, 1960), p. 177.

11. Ibid., pp. 185–86.

12. Scholes, *Church and State,* p. 16.

13. Forbes, *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard,* p. 112.

14. Scholes, *Church and State,* p. 13.

15. Fray Alonso de Benavides, *The Memorial of Fray Alonso de Benevides,* 1630, trans. by Mrs. Edward E. Ayer (Alhuquerque, 1965), p. 15. I have improved the translation. The Mansos were an Athapascan speaking people located in the general El Paso area.

16. Herbert E. Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish American Colonies," *American Historical Review,* 23 (Oct., 1917), 61.

17. Scholes, *Church and State,* p. 89.

18. Ibid. Scholes's concept of history seems flexible, since he can and does differentiate at times.

19. Ibid., p. 140. Contrary to the general picture painted by Scholes, it was Peralta who complained about the *encomenderos'* relationship with the Indian. Scholes incorrectly tries to argue that Ordonez was the one who opposed the *encomenderos'* treatment of the Indians but tricked Peralta into bringing the cases against the settlers. Certainly there was conflict between Ordonez and the settlers, but the extent of it is impossible to assess. The fact remains that when facing the governor, Ordonez was backed by the settlers.

20. Ibid., pp. 32, 43, 71, 78, 81. In a weak attempt to substantiate the split between settler and missionary, Scholes gives the example of Alferez Juan Escarrmad who was attacked hy the Church. Such an example, however, confuses the issue for Escarrmad was one of the few settlers who actually supported Peralta (p. 43). Scholes uses misleading examples throughout his book. He cites citizens who allegedly supported the Governor, extracting their names from caustic documents written by the missionaries who were at the time attacking many prominent people. These acidic remarks grew out of a temporary dispute over collection of trihute that ended in 1621 (p. 78). As a matter of fact, the governor had to issue orders forcing the citizens to stop aiding the missionaries (p. 71). Actually, Scholes fails to provide mucb evidence to support his contentions that the settlers were at loggerheads with the Church and that they mercilessly exploited the Indian (p. 89).

21. See ibid., pp. 103, 104, 111–12, for examples.

22. Ibid., p. 154.

23. Ibid., p. 150.

24. Ibid., p. 154. Scholes's interpretation is that the anti-Rosas faction was gaining control; actually, it appears that the settler representation was simply returning to normal.

25. Ibid., p. 165, n.

26. Ibid., pp. 155, 174–75.

27. Ibid., pp. 103–04.

28. Ibid., p. 106.

29. Forbes argues convincingly that Athapascan-Pueblo relations were friendly before the arrival of the Spaniards. Unfortunately, he fails to argue convincingly that the amicable relations continued after the Europeans' arrival.

30. Frank Reeve, "Seventeenth Century Navaho-Spanish Relations," *New Mexico Historical Review,* 31 (Jan., 1957), 42.

31. Forbes, *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard,* pp. 111–12.

32. Reeve argues that the pueblos were heavily fortified, poorly provisioned, and

willing to trade, and if supplies were desired the Athapascans could easily have traded for them.

33. Scholes, *Troublous Times,* p. 253, and *Church and State,* p. 142. Scholes cites these examples, though, he sees the Apache raids not as a search for food but as a military move which takes advantage of Pueblo and Spanish disarray and misery.

34. Scholes, *Church and State,* p. 142, countering the argument that the Pueblos were so poor that raids would not have been profitable.

35. Reeve, "Seventeenth Century Navaho-Spanish Relations," p. 48.

36. Letter from Fray Francisco de Ayeta to the King, May 10, 1679, in Charles Wilson Hackett, *Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya and Approaches Thereto to 1773,* 3 vols. (Washington, 1937), 3:298–302 (cited hereafter as Hackett, *Documents*).

37. Benavides, *Memorial,* pp. 56–57.

38. John Francis Bannon, *The Spanish Borderlands Frontier 1513–1821* (New York, 1970), p. 80.

39. Charles Wilson Hackett, ed., *Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Otermín's Attempted Reconquest, 1680–1682* (Albuquerque, 1942), 1:xxii–xxiii.

40. Forbes, *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard,* p. 177.

41. Ibid.

42. Letter from Fray Francisco de Ayeta to the King, May 10, 1679, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:302.

43. Ibid., pp. 298–302.

44. Declarations of Luis de Quintana, Diego Lopez Sambrano, and Fray Francisco de Ayeta, Dec. 22–23, 1681, in Hackett, *Revolt,* II, 289, 300, 309.

45. Scholes, *Troublous Times,* pp. 61, 98.

46. Spanish reaction often took the form of abuse. Much Indian resentment was leveled at Secretary Francisco Xavier, *Maestre de Campo* Alonso Garcia, and *Sargentos Mayores* Don Luis de Quintana and Diego Lopez, all of whom were accused of administering beatings, subjecting the Indians to forced labor and taking their belongings. From the interrogation of an Indian, Jose, on Dec. 19, 1681, by Otermín, and from his interrogation of two other Indians, Juan Lorenzo and Francisco Lorenzo, Dec. 20, 1681, in Ralph E. Twitchell, *The Spanish Archives of New Mexico* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1914), 2:57 and 66, respectively (cited hereafter as Twitchell, *Archives*).

47. Benavides, *Memorial,* pp. 20–21.

48. Interview with Diego Lopez Sambrano, Dec. 22, 1681, in Hackett, *Revolt,* 2:298–299.

49. Fray Angelico Chavez' work, "Pohé-yemo's Representative and the Pueblo Revolt of 1680," *New Mexico Historical Review,* 42 (Jan., 1967), carries this idea to the extreme by concluding that the Indians were incited to revolt by a black man.

50. Letter from the *cabildo* of Santa Fe to Otermín, Oct. 3, 1680, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:53.

51. Letter written by the *cabildo* of Santa Fe, Oct. 3, 1680, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:49; a list of the 21 missionaries is found in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:336–39.

52. Interviews with various Indians in ibid., pp. 52, 64.

53. Interrogation of Diego Lopez Sambrano, in Hackett, *Revolt,* 2:295.

54. Interrogation of an Indian, Juan, Dec. 28, 1681, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:52–53.

55. Ibid., p. 53.

56. Auto by Otermín, Aug. 9, 1680, in Hackett, *Revolt,* 1:5; taken from an interview with an Indian, Aug, 25, 1680, by Otermín, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:18.

57. Various interrogations of Indians in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:57–67.

58. Auto of Otermín, Sept. 8, 1680, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:335.

59. Interrogation of an Indian, Lucas, by Otermin, Dec. 18, 1681, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:64.

60. Ralph E. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexico History* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1911), p. 369.

61. Interrogation of an Indian, Juan, by Otermín, Dec. 28, 1681, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:53.

62. Interrogation of an Indian, Antonio, by Otermín, Aug. 23, 1680, in ihid., p. 14.

63. Letter from Fray Francisco de Ayeta to the King, May 10, 1679, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:298.

64. Ibid., p. 299.

65. Letter from Francisco de Montago, Feh. 27, 1677, attesting to the fact that 47 convicts and 3 volunteers went with Fray Ayeta, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:316.

66. J. Manuel Espinosa, *Crusaders of the Rio Grande* (Chicago, 1942), pp. 16, 19.

67. Letter from Fray Francisco de Ayeta to the King, May 10, 1679, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:298–99.

68. Letter written by the *cabildo* of Santa Fe, Oct. 3, 1680, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:46.

69. Letter from Fray Francisco de Ayeta to the King, May 10, 1679, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:298–99.

70. Ibid.

71. Report of the viceroy to the King, Feb. 28, 1681, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:339.

72. Letter written by the *cabildo* of Santa Fe, Oct. 3, 1680, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:44.

73. Petition by the *cabildo* of Santa Fe to Otermín, Sept. 1680, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:39; the muster held hy Otermín, Feb. 8, 1681, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:342.

74. Letter from Otermín to Fray Francisco de Ayeta, Sept. 8, 1680, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:336.

75. Letter written by the *cabildo* of Santa Fe, Oct. 3, 1680, in Twitchell, *Archives,* 2:43.

76. Auto by Otermín, Aug. 9, 1680, in Hackett, *Revolt,* 1:3.

77. Letter from Otermín to Fray Francisco de Ayeta, Sept. 8, 1680, in Hackett, *Documents,* 2:328.

78. The first Auto of Otermín, Aug. 9, 1680, in Hackett, *Revolt,* I. 7.

79. Second Auto of Otermín, Aug. 9, 1680; judicial process and declaration, Aug. 10, 1680; Declaration of *Maestre de Campo* Francisco Gomez, Aug. 14, 1680; Auto of Otermín, Aug. 13, 1680; letter from Otermín to viceroy, Oct. 20, 1680; all in Hackett, *Revolt,* 1:7–11, 208.

80. From Otermín come two sources of information about the assault on Santa Fe; both contain discrepancies. According to a letter from Otermín to Fray Ayeta, the assault began on Aug. 13 and continued until the retreat to Isleta on the following Monday, Aug. 19, implying a siege of only seven days (Hackett, *Documents,* 3:330–34). According to Autos of Otermín, the attack began on Aug. 15 with the retreat commencing on the 21st, again only a seven-day siege (Hackett, *Revolt,*

1:13–19). Both sources, however, refer to a nine-day siege. It is conceivable that Otermín, when referring to a nine-day assault in the Autos, meant to begin the battle on Aug. 13, the day he ordered the fortification of Santa Fe. This would explain the nine-day Indian offensive. The Autos were a day-by-day account of the events and are bound to be more accurate. The letter to Ayeta, although cited by many authorities, cannot be regarded as accurate on this point; it was written amid great hardship almost a month after the fact, and contained no internal evidence to explain Otermín's mention of a nine-day assault on the villa. This discrepancy should not invalidate the letter as a good source of information.

81. Letter from Otermín to Fray Francisco de Ayeta, Sept. 8, 1680, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:332; Auto of Otermín, Aug. 13–20, 1680, in Hackett, *Revolt,* 1:15.

82. Letter from Otermín to Fray Francisco de Ayeta, Sept. 8, 1680, in Hackett, *Documents,* 3:334.

83. Auto of the *Junta,* Aug. 25, 1680, in Hackett, *Revolt,* 1:32.

84. Letter from *Maestre de Campo* Alonso Garcia to *Maestre de Campo* Leira, Sept. 4, 1680, in Hackett, *Revolt,* 1:54–55.

85. Hackett, *Documents,* 3:342.

4. Did the right leader make the revolt possible?

Angélico Chávez

Pohé-yemo's Representative and the Pueblo Revolt of 1680

Born in New Mexico in 1910, Angélico Chávez entered a Franciscan seminary in 1924, inspired by what he had read about the achievements of Franciscans in the missions of California and New Mexico. He died in 1996 after a long career as a priest in his native New Mexico and as one of his native state's most prolific and revered writers of history, poetry, and fiction.

The strong influences of Chávez's Catholic-Hispanic background seem clear in this article, "Pohé-yemo's Representatives and the Pueblo Revolt of 1680," which appeared in the *New Mexico Historical Review* in 1967. Unlike Bowden and Gutiérrez, who see deep religious differences as a fundamental cause of the Pueblo Revolt, Chávez suggests that tolerant Franciscans gave the Pueblos no cause for revolt. Pueblo leaders claimed religious persecution as a pretext to gain "power and revenge." And those Pueblo leaders, he concludes, were *mestizos* (or *coyotes* as they were also called in New Mexico) rather than pure-blooded Pueblos.

Some of Chávez's analysis seems wrong-headed by today's standards. He confuses race with culture and attributes inherent characteristics to entire peoples. To him, Pueblos were a "peaceful people," Apaches were "warlike," and mulattoes like Domingo Naranjo were "more active and restless by nature than the more passive and stolid Indian." Pueblo religion, which he called "mythology," had "no Creation Myth," and Pueblos worshiped no "god," but rather